Situating laughter:  amusement, laughter and humour in everyday life by JAUREGUI, Eduardo S.
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE 
Department of Political and Social Sciences
■Hi
J
L -
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE 
REC E 1 V E D 'I
1 6 FEB, 1938
L I B R A R Y
Situating Laughter:
Amusement. Laughter, and Humour
in Everyday Life
bv
E duardo  S. Jau rcgu i
Thesis submitted for assessment with 
a view to obtaining the Degree of Doctor of the 
European University Institute
Florence, March 1998



European University Institute
3 0001 0036 6878 9
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE
Department of Political and Social Sciences
Situating Laughter: 
Amusement, Laughter, and Humour 
in Everyday Life
LIB 
152. 43 
JflU
by
Eduardo S. Jauregui
Thesis submitted for assessment with
a view to obtaining the Degree of Doctor of the 
European University Institute
Examining Jury:
Prof. Pier Paolo Giglioli (Università di Bologna)
Prof. Steven Lukes (EUI - supervisor)
Prof. Gianfranco Poggi (EUI)
Prof. Greg Smith (University of Salford - co-supervisor)
(h)
Florence, March 1998

Acknowledgements
I would like to express my gratitude to the Spanish Ministerio de Asuntos 
Exteriores for the research grant which has allowed me to pursue this project, and 
to the European University Institute, especially its Department of Social and 
Political Sciences, for providing me with its trust, support, services, and the id^al 
work environment.
I also thank the following people and institutions, without whom this thesis 
would not have been what it is:
Steven Lukes for his encouragement, advice, and counterinstances, and for 
believing in the project throughout; Greg Smith for his detailed, caring, and 
constructive criticism of these many pages, and for giving me the chance to air 
some ideas in public; Gianfranco Bettin, Bernard Giesen, Pier Paolo Giglioli, 
Marina Mizzau, Gianfranco Poggi, Arpad Szakolczai, and Matthieu Williams for 
their support and suggestions; Jason Rutter for providing us humour researchers 
with a cyberspace forum and a vast and ordered bibliography; Eva Breivik for 
much advice, information, and help in the SPS corridor; Ellen Robson, for 
bestowing upon me the computer on which these words were written; the libraries 
from which I so enormously benefited --the British Library in London, the John 
Rylands, Lewis, and University of Salford libraries in Manchester, and the 
Biblioteca Nazionale in Florence; all those who more or less intentionally provided 
me with empirical materia] and thoughts on laughter, including many a researcher 
whose work I ransacked for data and ideas; the Northcott, I.H., and Oña gangs, 
with whom I have had the pleasure of sharing more laughter than humans should 
be allowed; mamá, papá, Pablo, Javi, Elena, Maite, Luna, Boston, los Jaureguis y 
los Narvaez; and Emanuela for helping me to learn, among other things, that a 
thesis is not everything in life, and for living many of those other bits with me.
w w  m ww h W W .‘i f» ^  *,w *" .* "TV"* * ^  " W,MI ijWIUIimmiWHUB^ H Wf
Note on the use of gender-biased pronouns
My treatment of everyday social interaction has required frequent references to 
unspecified or hypothetical social actors. I have employed the masculine terms 'he' 
and 7115' throughout to refer to such individuals, despite the gender bias inherent in 
the convention, because I find the alternatives ("the person", "he/she", “s/he”...) 
awkward and cumbersome when used frequently. Wherever Tie* or Tiis' are used in 
this way, therefore, the reader is asked to understand 'he or she'.
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Situating Laughter:
Amusement, Laughter, and Humour in Everyday Life
In this introductory part o f the thesis,
I introduce the subject and the field  o f study, 
consider a number o f  traditional theoretical approaches, 
propose an appropriate methodology, 
and introduce a lesser-known contender to explanation.
Chapter One
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Chapter One: Preliminaries Section 1
1. Introduction ‘
Certain phenomena seem obstinately hidden from the lenses of scientific tools 
and microscopes. Least visible o f all, perhaps, lurks the man behind the lens; and 
within him, behind his eye, his seeing, thinking, and feeling *1/ In recent times, the 
scientific (and social scientific) endeavour has been shaken by glimpses of self- 
awareness, the deforming retina raised as gross evidence of the uncertain nature of all 
its prized research results. This will not be my purpose.
I turn the mirror on the scientist to have him observe certain features shared 
with other apes of his species, those features furthest removed from what he considers 
the ’serious work* before the test tubes. (And I assume that such things can, after all, 
be profitably studied). In this regard, it could be argued that the true 'furthest reaches' 
of science are not to be found in outer space but bordering the chit-chat between these 
men and women in the lab coats (or in the pin-striped suits, uniforms, aprons, and 
overalls); in the bars, cars, and homes to which they retire after work; among the 
gossip, temper tantrums, joking, and lust which colour their daily experience.
Laughter is something the reader will need little introduction to, as a human 
being. Nevertheless, to the scientist it represents a baffling and objectionable intruder; 
an embarrassing glimpse of himself. The emotions, less rational and less susceptible 
to objective inspection than other aspects of human behaviour, have long been 
shunned by Western science. Modem medicine ignores the person to hunt the 
microbe; economics and other social sciences model humans as rational decision­
makers; psychology builds computerized 'minds' that can play chess but cannot judge 
art.
Humorous amusement, however, holds a particularly accursed place among the 
emotions. Unlike anger, happiness, or fear, it appears to lack a simple, commonsense 
cause or purpose. An infinite miscellany of trivialities may trigger off this often 
explosive and strongly pleasurable bodily reaction, confounding attempts to 
understand its seeming unity at the subjective and physiological levels. Its 
evolutionary significance for our laughing species appears equally mysterious. Its 
association with all things unserious, moreover, relegates laughter to a uniquely
21
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ignominious comer. The phenomenon has remained largely unstudied throughout the 
development of the human and social sciences.
To be sure, laughter has been the subject of consideration by a long and 
honourable list of thinkers, from the Greek philosophers to modem psychologists, 
literary critics, and sociologists. In recent years, empirical research in the nascent field 
of 'humour research' has been growing at a considerable rate. Nevertheless, many of 
the most basic questions remain unanswered, including the most basic question of all:
What does it take for something to be ’funny'?
This thesis will propose a tentative answer, deriving from it a general scheme 
within which to classify the varied research findings of a currently scattered field. It is 
hoped that the proposal will find resonance both among investigators in the humour 
research field, and in all those who hold its mirror up to themselves with curiosity.
22
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Chapter One: Preliminaries Section 2
2. The Thesis
This section will introduce the subject of the dissertation, the aims it seeks to 
pursue in relation to this subject, the scope of the study, the methodology that has 
been employed, the rationale for undertaking such an endeavour, and a preview of the 
work to be presented over nine chapters.
2.1. Subject
Most human beings laugh —smile, smirk, snicker, giggle, chuckle, cackle, 
guffaw— almost every single day of their lives. Sometimes this laughter corresponds 
to some measure of real am usem ent -an  automatic bodily response to a 'funny' 
perception, including a pleasant subjective sensation of 'funniness' or 'hilarity'—, while 
other times the laughter may be relatively 'hollow' —feigned or exaggerated at 
something not truly considered amusing. On the other hand, humorous amusement 
which arises may remain unexpressed, with laughter being actively suppressed where 
it might have been more easily released. As for the things which may be considered 
'funny,' these include spontaneous, unintentional laughables such as harmless blunders 
or deflated pretensions, but also words or actions openly intended to provoke 
amusement, displays of humour.
Amusement, laughter, and humour together conform what I will refer to as the 
laughter triad .1 The phenomena corresponding to this set of closely interrelated terms 
can be briefly summarized as:
(1) the pan-human emotion responsive to 'fimny' or 'comical' objects
(amusement);
(2) its visible and more-or-less faithful expression (laughter); and
(3) the attempt to stimulate amusement (humour).
1 Identifying the entire triad with the label of laughter* is not entirely unjustified. In common speech, the 
word laughter* is often used to denote the expression of genuine amusement, or even a manifestation of 
amusement itself which is not expressed or observable (ie, laughing up one's sleeve*). It is also 
occasionally employed in reference to at least some types of humour -laughing at* as a synonym for 
satirizing or ridiculing— when no actual laughter has been displayed.
23
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These three phenomena will be the subject matter of the present thesis.
2.2. Aims
As hinted in the title, the aim of these pages will be to 'situate' the laughter 
triad, in a number of senses. Firstly and most generally, I will attempt to provide a 
collection of theoretical mappings of an area which has been long traveled but remains 
largely uncharted. The history of what has come to be known as humour research' can 
be traced back at least to classical antiquity, when Plato and Aristotle left their 
musings on comedy and the nature of 'the ridiculous/ The role-call of subsequent 
distinguished pioneers includes Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, 
Herbert Spencer, Henri Bergson, Luigi Pirandello, Sigmund Freud, Arthur Koestler, 
and Umberto Eco. In the present century, many areas have been explored in a more 
empirically-minded fashion, culminating in the last two or three decades with an 
unprecedented volume of research and a number of moves toward the 
institutionalization of an interdisciplinary field.
Nevertheless, a generally accepted understanding of contours, features, and 
relative position of specific points within the field has not yet arisen. Theoretical 
disorientation has persisted throughout the centuries:
Neque hoc ab ullo satis explicari puto, licet multi tentaverint.2
(Quintillian, 1st Century AD)
There is remarkably little acknowledged agreement about the nature of
humour.
(Michael Mulkay, 1988)
2 "None have yet satisfactorily expressed what it [laughter] is, though many have tried." De lns ti tut ¡one 
Oratorio, vi, 3. Cited in Grieg, 1923, p. 227.
24
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Chapter One: Preliminaries Section 2
With this thesis, I seek to ameliorate the situation. On the basis of certain rare 
or misunderstood sketches by early theorists, the elaborate ground plan drawn up for 
the study of the 'interaction order' by Erving Goffman, the reports of numerous 
professional and lay observers, and my own surveys of the area, I have developed a 
preliminary guide which may serve to orient current and future humour theory and 
research. Through the use of this conceptual topology, it is hoped that investigators 
originating in different disciplines or at work in distant areas will obtain a more 
accurate grasp o f their shared interests and relative positions, and perhaps thereby 
develop new channels of communication and the mutual interchange of tools and 
ideas.
From the outset, I admit the tentative and incomplete nature of this theoretical 
map, which is offered only in the hope that subsequent work will fill out gaps, 
elaborate rough approximations, and correct distortions. Assuming only such 
relatively minor adjustments will be necessary, its validity will be supported, and the 
major aim of the thesis fulfilled.
A more literal take on the 'situating' metaphor is also intended. Too often, the 
relevant phenomena in this field have been studied as abstractions, or in sterile 
laboratory environments. There is no doubt that interesting research can be (and has 
been) conducted by analyzing the structure of joke-book gags and by testing the 
reactions of subjects exposed to humour under varying conditions. The ideas and 
results of many such studies will be cited in later chapters. Nevertheless, it seems 
likely that many of the most essential features of amusement, laughter, and humour 
will be missing from this sort of work. Characteristics of the experimental laboratory, 
such as the need for systematic procedure or the subject's awareness of being under 
surveillance, represent the antithesis of the informal, spontaneous, closed-off 
environments where the phenomena in question tend to flourish. Anthony Chapman 
(1983) provides one telling detail (p. 137):
An index as to the artificiality and sterility of much of the humor research to
date is that the majority of researchers do not incorporate any measure of
25
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laughter in their work. One suspects that this is because they know from
experience that many of the persons they are observing will not actually laugh.
Laughter (and its kin) must be observed where they occur, in everyday situations: on 
bus queues, in bars, across the sales counter, in comedy clubs, over the telephone 
lines, and under the bedcovers. These phenomena should be, quite literally, situated — 
placed back into the interactional space which provides their natural home: the face- 
to-face encounter3.
Studies of a more naturalistic slant do exist, of course, including relatively 
unobtrusive experimental observation, participant observation in varied settings, 
diaries recording self-observation, and analyses of accurately transcribed conversation. 
Many'will be cited in the coming pages. Nevertheless, the emphasis —especially in the 
more theoretical approaches to the laughter triad - has generally been on data far 
removed from real-life situations. The wide body of relevant empirical facts has rarely 
been harnessed to support a general theory of amusement, laughter, and humour. In 
this thesis, I have made every effort to maintain theorizing at ground level.
Finally, ’situating laughter' will mean suggesting an essential, and not merely 
contingent, relationship between the laughter triad and the characteristics o f the social 
situation. Here I refer to the features of 'situated interaction' as analyzed by the 
sociologist of everyday relations in public, Erving Goffman. It is not merely that 
displays o f laughter and humour fall under the category of situated behaviours, and 
may be affected by situational factors even when performed in utter privacy. More 
fundamentally, it will be suggested that amusement itself reacts to interactional 
failures, to the mismatch between someone's self-presentation and the attributes he 
actually exhibits. Goffman's analysis of embarrassment will emerge as complementary 
to the suggested analysis of amusement, and many of his key references —the self as a 
ritual object, social life as drama, the insane asylum, frames of interpretation— will be 
drawn on as resources throughout the thesis.
3 Greg Smith (1997, personal communication) deserves credit for this phrasing.
26
Chapter One; Preliminaries Section 2
2.3. Scope and Method
The scope of the thesis has been dictated by the basic phenomena themselves. I 
have attempted to refrain, as far as possible, from limiting my data by preconditioned 
ideas and boundaries, seeking to track amusement, laughter, and humour wherever 
they might have taken me. The study has been guided by a set of basic questions, 
pursued more-or-less systematically, in whichever domains they seemed to apply. 
Some questions found ready answers or tentative solutions, some were rephrased or 
led to further questions, and others proved unanswerable. Those which remained 
consistently prominent throughout included:
1. What are amusement, laughter, and humour?
2. What causes or influences their manifestation?
3. What meanings are attributed to their observed manifestation?
4. What effects do they provoke in different circumstances?
5. To what uses can they be put?
6. What are the links between these varied features and the concerns of the
’ social sciences?
7. What methods can be used in their study?
8. What are the limits of our knowledge regarding these phenomena?
The enterprise will be limited quite closely in scope to the laughter triad itself, 
perhaps a minor concern of science, but one sufficiently demanding to merit exclusive 
treatment on occasion. Admittedly, amusement should really be considered within a 
more general context of psychological reactions. Though relevant to and oriented 
towards the literature on the emotions -especially that other social emotion, 
embarrassment—, this thesis will focus on the single case at hand. Similarly, laughter 
and humour belong to wider fields of communication studies which will be only 
alluded to in passing, not to mention the further connections to countless sociological 
concerns. The sheer number and magnitude of potential ramifications forbid a general 
treatment which devotes more than a minimal reference to each. The risk of 
trivializing topics as enormous and controversial as 'social control' or 'emotional
27
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expression’ has been taken in the interest of thesis size and complexity, leaving 
remaining work of detail to more capable others.
Though most of the observations to which I have had access concern 'Western’ 
society, and particularly the United States and Britain, they range across numerous 
cross-cutting planes of variation, each an immense and unique expanse: class, age, 
occupation, ethnic background, geographical location, immediate context, type of 
funny stimulus, goals of actors, distribution of power, and, of course, academic 
background and research aims of the observer. Moreover, relevant ethnographic 
fieldwork and historical fact from farther-flung comers of anthropological and 
chronological inquiry have also been consulted and integrated into the analysis, from 
classical Greece to present day African hunter-gatherers. The ideas proposed are in 
principle intended to apply to the human race as a whole, however well or badly they 
may fare in this ambitious intention.
The method employed could be described as an ongoing theoretical 
experiment. The questions detailed above, together with certain initial hypotheses and 
intuitions, were used to guide observation. Observations were compared against the 
early hypotheses, with refinements and alterations being made to  the developing 
theory. This testing process was repeated, once and again, with new and ever more 
varied sets of data. ’Observations’ included my own direct observation of both myself, 
others, and products labeled humorous’ or ’non-humorous,’ second-hand reports found 
in scholarly, journalistic, and other printed works, and in some cases ’plausible’ 
fictional or hypothetical accounts. This admittedly unstructured and intuitive 
procedure, which I have followed since an initial project in 1993 (Jauregui, 1993), has 
resulted in the growth of a theoretical classification by no means complete or secure. 
The distinctions and relations suggested in these pages will be validated or not 
according to their usefulness in the context of further research in the field. I have 
made every effort to present them as clearly as possible, with the aid of numerous 
empirical illustrations, in order to  facilitate this work.
As will be argued in a further chapter, this unorthodox but wide-spread 
methodology —most notoriously and brilliantly exploited by Erving G offm an- is 
particularly suited to the study of emotional expression and other aspects o f situated 
interaction. Its main justification resides in the status o f most adult human beings as
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’experts' in such matters. For example, though we may not be able to describe verbally 
what funniness is, we intuitively 'know' and recognize such stimuli every day —how 
else could we experience amusement at all? An accurate theoretical description of the 
laughter triad, therefore, should be able to trigger off many moments of 'recognition' in 
the widest variety of readers. In this genre of theory, every reader is involved in the 
'scientific' process, becoming a sort of individual experimenter testing the validity of 
the theory for himself. As no judgment is final, and results of each 'test' are not fully 
shareable, the theory will not be 'falsifiable' in the general, objective, Popperian sense. 
Nevertheless, this method delivers the best type of account which can be hoped for in 
these areas of science: individually falsifiable theories.
2.4. Rationale
Before launching into the main body of the thesis, there is a final question to 
be addressed: why laughter? The enterprise requires justification on a number of 
levels. Most generally, it might be asked why should anyone devote substantial effort 
to humour research in the first place. What purpose does it fulfill? What good might it 
do? What is the point?
There exists a veritable sub-genre, in the field, of embarrassed prefatory 
excuses provided to demonstrate the seriousness of a topic stigmatized by its 
association with tfie unserious. This suggests that studying the laughter triad is 
generally considered somewhat improper, somewhat ridiculous, a fact supported by 
the teasing and laughter which humour researchers tend to suffer when divulging their 
academic interests at dinner parties. Nevertheless, the amusement having subsided, 
these same dinner guests tend to display a genuine interest in the subject, an interest 
grounded in the surprising awareness that the most familiar of events can seem the 
most foreign, even the most mysterious; an interest, moreover, shared by thinkers of 
the stature of Aristotle, Plato, Hobbes, Kant, Bergson, and Freud. For this reason 
alone, the enterprise seems worthwhile.
It is not merely, however, that the widespread curiosity about these curious 
behaviours deserves feeding. The ubiquitousness of the laughter triad in the widest
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range of human environments makes it relevant to an unusual variety o f disciplines. 
Some of those which, at one time or another, have dabbled in and contributed to its 
study include aesthetics, anthropology, computing science, ethology, history, 
linguistics, medicine, philosophy, politics, psychology, and sociology. A better 
understanding of amusement, laughter, and humour, therefore, may contribute 
indirectly to research and theory in many of these areas.
In the present study, my pursuit of the laughter triad has also forced me to 
cross interdisciplinary borders. Nevertheless, the rooting of these phenomena in the 
social situation seeks to demonstrate their special significance for the social sciences. 
A second level of justification, tied to our specific academic surroundings, can thus be 
addressed: Why laughter in a department of social and political sciences? It will be 
argued that amusement, though itself a psychological mechanism, relates closely to 
the self-claims which make up the social personas of individual actors. The 
communication of alleged amusement by means of laughter and humour, in turn, 
connects all three terms to central sociological concepts and to the realities behind 
them: socialization and social control, group culture, identity, status, and power. An 
underlying theme of the thesis will thus be to clarify in what precise sense laughter 
might be considered 'social in nature', as Henri Bergson and others have suggested.
A  third question, concerning the reasons for choosing to develop a general 
theory o f  the field rather than taking up a more manageable subtopic, has been 
addressed briefly in the discussion of aims. Such a theory appears necessary both for 
the undertaking of any single subtopic, and in general within a field characterized by 
fragmentation and disorder. Humour research is presently conducted in the midst of an 
evident theoretical maelstrom, within which specific ideas, findings, and pieces of 
research float in isolated clusters, sometimes vainly grasping at each other in the hope 
o f coherence. Neither the four major 'global theories' of amusement —superiority, 
incongruity, tension-release, and play—, nor any of the 'multicausal' theories proposed 
have succeeded in reconciling views over what causes this psychological reaction, or 
how it relates to humour and laughter. Nevertheless, one or other o f these is often 
relied upon by investigators, who generally select the perspective most convenient for 
their specific object of study.
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Until the early part of this century, theoretical approaches to the field were 
common. Grieg in 1923 was able to list over 90 different views. On the other hand, 
empirical research was rare, and theoretical works could not often be characterized as 
empirically-grounded, systematic, thorough, and coherent: “The problem of humor has 
always been a special field of play for the irresponsible essay writer, and the literature 
that adorns it is notoriously inconsequential" (Eastman, 1921). In the past thirty years, 
a contrary pattern has developed. Serious empirical humour research has increased at a 
considerable pace, particularly in the United States. The creation of The International 
Society for Humour Studies (ISHS), a journal of Humour Studies {Humor), and a 
humour research list on the internet (at the mailbase.uk server), all attest to the 
growing interest and work in this field. Attempts to classify and interrelate this rapidly 
expanding body of work have not followed suit, however. Indeed, it has become a 
standard tenet of humour research that no general theory is attainable or even 
necessary.
I will not contest the notion that specific research into joking relationships, 
children's play, or the deployment of humour cues can illuminate important aspects of 
the laughter triad. I am skeptical, however, that the mere accumulation of facts will 
result in a better understanding of the field as a whole or even in a full understanding 
of any single observation. Finding the connections between isolated areas of research, 
on the other hand, will allow such areas to benefit from the exchange of methods, 
results, and ideas, and from an improved understanding of their location in various 
theoretical spaces. It seems to me that narrowly-focused analyses conducted free from 
any conceptual foundation will always remain superficial in some regard, blind to the 
elements shared with closely-related cousins. The search for a general perspective 
should not be wholly abandoned.
A final justification is required: how can the present writer presume to offer a 
theory which has escaped the minds of weighty thinkers for centuries? Here I offer my 
true reason for selecting the laughter triad as my object o f analysis. In early 1993 I 
began to test the idea, borrowed from Jose Antonio Jauregui's The Emotional 
Computer (1990)\ that amusement was a response to the 'violation of social norms’
4 Jauregui treats amusement within the context of a general theory of human decision-making (with its 
effects on both individual and social behaviour) which emphasizes the role of affect over cognition.
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(See Jauregui, 1993). Though the notion of 'social norm1 had to be specified and 
modified substantially, I discovered that the idea had a surprisingly wide applicability, 
and that it seemed to clarify ever more numerous relevant phenomena. In subsequent 
years, this impression has only grown, and I have found additional support from 
thinkers who have proposed similar notions (Plato, Aristotle, Bergson, E.F. Carritt, 
J.B. Baillie, Luigi Pirandello). Moreover, the rough ideas with which I began 
flourished in the fertile ground prepared by Erving Goffman, which I found not only 
uniquely suited to the task, but essential to its successful accomplishment. In short, the 
theory proposed is neither essentially new, nor unrelated to existing social theory. I 
have merely developed, as thoroughly as I have been able, an ancient but often 
neglected conception of the laughter triad which has come of age with the advent of 
Goffmanian sociology. It will be the charge of humour researchers, both professional 
and lay, to judge its validity.
32
--■■if*?
Chapter One: Preliminnrtes Section 2
2.5. Preview
The thesis is broadly divided into three main parts. PART ONE (Chapters 
One to Three) presents essential introductory material.
C hapter One, the chapter in progress, introduces the thesis as a whole, as well 
as the three basic terms of the laughter triad, which have not always been carefully 
distinguished:
1. Amusement (the emotion reacting to funny stimuli).
2. Laughter (its visible and more-or-less faithful expression).
3. Humour (the attempt to stimulate amusement).
C hapter Two will provide a critical introduction to the most influential 
theories of amusement, including the four main monocausal accounts —superiority, 
incongruity, tension-release, and play—, multicausal accounts, and agnostic stances. It 
will argue that none of these approaches is satisfactory. It will then discuss the 
possibility and character of a general amusement theory in the abstract, how such a 
theory might be developed and validated, and what historical precedents could support 
such an approach. Specifically, due to the nature and empirical location Of the laughter 
triad, a methodology similar to that employed by Erving Goffman in his analysis of 
the interaction order will be suggested as the single viable alternative. In this 
procedure, a continuous mutual comparison and adjustment of theory and data results 
in an ordered and richly illustrated description, a structured classification of concepts 
closely grounded in empirical detail, which if successful trigger off recognition and 
identification in prospective readers.
C hapter Three will introduce the reader to the type of amusement theory to 
be proposed, with a historical review of what will be called 'claim-discredit' 
interpretations of amusement. Plato, Aristotle, William Moore, Luigi Pirandello, E.F. 
Carritt, J.B. Baillie, Henri Bergson, Orrin Klapp, J.A. Jauregui, and others will be 
credited with variations on the view that amusement reacts to the discredit of an 
individual's claims about himself. A close kinship will then be noted between these 
ideas and the themes elaborately developed by Erving Goffman regarding the
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'interaction order', the order which regulates human relations in public surroundings. 
A brief introduction to Goffman's th ought will be offered. ,.
PART TWO (Chapters Four to Six) develops the central account of 
amusement, expanding upon the ideas of the claim-discredit theorists.
C hapter Four presents the main idea, the necessary condition for amusement 
(the sufficient conditions being reserved for Chapter Six):
*
1. Amusement is provoked only when a perceiver observes that a self-claim
put forward by a claimant has been discredited.
The Goffmanian notion of a self-claim -the  attribution of some predicate by a claim- 
maker to a claimant he represents, typically himself— will be specified in detail, and 
classified according to two variables: origin (method of claim-making) and content. 
An analysis of the requirements for perceiving the discredit of such a self-claim will 
be undertaken. This analysis will engender a number of further variables related to the 
circumstances of discredit, including its cause, the identity of the discredited 
participant, and the location of the event among various levels of interpreted reality.
C h ap ter Five will apply this interpretation of amusement to hundreds of 
'funny stimuli'. The immense variety of amusing events can be derived from the single 
definition of the necessary conditions proposed in the previous chapter. This single 
'claim-discredit' cause results in apparent differences on the basis of variables relevant 
to the type of self-claim discredited and the circumstances of the discredit and its 
observation. The distinctions already noted -origin and content of self-claim, cause of 
discredit, identity of discredited participant, and location of event- will be employed 
to illustrate some of the possible dimensions of variability. Absent-minded errors, 
irony, tickling, satire, practical jokes, and many other diverse examples o f funny 
stimuli will be related to each other along these axes.
In C hapter Six, the explanation of amusement will be elaborated with a 
number o f additions to the basic proposal. Firstly, two amendments are considered to 
complete the set of necessary and sufficient conditions for amusement:
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2. The perceiver of discredit does not identify himself with the claimant at the 
moment of perception.
3. The perceiver is sufficiently involved in a definition of events which places 
the discrediting in the foreground.
If condition '2' does not hold, and the perceiver identifies himself with the claimant, 
the former will experience embarrassment, unless condition '3' additionally fails to 
hold. If condition *3' does not hold, the perceiver will experience the cognitive and/or 
emotional processes stimulated by his dominant foci of attention.
Two further complications will be discussed: the possibility that several 
emotional reactions may be stimulated simultaneously, and the possibility that a single 
episode of observed activity, or even a single event, may include multiple potentially 
amusing stimuli.
t'
PART THREE (Chapters Seven to Nine) will broaden the focus to include *
the whole of the laughter triad.
C hapter Seven will treat laughter and humour displays as communicative 
expressions with closely synonymous meanings:
Laughter = "I am experiencing amusement at cause X"
Humour = 'T can experience amusement at cause X (and so can you)"
The direct allusion to amusement in both of these basic meanings permits the 
derivation of a number of additional submeanings associated with laughter and 
humour displays. These connotations, arising from the features of amusement- 
perception described in Part Two, include:
The 'discredit' connotation: "According to my current interpretation, claimant 
C's self-claim S has been discredited by fact F"
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The 'knowledge' connotation: "I possess the knowledge necessary to appreciate 
the amusing elements referred to by the laughter/humour”
The ’identity' connotation: "I do not feel identified as the claimant(s) 
discredited"
The ’involvement' connotation: "I am (or could be) sufficiently involved in the 
funny elements of the situation to enjoy amusement"
Humour displays express an additional submeaning:
“ The 'entertainment' connotation: "I am delivering a communication which can 
produce amusement at cause Y in my target sharing audience"
These meanings provide the crucial link between laughter/humour displays on the one 
hand, and amusement on the other, suggesting the futility of treating the former two 
without some conception of the latter.
The process by which an actor displays laughter or humour to an audience of 
observers will also be analyzed, with regard to the influence of physio-psychological 
and situational pressures, individual aims and skills, and the distribution of power.
C hap ter Eight will provide a lengthy though certainly not exhaustive list of 
the effects which amusement, laughter, and humour may have on individual 
experience and behaviour, the immediate situation, social relationships, and society at 
large. In relevant cases, intentional uses of these phenomena to provoke particular 
effects w ill be discussed.
Particularly attention will be paid to the effects and uses of laughter and 
humour displays. As communications, their consequences depend on meanings 
expressed, including those detailed in the previous chapter. This will permit the 
organization of large bodies of research according to a single theoretical scheme, 
simultaneously grounding such research in a unitary conception of amusement. Effects 
of laughter and humour include the broadcasting of an actor's discredit to others; the 
provocation o f further amusement and/or laughter, the transmission and reproduction
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of social norms shared by a group or society; the creation of boundaries between and 
around social groups; the creation or reinforcement of affiliation/disafflliation 
between two parties; the protection of an actor from discredit; the giving off of certain 
impressions to others; etc. These effects, and their related uses, will be classified 
according to the signification(s) from which they derive.
‘Functionalist* approaches to these topics, which have been dominant until 
recent times, will be criticized as methodologically careless and conceptually vague.
C hapter Nine will bring the thesis to its close by summarizing proposals, 
considering their cross-cultural validity, and suggesting how they may be used to 
situate the laughter triad and its field of study. Amusement will be presented as one of 
the ‘basic’ and universal emotions o f humankind, and an explanation will be given of 
cross-cultural variability in the experience of this emotion, and in the display of 
laughter and humour. Finally, I will offer a tentative classification of the humour 
research field, based on the proposed account of the laughter triad.
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3. The Laughter Triad
Our everyday familiarity with the phenomena and vocabulary of laughter and 
humour requires special care and attention in the definition of basic terms, often 
overused, vague and/or ambiguous. In this section I will set out and delimit the three 
fundamental concepts to be treated, justifying and making explicit any assumptions 
made along the way. Some basic well-confirmed facts will be presented, along with 
the major unanswered questions.
3.1. Amusement
“  The spontaneous, unconscious behaviours of the human body —sensations, 
reflexes, feelings, and emotions- have a single nature but a double appearance. Each 
event of this type is associated with two aspects which, though often separated 
conceptually, linguistically, and methodologically, can be treated as referring to an 
identical occurrence.
On the one hand, there exist the objectively observable signs of the event: the 
knee spontaneously jerks up the lower leg when the hammer hits the right spot; the 
eyes water and the comers of the mouth sag when a tragic situation is perceived. 
Sophisticated instruments may permit the detection and monitoring of less obvious 
physiological changes, such as alterations in brain and nervous system activity, skin 
conductance, heart beat rate, and chemical composition of the blood.
On the other hand, the subject of consciousness encased in this altered physical 
body can observe the phenomenon 'from the inside.1 Having one’s knee jerk 'feels' 
particular, while experiencing the dozens of physiological changes associated with 
sadness is a qualitatively unique subjective experience.
I will assume that both of these perspectives —objective and subjective— refer 
to the same event. When a person 'feels sad,' his subjective feelings are no more, and 
no less, than the first-person perception of certain bodily processes brought about by 
the tragic stimulus5.
5 1 make a distinction here between the raw experience of emotion and subsequent cognitive 
interpretations, which 1 take to be secondary.
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The Cartesian mind-body dualism widespread in Western society resists such 
conclusions. Intuitively, it seems that we cry because we are sad, or that we draw back 
because we feel pain. One reason is that there inevitably exist two languages 
corresponding to the subjective and objective identification o f bodily events. 
Happenings and features in objective reality are describable by reference to other 
exterior happenings and features. The subjective characteristics of guilt, however, 
(i.e., what it feels like to be guilty) can only be described in terms o f other feelings. 
There is an empathic or ‘internal’ understanding of such terms as pain or guilt which 
is irreducible to and irreconcilable with observable ‘external’ physiological or 
behavioural events. Moreover, many of the possible bodily correlates of affect ~i.e., 
the release of endorphins into the blood, specific alterations in neurological activity- 
are invisible to the naked eye, and others will continue to escape any conceivable 
advances in medical technology. Finally, we are often aware of a dissociation between 
feeling and its most evident bodily signs: we may 'counterfeit' smiles or frowns. The 
subjective aspects of emotion and feeling, therefore, appear much more salient or even 
exhaust the attention of most actors when considering such events. Thus, it seems only 
natural to believe that subjective feeling causes any observable bodily changes, or that 
in any case the two are separate.
I will maintain, however, that crying is a constitutive part of the sadness 
process, and that drawing back is a constitutive part of a defensive mechanism which 
includes bodily occurrences perceived as pain. William James (1890) first proposed 
this conception of affect (743-44):
O ur natural way of thinking about these coarser emotions is that the mental 
perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and 
that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My theory, on 
the contrary, is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception o f the 
exciting fact, and that our feeling o f the same changes as they occur IS the 
emotion. (...) I f we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from  
our consciousness o f it all the feelings o f its bodily symptoms, we find we have 
nothing left behind, no 'mind stuff out of which the emotion can be constituted 
and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains.
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Within the set of spontaneous bodily reactions, emotions are distinguished by 
the cognitive character of their stimuli. Sneezing, yawning, pain, or the taste bud 
messages resulting in 'sweetness' all react to physical, directly perceived stimuli of one 
type or another. Fear, happiness, nostalgia, and regret, on the other hand, follow the 
perception of events which normally require some interpretation. The concept that 
"my house is burning" has to be cognitively processed and understood, its implications 
assessed and valued, in order for emotions such as fear or sadness to arise. The 
'appraisal' process leading to various emotional reactions has become a central issue in 
recent theorizing about emotions (Oatley and Jenkins, 1996: 99-102). As will be 
argued more fully in Chapter Nine, amusement6 can be considered within the set of 
basic human emotions.
Amusement is defined firstly as a unique bodily emotion, associated (in its 
stronger manifestations) with the following characteristic bodily movements and 
sounds:
...the mouth is opened more or less widely, with the comers drawn much 
backwards, as well as a little upwards....the cheeks and upper lip are much 
raised.... The sound of laughter is produced by a deep inspiration followed by 
short, interrupted, spasmodic contractions of the chest, and especially of the 
diaphragm. From the shaking of the body, the head nods to and fro. The lower 
jaw  often quivers up and down...
(Darwin, 1902:211-215)
These observable signs, which I will refer to as laughter (See Section 3.2), are 
merely the grossest physical manifestations of a much wider range of bodily events 
constitutive of amusement, including epinephrine secretions and changes in heart rate,
6 There is no word in English which precisely and unambiguously covers the concept identified here. It 
continues to be, as Hobbes pointed out, "a passion that hath no name,” (1640: 45). 'Laughter' has been 
the most common label, but this term refers primarily to the observable signs of the emotion, which do 
not always reflect the actual bodily state.
My usage of 'amusement' will refer exclusively to humorous amusement, and in no case will be 
intended in the sense of 'enjoyment* Moreover, it is intended to cover the phenomenon as a whole, in its 
observable bodily manifestations and interiorly felt dimensions.
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skin conductance, muscle tension, respiration, and patterns of brain activity (McGhee, 
1983:16-19).
The observable bodily process of amusement corresponds to a unique 
subjective emotional experience, which I will refer to as the amusement 
feeling/experience, or simply as funniness.
Funniness can be further described as pleasurable. Seemingly spontaneous 
laughter which is experienced without pleasure is considered 'pathological' by medical 
science and "results in management problems for friends, family, or caretakers [of the 
patient] who are unable to comprehend the absence of inner well-being” (Duchowny, 
1983: 91). It has been argued that other subjective feelings accompany amusement, 
either always or in some cases: aggression, sexual arousal, general excitation, wonder, 
a 'sense' of the incongruous, relief, joy. None of these seems intuitively basic to 
funniness itself, however (though 'joy' might be considered a close relative).
Amusement, as other emotions, varies in intensity. Graded scales for 
measuring 'felt funniness' in psychological experiments have been devised (La France, 
1983: 2). Positive relationships have been found between variations in such funniness 
ratings and variations in heart beat rate, galvanic skin response, and muscle tension 
(McGhee 1983: 16-19). Fluctuations in perceived funniness also often correspond to 
the directly observable expressions of laughter “a graduated series can be followed 
from violent to moderate laughter, to a broad smile, to a gentle smile” (Darwin, 1902: 
216). This correlation is complicated by the ability of subjects to consciously control 
the display o f laughter (See Section 3.2). In many experimental studies o f humour, for 
instance, the two measures do not coincide, as the laboratory situation itself appears to 
inhibit laughter (Chapman, 1983: 137). In 'naturalistic* research, where observation is 
less intrusive, a closer fit has been found between felt funniness and observed laughter 
(ibid.).
Considerable evidence suggests that amusement is an involuntary, unlearned, 
and innate behaviour. For example, stimulation of the hypothalamus and diencephalic 
region of the brain has been repeatedly demonstrated to provoke "well-developed 
laughter" (Duchowny, 1983: 97). Patients with Bell's Palsy, an affliction in which half 
of the face becomes slack, can only smile voluntarily with one side of the face, but
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"once amused, then there is bilateral symmetry in their performance" (Miller, 1988:
8).
The possibility that infants leam to laugh through imitation seems unlikely: 
“Laughing as well as joyful shouts appear at a time when the laughing of adults does 
not facilitate the same behaviour in the baby but startles it more than anything else, or 
can even cause the baby to cry when it has been laughing” (D.W. Ploog, in Eibl- 
Eibesfeldt, 1975). It has been documented that deaf and dumb children, who could not 
have learned the behaviour, exhibit laughter in what seem to be typically amusing 
situations:
Goodenough observed that on one occasion, a doll was dropped inside 
the neck of a 10-year old child's dress: "When she got it out, she threw herself 
back into her chair...There were peals of hearty laughter."
(Black, 1984: 2995)
Amusement is commonly attributed universality throughout the human 
species, and the facts seem to support this claim. Not only laughter but joking, clowns, 
mimicry, and ridicule have been described in a wide range of societies (Apte, 1983). 
In a review of the admittedly sparse anthropological literature on the subject, Mahadev 
Apte concludes that "humour and its appreciation appear to be panhuman traits" (p. 
194). Another question is whether all peoples are amused in the same situations, and 
how such sameness or difference should be described. The answer to this remains 
open, though the aforementioned evidence of recognizable humour in divergent 
cultures suggests at least some similarities.
A related and equally common assertion holds that amusement is unique to 
humanity. This claim, however, is less certain, in view of some of the literature on 
primate behaviour. The "relaxed open-mouth display" or "play face" of a number of 
species closely related to Homo Sapiens is used during
the boisterous mock-fighting and chasing involved in social play.... It is often 
accompanied by quick and shallow rather staccato breathing. In some species,
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the breathing may be vocalized (e.g. the chimpanzee). The vocalizations then 
sound like 'ahh ahh ahh.'
(VanHooff, 1972)
In the case of chimpanzees, this expression
can easily be elicited by tickling.... Many authors (e.g. Darwin, 1872; Foley 
1935; Kohts, 1937; Grimek, 1941; Yerkes, 1943) were struck by its 
resemblance both in form and context with our laughter.
(Van Hooff, 1972)
The precise relations, evolutionary or conceptual, between human amusement and 
these animal behaviours remains unknown, and will probably continue to do so. It is 
impossible to determine, for instance, if chimpanzees subjectively experience 
funniness. Undoubtedly, Aristotle's 'laughing animal* (de partibus animalium, 673a8) 
reacts to a much wider range of stimuli. Nevertheless, the expressive and contextual 
similarities of his laughter to that of apes suggests that the behaviour may not be 
unique to humans.
Primate data does, however, support the common supposition that laughter and 
smiling constitute distinct expressions. Ethologists have distinguished between the 
"relaxed open-mouth display" and the "silent bared-teeth display" or "grin face." As in 
the case o f humans, the latter is used primarily in social situations of "affinity." (Van 
Hooff, 1972). Separate phylogenetic origins for the two are suggested by this 
evidence. Subjective experience also confirms the notion that these behaviours differ, 
particularly in their extreme forms: “Surely we can distinguish between a pure, intense 
smile from pure, intense laughter, and the two expressions are then very different 
indeed” (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1975).
As for the cause or causes of amusement, there is little agreement, as will be 
seen in Chapter Two. The question "what provokes amusement?" has accounted for 
much of the debate in the field.
One utterly basic point can advanced with some confidence: amusement 
reacts to a definite stimulus. However heterogeneous the array of events that may
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provoke it generally, each specific case seems to have been triggered by some 
specifiable event. Indeed, social actors must be able to account for outbursts of this 
type, as unmotivated laughter is considered a symptom of mental illness (Duchowny, 
1983: 92-93).
It has been occasionally argued that even this may not always be the case; for 
example, that one may laugh with real amusement but 'for no reason' or out of 'pure 
joy' or 'nervousness.' However, actual examples of these phenomena are rare. Most of 
the evidence is to be found in the literature on children:
A brief observation of three-year-olds at play suggests that laughter is a highly 
contagious reaction that may suddenly erupt in the midst of rough and tumble 
play, running, jumping, chasing and so forth. In these situations there is 
nothing that is actually funny to the child.
(McGhee, 1979: 126-27)
Such interpretations are questionable, however, on grounds of both vagueness of the 
description offered and a more essential methodological problem. How could it 
possibly be determined whether nothing, or on the other hand something, may be 
"actually funny to the child" in this case? Child's play constitutes a complex 
interpersonal activity presenting the individual participant with any number of 
physiological, cognitive, and emotional contingencies. Without a detailed analysis of 
’rough and tumble play' behaviour, we have no way of judging, independently of 
McGhee's conclusion, how random or mirthless these instances of laughter might be. 
Furthermore, the rudimentary communication and self-awareness skills of children 
present obvious methodological difficulties to the researcher interested in unraveling 
such psychological processes, as McGhee himself concedes7. Merely assuming away 
the cause in this case seems a hasty procedure.
In one of the few naturalistic studies of actual amusement reactions as reported 
by adult subjects (Kambouropoulou, 1930), the instances which appeared to lack a 
definite cause made up only 1.3% of the total (p.24). An examination of these
7 "It is impossible to determine in any particular situation whether an event was perceived as humorous 
by a young child.... We can only make an educated guess" (pp. 95-96).
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uncommon cases, furthermore, reveals that they either did not constitute amusement 
("Laughed numerous times to be polite, but not because I was amused", p.15) or, more 
commonly, were vague or partial explanations of complex events remembered long 
after the facts ("At a tea everybody talking and laughing," p.15). Another telling detail 
from the conclusions of this study is the finding that "a lower academic standing 
accompanies the greater proportion of laughing with no objective cause" (p. 79). 
Perhaps the subjects who provided more examples of 'unmotivated' laughter were 
wanting in the types of skills or attitudes conducive to an accurate and detailed record
The stimuli which provoke amusement can further be specified, at least in 
most cases, as cognitive stimuli: perceptions or mental states of some type. Jokes, 
puns,“stage comedy, everyday mishaps and mistakes —these must be perceived and 
mentally processed in some way by the subject of laughter to have been amused. On 
this point, at least, the different schools of humour theory will agree8. Debate has 
centered rather on whether it is a single cognitive elicitor or rather several which may 
result in amusement -and  what this/these elicitor(s) might be. A single appraisal 
process for amusement has not yet been agreed upon, casting some doubt on the very 
status of the phenomenon as an emotion.
The adjective 'funny' will be used to characterize stimuli of amusement, with 
the caveat that speaking in general of 'a funny story,' indicates only that it is 
potentially amusing, that it may provoke or may have provoked amusement in some 
individual. 'A funny story' additionally indicates that the story in question is actually 
amusing only when an actual or supposed instance of amusement has been explicitly 
indicated (i.e., "It was sooo funny; we laughed all afternoon."). Thus, 'funny X ' refers 
to the object or event in the world (X) to which an instance of actual, supposed, or 
potential amusement is attributed by some actor.
8 Outside of neuropsychological disturbances (brain damage, electrical stimulation, laughing gas), 
'tickling* is the only exception that occasionally appears, but not according to all interpretations (see 
Koestler, 1964:79-80; and this thesis. Chapter Five, 2.3.1).
of events.
46
Chapter One; Preliminaries Section 3
3.2. Laughter (Display)
Amusement cannot be directly observed, or at least not by anyone other than 
the subject of amusement who perceives the sensations of funniness. Only its outward 
manifestation as the movements and sounds of laughter can be seen and heard by 
other actors. These observable signs of apparent amusement I will refer to as a 
laughter display or simply as laughter.
As I have already pointed out, laughter displays are not always or even 
commonly equivalent to the spontaneous expression of actual amusement:
Although people laugh when they find something funny, they also 
- laugh when a 'joke' is seen to be anything but funny. Moreover, people can be 
very straight-faced in a truly humorous situation, giving little sign of felt 
mirth.... The person laughing the loudest may be the least amused, while the 
person smiling the least may be suppressing full-flow fun until a more 
appropriate context can be found.
(La France, 1983:2)
Laughter is, to some extent, subject to conscious control. This point, in its most 
general form, is obvious from the performances of professional actors and from our 
own subjective experience. The conclusions of researchers in the field of facial 
displays of emotion will surprise nobody:
The facial nerve is connected to the very old and to the newer parts of 
the brain. Facial expressions of emotion are at times an involuntary automatic 
response, and at other times, a voluntary, well-managed response system.... 
Facial expressions are language-like in that they often are voluntary, and the 
involuntary facial expressions are vulnerable to interference or modification by 
custom, habit, or choice of the moment. People can and often do put on false 
expressions to play with or seriously mislead another.
(Ekman, 1978: 141)
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Laughter can be consciously overstated or counterfeited on the one hand, understated 
or suppressed on the other. And not only its intensity, but its form and timing can be 
modified. Researchers in the field of conversation analysis have convincingly 
demonstrated that speakers modify their productions of laughter in line with the 
structural requirements of orderly talk (see, for example, Jefferson, Sacks, and 
Schegloff, 1987). A display of laughter may therefore be more or less spontaneous -- 
i.e., corresponding more or less closely to the level of amusement actually 
experienced.
A further complication has been suggested by Hochschild (1979), who 
convincingly argues that not only do actors consciously modify the facial and bodily 
expression of emotions with 'surface acting,' but actually manage the emotions 
themselves, with learned and practiced ’deep acting.’ Surprisingly familiar accounts are 
related by Hochschild’s interviewees: “I psyched myself up....I squashed my anger 
down....I tried hard not to feel disappointed....I made myself have a good time....I tried 
to feel grateful....I killed the hope I had buming...I let myself finally feel sad” 
(Hochschild, 1979: 561). Thus, the relationship between a particular instance of 
laughter and its supposed amusement becomes even more problematic: not only 
laughter displays, but amusement itself may be more or less spontaneous. Even if, as 
some have suggested (Ekman, 1978; La France, 1983), there may be ways of 
discerning true from feigned emotional expressions through careful attention to facial 
details, these may not necessarily distinguish between truly spontaneous reactions and 
adulterated ones.
Two important consequences follow for observers of laughter. Firstly, social 
actors can never be certain of the relationship between ’real* and ’apparent' amusement 
in any observed other. Secondly, humour and laughter researchers can never be certain 
of the relationship between amusement and laughter displays in their experimental 
subjects or observed 'natives.' In both cases, specific circumstances or techniques may 
increase the probability of accurate judgment (i.e., secret or unobtrusive observation, a 
request for 'funniness ratings'), but doubts and conflicting opinions may always 
remain. Again in both cases, some level of trust, based partly on subjective experience 
of honest emotional expressions, must be adopted in order to consider others' 
amusement at all.
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The reality of conscious emotional display also has its consequences for the 
behaviour of social actors and for the societies they populate. The various possibilities 
of control over laughter permit, as with other emotions, both the influence of culture, 
social structure, and interactional requirements on this behaviour, and its strategic use 
by individuals. One striking example of the former is provided by crude cross-cultural 
comparisons:
We know that some tribes are said to be dour and unlaughing. Others laugh 
easily. Pygmies lie on the ground and kick their legs in the air, panting and 
shaking in paroxysms of laughter.
(Douglas, 1971: 387)
As Douglas argues, there exist great differences in the extent to which societies inhibit 
or stimulate bodily expression, perhaps related to the role played by individual bodies 
in communicating social messages. The more ceremonial or ritualized the situation, 
for instance, the heavier the expressive content of bodily movements, and the less 
tolerance will exist for spontaneous outbursts. Specific cultural meanings, ritual 
practices, social hierarchies and structures of power, the requirements of conversation 
and social interaction, all of these may affect the ways in which actors seek to manage 
amusement and display laughter.
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3.3. Humour
'Humour1 (Humor to Americans) has been often used to denote all funny 
things, all sources of amusement (for example, in the very label humour research'). 
What is in practice often meant by humour,' however, is rather communicative 
presentations intended (by the communicator) to provoke amusement. I will, 
accordingly, use the term to mean this and only this9.
Instances of humour can thus be categorized as examples of 
artistic/communicative creation. A humorous piece can be regarded both as a piece of 
individual workmanship and as an instance of a cultural form of expression. Trends, 
styles, and genres of humour can be critiqued, analyzed, and compared across single 
performers, historical periods, and cultural settings. The same variety of analytical 
frames to which other cultural forms such as literary prose or table manners might be 
subjected —aesthetic, historical, anthropological, moral, economic, political, 
psychological, semiotic- has also been applied to humour. Identifying the specific 
'techniques’ of humourists and comedians has been another major concern of 
researchers: the question 'what provokes amusement' becomes 'how do they (try to) 
provoke amusement'.
Humour, in this narrow sense, has been the main focus of 'humour research.’ 
Though often acknowledging and including unintentionally funny stimuli within the 
bounds of this field, researchers have concentrated overwhelmingly on productions 
intended to be amusing: i.e., jokes, puns, ironic remarks, comedy, wit, clowning, 
mimicry, ridicule, satire. These humorous communications are both perceptually 
salient and methodologically appealing: Salient because humour is consciously 
created and discussed, culturally valued, and in Western society commercially 
produced and advertised; methodologically appealing due to the ease which humour 
can be reproduced or displayed in the experimental lab and written texts, or sought 
and identified in naturalistic studies (i.e., of joking relationships, comedy shows, 
children’s play, etc...).
9 The only exception will be the case of Humour research' itself, on the basis of the increasingly 
established nature of the field and its label.
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Even in discussions of so-called ’unintentional* humour, the very need to 
specify a modifier implies that *humour' by default refers to ’intentional humour/ The 
bias is so strong that in many analyses which include clear examples of 
unintentionally funny stimuli, the dominant wordings often continue to imply some 
sort of conscious volition behind the source of amusement. For example, Zillmann 
(1983: 87) mentions unwilled circumstances such as "misfortunes and 
setbacks...ugliness, stupidity, and ineptness" among possible causes. But his general 
description of this category is a festival of transitive verbs: “humor that disparages, 
belittles, debases, demeans, humiliates, or otherwise victimizes” (ibid.: 85). Though 
Zillman does not state that it a person (but rather the *humour*) which disparages or 
belittles, the terminology is misleading in a way congruent with the general bias 
towards humour. Can we say that a clumsy person is 'belittled by the humour’ of his 
clumsiness in the same way a target o f satire is belittled by a caricature? Perhaps, but a 
distinction between accidental and willed disparagements is thereby fudged, in favour 
of the latter. Zillman's description closely fits the majority of research in the area of 
disparagement humour, which has tested reactions to disparaging cartoons and jokes, 
but it seems less apt for unintentionally funny events, persons, and objects.
Moreover, several authors have explicitly relegated such potentially amusing 
stimuli to the status of 'non-humour/ as if placing them outside the bounds of study. 
Chapman (1983: 151) speaks of "nonhumorous laughter" in his mention of episodes 
when "people...laugh at others." Koestler (1964: 60) similarly dismissed as "entirely 
mirthless and humourless" laughter at mispronounced words, falls, poor dancing, and 
various other events from Kambouropoulou's (1930) study. Some have even classified 
such stimuli as provoking 'primitive' laughter within an evolutionary scale, more 
’harmless' or ’sympathetic* wit and joking supposedly characterizing modem man:
The ’primitive’ person enjoys his aggression directly, the ’civilized’ 
individual enjoys his aggression indirectly.
(Feinberg, 1978)
The amusement that laughter has finally released from its ungracious 
heritage of triumph, cruelty, and scorn marks a line of mental advance.
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(Gregory, 1923:344)
The relegation of funny stimuli which do not classify as humour to an inferior 
theoretical status has hardly been noticed by scholars, let alone justified or supported 
by empirical evidence. The few facts collected regarding causes of amusement in 
everyday life, however, reverses the scale of values. The category of events from 
Kambouropoulou's study which Koestler dismisses as "entirely mirthless and 
humourless" included 53% of the total instances of self-reported amusement and 
laughter by 100 university students over a seven-day period, a category defined as 
“instances where the cause is the inferiority or predicament of a person, the diary 
author included; awkwardness, stupidity, mistakes, ignorance, absent-mindedness, 
blunders, social breaks, unfortunate dilemmas, and calamities** (Kambouropoulou, 
1930: 14). The next largest category, accounting for 28% of the total, included 
unexpected and incongruous events or turns in the situation, whether "voluntary or 
not" (pg. 14). These results were confirmed forty years later with a replication of the 
procedure by two researchers (Graeven and Morris, 1972) who found "striking...the 
similarity in the distribution of humorous incidents for the two time periods" (p. 409). 
These studies indicate that the almost exclusive focus on intentional humour that has 
characterized the study of amusement may exclude from analysis the majority of real- 
life cases.
Such facts suggest that the ’humour* question is not merely terminological. The 
pervasive and rarely noticed bias against unintentionally funny stimuli has almost 
certainly misled and distorted theoretical analysis in the field. A broader outlook that 
encompasses not only the many varieties of humour but the wide range of naturally- 
occurring funny stimuli must be adopted if any serious progress is to be made. Not 
only empirically but also logically, the latter deserve an important role in the study of
i
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amusement and laughter (if not pride of place): The intentional provocation of an 
emotion or reflex presupposes the workings of the bodily process itself10.
10 It might be possible that amusement requires such interactional contingencies as perceived 
provocation, but this cannot be merely (even if implicitly) assumed. Considering the aforementioned 
empirical evidence, this possibility seems in any case highly unlikely.
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4. Conclusions
In this preliminary chapter, I have introduced the aims, methods, scope, and 
rationale of the thesis, anticipated its major points, and provided detailed definitions 
for the three basic and interrelated objects of study.
The thesis seeks to situate the laughter triad, a set o f three closely interrelated 
phenomena familiar to all of us through everyday experience: amusement, laughter, 
and humour.
Amusement is a mental and bodily process characterized by the feeling of 
’funniness* and the production of certain movements and sounds. It is an involuntary, 
unlearned, innate response to a cognitive stimulus or stimuli, as of yet unspecified by 
humour theory. It seems universal to mankind, though perhaps not unique, as similar 
behaviours have been observed in the closest simian relatives of Homo Sapiens. The 
interactional situation appears to be an important effect on the likelihood and degree 
of amusement. It can be classified as an emotion.
Laughter, or the laughter display, refers to the observable signs of apparent 
amusement. These may or may not accurately reflect the true emotional state of the 
individual producing them. In other words, laughter may be either relatively 
spontaneous or otherwise overstated, counterfeited, understated, or suppressed. Its 
form and timing may also be manipulated. Finally, 'deep acting' may allow the 
individual to intentionally modify amusement itself.
These possibilities present problems of interpretation for social actors and 
humour researchers, and allow for the influence of culture, social structure, and 
interactional requirements on laughter, as well as its strategic use by individuals.
Hum our refers to productions intended by an actor to cause amusement, 
which can be regarded as pieces of individual workmanship and instances of cultural 
forms of expression.
The aim of the thesis will be to 'situate laughter.' This will mean first of all to 
observe and analyze this triad in its natural home, the everyday interactional situation. 
It will be argued, moreover, that the manifestation of amusement is itself essentially 
contingent on fundamental features of situated interaction: the self-claims which make 
up situated self-presentations, and related concepts. Finally, in its broadest sense,
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situating the laughter triad will involve developing a topology of the field within 
which each member of the triad, their many varieties, and related phenomena will be 
located in relation to each other, to the social sciences, and to existing humour 
theories and research.
The scope, though narrowly focused on the laughter triad itself, will thus be 
broad in the sense of encompassing all possible instances o f amusement, laughter, 
and humour in any human society. It will also span the interests of numerous 
academic disciplines, with an emphasis on the social sciences resulting from the 
pursuit of the phenomena themselves.
The method used has been an unorthodox and intuitive sort which nevertheless 
represents the most viable alternative for the study of humour and other elements of 
everyday behaviour resistant to objective observation. It consists of successive 
comparisons of theoretical description with a growing body of empirical data gathered 
from the most heterogeneous set of situations possible. Validation depends on the 
recognition by other subjects of the features described from their own experience with 
them, and on the general utility of the theory for specific projects within humour 
research.
The topic of the thesis, which suffers from an evident whiff of impropriety, has 
been justified by its inherent interest to all individuals, and by its relevance to a wide 
range of areas within the social sciences and other disciplines. The thesis also answers 
a need for general theorizing in the field of humour research, characterized by 
fragmentation and diversity of approach. My confidence in proposing such an account 
is rooted in my own experience with its application, in its complementarity with the 
proposals of Erving Goffman's theory of the interaction order, and in its close kinship 
with the ideas o f numerous both well-known and less prominent humour theorists.
A brief preview of the proposals has also been provided. Amusement will be 
portrayed as reacting to the perception that an actor's claim about himself has been 
discredited, providing the perceiver attends sufficiently to the discrediting event and 
does not feel identified with the discredited claimant. Laughter and humour will be 
described as communicative signs whose meanings include a reference to amusement 
This reference will serve as the basis for an analysis of the effects and uses of laughter
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and humour. A general ordering and placement of the humour research field will 
emerge from these considerations.
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1. Introduction
The great and long-standing riddle in the field of laughter and humour research 
concerns the ’spark' or 'trigger' of amusement Known causes abound, of course: puns, 
jokes, mishaps, absurdities, paradoxes, tickling, obscenities, silliness, and 
rollercoasters, among others. What has evaded theorists is a general, formal, coherent 
description of the stimulus (or stimuli): what makes something funny?
The question has been rightly treated as the question of amusement, laughter, 
and humour, its solution, the key to a  general theory of some type. Understanding 
amusement is the first step towards understanding laughter and humour, for both of 
these communicative displays refer back to the basal emotion. In subsequent chapters, 
I will suggest an answer to the question of amusement (Chapters Four to Six), on 
which a theoretical scheme integrating laughter and humour will be based (Chapters 
Seven to Nine).
In this chapter, I will review the most common theoretical approaches to 
amusement. The four most popular single causes attributed to amusement have been 
'superiority/ 'incongruity/ 'tension-release,' and 'play.' The failure of each of these to 
account for all cases of fimny event has led some authors to develop equally 
unsatisfying multicausal theories, or even to abandon the search for any sort of 
encompassing description. None of these approaches has been successful in 
reconciling views on the subject.
1 will also provide some suggestions regarding theory and methodology in the 
search for the cause(s) of amusement. I will argue that the nature of the phenomena 
under study, and specifically their opacity to objective observation, precludes the 
application of conventional scientific paradigms (i.e., objective tests of hypotheses). 
The methodology I will label 'aggregate introspection* represents the most promising 
alternative, and indeed will be shown to have been tacitly adopted throughout the 
history of humour theory. This procedure begins with a continuous process of testing 
and reworking of the emerging theory with a growing body of empirical data from the 
theorist's own experience and those of others. The applicability of the resulting 
concepts and relations can then be tested by numerous others who are exposed to the 
theory, who together provide a judgment (a kind of 'aggregate test*) of its validity. A
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widely-acclaimed application of this unorthodox method will be described: Erving 
Goffman's theory of the interaction order.
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2. Traditions in Amusement Theory 
2.1. Monistic Theories
The reflexlike character of amusement, and the apparent unity of both exterior 
and interior manifestations, strongly suggests that the mechanism must be describable 
in terms of a single stimulus-response model. Many authors have been driven by this 
intuition to develop global monocausal theories. Though dozens could be listed, most 
of them have traditionally been classified under one of four general categories: 
aggression/superiority, incongruity, tension-release, and play.
2.1.1. Aggression/Superiority Theory
One common view presents laughter as an aggressive instinct which reacts to 
the errors, deformities, or vices of others.
This school of thought is commonly traced back to the ancient Greek 
philosophers. According to Plato, "when we laugh at what is ridiculous in our friends, 
we are mixing pleasure...with malice" (Philebus, SOa). Aristotle identified "a mistake 
or deformity not productive of pain or harm to others” as the source of amusement 
(On Poetics, v, I). It was Thomas Hobbes, however, who stated the proposal most 
directly:
Laughter is nothing else but sudden glory arising from some sudden 
conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity o f 
others, or with our own formerly.
(1640: IX, 13; See also 1651:1 ,6)
Hobbes' short words have been expanded upon by a number o f 'superiority' theorists 
(see Bain, 1880; Cams, 1898, Dunlap, 1925; Leacock, 1935; Rapp, 1949; Sidis, 
1913). Gruner (1979), a recent example, holds that the expression of amusement as 
laughter represents a kind of survival of the atavistic 'victory cry' which early 
hominids supposedly experienced after defeating their enemy. In the present day, any
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situation of felt superiority over another would provoke amusement. Other writers 
have merely proposed an aggressive 'spark' in all funny stimuli: Whenever humor 
occurs, an element of aggression is present -on  a broad spectrum ranging from the 
mild satisfaction of twisting the language out of shape to the malicious pleasure of 
watching a humiliating practical joke” (Feinberg, 1978).
Superiority and aggression theories can be discounted as global explanations 
of spontaneous laughter. One reason is that wit, puns, nonsense, and other apparently 
non-aggressive forms of humour cannot be plausibly accounted for by such a view. If 
we consider the abovementioned claim by Feinberg, for instance, his use o f the loaded 
phrase "twisting the language out of shape" fails to convince the critical reader o f any 
obvious similarity between laughing derisively and laughing at a pun. Rather, what 
seems twisted out of shape is the concept of 'aggression.' Without justification, 
Feinberg has assumed that people universally personify language and/or bear ill will 
towards the words they use. Moreover, verbal humour often provokes the most violent 
and explosive extremes of laughter, not just Feinberg’s "mild satisfaction."
Gruner (1979) has proposed a more ingenious account o f wit and incongruity : 
its perceiver laughs at a victory over himself, a self which has been fooled by a verbal 
ambiguity or trick. 'Victory,' or 'superiority' seems an inappropriate description of the 
relation between the amused self and the self to which the laughter responds, however. 
Triumphs and victories in their purest forms, whether over exterior enemies or over 
the self, do not necessarily or even usually result in amusement. Though derisive 
laughter may not be absent from football grounds, military battlefields, and election 
campaigns, victory in these arenas typically leads to expressions of shared joy: 
cheering, applause, shouts of triumph, smiles, and the like. Similarly with moments of 
great personal achievement, in which the victorious self will be able to perceive lesser 
previous selves. Naturalistic studies have not been conducted to determine what 
moments during a competitive or individual struggle may lead to amusement and 
which to joy. Everyday observation and subjective experience, however, suggest that 
the immediate reaction to victory, even sudden and unexpected victory, is other than 
humorous amusement.
The superiority explanation contains additional embarrassing consequences. 
For example, we may laugh at persons which we consider, despite their mistakes, 
better than ourselves in the relevant characteristic. Laughter at an opera singer's
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missed note does not require the audience member to consider his own singing 
abilities superior. Such a situation cannot be characterized as a ’victory.’
If not quite satisfying as general explanations of amusement, 
aggression/superiority theories contain undeniable value, and have led to intriguing 
experimental discoveries. Firstly, they draw attention to a set of stimuli which other 
theories (i.e., incongruity) either ignore or struggle with: the mishaps, mistakes, 
disparagements, defects, and blemishes of others. In these cases, the funny object is 
another social actor, or in some cases the peiteiver himself —we have seen that both 
Hobbes and Gruner take this latter possibility into account. The casting of this 
interpersonal relation as one of superiority/înferiority or aggressor/victim has proven 
unsatisfactory, but the identification o f such a relation at all continues to hold 
theoretical promise.
Such hopes are grounded in some of the best-confirmed empirical evidence in 
the humour research literature, what have been called 'dispositional' effects (see 
Zillman, 1983, for a review). These effects are relevant to 'disparagement humour,' 
that is, "humour that disparages, belittles, debases, demeans, humiliates, or otherwise 
victimizes" (ibid.: 85); in other words, funny stimuli which include a human object 
that is 'disparaged' in some way. In most of the studies, jokes which disparaged the 
representative(s) of some social or ethnic group were presented to subjects who held 
varying attitudes towards these groups. It has been repeatedly demonstrated that 
amusement before such stimuli depends on the affective disposition towards the 
object of disparagement, in the following manner:
1. The more intense the negative disposition toward the disparaged agent or 
entity, the greater the magnitude o f mirth.
2. The more intense the positive disposition toward the disparaged agent or 
entity, the smaller the magnitude o f mirth.
(ibid.: 91)
Additionally, similar effects have been found regarding the agent provoking the 
disparagement:
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3. The more intense the negative disposition toward the disparaging agent or 
entity, the smaller the magnitude of mirth.
4. The more intense the positive disposition toward the disparaging agent or 
entity, the greater the magnitude of mirth.
(ibid.: 91-92)
The finding that the perceiver's attitude towards a human object of amusement varies 
his overall level of amusement raises the question of how this perceiver-object 
relation may fit within a general theory of amusement, if such a theory is possible. 
Considering Hobbes' point that "men laugh at the follies of themselves past," (1640: 
IX, 13) and Gruner's analysis of wit, the possibility of 'self-disparaging humour* 
should also be taken into account.
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, 2.1.2. Incongruity Theory
Perhaps the most popular approach holds that amusement results from the 
perception of an 'appropriate' incongruity, an unusual or surprising relation between 
two contrary or unrelated phenomena. John Locke's discrimination between judgment 
and wit represents the earliest statement:
For wit lying most in the assemblage of ideas, and putting these together with 
quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, 
thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy; 
judgment, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in separating carefully, 
one from another, ideas wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to 
avoid being misled by similitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another.
(1690: H, xi)
Locke refers here to wit, the creation of funny stimuli, but implies that amusement is 
provoked when the perceiver of wit is "misled by similitude," when incongruous 
phenomena are joined in the mind by apparent congruity. This implication was 
developed by a number of eighteenth-century writers (Addison, 1711 and Gerard, 
1759, in Grieg, 1923), most elaborately by the Scottish philosopher and poet James 
Beattie:
Laughter arises from the view of two or more inconsistent, unsuitable, or 
incongruous parts of circumstances, considered as united in one complex 
object or assemblage, or as acquiring a sort of mutual relation from the 
peculiar manner in which the mind takes notice of them...unless when the 
perception of it is attended with some other emotion of greater authority.
(1776: 320/419)
Schopenhauer in 1819 issued an almost identical and influential restatement of the 
proposal, and in the recent years it has been taken up and refreshed by cognitive 
psychologists and linguists (Monro, 1951; Milner, 1972; Jones, 1970; Schultz, 1972; 
Suls, 1972; Wilson, 1979; Raskin, 1985; Norrick, 1986).
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In line with current conceptions of cognitive interpretative mechanisms, the 
latest versions describe the incongruity as taking place between two 'schemas,' 
'scripts,' or 'frames,' mental classifications of real-world objects and events, rather than 
between the real world phenomena themselves. Raskin (1985) claims that a text is a 
joke-carrying text if it satisfies the following two conditions:
(i) the text is compatible, fully or in part, with two different scripts
(ii) the two scripts with which the text is compatible are opposing scripts
(P- 99)
For example in the one liner, “ I used to be an atheist but I  gave up —no holidays" 
(Davis, 1993: 82), the 'script' covering the reasons for identifying with a religious idea 
is combined with an opposing script covering the reasons for holding a job. '
Incongruity theories have been found most helpful in the understanding of 
verbal and visual wit. Their proponents, however, have rarely intended them as 
general explanations of amusement. Raskin attempts to put forward "a formal 
semantic theory of verbal humour" (p. xiii). Beattie distinguished the laughter aroused 
by ideas from that aroused by tickling, and both of these were contrasted with laughter 
at the "ridiculous". Suls admits that "the incongruity-resolution model is not a 
complete account, it describes a part of the humor experience" (p. 55). I have included 
incongruity accounts under the label of 'monocausal theories' firstly because in some 
fields (i.e., in linguistics) they are often employed as such in practice, and secondly 
because not all authors have been so modest:
All laughter is occasioned by a paradoxical, and hence unexpected 
subsumption, it matters not whether this is expressed in words or in deeds. 
This in brief is the correct explanation of the ludicrous (...) There will be no 
question that here, after so many fruitless attempts, the true theory of the 
ludicrous is given, and the problem propounded by and given up by Cicero 
definitely solved.
(Schopenhauer, 1819; 1:58-59; 2:92)
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As a general explanation, 'appropriate incongruity' flags precisely where 
'superiority/aggression* excels. The interpersonal aspect of amusement has no place in 
such theories, which consider the psychology of a single individual. Furthermore, they 
ignore or fail to account properly for the 'disparagement' elements of humour, or for 
funny events in which real or fictional actors make mistakes, display incompetence, or 
suffer attacks by fate or other actors.
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2.1.3. Tension-Release Theory
Release theories propose that amusement is the body’s way of discharging 
excess nervous energy, aggression, sexual excitement, or any number of other 
physiological emotions or tensions. The origins of this idea, though foreshadowed by 
Kant11, are normally attributed to Herbert Spencer. “Laughter is a form of muscular 
excitement, and so illustrates the general law that feeling passing a certain pitch 
habitually vents itself in bodily action...strong feeling o f almost any kind produces this 
result...joyous emotion...mental distress...tickling...cold, and some kinds of acute 
pain” (1891: 458). The claim that strong feeling of ’almost any kind* produces 
amusement lacks detailed empirical support and is contradicted both by intuition and 
by the paltry list of feelings enumerated by Spencer himself (i.e., where is fear? 
anger?). Nevertheless, the subsequent account of funny stimuli of the incongruity type 
has been influential. Spencer identified, "descending incongruities" as a major source 
of amusement, events which defeat built-up expectations to which the body had been 
emotionally attuned, such as a misbehaved goat that suddenly appears on stage and 
sniffs at the actors during a climactically poignant theatrical love scene (p. 461-63). 
The "large amount of nervous energy...suddenly checked in its flow” is released by 
the "half-convulsive actions we term laughter" (p. 462).
A recent version of this idea was developed by Arthur Koestler in The Act o f 
Creation (1964). Koestler uses the metaphor of an inner ’pipeline’ which carries 
emotions as an individual interprets a given narrative: “When the pipe is punctured 
[by a funny stimuli], and our expectations are fooled, the now redundant tension 
gushes out in laughter” (p. 51). Koestler is more specific than Spencer in the 
identification o f both the accumulated feeling and the triggering cognitive mechanism. 
Though ”a bewildering variety of moods" may be included in the emotional tension, 1
11 In his Critique o f Judgement (1790:203), he states that
thoughts,...as far as they seek sensible expression, engage the body also. In the exhibition 
invoved in jest, the understanding, failing to find what it expected, suddenly relaxes, so that we 
feel the effect of this slackening in the body by the vibration of our organs, which helps to 
restore their equilibrium and has a benefical influence on our health..daughter is an affect that 
arises if a tense expectation is transformed into nothing.
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"it must contain one ingredient whose presence is indispensable: an impulse, however 
faint, of aggression or apprehension" (p. 51-52).
As for the ’spark' that ignites laughter, it is bisociation, "the perceiving of a situation 
or idea...in two self-consistent but habitually incompatible frames of reference" (p. 32- 
37). In other words, elements of both aggression and incongruity theories are 
ingeniously combined.
More in line with current conceptions of physiological processes, Daniel 
Berlyne (1960, 1969, 1972) proposed that amusement results when an arousal ’boost' 
that produces unpleasantly high levels of arousal, is followed by a sharp drop or 'jag.'
Relief theories have been popular with medical practitioners, child 
psychologists, and some sociological fieldworkers. As we have seen earlier in this 
chapter, substantial evidence suggests that amusement helps to reduce stress and 
threat-induced anxiety, with consequent benefits to overall health. Furthermore, 
laughter in early infancy typically follows the exposure to highly arousing stimuli, 
previously found threatening, which are now judged to be 'safe': tickling, monster 
masks, jumping off a 'high' platform, etc... (Sroufe and Wunsch, 1972; Rothbait, 
1973; McGhee, 1979: 127). A number of sociologists have also observed joking and 
laughter being used by social actors in real-life situations to relieve tension and 
anxieties. An example is the aforementioned study by Coser (1959), in which hospital 
patients used "jocular griping" to strip risky or dangerous situations of their 
threatening aspects.
Like other monocausal amusement theories, the 'relief explanation seems 
more plausible in some cases than in others. Fear-related laughter of the type 
commonly observed in children can also be observed in adults who watch horror 
films, engage in 'danger sports' or ride rollercoasters. In these cases a truly strong 
emotional state is followed by relief and amusement, once the situation is perceived as 
safe. However, while 'nervous laughter,' Coser’s 'jocular griping,' or Spencer's example 
of tragedy upstaged by a goat might be included in such a category of events, 
generalizing to other funny stimuli, such as jokes and puns, seems far-fetched. The 
'tension' that a short nonsensical phrase ('a knife without a blade that has no handle1) 
can produce in a hearer must be minimal, yet the laughter produced by such stimuli 
can be as explosive as any. In such cases, Koestler is forced to assume, ad hoc, the 
existence of unconscious reserves of emotion: “a minute cause can open the tap of
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surprisingly large stores of energy from various sources: repressed sadism; repressed 
sex; repressed fear; even repressed boredom” (1964: 60). The only evidence provided 
for such stores is the amusement itself.
It is also unclear how this type of theory might account for humorous 
appreciation of the mistakes* slips, and blunders of the self or of others. As has been 
pointed out above, Koestler excludes these from analysis as 'entirely mirthless and 
humorless.'
Unlike most other amusement theories, empirically testable physiological 
claims are additionally made by relief explanations. These have failed to stand up to 
experimental scrutiny. Deckers, Jenkins and Gladfelter (1977) found that changes in 
the difficulty of a test presented to subjects (presumably affecting tension) had no 
effect on laughter at the incongruous resolution of the test. Moreover, it appears that 
Berlyne's arousal ’jag,' or the reduction in nervous or emotional 'tension,' does not 
occur with the onset of a punchline or with laughter itself. Measures of physiological 
responses to humour have shown amusement to be correlated positively with increased 
heart rate, increased skin conductance, increased muscle tension, altered respiratory 
patterns, and characteristic EEG changes (McGhee, 1983: 16). The idea that the build­
up of an amusing narrative produces a  tension 'burst' by its unexpected conclusion 
seems implausible. Godkewitsch (1976) found that arousal was related mainly to the 
punchline of a joke, rather than to its body.
Sigmund Freud proposed a slightly divergent 'relief interpretation in his Jokes 
and their Relation to the Unconscious (1905). Freud viewed 'tendentious wit’ (i.e., 
disparagement, 'toilet,’ sexual, or *black’ humour) as a technique for liberating 
repressed aggressive or sexual desires. Jokes were considered a socially acceptable 
way of expressing certain taboo topics or sentiments, thus serving (like dreams) as a 
kind o f 'escape valve' for the unconscious.
Needless, to say, this theory cannot be applied to all types of funny stimuli. In 
fact, Freud did not provide a global and consistent definition for the techniques of wit, 
and admitted the existence of ’nontendentious humour'; this 'relief interpretation was 
only meant as a  part of a lesser-known theory encompassing what he called 'wit,' 
'comedy,' and 'humour.' Nevertheless, a number of followers have taken its proposals 
to implausible extremes:
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Question: Why did the moron jump o ff the Empire State Building? 
Answer: Because he wanted to make a smash hit on Broadway.
The huge phallic shape is the father's penis, the sight of which impels the child 
to competitive exhibition. He hopes to have a sensational success, but also 
fears a catastrophic defeat. Unable to abandon his ambitions, he pays in 
advance.
(Martha Wolfenstein, cited in 
Gruner, 1979: 78)
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2.1.4. Play Theory
The fourth most commonly cited global explanation of amusement dates from 
1902, when both M. Dugas (see Grieg, 1969: 271-72) and James Sully independently 
proposed that it follows the adoption of a 'play-mood' or playful point of view towards 
a particular object: “Even if the laughable spectacle does not wear the look of a play- 
challenge...it may so present its particular feature as to throw us off our serious 
balance, and by a sweet compulsion force us to play with it rather than to consider it 
seriously” (Sully, 1902:150).
A more fully developed statement of the theory was provided by Max Eastman 
in his Sense o f Humour (1921). Eastman considers the ability to create humour to be a 
human instinct in itself: “The sense of humor is a  primary instinct of our nature...a 
very inward indispensable little shock-absorber...for making the best of a bad thing” 
(p. 226/21). According to Eastman, amusement reacts to the observation of failures, 
disappointments, and other unpleasant stimuli, when they are viewed through the 
playful lens of humour. This humorous interpretation of events supposedly allows 
actors to 'free' themselves from the constraints of social norms and 'serious' thought 
and behaviour, and to overcome anxiety by recasting threats as absurdities.
Gregory Bateson (1955), William Fry (1963) and Michael Mulkay (1988) have 
recently revived interest in the 'play' interpretation. According to Mulkay, the play­
mode is characterized by an absurd multiplicity of meanings:
in the serious realm we normally employ a unitary mode of discourse which 
takes for granted the existence o f one real world, and within which ambiguity, 
inconsistency, contradiction and interpretative diversity are problems. In 
contrast, humour depends on the active creation and display of interpretative 
multiplicity. When people engage in humour, they are obliged to collaborate in 
the production. They temporarily inhabit, not a single, coherent world, but a 
world in which whatever is said and done necessarily has more than one 
meaning.
(Mulkay, 1988: 3-4)
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To prompt the audience for such collaboration, it has been pointed out that comics and 
humourists of every type provide humour 'cues' to signal that what is to take place is 
’not real' or 'not serious* (Fry, 1963; McGhee and Johnson, 1975).
'Play* theories reduce all funny stimuli to Tiumour,' in the sense I have defined 
it - intentional provocations of amusement, whether created by others or by the 
subject of laughter himself. Such a reduction strains credibility, however, in the case 
of amusement at spontaneously occurring mishaps, incompetence, or discredited 
claims. When laughter is directed at an individual, the laughter may sometimes be 
taken as 'not serious/ as 'just a tease/joke/ but other times may actually 'hurt' and be 
taken very seriously indeed.
Such examples are rarely even considered by play theorists, attention being 
almost exclusively focused on jokes, friendly teasing, comedy routines, and the like. 
Mulkay does occasionally attempt an explanation, as with the following excerpt from 
a political speech:
Conservative politician: The Labour Prime Minister and his colleagues are 
boasting in this election campaign that they have brought inflation down from 
the disastrous level of twenty-six per cent. But we are entitled to inquire who 
put it up to twenty-six per cent?
Audience: (laughter and applause for 8 seconds)
(example from Atkinson, 1984; 
cited in Mulkay, 1988: 207)
According to Mulkay, such attacks by politicians represent a competitors' "version of 
the world as unreliable, illusory or not to be taken seriously." It would be more 
accurate to say, however, that the cited jibe presents the Labour Party's definition of 
the situation (Labour keeps inflation down') as unambiguously false -indeed, Mulkay 
later describes the quip as attempting to "reveal the 'true character*" of Labour's claims 
(p. 207). This type of discrediting move cannot be described as 'playful/ and neither 
can the victim's actions or words be seen as 'nonserious.' The audience is not presented
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with a multiplicity of meanings but with a clarification of reality: a clarification w h ich  
to the right audience, nevertheless, is funny.
The specific trigger of amusement is never properly specified in 'play* 
accounts. 'Entering into a playful/humorous mode,' in this context, provides not an  
explanation but a tautology. Humour cues are not necessary to  amusement; neither are  
they sufficient for it. As for the switching of contexts and the creation of ambiguous o r  
multiple meanings, these are common occurrences in nonhumorous creative writing 
and other expressive arts such as poetry or abstract painting. They are also 
experienced in imaginative fancies and even true 'play' which is non-amusing.
Nevertheless, 'play' theory calls attention to interesting phenomena. The 
distinction between 'serious' and 'joking/play' modes may be a valid and significant 
one, even if we do not always laugh 'in jest.' How to characterize this binary contrast 
becomes an additional problem for any account of amusement. Relatedly, attention is 
drawn to the 'humour cues’ which indeed recur under various guises in performances 
and presentations of humour. The play o f children (and of adults) itself deserves more 
detailed observation than it has received.
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2.2. Pluralistic Theories
The failure to achieve a single-cause explanation of amusement has driven 
many researchers to abandon the possibility altogether:
It is interesting to notice how, in the literature of laughter, the more ambitious 
contributors have vainly attempted to bring the varieties of forms of humorous 
experiences under some definite laughter-causing principle... In order to bring 
causes of laughter into the desired category attempts are made which are, in 
themselves, frequently humorous... It is a hopeless task...to secure anything 
approaching a common principle.
(Kimmins, 1928: 1)
In some cases, the diversity o f causes posited is accompanied by the proposition that 
the explanandum behind felt funniness and observed laughter, therefore, can be 
divided into various essentially different phenomena.
It may be that, despite the apparent subjective and physiological unity of 
'amusement,' and certain contextual similarities, various independent causes lead to its 
occurrence or to several species of it. Unfortunately, however, there has been little 
consensus regarding the classification of the various 'types' of amusement according to 
stimuli. Here follows a partial list of lists:
Quintillian: (1) urbanitas, (2) venustum, (3) salsum, (4) facetum, (5) iocus, and (6) 
dicacitas. (in Grieg, 1923:227)
Hazlitt (1818): (1) the laughable —incongruous, (2) the risible -incongruous and 
contrary to custom, and (3) the ridiculous -incongruous and contrary to sense and 
reason.
Cordaveaux (1875): (1) slight imperfections, (2) slight annoyances, (3) the unexpected 
or surprising, (4) the indecent or obscene (in Grieg, 1923:259)
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Michiels (1886): (1) bodily vices or perturbations, (2) disrupted equilibrium am ong 
human faculties, (3) disadjustments of a person to the world (4) disadjustments o f a  
person to his own society (in Grieg, 1923:259).
Freud (1905): (1) wit (tendentious and nontendentious), (2) the comic, (3) humour.
Sidis (1913): (1) ascending laughter —difficult things become easy for the laugher, (2) 
descending laughter -easy things become difficult for others.
Gregory (1923): evolutionary scale o f increasing "humanization" of laughter, from 
more aggressive to more sympathetic forms.
D.T. Wieck (1967): (1) laughter where there is no object, (2) laughter at someone, and
(3) laughter at something.
Giles and Oxford (1970): (1) humorous, (2) social, (3) ignorance, (4) tension-release, 
(5) derision, (6) apologetic, (7) tickling.
i
Poyatos (1993): (1) affiliation, (2) aggression, (3) social, (4) anxiety, (5) fear, (6) joy, 
(7) comicality and ludicrousness, (8) amusement, (9) self-directedness, (10) certain 
random interactive occurrences.
Critical examination of any such list will find it no more adequate a description of the 
facts than one of the monocausal theories. "A priori," to Giles and Oxford "it would 
appear that laughter principally occurs under seven mutually exclusive conditions" (p. 
97), as enumerated above. Are they truly ’mutually exclusive’? Amusement at the 
blunder of a long-standing enemy, for instance, might qualify as both ’derision’ and 
'tension-release.* Would an ethnic joke be classified under 'humour' or 'derision'?
None o f these typologies has proved particularly helpful in understanding the 
phenomena. None has achieved general recognition. Most of them seem relatively 
arbitrary, while the others discriminate according to either trivial or patently 
misguided principles. However, at least they recognize the existence of real
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differences between funny stimuli which monocausa] theorists have often ignored or 
fail to treat convincingly.
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2.3. "No Theory'
More prudent, and perhaps more popular today, is the agnostic stance, w hich 
withholds judgment on general theories or classifications until more is known about 
particular areas. Or rather, a pluralistic theory is generally assumed, w ithout 
commitment to any particular classification:
If we have learned anything from the study of humor it is that oversimplified, 
global explanations are inadequate to the task.... The focus on specific issues 
within the broad area of humor, laughter, and comedy liberates the theorist and 
basic researcher from premature and unwarranted generalizations. By 
restricting their field of view, students of humor are better able to deal with the 
"  complexity of the phenomenon.
(McGhee and Goldstein, 1983, vol. I, p. vii)
For many, such an attitude will suffice. One need not always see the wood if it 
is a single tree that requires attention. Nevertheless, such statements seem post hoc 
justifications for a situation into which humour researchers have been forced. A 
general overview of the field would be o f undeniable value, and such a perspective 
must be possible. Though laughter may not be a simple stimulus-response reflex 
describable in a single way, there must be some manner in which the various current 
or perhaps future theories can be integrated to form a coherent field. The relationship 
between incongruity and disparagement humour, for instance, must be clarified: are 
they to be subsumed under a larger explanation, divided by some subtle boundary, 
combined into a new structure, or fractionated into lesser elements along some 
undiscovered plane?
The current situation can perhaps then be characterized as one of increasing 
but disorganized or at least divided knowledge. Experimental and other types of data, 
interesting in themselves, continue to  grow, but there lacks an encompassing 
framework within which to discuss the findings. Inevitably, without a coherent way to 
express the relationships between different isolated fields, individual researchers tend 
towards one or another of the general, outdated and unsatisfying old theories of 
superiority, tension-release, incongruity, and the like. Or worse, they combine
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elements from each in a more or less unprincipled manner. There is no general 
agreement as to what the best questions to ask are, how the basic phenomena should 
be defined, or how the different types of stimuli should be classified. The search for a 
general theory has been abandoned as unrealistic, but the existing subtheories cannot 
be reconciled with each other.
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3. Amusement Theory and its Validation
The preceding discussion constitutes a typical example of a popular sub-genre 
in the humour-research field, the critique of past and present causal theories 
(especially in preparation for the unleashing on the reader of a new-and-improved 
attempt). What has been less common, indeed rare, is the consideration o f the general 
criteria and methodologies that can, have, or should be used for assessing or validating 
theories.
It will be argued in this section that most humour theorists have intuitively 
followed a methodology which, though distant from the ideal of scientific practice, 
represents the most promising procedure for understanding phenomena such as 
amusement. Making this procedure explicit, however, may be of use both to better 
follow it through and to better compare and assess its results. The methodology, which 
I will call 'aggregate introspection,' is most suitable for studying features of everyday 
thought, emotion, and experience which are familiar to all human beings but 
inaccessible to controlled and objective observation. The first step of the procedure is 
for the theorist to gradually develop a description of relevant phenomena through a 
process of continuous testing and modification of the description with an expanding 
body of diverse empirical facts derived from everyday experience. He must then 
communicate his results in a manner —normally by the use of many and varied 
illustrations- which will allow others to understand his proposed concepts and 
relations, and to put them to the test themselves. The validity of the resulting theory 
can then assessed by all those who read and consider its proposals, by an identical 
process of testing with reference to their own experience. A successful theory of this 
type is one with which the largest and most varied body of competent readers will 
identify.
The aggregate introspection method is that which has been used to develop 
(and should be used to assess) the amusement theory proposed in Part Two of the 
thesis, as well as its extension (covering laughter and humour) in Part Three.
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3,1. Amusement and Conventional Scientific Methods
A causal theory of amusement claims that a  particular cause (the am usem ent 
stimulus) leads to a particular effect (the amusement response). Can such a relation b e  
demonstrated? And if so, how?
In conventional scientific practice, causal relations (’A  causes B‘) are proposed 
as hypotheses which may then be tested against empirical cases. Tests may b e  
engineered by the artificial provocation of appropriate circumstances (i.e., in an 
experimental laboratory) or carried out by seeking, collecting, and reporting 
observations of naturally occurring events. Researchers will attempt to see if it is the 
case that when *A* occurs or is brought about *B' always follows, and whether 
occurrences of B ' are always preceded by ‘A’. These tests should be objective, in the 
sense that observation are of events external to the mind of the observer, and thus 
shareable by other observers. 'A' and B ' should be describable in such a way that any 
trained researcher could carry out and report tests. If predictions are not borne out by 
any proper test, the hypothesis may be discarded or modified. Additional hypotheses 
may also be generated to account for variability of effects under different 
circumstances. A hypothesis which is highly falsifiable and yet remains unfalsified 
across all or most successive tests may be established as a  theory.
In the case of amusement, this procedure cannot be undertaken in the same 
manner. A theory attempting to characterize the cause(s) of amusement is not testable 
in the conventional scientific sense, due to the obstacles to objective observation o f 
the basic phenomena. In the testing o f amusement theories, there can be no 
interobserver agreement regarding the observation of either cause or effect (at least in 
most cases).
Amusement, as we have seen, reacts to a cognitive stimulus of some type, that 
is, to a mental event. ‘Appropriate incongruity,’ 'non-seriousness,' or 'superiority over 
an other* all attempt to characterize certain perceptions experienced by a subject, who 
does not ordinarily conceptualize them in such terms himself. Without science-fiction 
brain scans or telepathy, these events cannot be observed directly, except by the 
subject himself. Thus, two observers can never agree sensibly on whether a particular 
period of mental activity within one of them, let alone a third party, could be plausibly
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characterized as a case of ’superiority,' 'incongruity,' or whatever. Only one of the two 
observers would have direct sensorial access to the mental activity in question.
Amusement itself, o f course, is an equally elusive phenomenon. As we have 
seen, laughter cannot be taken as a transparent sign of its occurrence, and neither can 
the assertions of an actor. Again, therefore, we encounter the essential impossibility of 
inter-observer agreement. Moreover, the expression of amusement is highly sensitive 
to observation itself. The experimental paradigm is notoriously effective in 
eliminating laughter from interaction. Subjects, often isolated in the experimental 
room, nervous, and aware of their condition of observed 'subjects/lab rats’ rarely 
exhibit the uninhibited displays of laughter common in social interaction:
An index as to the artificiality and sterility of much of the humor research to 
. date is that the majority of researchers do not incorporate any measure of 
laughter in their work. One suspects that this is because they know from 
experience that many of the persons they are observing will not actually laugh.
(Chapman, 1983:137)
In my own short experience with the experimental approach (Jauregui, 1993) I noticed 
substantially more (and more suggestive) laughter in the few minutes before and after 
the procedure than during.
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3.2. Aggregate Introspection
As objective tests of amusement theories appear unfeasible, the remaining 
alternative is for subjective tests to be employed. Any subject of amusement —that is 
to say, any human being— may develop and test a theory of amusement by mere 
introspection. Normally, individuals do not devote much thought and effort to such 
endeavours, but they are nevertheless capable: at an intuitive level, all of us know 
what makes something funny (as well as many other features of the laughter triad), 
and can draw upon large pools of experience to make this intuitive knowledge more 
explicit.
Moreover, if a relatively accurate causal theory of amusement is presented in 
detail to any individual, he is likely to recognize its accuracy and prefer it to less 
accurate ones, by reference to his own experiences. In possession of an inexhaustible 
fountain of fust hand data (i.e., past and present knowledge o f his own amusement) as 
well as of second- and third-hand data (others' apparent/alleged amusement), he is 
sufficiently equipped to judge whether the theory accounts for the facts in a  plausible 
way. Indeed, an individual must look inwardly to make any such decision. Only when 
considering his own experiences can he be certain of the presence and degree of 
amusement, as well as of the object of amusement and/or laughter. Only by reference 
to such experiences, by a process of identification or 'projection,' can he understand 
the potential reality behind others' laughter display (whether observed naturalistically 
or measured with a 'laugh-o-meter').
If causal theories of amusement can only be tested by an individual scientist, 
the results of any test will be valid only for himself. A more general validity may be 
obtained, however, i f  many individuals carry out the relevant testing and agree on the 
result. In practice, though not always explicitly, this aggregate introspection method 
has been the usual procedure applied in the field of humour (and, incidentally, in other 
areas o f social and human sciences).
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3.3. Aggregate Introspection in Humour Research
All amusement theorists have been driven to the 'aggregate introspection' 
procedure, though it has rarely been discussed explicitly. An analysis of the texts of 
humour theorists, from Plato to Raskin, will reveal a common attempt to engage the 
reader's imagination and self-reflective abilities. The use of hypothetical examples 
forced on the reader by the second-person 'you,' for example, is common:
Take a case. You are sitting in a theatre, absorbed in the progress of an 
interesting drama.... There appears from behind the scenes a tame kid, 
which...walks up to the lovers and sniffs at them. You cannot help joining in 
the roar which greets this contretemps.
(Spencer, 1891: 461)
If you feel that such distortions of the human face do not really exist, 
that Daumier, deliberately exaggerating, merely pretended that they exist, then 
you are absolved from horror and pity and can laugh at his grotesques. But if 
you feel that this is indeed what Daumier saw in those de-humanized faces, 
then you are looking at a work of art.
(Koestler, 1964: 70)
Equally rife is the inclusive 'we':
( For most of us laughter bubbles to the fore only rarely when there is no one 
else around. These are occasions when we relive amusing accidents or when in 
daydreams we conjure up thoughts of others. Sometimes an author can levitate 
us so that we 'lose' ourselves in the story and imagine ourselves as first-hand 
witnesses to funny events. When we laugh it is as though we were actually 
present.
(Chapman, 1983: 148)
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Such assertions are wholly unsubstantiated, except by the author’s own p ersonal 
experience and perhaps his knowledge of a few other cases. Nevertheless, h u m o u r 
theorists feel confident enough about their typicality and generalizability to offer th e m  
as ’stories’ in which the reader himself is included. Even when the author re te lls  
examples from his own perspective, or uses the impersonal third-person terms Tie,* 
'subject,' 'speaker/hearer,' 'actor/observer,' and the like, the use of hypothetical 
examples in itself invites the reader to consider the plausibility of the author's w ords 
by reference to personal experience. Such hypothetical examples are perhaps the m o st 
universal feature of humour theory writing:
If 1 see a character in a film accidentally lean against the lever o f a slo t 
machine and thereby hit the jackpot, I might be amused by this incongruity. 
But if I were to do the same thing accidentally in a gambling casino, m y 
laughter might be all the greater because my enjoyment of the incongruity 
would be boosted by my positive feelings toward my sudden good fortune.
(Morreall, 1982:251)
These may even be supplemented with direct requests to exercise the imagination, as 
in the excerpt from Spencer quoted above ("Take a case..."), or this further example 
from Morreall's article: “Even adult laughter need not involve incongruity; consider 
our laughter on winning a game or on anticipating some enjoyable activity” (p. 245, 
my italics).
Such true or imaginary anecdotes are often complemented by a second 
common technique for stimulating audience participation. Particularly in the case o f 
verbal and pictorial humour, the reader can be engaged directly by being offered 
examples of amusement stimuli to be consumed on the spot for immediate analysis. 
Indeed, many books and articles in the field could be profitably ransacked by 
comedians for material and inspiration. Victor Raskin, for example, includes no less 
than 400jokes in his Semantic Mechanisms o f Humor (1985).
The substantive strategy employed by these authors has varied little. 
Commonly, illustrations are provided of funny events, which are interpreted according 
to the theory proposed (i.e., jokes contain incongruities, mistakes are incongruities, 
etc). As a contrast, situations where the causal factor is lacking or disappears are
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sometimes suggested« with claims that amusement in these cases is also absent or 
curtailed (i.e.t scientific discoveries resolve incongruities, producing surprise and 
admiration). Illustrations may also be offered to demonstrate that variations in the 
causal stimulus cause variations in amusement (i.e., the greater the incongruity, the 
greater the amusement). The quotes by Spencer, Moireal, Chapman, and Koestler 
cited above include examples of all three types. Implicit in this procedure is the claim 
that if these descriptions of reality find resonance in readers, who thus find the theory 
plausible, such support will be evidence of its validity.
In such theoretical works, experimental evidence, statistics, and documented 
cases of amusement are rarely to be found. These types o f observations are more 
common in analyses of topics at one remove from the question of the causes of 
amusement, analyses which often admit their indirect link to the central concerns of 
the field. Towards the end of a review of the experimental study of 'disparagement 
humour,' associated with 'superiority' theories, Doif Zillman (1983: 103) concludes 
that "dispositional considerations (...) project kowfimny a disparaging event will be to 
whom; but they fail to predict whether or not it will be funny in the first place.'' In a 
review of research on cognitive models of humour, Jerry Suls admits that though this 
type of analysis "describes a part of the humor experience,...[it] is not a complete 
account" (1983: 54-55). For the reasons provided above in section 3.1, such research 
is fundamentally unsuited to the task of validating a general account of amusement.
When discussing the validity of theories, authors again most often resort to the 
presentation of hypothetical anecdotes and directly amusing stimuli, allowing the 
reader to falsify where supposedly appropriate:
The familiar instance o f a man joining in the laugh against himself 
makes nonsense of the [aggression] theory.
(Baillie, 1921: 272)
Others, with Locke, have supposed that heterogeneity o r ... incongruity 
is naturally comic. Yet nobody need laugh at the combination of a hot sun with 
a cold wind.
(Carritt, 1923: 554)
89
Chapter Two:, Causal Theories o f Amusement Se c tio n ^
Reference to the aggregate level o f assessment also takes place, most often during  
introductions which bemoan the lack of a generally satisfying explanation fo r  
amusement:
No all embracing theory of humour and/or laughter has yet gained 
widespread acceptance and possibly no general theory will ever be 
successfully applied to the human race as a whole.
(Chapman and Foot, 1976)
In the first century the Roman Quintillian complained that no one had 
yet explained what laughter is, though many had tried. And even with all the 
philosophers and psychologists who have tackled the problem in the 
intervening centuries, the story is pretty much the same today — we are still 
without an adequate general theory of laughter.
(Morreall, 1982:243)
These types of statements leave unsaid the implied conclusion that a theory of 
amusement which ’generally’ does not convince is almost certainly untrue. Most 
readers will intuitively agree with the implication, however, especially after exposure 
to the theories themselves.
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3.4. The Method in Detail
The 'aggregate introspection* method may be described as a three-stage 
process: (1) Development and testing of a hypothesis by its creator; (2) individual 
assessment; and (3) aggregate assessment.
3.4.1. Development and Testing of a Hypothesis
In the beginning, there is the untested hypothesis and its originator. Attempting 
to trace amusement theories to such roots would be pointless, considering the ancient 
interest in the subject, but we may assume that such roots exist. For the sake of 
simplicity, let us consider the case of a monocausal theory:
% and only X, causes amusement in all cases ofX'
(i.e., the perception of incongruity, and only such a perception, causes
amusement in all cases where incongruity is perceived)
The creator of this hypothesis, then, would be immediately able to test it against 
numerous events recorded from past experience in his memory; and against 
subsequent events as they occur in his unfolding daily life.
Causa] relations can never be directly demonstrated in science, but they can 
easily be disproven. Thus, the above hypothesis would be supported if both of the 
following proposals should resist falsification over many trials:
* a) In cases of amusement, amusement always follows X
b) In cases of X, amusement always follows
If both statements were found to be supported by events for all cases encountered over 
a reasonable period, our scientist would have transformed his hypothesis into a tested 
theory, albeit an individually tested one.
For example, if 'the perception of incongruity' were to be tested as the only and 
consistent cause of amusement, the assessor could consider his various experiences o f 
amusement —verbal jokes, satire, parody, spontaneous mishaps, tickling— and attempt
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to decide whether these antecedent events could be characterized as 'incongruities' in 
some consistent sense. Conversely, he could attempt to imagine 'incongruities' o f 
varied types and observe whether and how amusement is related to them.
Guidelines for Testing
The testing procedure should be conducted according to three basic 
considerations. Firstly, the causal factor should be defined as precisely as possible. 
Vague concepts such as 'rigidity,' 'incongruity,' 'superiority,' 'tension-release,' or 'play,' 
may prevent a researcher from discriminating efficiently between relevant and 
irrelevant phenomena. They facilitate, rather, the application of the relevant term 
wherever convenient —not as undesirable a state of affairs in scientific practice as it is 
in scientific theory.
Secondly, the theorist should seek, as far as possible, to include within the 
testing programme the widest range of diverse instances of both the proposed cause 
(i.e., 'incongruity') and amusement itself. Though obvious, this guideline can prove 
difficult to achieve due to cultural and theoretical biases, as well as practical 
problems.
One common failing is the excessive focus on amusement, rather than the 
proposed causal event. Perhaps due to the greater saliency of amusement itself within 
their overall project, most theorists have organized their data according to a set of 
stimuli already known to be funny. The set of events generated by the definition of the 
cause, however, often seems to have been left unexplored. As we have seen, 
'superiority' theorists have restricted their use of the term to certain misfortunes o f 
others or to 'victory' in 'contests of wit' (i.e., Gruner, 1979), disregarding such events 
as success in sporting matches, or an army general's perception of relative rank when 
confronted with a private.
Regarding the full range of 'funny things,’ the tendency to identify amusement 
with humour (i.e., intentional attempts to provoke it) has already been discussed in 
Chapter One. In addition to the hugely varied range of unintentionally funny events, 
other relatively rare elicitors such as tickling, sensory illusions, magic tricks, 
amusement rides, or 'brain teasers' often escape mention. Certain instances of mirth 
may be difficult to test merely due to practical problems in overcoming barriers of
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distance: the laughter of young children or of peoples from radically different cultural 
backgrounds. Many situations also escape easy analysis due to their involving nature. 
Laughter is a pleasant experience occurring most often in relaxed, informal settings. 
These, however, are precisely the settings where an analyst will find the greatest 
obstacles to achieving the attitude of an observer. The nature o f the hypothesis itself 
may make certain stimuli more salient and others relatively invisible. Furthermore, 
temptations (of a more or less conscious nature) to ignore certain events which do not 
fit comfortably with a favoured scheme may obstruct a fair survey. Finally, disliked 
mental occurrences (i.e., 'cruel' laughter) may be repressed or disguised by the mind of 
the theorist.
The third proposed guideline recommends that when testing particular cases, 
the analyst should seek to apply the definition of the cause of amusement in a 
consistent way. This uniformity will only be possible, of course, if a sufficiently clear 
and precise definition has been constructed. If the meaning of this definition must be 
stretched or distorted to accommodate a particular fact, the hypothesis is falsified.
Non-Falsification of the Hypothesis
If these three principles have been followed, and neither statement ’a)’ nor 
statement *b)’ falsified, the hypothesis is confirmed by the researcher. In this case, the 
hypothesis should not only describe an element common to the range of funny events 
(and lacking in non-funny ones), but also plausibly account for and successfully 
characterize the evident diversity of amusing stimuli in terms of the definition 
proposed. Differences between jokes, tickling, gaffes, and other phenomena should be 
directly attributable to typical or logical variations in the characteristics or form of the 
cause identified.
Falsification and Reformulation
If statement ’a)' and/or Tj)' were falsified by facts, the researcher could attempt 
to modify the definition of X, yielding *Xj causes amusement.' Another option would 
be to add one or more 'exception clauses':
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a) 'In cases of amusement, amusement always follows X (except when it 
follows Y)12'
b) In cases of X, amusement always follows (except if G is also the case, and 
then Q follows instead)'
M .
The new revised hypothesis could then be tested as before. If such revisions 
yielded no better result, the hypothesis would have to be abandoned altogether.
In this process, a hypothesis guides the theorist to the empirical facts, and in 
turn these guide the theorist back to refreshing his hypothesis. The cycle may be 
repeated numerous times, ideally yielding an ever-closer fit between the two.
Supporting Evidence
Additional confirmation of the hypothesis could be obtained if it led to the 
explanation or understanding of well-known facts surrounding amusement, laughter 
and humour. Psychological, communicational, and social effects of amusement, 
laughter, and humour, as well as their uses and possible ’functions' (See Chapter 
Eight); the influence of 'affective disposition* on amusement at disparagement 
humour, the common presence of ambiguous or clashing elements in verbal and other 
types of humour; the use and effectiveness of humour 'cues' by comedians; the 
influence of interpersonal and interactional variables on amusement. If such 
phenomena can be accounted for naturally by a specific causal hypothesis of 
amusement, or its logical corollaries, the hypothesis would warrant additional 
credibility. In themselves, however, these sorts of elucidations cannot provide full 
validation of a thesis. It might be expected that a  good theory will constitute a hub 
connecting many recurrent facts in the field, but the main test of its validity continues 
to be its explanatory power regarding the varied range of amusement-provoking 
situations.
12 This line would yield a 'pluralistic' hypothesis (See Section I.B.)
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3.4.2. Individual Assessment
I have outlined in some detail the first stage of the proposed validation 
procedure, the testing of a hypothesis by its originator. Stage 2 is, in form, practically 
identical to stage 1: A proposed cause of amusement is carefully defined and then 
considered as a description of events over as wide a range of phenomena as possible, 
leading to acceptance, falsification, or reformulation/retesting.
In this case, however, the hypothesis has been borrowed by a reader or hearer 
from the more-or-less developed theory of an originator. Faced with an explanation 
such as 'appropriate incongruity provokes amusement/ an individual can exploit his 
exclusive access to his own mental processes in order to test the idea.
As documented above in section 3.3, every theorist of amusement invites his 
audience to participate in the scientific endeavour by checking the facts presented for 
himself, and on himself. A successful humour theorist ideally constructs his text as a 
systematic soliciting of recognition from his readers. Indeed, humour theorists often 
refrain from providing actual cases of amusement as evidence, aware of the emptiness 
of such proof. Hypothetical cases and examples of humour will suffice, as the crucial 
testing is to be done in the reader's head. When facts are produced, these serve merely 
as illustrations to clarify a point. If the illustrations are well chosen, and the argument 
well-developed, the reader will have all the tools and materials necessary to follow the 
author's testing procedure. Whether in the end he agrees with the author's conclusions 
is another matter. As an experimenter himself, he may abandon the hypothesis or 
perform new modifications upon it.
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3.4.3. Aggregate Assessment
The third stage of the testing process occurs at a higher level of analysis. 
Assuming a theory comes to be tested by numerous individuals, the proportion o f  
these who generally accept/reject the hypothesis represents a kind of aggregate 
assessment of its validity, a meta-test The theory as originally distributed can be 
considered as a sort of questionnaire of unusually large size (and only one rather 
leading question). In conventional science, a theory can be tested publicly, by a  
prediction or set of predictions which are either borne out or falsified by an 
appropriate experimental procedure. In the realm of the emotions, intentions, 
motivations, and thought, the experimental procedure must be carried out privately, 
but the results can be shared publicly.
For a theory of amusement to be considered validated, an extremely high 
proportion of ’experimenters' would have to agree on its validation. Mere numbers, 
however, cannot be the sole criterion. Particular weight should be granted to the 
opinion of professional social scientists, and especially those with experience in 
humour and related academic fields (i.e., emotion, communication, and other areas of 
psychology and sociology). Attention should also be paid to the possible adhesion to 
the view of assessors from widely divergent theoretical, disciplinary, ideological and 
other backgrounds and leanings. Ideally, and allowing for cases of poor 
comprehension of the theory and shoddy application of tests, an almost complete 
unanimity would be required. In less abstract terms, this could be achieved by the 
general acceptance of a single paradigm by the main of humour research.
Admittedly, the procedure is wanting in scientific rigour. The variability in 
completeness, quality, and method of individual 'tests' cannot be assessed in practice. 
Many extraneous factors are likely to bias these procedures: variable exposure to 
theoretical alternatives, preconceived ideas on amusement, time and effort devoted to 
the task, self-reflective and analytical skills, cultural distance from the idioms used in 
the theoretical text. There exists no higher authority, furthermore, charged with the 
task of 'counting heads' and deciding upon the outcome of the aggregate test, nor any 
systematized procedure for such head-counting or for the weighing of the relative 
importance o f opinions.
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Three justifications can be used to defend the method, though none of them 
will satisfy a committed skeptic. The most decisive of these, perhaps, is the lack of 
alternatives for humour theory. Due to reasons outlined above, traditional methods fall 
short of the task, and 'aggregate introspection' seems altogether less ineffectual. A case 
could be made, certainly, for abandoning the amusement project altogether. I will 
assume, on the other hand, that the search for answers may be worthwhile —though the 
certainty of such answers should not be overestimated.
The second reason is the historical derivation of the first: as documented 
above, proposals of causal amusement theories have always employed a more-or-Iess 
sophisticated version of this method. This 'safety in numbers' argument does not 
improve the intrinsic credibility of the approach, but it does bolster its claimed status 
as ’least awful of several evils.'
Finally, on a more positive note, 'aggregate introspection' has actually been 
used in other fields with great success, even acclaim (as well as, admittedly, 
considerable puzzlement and resistance towards the method itself). A case will be 
considered below.
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It could be argued that silence on matters requiring such methods would be
3.5. A Successful Precedent
more prudent. On the other hand, they have in the past achieved results which have 
been widely recognized and applauded.
One outstanding example of aggregate introspection can be found in the work 
of Erving Goffman. This American sociologist developed a theory of the behaviour o f 
individuals during social interaction which has had an enormous influence throughout 
the social sciences. Despite its success, however, his work has baffled researchers 
since its publication due not only to the novelty of the topic he treated, but also to the 
methods employed. These methods fit well with the description provided above o f 
‘aggregate introspection.* Goffman’s texts can accurately be characterized as 
following a systematic solicitation of recognition from his readers, a recognition 
which moreover has been largely achieved in the widest of academic and non­
academic circles.
Goffman routinely made claims about social behaviour without what might be 
called 'proper empirical support.’ Indeed, the bulk of his writings consist of such 
claims, and Goffman had no qualms about admitting the fact:
Throughout the papers in this volume unsubstantiated assertions are made 
regarding the occurrence of certain social practices in certain times and among 
peoples of various kinds. This description by pronouncement is claimed to be a 
necessary evil. I assume that if a broad attempt is to be made to tie together 
bits and pieces of contemporary social life in exploratory analysis, then a great 
number of assertions must be made without solid quantitative evidence.
support could be obtained for his assertions, a possibility that many of his 
commentators have seconded: “Whether people share the interactional concerns 
identified by Goffman, and whether they orient to such concerns in the manner he 
suggests, are frequently questions which await further inquiry” (Drew and Wooton, 
1988: 6). As Drew and Wooton suggest, however, these questions still ’await’ inquiry -
(1971: xiii-xiv)
In this and other passages, Goffman implies that (despite his own practice) empirical
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-they have not in fact been tested. Indeed, though many of his concepts have become 
widely accepted and applied, there has been little empirical work explicitly aiming to 
test and follow up on his ideas, no Goffman 'school' or research centre to study his 
'interaction order' (Drew and Wooton, 1988: 2). Why is this the case? Considering 
"the breadth of Goffman's appeal and the popularity of his writings" (Bums, 1992: 1), 
and his alleged status as "one of the leading sociological writers of the post-war 
period” (Giddens, 1988: 250), it seems highly unlikely that mere lack of interest could 
explain such a state of affairs almost forty years after The Presentation o f Self in 
Everyday Life (1959).
I would argue that the nature of: Goffman's assertions makes unfeasible, 
problematic, or merely superfluous any conventional empirical study. The everyday 
events, practices, and situations which he excelled in describing and classifying — 
attempts to control bodily outbursts in public, the uses and meanings of eye-contact, 
the cues used by actors to interpret 'what is going on’— together constitute precisely the 
types of phenomena least amenable to controlled, objective observation. How does 
one go about 'proving,' for instance, that people universally display 'greeting 
behaviour' in the manner that Goffman suggests (1971: 62-94)? Trying to reproduce 
the possible variables in 'the laboratory' (merely one of the infinite possible situations 
considered by Goffman) seems as far fetched as experimenting with the full range of 
laughables. Neither could any respondent (nor, hopefully, any researcher) possibly 
take seriously a questionnaire on the subject...
When bumping into a friend on the street (you see him, he sees you), do you
A) Immediately make a sign of recognition ('Hello', waving, smile...)
B) Wait until he makes a sign, then reply.
C) Go about your business as before
D) Consciously look away.
It is not that empirical corroboration o f these sorts of findings, or at least some 
o f them, would be impossible. Rather, such corroboration would be somewhat naive 
and superfluous, considering the immediate forcefulness of Goffman's technique at its 
best. Even naturalistic observation of a conventional kind, while missing what actors
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hide (arguably the very focus of Goffman's work), could offer only additional cases of 
the ’already evident.' All of us know, by an intuition founded on masses of first-hand 
experience, how and when people engage in greeting behaviours, or how and when we 
experience embarrassment, manage a three-way conversation, or consider someone a 
bit lunatic. There seems little need to carry out further tests to prove these things to us 
when a few choice illustrations by this "untiringly perspicacious" observer (Bums, 
1992: 2) will suffice to convince each reader of such obvious (if not always 
verbalized) facts.
Goffman's unorthodox use of empirical data has been widely discussed. He 
drew his examples from a veritable ragbag o f sources: “Some data have been drawn 
from a study of a  mental hospital (hereafter called Central Hospital), some from a 
study of a Shetland Island community (hereafter called Shetland Isle), some from 
manuals of etiquette, and some from a file where I  keep quotations that have struck 
me as interesting” (Goffman, 1963: 4). All of these (and other) sources seem to have 
been given equal weight, and no less than that given to countless hypothetical 
examples, such as the following:
The social situation then may be the scene of potential or actual conflict 
between the sets of regulations that ought to govern. Note the famous conflict 
of definitions in the situation between summer tourists, who would like to 
extend summer-resort informality to the stores in the local town, and the 
natives, who would like to preserve proper business decorum in such places.
(1963:20)
A similar strategy seems to be in operation, therefore, as in the case of humour theory. 
The object of providing these examples being merely to illustrate ideas, their origin 
could be no less than wholly irrelevant: “By and large, I do not present these 
anecdotes, therefore, as evidence or proof, but as clarifying depictions...” (1974: 15).
Regarding the actual process by which he arrived at his ideas, Goffman left 
few hints. His books and articles represent complete and self-contained concept 
structures for which the building instructions' seem to have been thrown away. Robin 
Williams (1988), in attempting to distill them from the substance of Goffman's work, 
argues that a  continuous restructuring of theoretical models was undertaken.
too
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Comparisons of a tentative model with a growing body o f empirical data would 
prompt modification of the theory, which in turn would feed back on the range of facts 
to be analyzed. This technique (the very same I have recommended in my description 
of 'aggregate introspection') has been called "reciprocal or double-fitting" by W.W. 
Baldamus: 'This may be envisaged by imagining a carpenter alternatively altering the 
shape of a door and the shape of the door frame to obtain a better fit, or a locksmith 
adjusting successively both the keyhole and the key” (cited in Williams, 1988: 74-75). 
A progression of ever-more-precise concepts emerges from a chronological analysis of 
Goffman's texts. Many critics have expressed puzzlement at the apparently cavalier 
way in which terms and definitions carefully crafted in one book are altered or 
abandoned in the next. This lack of cumulation is a feature of the method employed. 
The same field of events is attacked from various fronts to yield the most accurate 
description possible, each new thrust strengthening and refining a core of basic 
concepts while risking other, more tentative, innovations. All throughout, Goffman 
avoided overestimating the validity of his discoveries. These were to be treated as 
"exercises, trials, tryouts, a means of displaying possibilities, not establishing fact" 
(1981: 1).
The relevance of the 'aggregate introspection* process to Goffman's method can 
best be appreciated by reflecting upon the experience of reading his ideas. 
Commentators on Goffman have remarked upon the way in which the reader is 
stimulated to fill out the text with examples from his own experience, and 'seduced' by 
Goffman's prose into reaching the author's conclusions:
Many of his more impressive achievements ... consisted as much as anything 
in the way he organised his subject matter so as to produce an array of 
instances immediately recognisable to  his readers.
(Bums, 1992:358)
Goffman is the master of the darting observation, in a kind of analytical 
pointillism. His method seems to involve ’sociology by epitome'. It is a 
powerful method; it yokes the reader to its purposes; it impresses the reader's 
mind and experience into its service. It works in something like the following 
way.
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His observations achieve their sense of typicality, however exotic their 
scenes may actually be, by using but a stroke or two, an observation or two, a 
detail or two, to indicate the scene which we as readers are to call up from 
memory, personal experience or imagination. If he succeeds, that is if we 
succeed in calling such a scene to mind, our very ability to do so from his 
detail or two is 'proof of its typicality. The typicality of the scene or action has 
not only been 'shown', but has been enlisted and exploited, and the adequacy of 
his description, the bit or two o f characterization, has ipso facto been 
demonstrated.
t (Schegloff, 1988:101)
These moments of ’recognition' are confirmations for the individual scientist 
(but only for him) that a proposed theory, or some element within it, describes certain 
events correctly.
As for 'aggregate assessment' itself, it can be argued that Goffman's work has 
both undergone such a procedure and, what is more, has generally achieved validity 
through it:
No one would question the claim that Erving Goffman was one of the leading 
sociological writers of the post-war period. His writings have been more or 
less universally acclaimed for their luminosity, their charm and their insight. 
Probably no sociologist over this period has been as widely read both by those 
in neighbouring social-science disciplines and by the lay public. (...) I want to 
propose that Goffman should indeed be ranked as a major social theorist, as a 
writer who developed a systematic approach to the study of human social life 
and one whose contributions are in fact as important in this regard as those of 
[Parsons, Merton, Foucault, Habermas, or Bourdieu].
(Giddens, 1988:250)
[At the time o f the publication of his last book Forms o f  Talk 1981] the 
breadth of Goffman's appeal and the popularity o f his writings outside the 
special interests o f social scientists had been apparent for many years.... Sales 
of The Presentation o f Self were over half a million, Stigma was reaching
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towards its thirtieth reprinting, and translations existed in over a dozen 
languages.... It was surprising to find the theatre critic of The Guardian 
adopting the term "Goffmanesque" for occasional use and, what is more, 
leaving it unexplained.
(Bums, 1992: 1)
Such statements of Goffman's "universally" acknowledged success attain their true 
significance when contrasted with the orthodox body of methodological complaints 
usually leveled against this unique sociologist His bizarre and heterogeneous set of 
empirical examples do not prove his theories, his definitions shift and shimmer, the 
results seem difficult if not impossible to 'test* —and yet, the 'brilliance' of his insights 
is everywhere admired, within and without the academic circles. Even his 'enemies' 
speak well of him:
Rarely, if ever, are these weaknesses described by critics in order to undermine 
Goffman's whole endeavour. More often, the criticisms serve to legitimate the 
parceling out of some part o f Goffman’s work and make it possible for this part 
to be pressed into service for the critic’s own project.
(Williams, 1988: 72)
A wide consensus, then, holds that many of Goffman's descriptions accord with the 
realities of everyday social interaction. Less clear are the precise aspects of Goffman's 
legacy which have been best corroborated by individual tests on a grand scale. Many 
will agree that ’’the conceptual apparatus he made use of proved defective on 
occasions" (Bums. 1992: 6), but no statistic exists to determine possible patterns in 
the assessment of success and failure. The generalizability of his findings also remains 
unknown: Which elements of the 'interaction order’ he described might be common to 
social interaction everywhere and which to lesser groupings? Though these questions 
of detail and scope suggest the limits of 'aggregate introspection,' the overwhelming 
success of Goffman's work demonstrates the considerable potential of this method.
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4. Conclusions
I have considered a number of theoretical treatments of the possible cause or 
causes of amusement. Monistic explanations have identified a single cause — 
aggression/superiority, incongruity, superfluous tension, o r a playful a t t i tu d e -  
but none of these has proven convincing for all cases. Each of them, however, has 
drawn attention to thought-provoking phenomena, which should be taken into account 
by any theory: superiority theorists to amusement which is directed toward an 
object/victim, and to dispositional effects; incongruity research to amusement 
resulting from the mental union of clashing mental frames -a s  in jokes and wit; 
tension-release theories to amusement triggered by the inappropriateness of a felt 
emotion; 'play' interpretations to humour cues,' the serious/non-serious distinction, 
and the activity of play itself.
Pluralistic Theories have attempted to separate amusement into different 
types according to cause, but no single classification has proven satisfactory. The most 
common current attitude seems to be that of non-committal to any general theory at 
all, in view of the implausible explanations available. Nevertheless, some answer 
(whether monist or pluralistic) to the causal question of amusement is certainly 
desirable to researchers in the field, and almost certainly possible.
In the second half of the chapter I have considered the question of how a 
causal theory of amusement might be constructed and assessed, in preparation for the 
proposal of such an account in Part Two of the thesis.
I have argued that such a theory will not be testable according to the 
conventional scientific paradigm, due to the essentially private nature o f the m ajor 
phenomena. Full confirmation for the complete range of amusement scenarios is only 
possible by tests carried out by and valid only for an individual scientist. General 
validity of a hypothesis may be established by aggregate assessment, a consideration 
of the proportion of individual tests which the hypothesis passes/fails.
Despite the problems associated with this method of aggregate in trospection, 
it seems the only viable option for amusement theory. The authors considered in 
Section I of this chapter, in fact, all resorted to this approach. Further justification has 
been offered in the form of an outstanding example of its application in the social 
sciences: Erving Goffman’s thought on everyday social interaction.
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In Chapter Three I will suggest that Goffman's relevance to humour research  
goes far beyond the methodological.
I
106
Chapter Three:
The Discrediting of Actors' Self-Claims
1. Introduction page 109
2. Claim-Discredit Humour Theory page 111
2.1. False Fronts: Plato, Moore, and Pirandello page 111
2.2. Bad Art: Aristotle, Carritt page 115
2.3. Unfulfilled Ends: Baillie page 119
2.4. Deviance: Bergson, Klapp, Powell, Jauregui page 121
2.5. Others page 123
3. The Sociology of Erving Goffman page 125
3.1. Self-Claims on the Everyday Stage page 126
3.2. Discredit and the Sacred Self page 129
3.3. Frames of Experience page 132
3.4. Summary page 135
4. Mutual References page 137
4.1. Goffman on Humour Research page 138
4.2. Humour Research on Goffman page 143
5. Conclusions page 145

Chapter Three: The. Discrediting o f Actors* Self-Claims Section!
1. Introduction
In this thesis, I will develop a theory of the laughter triad based on a fifth 
candidate to a ’cause of amusement’: the discrediting of a social actor's self-claims. 
The central idea, to be developed fully in Chapters Four to Six, proposes that 
amusement follows the assessment, by a subject, that a claim made by a person about 
himself -about his intelligence, knowledge, beauty, strength, courage, possessions, 
history, or any other characteristic or competence- has been discredited. A political 
speaker who portrays himself as a champion of environmental defense can draw 
laughter from environmental activists aware of his resistance to 'green' legislation in 
the past. Anyone claiming to be 'on a diet' is vulnerable to the mirth of others if spied 
secretly tucking into temptation at a pastry shop. Moreover, most self-claims are made 
tacitly: surgeons claim manual dexterity and care for patients; fashion models claim 
beauty, grace, and poise; university professors claim certain pools of knowledge and a 
substantial 'academic curriculum'; and all of us claim 'common knowledge,' 'common 
sense,' and the ability to see and hear accurately, think logically, coordinate and 
control our bodies, and talk properly. For these reasons, typical objects of amusement 
include surgeons who forget tweezers in patients, fashion models who stumble on the 
catwalk, university professors caught out as ignorant, and any of us found to be 
uncultured, scatterbrained, muddleheaded, oafish, or inarticulate.
The idea is not new. Indeed, in this chapter I will demonstrate that its history 
can be traced back as far as any of the better-known theories. Plato, Luigi Pirandello, 
and William G. Moore described the ridiculous individual as one who believes or 
presents himself to be different than he actually is. Aristotle and E.F. Carritt identified 
aesthetic defects - th e  failure to express what is intended— as the essence of funniness. 
J.B. Baillie portrayed amusement as reacting to a perceived incongruity between a 
goal and its achievement. Henri Bergson, Orrin Klapp, Chris Powell, and J.A. 
Jauregui have argued that deviance from social norms of thought, appearance, or 
behaviour provokes hilarity. All of these suggested stimuli of amusement share a close 
kinship with the notion of 'self-claim discredit.'
Despite such proposals, this theoretical perspective has largely escaped 
attention. The neglect may have been partly due to the heterogeneity of metaphors and 
phrasings employed by theorists. A more important factor, however, may have been
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the lack of an encompassing theoretical framework or field within which such a view 
might have been more fully developed or understood. From 1959 to 1983, just such a 
framework was developed by the American sociologist Erving Goffman, around what 
he called the'interaction order1 (Goffman 1959; 1961; 1963; 1963b; 1967; 1969; 1971; 
1974; 1981; 1983). In the second half of the chapter, I will present an introduction to 
Goffman's work, suggesting that it provides a general understanding of the area within 
which 'claim-discredit* theorists have struggled, and thus the opportunity for such a 
view to be more firmly established as an alternative to the better-known accounts of 
amusement
no
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2. Claim-discredits in Humour Theory
Numerous scholars and comic artists have developed one or another variety of 
what I will call ’claim-discredit' theories. The images and metaphors employed by 
these theorists have varied substantially: seeing behind the deceptive mask of a stage 
character, judging a work of art to be ugly, noticing a mismatch between ends and 
achievements, detecting the infraction of a social norm of propriety. This conceptual 
variety occludes an essential convergence of perspective rarely noticed either by 
commentators or by the authors themselves. In this section I will present some of the 
more notable versions of the claim-discredit theory o f amusement, under a few basic 
headings.
2.1. False Fronts:
Plato, Moore, Pirandello
Plato and Aristotle are frequently cited as the respectable forefathers to 
theories of superiority or aggression (See, for instance, Zillman, 1983; Ziv, 1984). The 
original texts, however, do not fit comfortably with such a portrayal. In Plato's 
Dialogues, we find the following exchange between Socrates and Protarchus:
Socrates; That being so, observe the nature of the ridiculous.
Protarchus: Be kind enough to tell me.
Socrates: Taking it generally it is a certain kind of badness, and gets its name 
from a certain state of mind. I may add that it is that species of the genus 
'badness' which is differentiated by the opposite of the inscription at Delphi.
Protarchus: You mean, 'Know thyself, Socrates?
Socrates; I do. Plainly the opposite of that would be for the inscription to read, 
'By no means know thyself.'
(...)
Socrates: If anyone does not know himself, must it not be in one of three 
ways?
Protarchus: How so?
Socrates: First, in respect of wealth, he may think himself richer than his 
property makes him.
Protarchus: Plenty of people are affected that way, certainly.
i l l
Chapter Tftte^IhejDiscreclitinq .of. Actors'. Self-Claims Section. 2
Socrates: But there are even more who think themselves taller and more 
handsome and physically finer in general than they really and truly are.
Protarchus: Quite so.
Socrates: But by far the greatest number are mistaken as regards the third class 
of things, namely possessions of the soul. They think themselves superior in 
virtue, when they are not.
Protarchus: Yes indeed.
Socrates: And is it not the virtue of wisdom that the mass of men insist on 
claiming, interminably disputing, and lying about how wise they are?
Protarchus: Of course.
('Philebus', 48-49)
In this dialogue, Plato describes a kind of laughter which is directed at another 
individual. In a later passage he furthermore characterizes it as "delight in [others'] 
misfortunes" and as a kind of "malice." For these reasons, Plato’s words have been 
classified under the 'disparagement' interpretation of laughter. The above lines, 
however, far from suggesting that mere disparagement, victory, or superiority result in 
amusement, specify the discrediting o f  unjustified conceit as the effective cause.
In the dialogue, Socrates defines the ridiculous individual as one who claims to 
be more/better than he actually is. Usually this occurs because he wrongly believes 
himself to be so, but the case of "lying" about the self is also considered. The cause of 
laughter implied in such a definition is the  observation, by a  perceiver, th a t a  
socially valued self-claim put forw ard by an  acto r is false.
A similar idea emerges from a twentieth century study of Molière by Will G. 
Moore (1949). In this work of literary criticism, Moore adopts a new approach to the 
classic analyses of Moliere's theatre by emphasizing not the social critique they 
contain but rather the comedy itself. In doing so, he implicitly constructs a theory of 
amusement based on a theatrical metaphor of 'parts’ and 'masks':
All of us play many parts; comedy delights in the situations that force us to 
abandon or interrupt the part, to remove the mask. Molière is endlessly 
inventing such situations, in which men get excited or angry, and cannot keep 
up the part.
(p. 104)
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Despite such general statements, Moore applies these ideas only to Moliere's own 
plays, which indeed provide countless fitting illustrations. In the case of Le Malade 
Imaginaire, for example,...
Argan, by nature a healthy man, is persuaded to act as if he were ill. Diafoirus 
pere devotes all his energies to proving that black is white. His-son is a nitwit 
pretending to be clever. Beline protests an affection she is all too ready to 
disavow. Toinette adopts a disguise that deceives nobody but her master. The 
suitor gets into the house under false pretences. Louison feigns death. Argan's 
doctors parade a power they do not really possess.
(p. 75-76) ’
Far from being restricted to the works of a French playwright, Moore’s account 
can be applied even more generally than Plato's. Many of Moliere's characters fall 
neatly under Plato's category of people who turn out to be less venerable than they 
claim. However, the mask metaphor encompasses a wider range of amusing situations 
if applied not only to stage characters but also to 'social actors.' Plato gave examples 
only of standard, socially-valued self-claims such as wealth, wisdom, or physical 
beauty. Moore, on the other hand, recognizes that all manner of specific self-claims, 
even socially undesirable ones such as being ill or dead, can be funny when the mask 
falls or is tom off. The stimulus of amusement implied here is the observation, by a  
perceiver, that a self-claim put forw ard by an actor is false.
Forty years earlier, Luigi Pirandello had defined the role of the humourist in 
similar terms. The Sicilian comic playwright described his trade as one of creating and 
then unmasking fictional characters, who are merely reflections of real human 'mask- 
wearers':
Unwillingly, unknowingly, [man] is always wearing the mask of whatever it is 
that he, in good faith, fancies himself to be: handsome, good, courteous, 
generous, unhappy, etc., etc. To think of it, all this is so ludicrous ... yet we lie 
psychologically just as we lie socially. Everybody straightens up his mask the
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best he can — that is, the external mask, for we also have the inner mask, 
which often is at variance with the outer one.
The humorist readily perceives the various simulations used in the 
struggle for life; he amuses himself by unmasking them, but he does not 
become indignant: it's the truth!
(1908; 132, 134, 139)
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2.2. Bad Art: Aristotle, Canitt
Aristotle provided a slightly different perspective on the claim-discredit idea. 
Though his full thoughts on ’Comedy’ have been lost, a short passage in Poetics 
provides a tantalizing clue:
As for Comedy, it is (as has been observed) an imitation of men worse 
than the average; worse, however, not as regards any and every sort of fault, 
but only as regards one particular kind, the Ridiculous, which is a species o f 
the Ugly. The Ridiculous may be. defined as a mistake or deformity not 
productive of pain or harm to others; the mask, for instance, that excites 
laughter, is something ugly and distorted without causing pain.
(On Poetics, V, 1)
This view has been taken to depict a particularly cruel and unfair sort of 
laughter: mockery at the gross deficiencies of fellow human beings. I suspect that 
Aristotle has been misunderstood in this regard, however, the short paragraph that 
remains of his thoughts on Comedy having been interpreted without reference to the 
philosopher's wider views on relevant topics.
The above passage does not actually offer a theory of amusement, but rather a 
description of stage comedy. If a 'cause of amusement' is to be read into these words, 
however, Aristotle defines it as "one particular kind of [fault in men] which is a 
species of the Ugly" — in other words, an aesthetic fault. Specifically, it is that set of 
ugly things (in persons) which are not productive of pain or harm to others, the 
'harmlessly ugly.' What does it mean to say that something is ugly? Though Aristotle 
did not provide a definition or theory of beauty, his writings on the arts provide some 
keys to his understanding of the notion and its contrary (see Poetics; and Butcher, 
1902, for a detailed commentary).
According to Aristotle, objects in nature all tend towards, but rarely achieve, 
some ideal prototype. All things have a permanent essence, partly occluded by minor 
deficiencies, damage, and decay: each of a dozen apples, for example, is a slightly 
flawed example of the same perfect 'appleness.' Artists attempt to ’imitate nature,' not 
by copying the observable objects around them, but by discerning and reproducing the
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ideals towards which nature strives. Similarly, practitioners of the 'useful arts' 
(scientists, educators, doctors...) attempt to actually supplement the work of nature 
with activities that build on the existing state of events to produce outcomes ever 
closer to the perfect model.
If we assume that Aristotle saw beauty as the outcome o f a successful work of 
art, then the beautiful would be that set of things, natural or man-made, which most 
resemble the ends at which nature aims. Ugliness in persons, then, would be found 
wherever an aspect of a person (a characteristic or a behaviour), left much to be 
desired in comparison with the hypothetical 'perfect human being.’ If such a 
shortcoming was not seen as harmful (to either the observer, the actor, or to anyone 
else), it would be found amusing. Two categories of human ugliness were offered by 
Aristotle: mistakes and deformities. Following from the above analysis, mistakes can 
be considered failures to achieve a minimum standard (i.e., sufficient closeness to 
perfection) regarding a particular skill or competence. Deformities constitute failures 
to achieve a minimum standard regarding appearance.
Considering the wide range of activities embraced by the label of ’art’ in Greek 
thought (from painting to politics), 'mistakes' and 'deformities' could include a vast 
array of varied mishaps, errors, and distortions. Aristotle’s view of amusement, 
therefore, probably went beyond the sorts of unseemly images that the phrase 
'laughing at ugliness' evokes in the modem reader:
^ Taking account of the elements which enter into the idea of beauty in
Aristotle, we shall probably not unduly strain the expression [ugliness], if we 
extend it to embrace the incongruities, absurdities, or cross-purposes of life, its 
blunders and discords, its imperfect correspondences and adjustments, and that 
in matters intellectual as well as moral.
(Butcher, 1902:374)
The notion that nature 'tends' towards a  single perfect ideal may well be 
doubted. In this century, the social sciences have tom apart the idea of a single, 
objective, 'correct' and 'natural' ideal of behaviour or appearance: such ideals vary 
from culture to culture, and from one generation to the nex t A more relativized
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version of the ’ugliness’ concept would be required for the Aristotelian view to 
withstand modem scrutiny.
Just such a perspective was developed in a little-known paper by political 
theorist E.F. Carritt (1923) who also defined *the ludicrous' as an "aesthetic defect." 
Carritt did not recognize the closeness of Aristotle's view to his own, drawing his 
inspiration rather from Benedetto Croce's Aesthetic (1901). According to the Italian 
philosopher, all fields of human endeavour —logical, moral, economic— have their 
aesthetic side. Ugliness was defined by him as a failure in expressiveness, and Carritt 
identified this failure as the cause of amusement (p. 561):
* -
A vice, a fallacy, a blunder are, from the moral, logical, economic
points of view, serious enough; they are in fact wicked, false, dangerous; and
the man who cannot see this is fatuous. Regarded as incoherencies of
expression, bits of mechanism adhering to life, faults of style, so to speak, they
are ugly and absurd. The man who cannot see this has no sense of humour.
( .. .)
What, then, is the typically amusing thing? I should say a work of art 
that misses its mark. The most immediately and undeniably funny thing in the 
world is what seems to us a bit o f high-faluting tragedy or unintended bathos. 
Of the same kind is any breakdown of dignity or intensity, whenever a man has 
wished to present himself or his position as venerable or tragic or passionate 
and is betrayed into words or action inconsistent with the part he would play. 
(...) Next comes the failure of life, especially in its bodily aspects, to express 
congruously either the human spirit, which we naturally assume a body should 
express, or some definite feeling which we expect it to express in a given 
context.
Carritt holds that when an individual regards the aesthetic side of any human state, 
action, or production —a work of art, a political speech, a business transaction, a plate 
of spaghetti alia carbonara-  the discovery of ugliness provokes amusement, that is, 
the discovery that what was meant to have been expressed has not been: the 
composition of the painting is confused, the prime minister stutters, the spaghetti turn 
out to be overcooked and pasty.
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Noticing an aesthetic defect is equivalent to discovering that an artist has not 
produced beauty, that he has failed to fulfill an  expressive self-claim. In the eye of 
the beholder, an artist can be held accountable for not only explicit claims about what 
he sought to achieve (such as the artist's words, cues in the work itself, or its title) but 
also for implicit self-claims applicable to every artist in the relevant society, and 
others applicable to artists within the relevant genre or school (i.e., specific standards 
of quality and style applicable to the mode and genre of expression).
According to Croce, however, every man, in so far as he thinks and acts, can 
be considered an 'artist': as a manager running a business, as a professor giving a 
lecture, or as a pedestrian gracefully ambulating and avoiding collisions. What is 
conventionally labeled 'art' is merely the specialized activity in which expression 
constitutes the primary aim. Plato's self-deluded boasters and Moore's mask-wearers 
are objects of ridicule because they fail to actually express what they explicitly or 
implicitly claim about themselves. Thus, the Aristotelian view can be subsumed under 
the earlier general statement: amusement results from  the observation, by a  
perceiver, th a t a  self-claim put forw ard by an  actor is false (i.e., has not been 
expressed).
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2.3. Unfulfilled Ends: Baillie
J.B. Baillie (1921) developed a further variation on this basic idea. In his words (p. 
259),
Laughter arises when the character or process of an object, which is considered 
to refer to an end, real or supposed, is judged to be partially or wholly 
incongruent or incoherent with the end in view. It is important to note that the 
end must not be given up but must still hold good in spite of the incongruity; 
and also that the object laughed at must not give way and must be none the 
worse for its incoherence with the end.
Baillie illustrates with the image of "a malicious wind playing havoc with a dandy's
dignity and carrying his hat by leaps and bounds far down the street, with its owner in
hasty pursuit." The man insists on the relation between him and his hat, while the
forces of nature continue to deny the existence of such a relation.
This theory can be considered a close relation of those discussed so far. A
precondition to amusement stipulated by Baillie is the 'appreciation' of an object: “The
peculiar character of this mental attitude [appreciation] towards the situation is that we
look at it in the light of an end which it seeks to fulfill” (p. 257). In the view
developed by Carritt, the mental process exercised upon an object by the individual
could well be labeled 'appreciation' in this sense, though he would have added the
adjective 'artistic.' Baillie defines 'the ludicrous' as that which falls short of the end
\
aimed at, congruent with the earlier definition that we laugh at that which falls short 
of expressing the intentions of an 'artist,' or the quality attributed to himself by a stage 
character.
Baillie's formulation takes for granted the interpersonal nature of the 
amusement situation. By making this element explicit, the conclusions of 
Aristotle/Carritt are again reached. The concept of an 'end' implies the existence of 
(normally human) volition; the concept of 'appreciation* assumes a human appreciator. 
The fact that "the end must not be given up" and is aimed at "certainly" (p. 259) 
communicates to the observer that this end is claimed by the actor as his —as in the 
case of the dandy claiming the ownership of his hat by running after i t  To judge the
119
Chapter Three: The Discrediting o f Actors' Self-Claims Section _2
actual achievements of a person in relation to the intended outcome is to treat the 
former as aesthetic creations (in Croce's sense).
This particular version, however, helps to clarify an important point: Two 
different stances may be adopted towards a work of art, and only one may result in 
amusement. Firstly, the object can be merely perceived or experienced, the individual 
opening himself up towards it in a freely accepting, non-judgmental way. Secondly, 
the object may be judged, given a critical treatment on the basis of stylistic criteria. 
The naive museumgoer and the jaded art critic personify the two opposing attitudes, 
though in practice, of course, both are exercised to various degrees and at different 
points during an aesthetic experience13.
It is only when an observer adopts the critical stance that amusement may 
result, once a shortcoming is spotted. Noticing an expressive fault as a fault requires 
such an attitude o f critical assessment Though the point is implicit in Carritt's article, 
and even in the ideas of Plato, Moore, and Pirandello, Baillie's focus on the mental 
attitude of 'appreciation' brings it to the fore.
13 This distinction has been made by a number of philosophers who have dealt with aesthetic questions. 
Gadamer (1966:5) writes:
...when we judge a work of art on the basis of its aesthetic quality, something that is really much more 
intimately familiar to us is alienated. This alienation into aesthetic judgment always takes place when 
we have withrawn ourselves and are no longer open to the immediate claim of that which grasps us. 
Gadamer, of course, was interested in emphasizing the moment when a work of art 'grasps' the observer; 
in the case of amusement, it is rather the distanced 'judgement* which must be applied.
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2.4. Deviance:
Bergson, KJapp, Jauregui
Only one variation of this 'claim-discredit' cause of amusement has received 
much attention among humour researchers and beyond, that o f Henri Bergson (1900). 
For Bergson laughter constituted a corrective for inelasticity in man's behaviour. 
Social actors are expected by each other to adapt continuously to changing situations, 
their failures in this regard provoking mirth in others. The trigger of amusement is 
identified (p. 21) as,
a certain rigidity of body, mind, and character, that society would still like to 
get rid of in order to obtain from its members the greatest possible degree of 
elasticity and sociability. The rigidity is the comic, and laughter is its 
corrective.
Bergson's personification of society and his identification of an exclusive social 
'function' of amusement jar with current sociological thinking. His struggle to extend 
the idea of 'rigidity' to diverse types of amusing stimuli eventually itself becomes a 
prime example of risible mental rigidity. Nevertheless, the work contains an unusually 
exhaustive analysis of the range of amusing events, and many thought-provoking 
passages.
As Carritt and Baillie, Bergson considers laughter a kind of judgment, indeed 
an aesthetic one, and makes the distinction between this judgment and the 
consideration of serious (i.e., tragic) consequences. He also closely paraphrases Plato, 
identifying "vanity" as "the one failing that is essentially laughable," (p. 174) and 
arguing that, “however unconscious [an individual] may be of what he says or does, 
he cannot be comical unless there be some aspect of his person of which he is 
unaware, one side of his nature which he overlooks; on that account does he make us 
laugh" (p. 146). In many passages, Bergson could be said to agree that amusement is 
provoked by the discrediting of actors' self-claims, though the analysis is limited to 
cases of socially valued self-claims. His 'elasticity' requires the achievement of 
conformity to the many characteristics expected of actors by society in specific
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situations, to the social norms of proper behaviour14. Deviance from these rules, to 
which most actors claim allegiance, provokes the amusement of others. In this case, 
Bergson falls closely in line with the Platonic view, which fails to encompass specific 
self-claims of neutral or negative social value.
Baillie (p. 289) recognizes a "vague insight" of his theory in Bergson's essay, 
and Carritt (p.560) finds some sections "extraordinarily near the truth". However, the 
unfortunate metaphor of 'rigidity* or 'mechanism' is applied in so many other senses 
that the former considerations often seem lost within a large and incoherent whole. 
For example, his treatment of verbal humour requires the acceptance of a forced 
notion of language as a living thing and the joke-work as a 'mechanism' or 'rigidity' 
encrusted upon it (pp. 103-131, esp. 129-30).
The evidently misconceived central metaphor15 has prevented Le Rire from 
serving as the foundation for a theory of laughter, despite the wide-ranging popularity 
of the work. It has, nevertheless, exercised a considerable influence, primarily in 
stressing the social aspects of laughter: the idea that amusement is directed at human 
beings, whether others or the self; the influence of other participants on mirth; the 
conception of laughter as a social corrective.
Several other theorists have proposed a view of amusement in terms of 
violated social norms. Orrin Klapp (1950) described a 'social type' which he claimed 
was universal throughout human society, a kind of person who is laughed at and 
ridiculed everywhere (p. 157):
The fool is distinguished from the normal group member by a deviation in 
person or conduct which is regarded as ludicrous and improper. He is usually 
defined as a person lacking in judgment, who behaves absurdly or stupidly. 
The antics of the fool, his ugliness, gracelessness, senselessness, or possible 
deformity o f body represent departures from corresponding group norms of
14 More will be said about the relationship between self-claims and social norms of ‘demeanour’ or 
‘propriety’ in Chapter Four, 2.4.
15 Bergson's reliance on the mechanism/life contrast stemmed from his wider philosophical programme, 
often referred to as 'vitalism.' Bergson (1907) viewed the cosmos as infused with an elan vital, a vital 
impetus or force responsible for the development of time (ie, of events). Human intelligence, through 
the process of a guided evolution, was a product of this vital force. Within this scheme, amusement 
could serve a corrective function by punishing deviations (ie, rigidity) from the natural and creative 
vital flux.
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propriety. The fool is the antithesis of decorum, beauty, grace, intelligence,
strength, and other virtues...
This conception of the fool identifies the infraction of social "norms of propriety" as 
(at least) one cause of spontaneous laughter. Citing Le Rire, Klapp also agreed with 
Bergson in his identification of "social control" as one of the chief functions of the 
fool.
Chris Powell (1977) has defined humour as "a cornerstone of everyday social 
order" (p.55) which is targeted at deviant or unconventional individuals and 
behaviours: “We respond with humour where our attention is drawn to 'events’ in the 
widest sense, which from our perspective seem to break some kind of rule, be it of 
'rational' opinion, taste, manners or behaviour” (ibid.: 53). Powell further suggests that 
to be found funny, such deviance should be perceived as not "too serious" or 
threatening (p. 53).
Jose Antonio Jauregui (1990) has recently proposed a similar view more 
explicitly as an amusement theory, within a general model of the emotions. According 
to Jauregui, the brain is “bionaturally programmed to trigger off the emotional 
mechanism of laughter -urges to laugh— each time it receives information through its 
sensory channels o f the infraction of a social norm...with the object of drawing 
attention to, judging, and penalizing the infraction” (p. 158). Though the precise 
nature of the 'social norms’ referred to is not specified further, both the illustrative 
anecdotes offered and the examples of codes alluded to ("norms of dressing, walking, 
reasoning...talking” —pp. 162-63) appear to circumscribe a similar domain to that of 
Klapp’s 'impropriety/ Bergson's 'inelasticity/ or Powell's 'non-serious* deviance.
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2.5. Others
The views cited above document the existence of a rarely mentioned16 
tradition in humour theory identifying the discredit o f self-claims as the cause of 
amusement. Plato, Will Moore, and Pirandello, with their reference to masks and 
pretense, provided some of the most direct statements o f this interpretation: 
amusement reacts to the failure by an actor to be who he claims to be. Aristotle and 
E.F. Carritt phrased the argument in terms of failures by an actor to express what he 
overtly intends (i.e., aesthetic faults), and J.B. Baillie as failures to achieve what he 
overtly intends. Henri Bergson, Orrin Klapp, Chris Powell, and J.A. Jauregui, on the 
other hand, have couched the theory in the language of normative deviance: 
amusement follows failures by an actor to achieve what he should intend.
This historical introduction to the idea of a -claim-discredit* theory of 
amusement is not meant to be comprehensive. It represents a personal selection which 
will inevitably leave out relevant contributions. Henry Fielding (1742: 249) wrote in 
preface to Joseph Andrews that "the only source o f the true Ridiculous ... is 
affectation”. According to Hegel (1842), "any contrast between the essential and its 
appearance can be ridiculous.” Emerson (1843) defined the source of amusement as a 
contrast between being' and 'seeming.' Murray Davis (1993) devotes three chapters of 
his book to a comic form characterized by the "debunking [of] social units that have 
become idealized in various ways” (p. 218). It would be surprising to find that several 
other similar views did not exist, either as monocausal hypotheses, parts of 
multicausal ones, or implicit ideas in various works. Too many have expressed an 
opinion on the pan-human topic of laughter for full credits to be allotted. My principal 
aim has been to illustrate the basic idea with a range of varied attempts to describe it, 
and to document the support which this theory has enjoyed through the ages.
16 'Claim discredit' accounts have been generally excluded from reviews of amusement theories. Davis' 
mention of "humour theories...that unmask the ideal self to reveal the actual self* (1993: 219; see also 
pp. 149-306) is an unusual exception. The authors of these theories have also rarely cited each other.
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3. The Sociology of Erving Goffman
The expressive dimension of human behaviour, as such, has not received much 
attention from social scientists, particularly as it impinges on ordinary interaction. 
Only limited aspects of the topic have been studied, by some linguists, sociologists of 
religion, anthropologists interested in symbols and ritual, and researchers in the field 
of face-to-face communication. Croce's ’Science of Aesthetics' (1901) has not 
materialized. This may have been one reason why the ’claim-discredit' ideas of Plato, 
Aristotle, Baillie, Carritt, Bergson and others have not yet found their proper place in 
humour research. /
One sociologist, however, devoted his entire career to delineating a field of 
study that would focus specifically on the expressive aspect of everyday action: 
Erving Goffman. In my view, the accounts of amusement that have been presented in 
this chapter can best be understood in relation to his theory of the 'interaction order,' a 
theory which according to Anthony Giddens has earned him a place among the "major 
social theorists” (1988: 250).
Goffman described participants of social interaction as actors who present 
particular images of themselves before specific audiences. Smooth social interaction, 
as well as the social standing and emotional stability of participants, depend crucially 
on maintenance of the individual self-claims which make up these 'stage characters.’ 
Consequently, much is made of situations where self-claims are discredited, and of the 
resulting embarrassment, ritual reparations, and relevant sanctions. As might be 
gathered from the preceding discussion, this is the point at which amusement theories 
of the 'claim-discredit' variety intersect with the analysis of the interaction order.
Before returning to the question of laughter, I will present a short summary of 
Goffman's thought.
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3.1. Self-Claims on the Everyday Stage17
Self-claims and their discredit are primarily relevant to human behaviour in 
situations of co-presence, where persons are close enough to mutually observe each 
other in whatever they are doing. A group of co-present individuals composes a 
gathering located in a situation, the spatial environment within which co-presence 
exists: the driver and passengers on a bus compose a gathering within the situation o f 
the bus interior.' If a gathering shares a focus of attention, such as a conversation or a 
team pickpocketing operation, it becomes an encounter (one or more of these may 
exist within the larger gathering of the 'bus riders'). Co-presence allows each 
interactant not only to give and receive linguistic messages but to give off information 
about himself and about the way in which he perceives the situation; in fact, even if no 
linguistic messages are transmitted, no participant can avoid giving off such 
expressive messages: clothing may speak of profession, respect for the occasion, 
and/or vanity, among other things; accent may reveal social class, region, or ethnicity; 
facial features and expression may give away nervousness, illness, age, and/or gender 
(1963).
Individuals are generally aware that others will look to these sorts of signs for 
information about themselves, and thus will manipulate them more or less 
strategically to give perform ances (including setting, appearance, and behaviour) 
which they consider to be useful, truthful, appropriate, or desirable in some way. They 
can be conceived of as actors who represent various parts  to particular audiences.
Self-claims are the constitutive elements of such parts (or self-presentations), 
the building blocks out of which these 'stage characters' are constructed for others. 
Self-claims are attributions explicitly or implicitly made by the actor about himself: 
self-claims of skill, of possession, of appearance, of experience, of knowledge, of 
intelligence, of identity, or of any other characteristic imputable to a person. They may 
be made verbally ("I can drive a large bus through heavy traffic") or non-verbally (bus 
driving = "I can drive a  large bus through heavy traffic"). Self-claims are also, to a 
great extent, imposed from without, as many are automatically associated by the
17 The remainder of Section 3 will be based entirely on Erving Goffman's writings. His name will thus 
be omitted from citations, and I will include only the date of the relevant work at the end of each section
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relevant culture with social roles and categories, or simply with the status of a ’normal' 
individual. Most of us, both on and off buses, do and are expected to claim a 
respectable and well kept appearance, control over 'our' spaces and things, the 
possession of what are referred to as ’common knowledge' and 'common sense,' and 
competence in walking, talking, and controlling emotional and bodily outbursts, 
among other attributes. A bus driver, by assuming this specific role, may further be 
held responsible by his passengers and others for fulfilling numerous requirements 
implied as self-claims of the post: the ability and willingness to drive his vehicle 
quickly, safely, and competently along a predetermined route, the ability and 
willingness to enforce passenger discipline if it should exceed certain limits, the 
abstention from alcohol or drug intoxication during work, and the possession and 
readiness to share information about bus routes and city streets.
Performances are carried out by teams (of one or more members) on a front 
stage, where facts incongruent with the qualities of the enacted self are concealed; 
these performances are planned and rehearsed in the back stage regions, where the 
impression generated by an act is contradicted "as a matter of course." For example, a 
bus driver may put on an appearance of calm dexterity at the wheel, of respect for his 
passengers, of toughness, of cool professionality; with his companions at the bus 
depot, however, he may freely slander passengers who arrive with no change or 
perhaps even share half a bottle of whisky before returning to the job.
This 'dramaturgical model' of interaction does not imply that individuals do 
not act in earnest: belief in the part one is playing varies from cynical acting and 
deception to heartfelt sincerity. The bus driver may become quite involved in his 
tough, cool, dexterous, professional act; on the other hand, the pickpockets in the back 
will be sharply aware of the discrepancy between their normal appearances and the 
fancy handiwork going on 'under cover' (1959). Neither is this model a restatement of 
role theory. Performances of a front include the enactment of a claimed relationship 
between the self and relevant institutionalized roles. For example, the bus driver may 
express role-distance when an old friend jumps on board, by jokingly putting on a 
caricatured version o f his own l)us driver' behaviour. Such an act is carried out to
dealing with ideas from a different book. Citations will rarely be exhaustive, as many of the ideas are 
treated in several texts under different labels.
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demonstrate to others that there is a complex self behind the mask worn, different 
from and detached from the role itself (1961). > ■
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3.2. Discredit and the Sacred Self
The complex organization of modem Western societies, with their well- 
bounded and protected spaces, permits individuals to develop many different 'selves’ 
for different situations, audiences, and moments, without excessive danger of having 
their constitutive self-claims continuously discredited by leakages of damaging 
information (1959). On the other hand, it could also be said that complex societies 
positively require the performance of numerous, often contradictory characters which 
will be discreditable. Each category within the system of social classification —father, 
friend, husband, bus driver, male, Protestant, British, human being— includes "a 
complement of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural for members/ Inevitably, 
there are attributes held by every individual which conflict with expectations for one 
of his relevant categories, stigmas, and these should be hidden if the person does not 
wish to be rejected by the relevant social group. If a stigma cannot be hidden and 
affects a major category (physical disfigurement is the prototype), the person may 
become practically cut off from normal social interaction. However, all individuals are 
vulnerable to such discreditings (1963B).
Goffman treats the self not only as an actor, but also as a ceremonial object, in 
the Durkheimian sense. Everyday interaction habitually includes many minor ritual 
offerings, tributes, and avoidances designed to protect the sensitive and fragile self­
presentation projected by each participant. The 'sacredness' of the self is nevertheless 
'spoilt' occasionally, intentionally or otherwise, and must be repaired by further 
ceremonial work.
An actor's performance makes an evaluation of the situation and its 
participants, especially himself. Face is defined as "the positive social value a person 
effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a 
particular contact (...;) an image of self delineated in terms of approved social 
attributes". Every individual is emotionally attached to his own face and to those of 
certain others: if events establish a better than expected face, he experiences positive 
feelings; if a worse than expected face, negative ones. Goffman in fact concentrates 
throughout his work on events which threaten or damage face, and the feeling which 
these events cause in those emotionally attached to the face is em barrassm ent. If a 
sudden jerk o f the bus causes a well-groomed executive to topple awkwardly over an
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elderly lady, the qualities of politeness and grace he had been projecting and to which 
he is attached will be discredited, and this will cause him great unease and perhaps to 
fluster.
Two basic types of face-work may be undertaken to counteract such incidents. 
One set is composed of avoidance practices, which keep the person at a safe distance 
from threats: avoiding certain persons or topics of conversation, modesty, ignoring the
threatening event, etc__Riders on the bus may, for instance, grab onto handles and
bars not only for the sake of physical safety but to avoid unseemly encroachment on 
others' personal space. If the incident cannot be avoided or overlooked, however, the 
self will find itself in a state of ritual disgrace, requiring some sort of repair. This 
corrective process consists of 4 "classic moves": (1) a challenge calling attention to 
the misconduct; (2) an offering by the offender, (3) an acceptance of the offering; 
and (4) an expression of gratitude by the offender. This basic model varies in 
practice. Continuing our example of the businessman's fall, he may immediately offer 
apologies and self-recriminations, reassure the aggrieved woman that his intentions 
were far from those implied by the sudden bodily contact, and ask concernedly about 
her physical state —these would combine a self-initiated challenge with the offering 
stage. She may reply with a forced smile and an acceptance of the apology (stage 3) or 
perhaps continue the challenge with a scolding speech, which would necessitate 
further apologies. Gratitude may be expressed by word or gesture (such as a 
deferential nod and an embarrassed smile), or be merely implied (1967).
Gatherings are ordered, their participants being subject to the norms of what 
Goffman variously calls the communicative, expressive, public, ceremonial, or 
interaction order (1963, 67, 71, 83). These norms are different from substantive 
norms, which guide conduct in matters felt to be important in their own right, roughly 
covering such concepts as 'morality' and 'ethics.' Ceremonial norms limit the 
performances of actors and protect the sacredness of each individual in two ways.
Rules of deference define what action must be taken to convey the appropriate 
respect and appreciation to other persons. These include all manner of respectful 
avoidances, tact, and verbal or physical offerings necessary to safeguard the sanctity of 
these others. Willfully transgressing such norms can be interpreted as an aggression. 
Rules of dem eanour, on the other hand, relate to the upkeep of the individual's own 
sacredness. Individuals must not claim a face which they cannot sustain, and must
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struggle to sustain it at all times or be subject to disgrace. Dress, personal hygiene, 
discretion and sincerity, modesty, sportsmanship, command of speech and physical 
movements, self-control over emotions and desires, poise under pressure, and other 
behaviours must constantly reinforce the line taken by the actor. When his front is 
discredited, his self is spoilt, and embarrassment may result (1967).
A general conformity (or at least apparent general conformity) to the 
exigencies of the ceremonial order is essential to social life. Norms of deference and 
demeanour seem trivial and arbitrary, 'mere’ matters of etiquette, but these 
conventions create a symbolic world by which to guide our every action. We can 
usually assume that people who wear certain uniforms, sit in the driver's seat of a bus, 
and act within certain behavioural limits have been trained to maneuver these large 
vehicles through city traffic and will do so along a predictable path, with the greatest 
concern for the security of passengers. Thus, the latter can feel safe in the belief that 
by boarding bus 171 they will reach a stop at Trafalgar Square within a reasonable 
time, though in fact it could easily be crashed into a wall or driven in the opposite 
direction. A bus driver wearing a loud T-shirt and bathing trunks, or who steered the 
vehicle while bouncing on his seat, hooting and neighing loudly, would not inspire 
such confidence: Passengers would be likely to supervise his behaviour closely for 
further alarming signs and perhaps step off at the first possible stop or challenge his 
right to continue driving. Individuals who routinely violate the norms of the public 
order are threats to the predictability of the environment necessary for the efficient 
pursuit of goals by others. In Western society, such deviants may be labeled 'insane* 
and confined to mental asylums, powerful proof of the importance of 'mere' etiquette 
(1967).
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3.3. Frames of Experience
An individual perceives the world at any one time according to a particular 
definition of the situation, a socially constructed fram ew ork o f interpretation which 
gives meaning to unfolding events. Performances, whether in gatherings or in 
encounters, express such a definition of the situation. Conversely, the framework 
which actors agree on (this agreement being basic to interaction) determines the type 
of performance which will be appropriate. This official definition of the situation can 
differ from the private frames actually applied by specific individuals.
There are n a tu ra l frameworks, describing an unconscious and deterministic 
universe (i.e., about the world of ’things’), and social frameworks, interpreting events 
incorporating "the will, aim, and controlling effort of an intelligence” (i.e., about the 
world of people). All actors perceive events by use of such frames, but not always are 
they in agreement over the correct frame to be applied. Most passengers of our bus 
would presumably (1) assume the vehicle to be a man-made machine powered by 
fossil fuels and guided by a conscious, trained driver at the instruments (natural 
frame); and (2) see the This situation' in terms of a public transport service along a set 
route, useable by individuals for the purpose of traveling from one programmed stop 
to another (social frame). A small child, on the other hand, might well (1) believe the 
bus to be a magically powered device, or even a living being; and (2) see the event as 
an amusement ride designed for everyone, for children, or perhaps even just for 
himself.
The natural and social varieties are p rim ary  frameworks, "seen as rendering 
what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is 
meaningful." These may be contrasted with keyings, which are ways of transforming 
events already meaningful according to some primary framework into something else. 
Playfully pretending to ride a bus, a Filmed bus ride, a bus driver's driving practice — 
these are all keyings o f a  real bus ride, patterned on but distinguishable from the 
original event. Another type of transformation is a fabrication, the managing of 
activity by one party to deceive others about what is going on. The behaviour of the 
group of three pickpocket artists who enter the bus is designed to reinforce the 
definition of events applied by most passengers: The thieves enter the crowded bus 
from separate doors, and two act as shields for the third who, looking abstractedly in
Chapter Three: The Discreditino of Actors' Self-Claims------------------------ Section -2
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another direction, will surreptitiously direct his hand towards a promising pocket or 
purse. Clearly the pickpocket and his victim apply very different interpretations to the 
behaviour of the former, one having more information about the real state of affairs 
than the other. The interaction order is vulnerable to such pretenses of normality 
because people inevitably depend on a limited number of signs on which to base their 
judgments.
Different types of framing troubles are common. One may apply the wrong 
frame (a bus passenger who calmly ignores the pickpocket as his wallet disappears). 
Or events may be ambiguous and permit a confusing multiplicity of contradictory 
frames to be applied (a bus passenger suspects the pickpockets of deceit but is not 
quite sure). A fram e break may take place when events are perceived which cannot 
be managed by the frame (a passenger notices a foreign hand in his pocket). Finally, 
open contests and debates may flare up over the correct frame to be applied (a 
passenger challenges the pickpockets and they claim innocence in outraged tones). 
People who, due to frame breaks, are left devoid of any coherent framework on which 
to base their behaviour, undergo negative experience, a situation of flustered 
confusion which is the opposite of an "organized and organizationally affirmed 
response" (1974). Another possible problem is the excess or insufficiency of 
involvement in a frame, the psychological engrossment in framed events, for which 
an appropriate level is normally defined.
Frame analysis is relevant to self-claims and their discredit in at least two 
separable senses. On the one hand, social frameworks include the specification of the 
self-claims applying to all participants in a situation, and of the criteria by which to 
judge their fulfillment. Self-claims are the constitutive elements of self-presentations, 
and these in turn form a major part of the content of social frameworks. Thus, the 
official framework defines what events participants openly agree would discredit 
which self-claims within the situation to which the frame applies. For example, the 
definition of a bus situation includes the bus driver's self-claim of driving skill and 
passengers' self-claims to maintain balance and sufficient interpersonal distance 
despite the movements of the vehicle. Each participant's private individual frame will 
simultaneously provide him with his own criteria on these subjects.
Frameworks do not only include self-claims, however, but are also included 
within their domain. The possession of frames, and frame management as an activity
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and a competence, are themselves attributes about which self-claims may be made: 
Tm  very good at figuring people out," 'Til tell you what your problem is...," "No one 
fools me,” ”1 know these streets like the palm of my hand," "I am paying attention." 
These kinds o f self-attributions, which regard the claimants' mental possessions and 
abilities, can indeed be considered among the most fundamental claims that can be 
made about the self. Failures to know basic facts about the natural or social world, to 
interpret events correctly, or to display an appropriate level o f involvement in framed 
events, can itself result in discredit, or can lead to discrediting behaviours (1974: 308- 
321).
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3.4. Summary of Goffman's Thought
Individuals are actors who create and maintain self-presentations before 
specific audiences, usually in accord with socially given frameworks of interpretation 
defining the relevant situations of co-presence. These characters are built out of claims 
about the self which may be supported or discredited by events. Actors are 
emotionally attached to the social value associated with these self-presentations, so 
that their emotional peace depends on their own and others' behaviour and on 
unfolding events continuously supporting the current character and the framework 
within which it fits. The interaction order is the result o f actors jointly trying to 
maintain these public projections, and it provides actors with a continuous guide for 
action. Embarrassment is the common result of failure, and confinement to a mental 
hospital is the common Western remedy for those who provoke too many failures.
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4. Mutual References
There exists an evident congruency between Erving Goffman’s thought and the 
‘claim discredit' notions of amusement. The concept of the self-claim —a claim 
implicitly or explicitly made by an individual about him self- is central to Goffman’s 
theory, and the vicissitudes of maintaining self-claims and managing their discredit 
constitutes one of the main themes of his work. It is no mere coincidence that Carritt, 
Pirandello, and Moore resorted to the dramaturgical description of individuals as part­
playing actors. Goffman's writings examined and dissected the very perspective on 
human behaviour which had been applied by the claim-discredit theorists. With this 
lens, one focuses neither on the grand and distant social institutions of sociology nor 
on the individual in the immediate foreground. Rather, it is a rarely-seen middle 
ground which comes into view: the actual situation in which two or more individuals 
interact. The very fact of mutual observability which defines a 'situation' transforms 
every participant into both performer and audience. Each of his characteristics and 
behaviours becomes an expressive sign, while he himself becomes a potential critic of 
the everyday 'stage' or 'exhibition.' Thus, Goffman's field covers precisely the 
aesthetics of social life.
Two questions immediately arise:
1) Did Goffman have anything to say about the laughter triad?
2) Have humour researchers had anything to say about the sociology of Erving
Goffman?
The remainder of this chapter will concern itself with their answers.
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4.1. Goffman on Humour Research
Goffman himself did not address the question o f amusement directly. Outside 
of scattered comments and his extended treatment of ’embarrassment’ (1967), his 
emphasis was on the conscious attempts o f interactants to manage situations, rather 
than on the less-controllable eruptions of emotion. His pursuit of the interaction order 
and its establishment as a field separable from the study of not only social structure 
but also of the individual social actor excluded, as far as possible, the psychological 
underpinnings of phenomena from analysis. Moreover, his concerns lay more on the 
side of participants as performers than as audience members.
However, there are countless implicit references to amusement in the form of 
mirth-provoking illustrations used in the texts. The discussion o f the interaction order 
inevitably placed a strong emphasis on examples of 'disorder’: interactional disasters, 
breakdowns, and sabotage. As we have seen, embarrassment often results when 
certain types of these disordering events occur. However, according to Baillie, Carritt, 
and the other claim-discredit theorists, an observer's reaction to happenings or 
behaviour of these types should be amusement, however upsetting they might be for 
the participants responsible.
Indeed, wherever Gofftnan’s analysis turns to events which discredit a front, to 
errors of frame, situational improprieties, ceremonial blunders, or the unusual 
behaviour o f mental patients, humorous examples abound. Chapter 9 of Frame 
Analysis, entitled "Ordinary Troubles" and dealing with ambiguities and errors of 
frame application, is a good source:
[excerpt from The San Francisco Chronicle, 11/29/1967]
The way Dave Niles reported it on KNBR, this guy is lying face down 
on Powell St., with traffic backed up for blocks. A Little Old Lady climbs 
down from a stalled cable car and begins giving him artificial respiration -  
whereupon he swivels his head and says: "Look lady, I don't know what game 
you're playing, but Tm trying to fix this cable!"
(1974, p.310)
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The "classic cases" of embarrassment cited by Goffman (1967) -changes of 
role or status, being in the ’wrong' social scene, inordinate physical proximity, the lack 
of basic skills or attributes of society, and clashes of one role with another— are no 
less classic comic situations. Similarly with many of the examples of minor 
inconsistencies between projected front and performance:
Men trip, forget names, wear slightly inappropriate clothes, attempt to buy a 
too-small amount of some commodity, fail to score well in a game, arrive a 
few minutes late for an appointment, become a trifle overheated in argument, 
fail to finish a task quite on time.
(1961, p.92)
An entire essay in Forms o f Talk (1981), a case study of radio announcers' 
mistakes, draws its empirical illustration "mainly” (p.242, footnote) from "eight of the 
LP records and three of the books produced by Kermit Schafer from his recording 
(Jubilee Records) of radio bloopers" (p. 197, footnote) which presumably were 
prepared for sale as ’humour’:
"In Pall Malls, the smoke is traveled over and under, around and through the 
tobacco; thereby giving you a better tasting smoke..." (ENGINEER FLIPS 
WRONG SWITCH AND PICKS UP UNSUSPECTING DISC JOCKEY) 
"...How the hell can smoke go through a cigarette, if it don't go over, under, 
around and through the tobacco?"
(p. 268)
Merely by exposing individuals as actors with embarrassing secrets to hide, 
Goffman causes the reader to find amusement at his own secret discredit, as well as to 
feel some measure of unease. Emanuel Schegloff has commented on this experience 
(1988: 89): “How many readers, and hearers, felt revealed and exposed, gave out 
embarrassed giggles at the sense of being found out by [Goffman's] accounts?”.
Even in his own dealings with others, it appears that Erving the social actor, at 
least in his younger days, derived pleasure from playing with the projected selves of
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others. Paul Bouissac has characterized him as a "comedian-experimenter" who 
"enjoyed straining social interactions by obnoxious behavior in order to gain some 
insights into the 'frames’ at stake" (1990: 417). He cites Paul Ekman's anecdote about 
a psychology experiment:
I pointed to Erving some of their more interesting expressions which we would 
be able to dissect later when reviewing the videotape. He however was taken 
with the fact that serious people were willing to engage in such conversation in 
a laboratory setting, and decided to test how much interference they would 
tolerate. Dressed in his usual casual style, he posed (quite credibly) as a 
janitor. He walked into their room, saying that he had to remove some of the 
furniture. He removed one piece of furniture after another while they 
continued their argument, until finally he took away the chairs in which they 
were sitting. They continued their argument standing up!
(Ekman, in Bouissac 1990:417)
In addition to such implicit references to amusement in Goffman's work (and 
life), his interest in the laughter triad is also reflected more explicitly in his writings. 
From one of his first publications (1955), a (not very favourable) book review of 
Martha Wolfenstein’s (1954) Children’s Humour, mentions of humour theory and of 
its domain recur frequently throughout his books and articles. He considers, among 
other topics, strategic use of laughter displays (1981: 88,118), informal social control 
through ridicule (1961: 77), clowns and jokers (1961: 64-65; 1963b: 141-142), the 
acting out of improprieties ’in jest’ (1967: 86; 1974: 48-53, 188-97, 515; 1981: 154), 
the appearance of subversive ironies and gallows humour (1961: 76-77), the use of 
humour to carry embarrassing or critical messages (1967: 26-30), the surreptitious 
communication of amusement through 'collusive by-play* (1961: 62-63; 1963a: 179- 
88; 1981: 154), the possibility of laughter (among other emotions) 'flooding out' and 
causing an actor to lose his expressive control (1961: 55-61; 1974: 350-59), the use of 
joking to create 'role-distance' (1961: Hole Distance', esp. 98-117), joking with 
strangers following an impropriety (1963a: 125), techniques of fictional comedy 
(1971: 296-7; 1974: 327, 369-74, 381-382, 444; 1981: 81), pranks and other 'benign 
fabrications' used to fool a victim (1974: 87), different 'types’ of amusement
140
Chapter Three: The Discrediting o f Actors’ Self-Cloims Section 4
depending on frame level (1974: 130), amusement caused by the 'upkeying' of a 
situation (1974: 359-368), and amusing wordplay (1974:441-443).
As will be seen in later chapters, these scattered ideas can be integrated within 
a theory of the laughter triad based on a claim-discredit account of amusement. The 
very relationship between self-claims and hilarity, however, is more directly hinted at 
by Goffman himself on a number of occasions. In "Radio Talk" (1981), he considers 
the major self-claim attaching to the role of a radio announcer, "the production of 
seemingly faultless fresh talk." As seen above, Goffman obtained the empirical 
illustrations of announcer claim-discredits from a set of hlooper* records marketed as 
humour. And indeed, Goffman asserts that in managing the basic capacity required of 
radio announcers, the behaviours that must be avoided go beyond committing clearly 
identifiable errors: “...the progression from faults to faultables must be extended to the 
risibly interpretable, and this last appears to be the broadest category of all” (p.244, 
my emphasis). In this passage Goffman clearly equates (1) the production of a fault 
which discredits the self-claim to a specific competency (according to the fair or 
unfair valuation by an observer); (2) embarrassments; and (3) (at least one type of) 
funny stimuli18. Subtitled, "a study of the ways of our errors," this article focused on 
announcer talk merely as a case study of the countless abilities and characteristics that 
may be claimed by an individual in public. Thus, this tantalizing suggestion could 
have easily been (but was not) generalized and expanded upon by Goffman to refer to 
all self-claims.
It is also significant that the only extended discussion of humour theory 
regards one of the claim-discredit theories treated in Section 2 o f this chapter: Henri 
Bergson’s "fine essay" on the comic (1974: 38). After agreeing that "individuals often 
laugh when confronted by a person who does not sustain in every way an image of 
human guidedness," Goffman adds the tie to his own ideas:
Bergson only fails to go on and draw the implied conclusion, namely, that if 
individuals are ready to laugh during occurrences o f ineffectively guided 
behaviour, then all along they apparently must have been fully assessing the
18 This equivalence is alluded to again in the same article (pp. 253, 307,321-322).
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conformance of the normally behaved, finding it to be no laughing matter.
(1974:38)
Interestingly, Goffman also once requested a translation of another of the ‘claim- 
discredit* theories of comedy mentioned in Section 2 of this chapter, Luigi 
Pirandello* s VUmorismo (Pier Paolo Giglioli, personal communication).
His brief mention of Freud’s inteipretation of jokes (1961: 60) is also 
revealing. It occurs during a discussion of the suppressive work carried out by 
participants of interaction, who normally attempt to ignore events 'officially* irrelevant 
according to the current definition of the situation. Goffman agrees with Freud that 
when the official frame of interpretation changes radically, the liberation of actors 
from the need to suppress certain aspects may result in laughter. However, he adds in 
a footnote: “Freud, of course, saw the suppressive function as associated often with 
sexually tinged matters, instead of merely socially irrelevant properties that disrupt 
identity-images, one instance of which is the sexual** (ibid.; my emphasis). Though 
Goffman refrained from providing his own view of amusement in general terms, these 
comments on humour theory suggest his probable sympathy for claim-discredit 
accounts —at the very least as partial explanations.
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4.2. Humour Research on Goffman
From the time of the first major publications by Erving Goffman, humour 
researchers have recognized the interest of his work to their own. In a footnote of her 
celebrated article "Laughter Among Colleagues: A Study of Humor Among the Staff 
of a Mental Hospital" (1960), Rose Laub Coser expresses her gratitude to Goffman, 
who is cited both in this and in an earlier article (Coser, 1959), for a critical reading. 
Alfred Walle (1976) considered "Erving Goffman's dramaturgical analysis...a useful 
model" (p. 203) for dealing with the use of jokes by clients at an all-night diner, as 
have Joan Emerson (1973; 1975) and Robert A. Stebbins (1993) in similarly 
ethnographic studies of specific 'situated activity systems.'
Examples can be multiplied. Greg Smith has explicitly attempted to "explore 
the.potential of some of Goffman's writings as an analytical resource for the close 
sociological examination of laughter" (1996) and humour (1993). Marina Mizzau 
(1984) has partly grounded her analysis of irony use on Goffmanian conceptions of 
strategic and ritual interaction. Isabelle Van de Gejuchte (1996) has defined the limits 
of amusement elicited by political satire in terms of Goffmanian 'frames.' Zajdman 
(1995) has employed the terms 'face' and 'face-threatening acts’ in order to study 
joking behaviour and its possible consequences. Bouissac (1990) has analysed the 
performance of comedian George Carl as a "systematic violation of the rules of 
performance" (p. 426). These and other authors19 have recognized the benefits of 
studying amusement, laughter, and humour in their natural environment, the domain 
of face-to-face interaction which Goffman so tenaciously explored.
At least one writer on humour has argued, as I have done, for a more profound 
relevance of Goffman's work to humour theory:
The foremost contemporary theorist to expose the discrepancy between our 
ideals and our actuality, to unmask our current vanities, was the late 
sociologist Erving Goffman. Although seldom mentioning humor,... Goffman's 
sociological studies clearly parallel humor theories and practices...that unmask 
the ideal self to reveal the actual self. No other social scientist's work has
19 Some authors have recognized these benefits without a direct reference to Goffman. Pollio (1983), 
for instance, proposes the need for a humour theory that takes account of laughter as an "embodied 
activity," and as one which takes place in social situations.
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produced as much amusement as Goffman's, especially through the particular 
examples by which he illustrates his general insights.
(Davis, 1993: 219)
Davis' grouping of "humour theories...that unmask the ideal self to reveal the actual 
self* is rare, and he devotes a number of chapters of his book (pp. 149-306) to funny 
stimuli which involve discredit —though this is treated as only one category o f 
funniness. In the following chapters, I  will develop a detailed account of all 
amusement in these terms, and on this basis a larger theory also encompassing 
laughter and humour.
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5. Conclusions
I have presented a historical introduction to a causal theory of amusement 
substantially different from the traditional views discussed in Chapter One: the 
discrediting of a  claim  made by a social actor about himself. There have been four 
main keys in which the idea has been proposed by different authors:
1) Plato argued that we laugh at those who claim to be more than they actually are, in 
terms of possessions, appearance, or virtue. W.G. Moore generalized this idea in his 
analysis of Molière by identifying the falling off or removal o f any 'mask' worn by an 
individual as the source of mirth. Pirandello described the role of the humourist as the 
tearing away of such masks.
2) Aristotle, and in this century E.F. Carritt, presented aesthetic defects as the cause of 
amusement. If viewed as failures of expression, in Croce's sense, such defects can be 
held equivalent to the discreditings of self-claims.
3) J.B. Baillie developed the idea in terms of an incongruity between the end sought 
by an individual and his actual achievements, highlighting the specific attitude of 
'appreciation' that must be adopted by a perceiver in order to notice such an 
incongruity.
4) Bergson, Klapp, Powell, and Jauregui have written instead of deviance from a 
certain class o f social norms, those regulating conduct and appearance proper to 
specific social situations (i.e., propriety as opposed to morality).
I have briefly summarized Erving Goffman's theory of the interaction order, 
which shares an evident affinity with this school of humour theory. Goffman presents 
individuals as performers enacting situated selves made up of constituent self-claims. 
If a self-claim is discredited by events, the discredited individual feels 
em barrassm ent and his 'sacred' self becomes spoilt and in need of ritual repair. 
Respect for norms of deference and demeanour (i.e., of propriety) safeguards all 
projected identities within a relevant situation. Such norms are internalized in the
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minds of participants as situationally-specific social fram ew orks, providing them  
with both a guide for action and for interpretation of others' actions. The result o f  
general conformity to these apparently trivial rules is an ordered social world 
intelligible to participants -continuous deviation may result in the confinement of the 
transgressor to à  psychiatric institution.
In the final section, I have identified a number of mutual references between 
Goffman and humour research, supporting the proposed link between the two. Though 
Goffman did not treat the question of amusement directly, occasional comments or 
allusions to the laughter triad can be found in most of his books and articles, as well as
i*
countless amusing anecdotes and illustrations. These tend to express ideas congruent 
with those of claim-discredit theorists of amusement.
Conversely, humour research has been increasingly rummaging through 
Goffman's theoretical toolbox, with a growing recognition of the essential 
belongingness of the laughter triad within the realm of situated interaction. One writer, 
Murray Davis, has recently argued for the profound relevance of the 'interaction order* 
to amusement itself. In the following chapters, I will attempt to describe the nature 
and extent of this relevance, reconstructing the amusement theory Goffman himself 
did not write, and proposing a new way forward for humour research.
i w
Situating Laughter:
Amusement, Laughter, and Humour in Everyday Life
PART TWO
In this central part o f the thesis,
I develop a causal account o f the amusement emotion, 
based on the notion o f  the self-claim  discredit.
Chapter Four
A Hypothesis of Amusement
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A Typology of Funny Events
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Elaborations of the Model
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1. Introduction
In Part One of the thesis, I defined amusement as the pan-human emotion the 
manifestation of which is observable as laughter, and which may be provoked by 
humour or by other types of funny stimuli. I argued that an understanding of the 
laughter triad --amusement, laughter, and humour- required a valid and coherent 
account of the cause of amusement, which has not yet been agreed upon despite a 
large catalogue of proposed theories. Finally, I proposed some general guidelines for 
developing a causal theory of amusement —the procedure of ’aggregate introspection'- 
and identified a promising alternative to the most well-known causal accounts: 
amusement as triggered by the perception of another’s self-claim having been 
discredited.
In Part Two I will present a detailed exposition of this 'claim-discredit' 
hypothesis of amusement for 'aggregate assessment' by readers. Following the 
guidelines set out in Chapter Two, I will define as precisely as possible the proposed 
cause of amusement (this chapter), and attempt to apply it consistently throughout the 
widest range of funny stimuli (Chapter Five), distinguishing these also from closely 
related unfunny phenomena (Chapter Six). In Part Three, a general theory of the 
laughter triad will be developed on the basis of this causal hypothesis.
The basic proposal can be briefly stated as follows:
Amusement is provoked only and always in a subject when he perceives that a 
self-claim put forward by a claimant has been discredited, provided that 1) the 
perceiver does not identify himself as the claimant at the moment o f 
perception; 2) the perceiver is sufficiently involved in a definition o f events 
which places the discrediting in the foreground.
Discussion of the latter two points will be reserved for Chapter Six. These 
amendments, which distinguish between funny and unfunny claim-discredits, are 
secondary to an understanding of what claim-discredits consist of in the first place.
In this chapter I will specify, in great detail, the meaning of the two central 
concepts: the self-claim and its discredit. A self-claim will be defined as the ascription 
of some attribute to a claimant by himself (or by a legitimate agent): "My name is
151
Chanter four. A Hypothesis of Amusement .Section 1
Napoleon Bonaparte"; "I can beat you at chess"; "my other car is a Porsche"; "I have 
never used illegal drugs"; "my arm hurts"; "I can read and write"; 'Tm a trustworthy 
kind of person"; "I don’t believe in marriage"; "this is my seat"; "I hate spinach"; 
"don’t move or HI shoot." The discredit of such a claim will be said to take place when 
events fail to confirm the attribution: the claimant (respectively) proves to be other 
than Napoleon, repeatedly fails to beat his opponent at chess, does not own a Porsche, 
was once a regular cannabis smoker, faked the pain, is illiterate, proves a scoundrel, 
marries, lacks a valid ticket for the seat, enjoys the taste of spinach when he actually 
tries it, or does not have the nerve to fire a gun. Both a self*claim and its discredit are 
realities in the mind of a single perceiver, whose observation of these phenomena 
depends on the social frameworks of interpretation he applies to the current situation. 
Different opinions on what ’pain’ or literacy* mean or entail, for instance, will lead to 
varying judgments as to whether a bee sting could possibly be considered a cause of 
claimed discomfort, or whether a certain written text constitutes proof of great literacy 
or glaring illiteracy.
Much of the analysis will be devoted to identifying and describing the main 
variables relevant to self-claims and their discredit. This will not only allow the reader 
to obtain a better conceptual grasp on the phenomena at issue, but also provide an 
order with which to classify the heterogeneous range of funny stimuli in the following 
chapter. J
Self-claims may be classified according to perceived 'origin* and 'content*. The 
origin of a self-claim is the way in which (according to the perceiver) the attribution 
has been ascribed by a claimant to himself: by explicit assertion (Independent), by 
role membership (role), or by mere participation in human society (universal). The 
content of a self-claim is the actual substance of the attribution: the skill, quality, 
emotion, mental state, identity, possession, relationship, or other characteristic that is 
claimed. Five types will be distinguished: skill, mind, territory, appearance, and 
biography.
Self-claim discredits will be said to vary according to their perceived ’cause,' 
'claimant', and location'. The cause of a discredit can be either mere accident or the 
intentional actions of an agent. The claimant affected by discredit can be either the 
perceiver himself or some other individual. The location of the discredit may be 
either untransformed reality or some transformation of events such as oral
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recountings, literature, theatrical representations, film or audio recorded material, 
rehearsals, games, or mental imaginings/distortions.
This discussion of variables will permit, in Chapter Five, the development of a 
typology of amusing stimuli on the basis of the natural variability of claim-discredit 
situations. In this way, I will attempt to systematically account for the vast range and 
diversity of funny objects from the starting point of a single eliciting cause of the 
emotion. Jokes, gaffes, wind-ups, coincidences, tickling, theatrical comedy, nonsense 
rhymes, satire, slapstick, and other triggers of amusement will be shown to cause, 
constitute, or include claim-discredits of one type or another.
Clearly, not all self-claim discredits lead to a perceiver’s amusement. Being 
'caught out' in a lie or exaggeration may be experienced as deeply embarrassing. 
Political corruption scandals involve the discrediting of a public servant's basic role 
self-claims of honesty and commitment to public interests, but result in humiliation 
(for the accused) and moral outrage (for the general public). Accidentally driving a car 
off the edge of a cliff, while constituting a clear failure to maintain one's claim to 
drive properly, is anything but funny to the passengers or to their families.
The differences between amusing and non-amusing claim-discredits will be 
treated in Chapter Six. To anticipate, these differences will be accounted for by two 
further variables relating to the perception of claim-discredits: perceiver-claimant 
identity and perceiver-discredit involvement -that is, the extent to which the 
perceiver identifies himself as the claimant, and the extent to which the perceiver 
attends to discrediting events (as opposed to other features of the situation)20. A 
pedestrian who walks into a lamppost while talking to a friend may be laughed at by 
his friend for this failure to keep up self-claims of watchfulness and competent 
ambulation. The careless pedestrian may also experience amusement himself, due to 
his ability to detach and disown (i.e., not identify himself as) the part of himself which 
was so careless. On the other hand, if the accident was witnessed not by a friend but 
by a first-time acquaintance before whom the pedestrian wished to make a good 
impression (a sexual interest, a prospective employer), he might find such detachment 
more difficult, and feel acute and unpleasant embarrassment instead. Moreover, if the 
accident was quite serious, involving severe pain, loss of consciousness, or bleeding, 
the victim's laughable/embarrassing carelessness would probably be ignored (i.e., not
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the main focus of cognitive involvement) by most participants, with pain, fear, 
concern, empathie suffering, and the like dominating reactions.
A full discussion of the boundaries between funny and unfunny claim-discredit 
situations will be held off for the moment. The following pages will focus on the 
meaning and variability of such self-claims and claim-discredits in general.
20 See the brief statement of the causal hypothesis above.
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2. Self-Claims21
2.1. Definition of'Self-Claim'
During interaction the individual is expected to possess certain 
attributes, capacities, and information which, taken together, fit together into a 
self that is at once coherently unified and appropriate for the occasion. 
Through the expressive implications of his stream of conduct, through mere 
participation itself, the individual effectively projects this acceptable self into 
the interaction, although he may not be aware of it, and the others may not be 
aware of having so interpreted his conduct At the same time he must accept 
and honor the selves projected by the other participants. The elements o f a 
social encounter, then, consist o f effectively projected claims to an acceptable 
self and the confirmation o f like claims on the part o f the others. The 
contributions of all are oriented to these and built up on the basis of them.
(Goffman, 1967: 105-06 
my emphasis)
One way of viewing social interaction is in terms of the self-claims being 
made by participants before each other, and the subsequent attempts to sustain them. 
A self-claim is defined as a skill, quality, emotion, mental state, identity, object, 
relationship, territory, or any other attribute ascribed to a claimant by a claim- 
maker who is either the claimant himself or someone seen to legitimately represent 
the claimant. The phrase 'making a self-claim,' or simply 'claim-making,* will refer to 
the action of ascribing such an attribute to the self. To simplify the exposition, I will 
consider initially only cases where the claim-maker and the claimant are one and the 
same person.
Self-claims may be made verbally and explicitly, in such typical forms as "I 
am...", "I can...” or "I have...". A random assortment of examples follows.
21 The roe of the term 'claim-making' in this chapter and in the thesis is in no way related to the concept 
of 'claims-making' in the social problems literature (ie, Spector and Kitsuse, 1977: 73-96).
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la m ...
the king o f the mountain 
polish
chaste, humble, and obedient 
pretty good at chess 
just joking 
ill
a rationalist 
going to  the office
I can...
drink while making my ventriloquist doll whistle 
beat you up
prove the existence of an infinite set of prime numbers
walk
convince Maggie to come to the party 
smile in the face of adversity 
handle snakes
I have—
brown eyes
a daddy who can beat up your daddy 
nothing up my sleeve 
a Visa Gold card
10,000 beer cans from all over the world 
secrets you will never know 
an answer to your question 
this here piece o’ land 
three brothers and one sister
Writing curriculum vitae or application forms, and introducing oneself to a stranger, 
are common activities which involve much claim-making of this explicit type. Most 
self-claims, however, are made non-verbally, and often even unconsciously. Any 
aspect of a participant’s performance —setting, dress, accent, poise, manner— may 
express self-claims o f one type or another. For example,
Leaving a coat on a  chair. I have temporary rights over the use of this chair; I own this 
coat; I will be returning to this chair shortly.
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Walking up a pavement confidently: I am walking in this direction; I know where I am 
going; I can walk; I have temporary rights to the space immediately in front of me.
Being attired as a policeman: I am a policeman; I have respect for the law; I have good 
knowledge of the criminal code; I am willing to risk my life in the battle against 
crime.
Even though not always consciously aware of having made such self-claims, actors 
can be held accountable to them, and may on occasion be confronted with or even 
forced to defend them.
Individual self-claims constitute the elements or building blocks of the various 
'presentations of self (i.e., 'faces,' 'parts,' 'routines,' 'projections’) put forward by a 
participant on the various stages of social interaction. The self-claims I make define 
who I am. Relatedly, the fact that I make self-claims determines my being someone at 
all: a person who makes a point of claiming the least possible is said to have "no 
personality."
The 'existence' of a self-claim, the question of it having been made or not in 
actual fact, is always relative to the opinion or point-of-view o f an individual or group 
o f individuals. Self-claims cannot exist in a void, being subjective interpretations o f 
social action or being. No self-claim is possible in the absence of an observer, if only 
the claimant himself. During an interactional situation, the self-claims seen to have 
been made by a single participant may vary from one observer to the next, and from 
any observer to the observed claimant. Thus, when speaking of self-claims, a 
subjectivity is always implied, whether real or hypothetical, within the world of an 
anecdote retold, within a specific reality, or merely in the minds of the theorist and/or 
reader. It is worth noting that this feature of self-claims creates the potential for 
confusion between the supposed initial imputation of an attribute to the self ('Tm the 
hottest thing in town") and the secondary attribution of this attribution by an observer 
to the claimant ("He thinks he’s the hottest thing in town").
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2.2. Self-Claim Variables
The foregoing examples illustrate another feature of self-claims. Covering no 
less than the entire range of characteristics that may be attributed to a person, self­
claims are not only infinite in number but enormously varied. Two theoretical 
distinctions may be found useful in ordering this concept: the orig in  of a self-claim — 
whether it has been made independently or else by virtue o f a role membership or 
mere humanity'; and the content of a self-claim, the actual substance of the attribution 
(i.e.: Is it about skills, mental contents and abilities, owned territories, appearance, or 
biography?).
2.2.1. Origin o f Self-Claims
Firstly, self-claims can be classified according to their orig in . On what basis is 
a particular self-claim attributed to an actor by an observer? How has it been made? 
Where does it 'come from? Three types of origin can be distinguished: independent, 
role, and universal.
2.2.1.1. Independent Self-Claims
At one extreme are singular or exceptional assertions which the claimant is not 
bound by rule or expectation to make. An actor independently chooses to make this 
sort of self-claim, adding an element to his sense of self-determination, his 
individuality, and his personal identity. Independent self-claims are not necessarily 
exceptional in the sense o f ’extraordinary,' though they may be. "I can walk a tightrope 
between two skyscrapers," "I saw The Seven Samurais last night,” and 'Tm hungry” 
may qualify as independent self-claims in the sense that (and in so far as) they are not 
strictly required of the relevant participant by social constraints.
Another necessary qualification regards the freedom of 'choice* I appear to 
have attributed to such self-claims by the use of the word 'independent*. This freedom 
is severely limited by the fact that almost any action or feature o f an actor presented 
before others will express an assertion about the self. Idle pieces o f chit-chat express 
all manner of claims about what the speaker knows, has experienced, or believes;
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attempts to perform ordinary activities such as automobile driving or museum visiting 
constitute self-claims of competence in specific areas; even disclaimers represent 
assertions of inability or non-possession. Making independent self-claims (not to 
mention other types) is an unavoidable side-effect of interaction.
Thus, there is more freedom regarding which independent self-claims to make 
than regarding whether to make them at all (the latter will vary roughly with the 
amount of presence and activity undertaken in public). Moreover, all manner of 
pressures, limitations, and difficulties may influence choices made regarding 
independent self-claims. It may be quite desirable, for instance, to make a certain 
claim ("Yes, I have seen The Seven Samurais") in the light of currently accepted 
values (i.e., among a group of film enthusiasts). Perhaps it would be more accurate to 
say that it is other participants of interaction who attribute 'independent' volition to 
the claimant, rather than the claimant himself. Nevertheless, the claimant does at least 
potentially have some scope for carving out a unique self-image out of such 
assertions.
As will be seen, only this type of self-claim may be expressed verbally (though 
even here non-verbal expression is most common).
2.2.1.2. Role Self-Claims
Society establishes the means of categorizing persons and the complement of 
attributes felt to be ordinary and natural for members of each of these 
categories.
(Goffman, 1963: 2)
By fate and by life-choices individuals are classified by themselves and others 
according to various schemes of social roles22: professional, kinship, age, sexual, 
territorial, political, ideological, artistic, religious, organizational, and situational. A 
role, from one perspective, can be viewed as a projected image of self shared by all 
roleholders. All doctors enjoy the prestige and the financial rewards of belonging to
22 By 'role' I will mean no more than a socially-defined category of persons associated with a set of 
attributes. In Stigma (1963: 1) Goffman uses the term 'social identity/
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this restricted group. All gain prestige from the publicized successes of a few, and all 
suffer from the publicized errors of a few. More relevantly to the current discussion, 
any doctor is expected to fulfill the self-claims attaching to this role: a history of 
successful medical studies (preferably framed and displayed on the wall of his 
practice); accuracy in reaching medical diagnoses; a commitment to care; emotional 
tolerance to sights of nakedness, blood, disease, deformity, and death; adequate, clean, 
and sterile equipment and surroundings. No one can escape making countless self­
claims by virtue of membership to the various social groupings with which he is 
identified.
Roles vary in specificity from the most particular to the most general. At one 
end of the spectrum we find characteristic parts or routines regularly enacted before 
certain audiences by a single individual: ’Jo Smith with his office colleagues', T)r. 
Twistbone with a patient,’ 'Attila the Hun on the battlefield,' 'Attila in private with his 
concubines.' These individual routines are built up on the sediment of countless past 
independent self-claims, on consistencies of behaviour and appearance observed over 
several performances.
Progressing towards greater generality, we find roles shared among larger 
groups of people: antique car collectors, skiers, Mormons, plumbers, Frenchmen, 
contract killers. Each of these categories is associated with a set of self-claims 
expected of members. In his article "Radio Talk” (1981: 197-330), Goffman analyses 
the vicissitudes of maintaining the central claim attributed by radio broadcasters to 
themselves: "the production of seemingly faultless fresh talk" (p. 242). At the opposite 
extreme from individual routines we find such inclusive categories as 'male' and 
'female' or 'child' and 'adult'
Role self-claims cannot by definition, be established verbally: the very fact of 
belonging to a social role is the effective assertion o f such self-claims, and their 
verbalization provides mere redundancy.
It should be clarified that the self-claim of membership to a role is not 
necessarily or even usually a role self-claim itself. '1 am a trapeze artist' or 1 belong to 
Amnesty International' would qualify as independent self-claims (of membership to a 
role), unless implied in the definition of a super-ordinate role. As an example of the 
latter 7 am white' could be seen as a role self-claim associated with the independent 
self-claim '1 am a neo-nazi.’
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2.2.1.3. Universal Self-Claims
The concept of ’person* or *human being' can be considered a role in the sense I 
have been using the term (i.e., as a collective 'self-presentation'), the most general of 
all roles.
This 'universal' role is not free from requirements. Most of us normally remain 
unaware of the many self-claims we make and are expected to make by mere virtue of 
being persons in society. On the other hand, some individuals suffer crippling 
handicaps in dealing with simple everyday activities due to failures in this regard: 
physical deformities, stigmatized racial or ethnic backgrounds, problematic sexual 
identities, psychological disorders, or criminal records (Goffman, 1963B). 
Occasionally all of us become sharply aware of these basic expectations, finding 
ourselves in situations which expose a particular deficiency:
The most fortunate of normals is likely to have his half-hidden failing, and for 
every little failing there is a social occasion when it will loom large.
Competency in regard to common-human abilities is something we tacitly allot 
to all adults we meet with, an achievement and qualification they are taken to 
start with, credit for which they receive in advance. An individual's failure to 
sustain these 'normal* standards is thus taken as evidence not only that he 
doesn't (or might not) measure up in these respects, but also that as a claimant 
he has tacitly presented himself in a false light. With reappraisal goes 
discrediting and an imputation of bad faith.
(Goffman, 1963B: 126; 1981:202)
A universal self-claim is one assumed to be made by 'everybody' or 'all normal 
people.' They are not necessarily truly cross-cultural self-claims. Every society creates 
and defends its own version of what constitutes 'normal' behaviour, appearance, and 
other characteristics of personhood. A self-claim is *universal' only from the point-of- 
view of a single individual or of a social group. However, there may be a number o f 
basic requirements to social interaction:
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Participation in any circuit of face-to-face activity requires the participant to 
keep command of himself, both as a person capable o f executing physical 
movements and as one capable of receiving and transmitting communications.
(Goffman, 1961:93)
There is a special family of competencies seen to be common to the human 
estate by virtue of involving ongoing requisites for living in society: the 
ability, for example, to walk, see, hear, dress appropriately, manipulate small 
physical objects and, in literate societies, write, read, and compute with 
numbers.
(Goffman, 1981: 201)
In the following discussion regarding the substance of claims about the self, 
some general categories of claims will be suggested which all societies require o f 
members. In each case, however, the specific substance of requirements will vary. For 
example, the level of competence and detailed characteristics associated with 'walking* 
in an urban environment, with its hard surfaces, broad but restricted pedestrian areas, 
and crowds of people, differ from those associated with walking in arctic, mountain, 
or tropical forest surroundings. Social definitions of what ’walking’ competence entails 
will vary accordingly.
As in the case of role self-claims, and for the same reasons, universal self­
claims cannot be made verbally.
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2.2.2. Content of Self-Claims
Self-claims can additionally be classified according to their content, though 
here the choice of distinguishing criteria tends to be rather more arbitrary. Plato, as we 
have seen (Chapter Three, Section 2.1), identified 'virtue,* 'wisdom,' 'wealth,' and 
'physical beauty' as the four aspects regarding which a man may or may not 'know 
himself. 1 will adopt a somewhat different division, including self-claims of skill, 
self-claims of the m ind, self-claims of territory , self-claims of appearance, and self­
claims of biography.
2.2.2.I. Self-Claims of Skill
Self-claims of skill assert a specific level of ability by the claimant regarding 
some observable and/or complex activity: tennis-playing, nation-conquering, lock­
picking, speech-giving, or brain-transplanting. "I can do..." would provide a verbal 
statement of this type.
From the point of view of a particular individual or society, certain self-claims 
of skill will be associated with certain claimants by virtue of role-membership or 
merely by virtue of being human beings. In Europe, parents must be able to teach their 
children 'proper manners,' dentists to pull teeth and fill cavities, and males to play 
football (soccer). In Italy, all individuals are expected by most natives to be able to 
cook a proper pot of pasta, in Brazil to dance the samba, in Great Britain to tolerate 
the ingestion of large quantities of beer.
Certain self-claims of skill must be demanded of all members (i.e., will be 
considered 'universal') by almost every human society. In order to be able to interact at 
all, or to interact at an adequate standard, social actors must demonstrate competence 
in a number of domains. Firstly, they must be able to produce language and other 
accepted means of communication efficiently. Errors may occur at various levels: 
pronunciation, handwriting, spelling, lexicon, syntax, style, interest of content, 
relevance of topic, continuity of thought, conversational turn-taking23. Sensory-motor 
coordination is a second basic categoiy of universal skills, including such abilities as
23 See "Radio Talk: A Study of the Ways of Our Errors" ia Goffman (1981) for a consideration of 
speech as a basic human competence.
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walking, orientation, guiding the various bodily parts through space, and manipulating 
objects34. Thirdly, each society sets an optimum level o f control over the body, 
restricting freedom in regards to acceptable bodily movements, emotional expression, 
and 'creature releases'23. Individuals must therefore develop the necessary competence 
in managing their body.
2.2.22. Self-Claims of the Mind
Self-claims of the mind assert either
a) the possession of a fact, belief, memory, desire, opinion, attitude, or other 
latent mental state or property by the claimant; or,
b) a specific level of ability by the claimant regarding some mental activity 
(including perception): calculating square-roots, forecasting stock market 
tendencies, appreciating modem art, recognizing musical notes, 
communicating telepathically, understanding Slovenian.
Verbalized statements would be of the types "I think...", "I believe...", "I feel...", "I 
understand...", "I want..", "I know...”, "I can see/hear/smell/touch/taste...”.
Again, social roles are typically associated with certain self-claims of the 
mind. Charity workers are required to possess philanthropic ideals and motives; 
geometry teachers to know the formula for calculating circumferences. Other mental 
self-claims will apply to whole societies: knowledge of earthquake emergency 
procedures in Japan, pride of being an American* in the United States, understanding 
three languages in Switzerland.
It is possible to distinguish a number of categories of mental self-claims which 
all societies demand of the individual24 56.
Firstly, individuals must be able to report with some accuracy on what occurs 
within their perceivable environment, a mental competence I will term immediate
24 At least the ability to maneouver the body through space as a pedestrian has been discussed at some 
length by Goffman (1971:5-18).
25 Mary Douglas (1971) has treated the social control of the body from a cross-cultural perspective.
26 Goffman's Frame Analysis (1974) can be interpreted as a study of such claims.
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perception. They are expected to perform to a certain level with their 'exterior' senses 
of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch; likewise with their 'interior* senses of hunger, 
thirst, pain, itchiness, and such bodily messages. They must be able to offer 
reasonably accurate judgments of colour, bitterness, sharpness, weight, size, tone, 
loudness, and other culturally-relevant sensoiy characteristics of stimuli.
Secondly, individuals must possess and, when relevant, apply the ’correct' (i.e., 
culturally defined) n a tu ra l frameworks of interpretation. Natural frames, as 
mentioned in Chapter Three, are those which we use to view things in terms of an 
unconscious, mechanistic universe. In Western society, our scientific theories tell us, 
among other things, that billiard balls pushed off a table drop down towards the 
ground. A force called 'gravity* prevents them from floating in space or spiraling up 
towards the ceiling. Individuals should interpret events within the conceptions and 
ideas currently held about how the world ’works.'
Thirdly, individuals should be seen to possess and correctly apply the 
appropriate social fram eworks of interpretation. Social frames are ordered 
classifications of knowledge by which actors interpret events guided by conscious 
action, the social world. Individuals are expected to possess the frames considered 
'common knowledge* by their society, and to apply them with 'common sense.' They 
are expected to be 'cultured,' knowing about their own personal histories, the history 
and geography of the world around them and of their society, the laws of fashion and 
good taste, practical information essential to everyday life, the rules of morality and 
etiquette, and the various types of social occasion and their workings. Individuals 
must additionally manage these matrices of knowledge according to accepted 
procedures. One thing is to know that cups are designed for drinking. Another is 
whether they are actually used accordingly or rather as hats, juggling balls, or 
representations of a deity. Thus, social frame discredits would include not only 
revealing a lack or incompleteness of a basic social frame, but also using the wrong 
frame to interpret events, failing to identify an element from a particular frame, 
misjudging a particular item (according to values attached to the item within the 
frame), or using items (objects, ideas, or activities) from one frame in an inappropriate 
context (i.e., mixing frames).
Fourthly, individuals should be able to decode verbal and other forms of 
symbolic communication efficiently, when such messages are offered competently
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within the receiver's range of attention. L anguage in terpreta tion  is a subset of the 
interpretation of situations, but it is an important one, for language is the main tool 
used by participants to intentionally communicate meanings to each other.
Fifthly, a participant in a situation is expected to display appropriate 
cognitive and emotional involvement in the frame shared with other participants. 
Indeed, participation is synonymous with involvement. Situations —card games, board 
meetings, funerals- seem real only as long as participants generally appear to be 
genuinely engrossed in them. On the other hand, a situation may be threatened by 
overinvolvement (i.e.. by 'excessive' emotional displays). Thus, all societies must 
require a self-claim of 'appropriate* involvement.
Finally, individuals must be required to display logical and consistent 
thought, what might be called calculation 'within the parameters o f a frame.' The 
simple rales of rational computation must be followed by members of a society if they 
are to be considered fully capable for social interaction.
2.2.2.3. Self-Claims of Territory
Self-claims of territory concern the control over certain 'fields of things' which 
Goffman (1971) refers to as the "territories of the self': personal possessions, clothing 
and the body itself, permanently-owned spaces such as homes and gardens, occupied 
areas such as phone booths or tables at a cafe, the 'place' held in a queue, guarded 
information, the right to talk during a discussion.
A territorial self-claim belongs to one o f two complementary types:
a) Self-claims of control over the claimant's own preserves.
A self-claim to control is a claim  of ability and willingness to defend 
and protect the preserve from unauthorized intrusion. Examples include 
purchasing a commodity, 'saving' a  place at a canteen table, conquering a 
castle, and the child's taunt "I've got a  secret."
b) Self-claims o f respect for the preserve of another.
A self-claim to respect is a claim  of intention to avoid intruding upon a 
preserve without previous authorization. Examples include shows of tact and
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deference, pledges of allegiance/obedience, a door-to-door salesman's "This 
will only take a minute of your time...", a politician's vow to abstain from 
increasing taxes, a bank robber's "Nobody's going to get hurt (if everyone 
cooperates)...", and a peace treaty between two nations after a war of territorial 
conquest.
Certain territorial self-claims accompany specific social roles. A shopkeeper 
claims control over the goods displayed, and respect towards the customer's questions 
and requests. A customer, conversely, claims control over the shopkeeper's attention 
(at least as much as any other customer), and respect towards the goods displayed.
Other territorial self-claims are considered universal within a single society. In 
Great Britain, for instance, unacquainted individuals passing each other on the street 
respectfully avoid 'staring' at each other —only the briefest scan is permitted for 
purposes of maneuvering and possible identification. The more prolonged looks 
common in Mediterranean countries would be seen as invasions of privacy, 
transgressions of one’s right to be ignored.
Five categories of territorial self-claims can be applied cross-culturally. 
M aterial territories include personal possessions, objects to which the owner 
has temporarily lain claim to, human dependents, and the controls o f creature comfort 
systems such as lights, heating, or music players.
Spatial/bodily territories include the body of an individual, the space 
immediately surrounding it, and all spatial preserves which he is responsible for 
protecting.
During focused interaction (encounters), and even during unfocused 
interaction, there are a number of bounded interactional territories, both in space 
and in time, which participants have a duty to protect and/or respect. The encounter 
itself can be thought of as a closed unit which outsiders may enter and participants 
may leave only according to certain rituals of entrance and exit. Similarly, interaction 
is organized sequentially in time, as a series of turns, and certain rules of turn-taking 
must be enforced if individual selves are to be preserved undamaged. (Goffman 1961, 
1971,1981)
Informational territories refer to the facts, ideas, or feelings which an 
individual is expected to maintain private, or secret, concealed from certain others.
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Personal information about sexual, toilet, and criminal activities, for example, are 
commonly withheld (and, by others, not requested) during public interaction in our 
society. Physical blemishes and deformities are also normally disguised, if not hidden 
altogether (and, by others, ignored). More generally, any information known to clash 
with an image of self being presented, should be concealed by the actor and 
disattended by fellow interactants.
The ego te rrito ry  is the symbol or idea of the very self, sometimes referred to 
as 'honour' or 'dignity'. This can be damaged or mistreated in various ways. What we 
call an ’insult' is a direct affront to the self, and it is something which an actor should 
not tolerate, and which others should avoid causing. Insults may be 'active* (a sign of 
disrespect is offered) or ‘passive' (a sign of respect due is not offered).
2.2.2.4. Self-Claims o f Appearance and Condition
These refer to the physical aspect and condition of the claimant (or the 
possessions and settings for which he is considered responsible), and may be 
verbalized as "I look...", "my things look..." or "My physical condition is...". Some 
elements include the beauty, cleanliness, and orderliness of possessions and owned 
spaces, bodily and facial configuration, posture, body odour, audible qualities of 
voice, skin/hair colour and texture, dress, hygiene, age, constitution, and health.
Role self-claims o f appearance and condition include the fashionable standards 
of beauty required of 'top models,' the advanced age typical of national leaders, the 
large size of night-club doormen, the cleanliness of a chefs kitchen, the colourful suit 
and elegant poses of a  bullfighter, the stamina o f long-distance runners, and the scars, 
piercings, tattoos, stretchings, flattenings, and other bodily disfigurations applied to 
initiated members of several Western and non-Westem social groups.
Universal self-claims of appearance vary from one society to another. In the 
United States, standards of teeth whiteness and straightness are extremely high in 
comparison to European standards. Europeans, on the other hand, are much less 
tolerant regarding obesity than Americans, All societies, however, impose some basic 
norms of appearance 'universally'. A few basic cross-cultural categories can be 
obtained from the above listed ’elements' of appearance.
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22.2.5. Self-Claims of Biography
The types of self-claims presented thus far concern potentialities of the 
claimant (I can do, I can control...), which may or may not be realized in actual 
circumstances. This fifth category, on the other hand, regards allegations of actual 
fact, of events that did, do, or will take place (whether visibly to observers or not).
Biographical self-claims describe the circumstances, activities, mental and 
bodily states, relationships (to objects, persons, or categories), or mere presence of the 
claimant at more or less specific points in space and time. They may be put into words 
in these and similar ways: "I was there (at that time)", "This happened to me (then)", 
"I felt/am feeling...", "I did it (this many times/for the first time at this age)", "I am 
now doing this", "I am going to do this (within this amount of time/as soon as 
possible)", "I am/was a friend/nephew/colleague/business partner of...".
Specific roles demand particular 'careers' to be undergone by individuals 
within a specific time frame. In some cases, this required history may extend beyond 
the individual's life through his genealogical roots. The process of recruitment for 
specific occupational roles, for instance, often includes testing not only of abilities, 
knowledge, and appearance, but also of such biographical facts as specific types of 
education undertaken, work experience undergone, residence taken up, gender, and, in 
some cases, socio-cultural/hereditary background. Once part of a role, continued 
membership may require further biographical additions —publications in the case of 
academics, supernatural perception, protection, and healing in the case of Amazonian 
shamans.
Bach society expects specific biographical facts from all individuals. Some 
'universal' expectations of this type which are almost unique to the Western world 
include the experience o f 'falling in love’ (to be had at least once in a lifetime) and the 
fact of having traveled at least several hundred miles from one's birthplace. In many 
other societies, undergoing a prolonged initiation ceremony into adulthood and 
forming part of vastly extended matri- or patri-lineal families would seem equally 
obvious biographical essentials.
There are also a number of basic cross-cultural categories of such self-claims 
that may be identified:
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a) typical experiences which are taken for granted by members of the society: 
rites of passage, socialization practices, typical economic, recreational, and 
ritual activities, emotional and physiological events, first-hand perception of 
typical natural and social phenomena. In the Arctic, for example 'dressing 
warmly' and 'walking in snow' might constitute basic life experiences; these 
would be lacking, however, in members of a Pacific island society, where 
swimming naked in bright, clear, warm water would seem equally basic'.
b) typical places where each individual is expected to have been at 
appropriate times. These include not only specific locations, such as Tjondon' 
or 'Red-Rock Mountain* but abstract concepts such as ’home', 'a city', or 
'outdoors.'
c) typical social relationships with categories such as 'mother,' 'friend,' or 
’object-of-sexual-desire.'
d) typical possessions, which among nomadic hunter-gatherers would be no 
more than a few hand-made portables, and in middle-class suburban America 
might include a large closetful of clothing, an automobile from age 16-20, and 
a large furnished house with front and back garden from 25-35.
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Section 2
2.3. Claim-makers and Claimants
Most often, the individual who actually makes a self-claim by word, deed, or 
observable condition is also the one about whom the self-claim is made. This will 
invariably be the case if  the attribution is of role or universal origin. Thus, unless 
specified to the contrary, I will use phrases such as ’X makes a self-claim* in a loose 
sense, meaning 'X makes a self-claim about X '
It is possible, however, that with some independent assertions claim-maker 
and claimant are not equivalent. Performances on the everyday stage are sometimes 
given by groups of individuals or teams (Goffman, 1959: 82-100) who share a set of 
self-claims that apply to the group as a whole. The self-claims to be made may be 
discussed in private, but once in public any self-claim made by a single member of the 
team must be supported by all others —a front of agreement must be maintained at all 
times. Thus, one individual may be a claim-maker for a large group of claimants 
which includes himself. A specialized role of director or spokesperson may 
institutionalize this relation.
Another possibility is for one person or group to act as claim-maker for a 
separate claimant. This may occur if the former is seen to have taken the role of 
legitimate agent or representative. Examples include the agent of an author or 
performer, the lawyer who represents a client, the slave auctioneer, the football player 
advertising a brand of sports shoes, and the employee who tries to 'sell* a friend as a 
candidate for an available job in his company. In this case, the claim-maker is not a 
claimant himself —or at least not of the same claims— and yet the actor represented 
will be held responsible for the self-claims made on his behalf.
Chapter Four: A Hypothesis o f Amusement_________________
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2.4. Self-Claims and Social Norms
Self-claims are involved in the maintenance of social order. As suggested 
above in section 2.2.1, many such claims —specifically, those of ‘role* and ‘universal* 
origin- derive from a social definition of who the claimant is. A lawyer does not need 
to verbally declare his knowledge of basic legal theory, or his respect for the law, but 
if questioned will readily provide such declarations (perhaps in an offended tone). 
These self-claims are implicit, but they are most certainly present, and their discredit 
will elicit the same sorts of consequences as if  they had been explicit. Our society has 
previously associated the role of ‘lawyer* with a whole host of essential attributes, 
and likewise with all other conceivable roles, including the universally applicable role 
of 'human being.*
These associations can also be characterized in terms of the social norms 
(rules, expectations) applying to a specific role, or to all people generally. Social 
norms, which can be defined as socially shared ideas about the required or 
recommended actions or characteristics of individuals. Not all social norms are related 
to self-claims, however. A contract killer, for instance, does not violate any self­
claims when he ‘rubs out’ each new victim, though he breaks both criminal laws and 
widely-shared moral codes. On the contrary, he fulfills his self-claims to competence 
at his job and willingness to carry it out despite moral and criminal prohibitions. In 
other words, he is punctilious in observing the norms of appropriate behaviour for a 
person of his office.
What kind of norm would we be referring to in this latter case, and how might 
it be distinguished from other kinds? Goffman treated this question in his essay “The 
Nature of Deference and Demeanour*’ (1967: 47-95). Here he defined in detail the 
type of norm which arises from the association o f particular self-claims with particular 
social categories: norms of demeanour. These norms are one of two types of what 
have been variously characterised in sociological and anthropological theory as 
‘expressive*, 'ceremonial,* or ‘ritual* norms: “A ceremonial rule is one which guides 
conduct in matters felt to have secondary or even no significance in their own right, 
having their primary importance —officially anyway— as a conventionalised means of 
communication by which the individual expresses his character or conveys his 
appreciation of the other participants in the situation” (p. 54). These norms are to be
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distinguished from ‘substantive* (also ‘instrumental’ or ‘intrinsic’) rules, which cover 
matters important in their own right: thou shalt not kill, injure, steal, deceive, etc. 
Substantive norms are not based on what we expect others to have claimed about 
themselves, but rather on absolute (i.e., moral) ideas of what is ‘right* and ‘wrong.* 
Violations of substantive norms may sometimes constitute violations of ceremonial 
norms (as when an ‘upright* citizen poisons his spouse), but they may also constitute 
the fulfillment of ceremonial norms (as with our contract killer’s immoral and criminal 
routine).
A second distinction within the set of ceremonial norms is between those by 
which the individual “conveys his appreciation of the other participants in the 
situation** -norms of deference— and those by which he “expresses his character*’ — 
norms of demeanour. Norms of deference include rules about tact, politeness, 
offerings of respect, and other behaviours by which the dignity of others is protected. 
They involve taking care to avoid discrediting the self-claims of others. Norms of 
demeanour, on the other hand, are designed to protect the standing and dignity of the 
actor himself, by upholding the “character** or self-presentation he has created for 
public display. They involve the fulfillment of self-claims, normally of role or 
universal origin27.
This relationship between self-claims and social norms is relevant to a number 
of issues in humour research. For example, in Chapter Three, 2.4, it was seen that 
some of the ‘claim-discredit’ theorists of amusement phrased their account in terms of 
rule-violation. These theorists focused on the discredit of role and especially universal 
self-claims, but otherwise provided accounts of amusement closely akin to that being 
proposed in this thesis. Another relevant point concerns the social ‘conformity* or 
‘control’ effect/function that has often been attributed to laughter and humour. This 
issue will be discussed further in Chapter Eight, 4.1.3 - 4.1.4.
27 Independent self-claims are by definition made independently of social expectations.
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3. Claim-Discredits
3.1. Definition of 'Claim-Discredit'
Assuming a self-claim has been made by (or for) a claimant, how may this 
claim be discredited? What does it mean to say such a thing? It should be recalled that 
the existence of a self-claim depends on the opinion of a single perceiver (or group of 
perceivers). Likewise, the discrediting of a self-claim can only occur relative to a 
perceiver, and moreover to the same perceiver of the original claim.
Noticing a discredit is the result of an assessment of a self-claim's truth by the 
claim's perceiver. This assessment consists in a comparison of a self-claim’s meaning 
with all available facts relevant to the claim. Such facts include those previously 
known to the perceiver, those currently observable, and those which become 
accessible with the passing of time.
The assessment o f a self-claim’s truth may have one of three outcomes. If a 
self-claim is supported by known facts, and the perceiver has no further reasons or 
disposition to doubt the claim, it may be accepted (at least temporarily) as true. 
Another option would be for the perceiver to doubt the truth of the self-claim, without 
deciding on its falsity —the agnostic position. This could be due to a suspicious nature 
or habit, concrete grounds for skepticism (such as past deception or error by the 
claimant), importance o f the assessment, scarcity of relevant facts, or any combination 
of these elements. Such a state of indecision may give way to either positive or 
negative outcomes after additional information becomes available or ’testing’ is 
performed.
Finally, the perceiver may conclude that some observed event or circumstance 
contradicts the self-claim, revealing its inaccuracy or falsehood. In this case, the self­
claim is said to be discredited. The circumstance which contradicts the self-claim will 
be referred to as the discrediting fact, and the occurrence of its coming to light as the 
discrediting event. As the shortfall between claimed reality and the reality disclosed 
by the discrediting fact may be greater or lesser, discredits admit of degrees. Thus, I 
will refer to the greater or lesser seriousness of the discredit.
It should be noted that the act o f ’perceiving a discrediting event’ does not only 
include discredits of self-claims made before the perceiver himself, but also of claims
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made before third parties. The peiceiver may be aware of many self-claims made by 
participants to each other (not all of which will apply to himself), and will be able to 
recognize situations where one's perception will result in the other's discredit. For 
example, John might know that Henry is being unfaithful his wife, and could witness 
Henry's discredit if she found incriminating evidence of the fact —even though this 
would not discredit Henry in John's eyes. From this possibility, it follows that the 
same discrediting fact may allow a  single perceiver to  witness a number of 
discrediting events, as additional participants become aware of the new information. 
Someone who spreads gossip observes a new discrediting o f its subject with each 
retelling of the ’juicy* story to a different audience.
176
Chapter Four: A Hypothesis pfAmusement Section 3
3.1.1. Requisites of Discredit Perception
Experience, in a general sense, can be defined as the subjective mental 
continuum of an individual, composed of the perceptions of all objects in the world 
which become available to the senses and attention throughout his conscious lifetime. 
Individual perceptions are not directly and automatically provided by the senses, but 
rather mediated by cognitive frameworks of interpretation, which direct attention and 
provide relevant meanings, values, and contexts“ . The same running man, for 
instance, could be perceived as 'a moving object,' 'a human organism at maximum 
speed,' 'someone who is late,' 'a pursued criminal,' 'a reckless pedestrian,' 'a trained 
athlete,' 'a symbol of our stressed-out urban life,' 'a difficult target,1 'an interesting 
photographic subject,' 'a sexy guy,’ a growing speck in my field of vision,’ 'Jeremy,' 'an 
orthodontist from Ohio,' 'the spitting image of Harrison Ford,' 'Cynthia's husband,' and 
'a selfish lout.'
Frames of interpretation, shaped largely by the social environment to which 
the individual has been exposed, can be divided into natural and social frames (See 
Chapter Three, 3.3). Self-claims and claim-discredits clearly relate to the latter 
category, and thus they can only be noticed when a social framework is being applied 
to a situation by a perceiver.
The requirements necessary for a perceiver to detect the discrediting of a self­
claim can be listed as follows:
a) The observation through sensory means of a circumstance interpretable as 
the making of a particular self-claim,
A potential observer of a discrediting could fail to detect the event if he 
was not present or not paying appropriate attention when the original self­
claim was made; or if barriers to sensory reception prevented the perceiving of 
the relevant circumstances.
u  The term 'perception' (ie, of a claim-making or a claim-discredit event) will be intended throughout in 
this wide and ’constructivist' sense: 'perception* as the end-point and output of a cognitive interpretation 
rather than as a direct and unprocessed sensory imprint
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b) The observation through sensory means of a circumstance interpretable as 
the discrediting of the self-claim (i.e.. a discrediting fact).
Again, physical presence, attention to relevant details, and absence of 
barriers are essential.
c) The possession of an 'appropriate'29 social framework.
According to this framework, the observed occurrence required by 
point ’a' should constitute the making of a particular self-claim, and the 
observed occurrence required by point V  should constitute a more-or-less 
serious contradiction of the claim.
What are seen as self-claims by some are not seen as such by others. In 
Southern European 'classroom’ situations, students do not often contribute to 
the class discussion. Speaking to the class implies a self-claim of substantial 
knowledge about the current topic, and thus a risk of embarrassment by the 
professor or other knowledgeable pupils. In the Anglo-American educational 
system, on the other hand, offering opinions is actively encouraged. An Italian 
'Erasmus' student at a British university, therefore, was continuously surprised 
by the 'shameless' and 'ridiculous' displays of classmates who constantly 
revealed their ignorance with ungrounded contributions. In this case, the 
British students did not possess a  framework under which speaking publicly in 
a classroom situation would constitute a claim of knowledge on the current 
topic.
Even if a self-claim has been perceived as such by an observer, a 
potentially discrediting event may be interpreted otherwise by the use of 
frameworks possessed. Consider the case of a French citizen of African 
descent. A xenophobic French nationalist may agree with a more tolerant 
compatriot that the man claims to be French. Their varying social frameworks, 
however, could lead to disagreements over whether the man's ancestry 
discredits his self-claim of nationality.
dl The application of the ’appropriate1 social framework.
29 By 'appropriate' in this context I mean only appropriate for an interpretation of the percept in question 
as the discrediting of a self-claim. No connotation of 'correctness,* truth, or accuracy is intended.
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The same strip of activity could be experienced by the same individual 
in twenty different ways depending on the framework of interpretation applied 
to the scene. It is not enough that the individual possess the appropriate 
framework of interpretation; he must also apply it at the relevant moment.
For a claim-discredit to be perceived, an observer must engage in an 
assessment of a self-claim's truth. In other words, he must apply a framework 
which establishes the requirements of a self-claim (seen to have been made) to 
a set of facts known about the claimant; and, he must judge whether these facts 
’fit’ with the requirements. Though such assessments are routine aspects of 
mental behaviour, they cannot take place always and for all the self-claims that 
could potentially be assessed at any given moment. There are severe limits to 
the allotment of attention by a human individual.
During a radio programme, for instance, many spoken errors by an 
announcer could be overlooked by a listener interested by the content of the 
transmission itself. These mistakes, on the other hand, would not pass 
undetected by the programme director as he judges the announcer's 
performance. Such errors have also been compiled and sold as 'humour' by 
various entrepreneurs, and bought by consumers who presumably listen with a 
continuously critical attitude.
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3.1.2. Catalysts of Assessment
Testing the truth of observed self-claims seems to be a routine mental activity 
carried out by human beings, whose accurate knowledge of their social surround is 
essential to their safe and effective pursuit of ends30. Generally, it takes place almost 
unconsciously, either closely following the observation of a self-claim, or closely 
following the observation of new relevant information which subsequently comes to 
the attention of the perceiver. In certain environments where little trust is placed in 
self-presentations -i.e ., those of international espionage (Goffman, 1969: 3-84), 
police or judicial inquiry, journalistic investigation, and, o f course, social science 
research- it may occur more frequently and intentionally.
In some cases, the behaviour of third parties may elicit a moment of claim- 
assessment by the perceiver. One example is provided by agents who intentionally 
attempt to cause discredit by testing or disproving self-claims. The mere appearance at 
a situation of a new participant may also cue the perceiver to re-assess the 
informational state of affairs regarding self-claims made by all present towards the 
new arrival, and vice-versa. Also, a discrediting event may be retold, verbally or 
otherwise, to the perceiver, often stressing or exaggerating the extent of the discredit 
(See Section 3.2.3.2). Gossip, satire, and much comedy and humour can be classified 
here. The mere labeling of an upcoming performance as 'humour' predisposes the 
audience for claim-assessment in the directions suggested by the performer -a s  was 
seen in Chapter Two, such humour 'cues' are a common feature of attempts to 
stimulate the amusement of others. Relatedly, the sounds and images of others' 
laughter or embarrassment can incidentally act as 'alarm signs' (Goffman, 1971: 238- 
328) for the perceiver, to which he may respond by consciously testing the self-claims 
active in his immediate environment. Eyebrow-raises, finger-pointings, 'significant' 
stares, whispered messages, and other collusive or open communications may also put 
the perceiver on guard, in these cases more intentionally.
30 In "Normal Appearances," (1971:238-328) Goffman suggests that actors continuously monitor their 
current situation for a match with their concept of what is 'normal1 -an activity he labels "dissociated 
vigilance." He presents a number of phenomena, such as the practices and tribulations of con-artists and 
other conscious 'fakers* as powerful evidence of this idea.
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3.1.3. Uncertainty, Disagreement, and B ias
An assessment of fit between self-claim and fact shares many features of 
judgments, including the possibility of bias and error, a certain amount of decisional 
leeway, ultimate uncertainty, scarcity or abundance of relevant facts, and limits of 
time and attention. Disagreements among a multiplicity of observers as to the 
funniness of any single event are intrinsic to the process.
In the case at hand, the major issue whose outcome will be influenced by such 
features may be stated as follows: 'Has self-claim X been discredited by fact Y, and if 
so, to what extent?' This general problem, however, may be broken down into two 
constituent points at which disagreement, error, and the like may be more specifically 
located.
The first concerns the question of whether or not the self-claim has actually 
been made by the alleged claimant, and if so how strongly. Was it made recently or 
years ago? Has it been repeated often? Do other witnesses corroborate the existence of 
the self-claim, or is it the perceiver's individual belief? Has the 'claimant' perhaps 
made a point of offering disclaimers? Are alternative interpretations of the claiming 
act possible? How well does the perceiver know the alleged claimant personally? How 
familiar is the perceiver with the alleged claimant’s cultural background? If a role self­
claim, how familiar is the perceiver with the expectations of the role in question, and 
with the claimant's membership status? The story about the 'shamelessly ignorant' 
British students -from  the Italian perspective- exemplifies the type of disagreement 
which may arise.
Secondly, the issue of whether or not the facts at hand represent the self­
claim's discredit must be decided. Is the claimant just pretending? Is he knowingly and 
intentionally breaching rules merely to make a point? Is the event in question an 
exception? Are other alternative interpretations possible? Is the perceiver aware of the 
claimant's interpretation? Does the perceiver have all the evidence at his disposal? 
How large is the gap between self-claim and fact? Are other participants in agreement 
with the perceiver's version of the event?
These decisional variables, of course, are merely abstract possibilities of 
uncertainty or disagreement. They do not normally engage the perceiver's attention at 
the time of assessment, this being primarily an unconscious process. In practice, most
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of these questions are taken for granted, or have been resolved previously to the 
moment at which the assessment takes place. In other words, this high-speed, semi­
automatic judgment is based more on prejudice —i.e., on the use of internalized frames 
of interpretation- than on conscious sifting and weighing of evidence. A perceiver 
may believe rationally that laughing at a  blind man’s stumble is unfair -th e  blind 
cannot claim the same kind of walking competence as the sigh ted - and yet he may 
find himself smiling or snickering at the unexpected event against his own better 
judgment. Similarly, new employees at a mental home must probably undergo a 
learning period before they may cease to react with amusement, shock, and outrage at 
the pathological behaviour of patients, and begin to accept them  as 'normal* in this 
context31.
One major source of bias, however, can be confidently identified: the opinion 
of other participants in the situation, for example as expressed by their laughter or 
non-laughter. It appears that the assessment process, though too rapid to allow much 
reasoning, may allow the influence o f others’ assessment outcomes. If other 
individuals sharing the social situation of the perceiver —particularly if these are 
friends or liked individuals- appear to find an event funny, the perceiver's probability 
and intensity of amusement will increase. Varied empirical findings, such as the 
psychological experiments carried out by Anthony Chapman and Hugh Foot on 
'companion effects' (See Chapman, 1983) and the effectiveness and widespread use of 
'canned laughter' (Fuller, 1977) testify to this phenomenon (see Chapter Eight, 4.1.2). 
The opinion of culturally 'close' others confirms the perceiver's own suspicions or 
beliefs that a self-claim has been discredited according to the appropriate frame of 
interpretation, tipping the scales of assessment in the positive direction. The presence 
of an unamused friend, or of strangers/outgroup members, may on the other hand 
reduce amusement, as the perceiver may be less sure of his judgment.
In cases where the discredit has been caused by an agent, or retold as 'humour', 
the action of the agent/teller reveals his assessment of the event in question as funny, 
and thus exerts an identical effect on the perceiver. As noted in Chapter Two (2.1.1), it 
has been demonstrated that amusement varies proportionally with the positiveness of 
the perceiver's affective disposition towards the disparaging agent, A skillful
31 And indeed, it appears that such reactions are never completely eliminated (See Chapter Eight, 4.1.4)
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comedian is able to guide his audience’s interpretations, and thus their amusement 
reactions.
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3.2. Claim-Discredit Variables
Situations in which a self-claim's discredit is perceived, following a process o f 
claim assessment, may be classified according to at least three variables: the cause of 
the discredit, which may be mere chance or accident on the one hand, some conscious 
agent on the other; the personal identity of the claim ant discredited, which may be 
that of the perceiver himself or else some other actor; and the location of the event in 
one of many types of framed reality —either 'untransformed' reality or some kind of 
'transformation' (book, story, film, imagining, play, etc.).
3.2.1 Cause of Discredit: Accident/Agent
A discrediting fact may be exposed spontaneously over the course of everyday 
events. The claimant may let something 'slip,' challenging situations may arise which 
test his self-claim beyond the breaking point, or others may unintentionally trespass 
his 'backstage' regions and witness normally hidden parts of his self. These types o f 
circumstances give rise to what I will call accident-caused discreditings. On the other 
hand, discrediting facts may be sought and/or publicly exposed intentionally by fellow 
participants, for various reasons: to discomfit the claimant, ruin his reputation, or 
’teach him a lesson' in humility/honesty; to learn the truth of a self-claim when much 
is at stake (as in the case of espionage); for sheer pleasure, fun, or 'malice'. Various 
strategies (i.e., 'uncovering moves' —Goffman, 1969: 11-27) may be adopted: the 
claimant may be put under 'pressure* by engineering situations that will test his self­
claim, information may be sought from other sources, illicit trespassing of backstage 
regions may be undertaken, and 'evidence' may even be invented, deliberately 
misinterpreted or exaggerated, 'planted,' or faked. In such cases I will refer to the 
discreditings as agent-caused.
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3.2.2. Claimant of Discredit: Perceiver/Other
Another variable concerns the personal identity of the discredited individual. 
Normally we envisage a perceiver who observes the discredit o f someone else, but 
occasionally he may also find his own self-presentation damaged by some fact. Every 
actor is frequently aware of himself from the perspective of an observer. Indeed, his 
ability to see himself 'from the outside' is crucial to his development of his own 
concept of self, and for managing social interaction (Mead, 1974). Thus, on this basis 
we may distinguish between perceiver and other discredits.
As will be seen in Chapter Six (Section 2), discredits of the perceiver often 
lead to embarrassment rather than amusement (See also Goffman, esp. 1967: 97-112). 
Nevertheless, when the perceiver does not closely identify with the part of himself 
discredited (i.e., it was 'just a silly mistake', 'not the real me*), amusement is also 
possible.
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3.2.3. Location of Discredit: Untransformed/Transformed Reality 
3.2.3.1. Levels of Reality
The location of a discredit refers to its place within the layered framework o f 
interpretative matrices through which individuals experience the worlds of fact and 
fantasy (Goffman, 1974; see also this thesis, Chapter Three, 3.3). This variable is 
considerably less straightforward than the causes and claimants o f discredit, and will 
thus require a more elaborate presentation.
By saying that a perceiver 'observes' the discrediting of a  self-claim, I do not 
necessarily imply his physical presence at the scene of the discrediting. He could be 
watching a television newscast, reading a novel, listening to 'gossip,' scrutinizing a 
photograph, or recalling an old memory. M uch observation o f social events takes 
place at one or more removes from the actual happenings in question —which need not 
have even occurred in 'real life.'
How may a social event (or indeed, any event) be positioned in relation to its 
perceiver? The most basic distinction to be made is between events which take place 
in untransform ed reality and those which take place in any number of transform ed 
realities.
'Untransformed reality' refers to the level which a perceiver would refer to 
when asked what was 'really going on* in a particular situation32. It is the most basic 
level of interpretation, beyond which the natural or social world would cease to have 
meaning: in Goffman's terms, a 'primary framework,' either natural or social. What is 
seen as real warfare, with real weapons and real deaths, occurs in untransformed 
reality. By contrast, the warfare within a film such as Apocalypse Now is a 
'transformation' of this primary frame, as is the warfare in a  board game such as Risk, 
the warfare in a military drill during peacetime, or the warfare we imagine now as I 
use the word 'warfare.'
It is a  remarkable fact that perceivers can and do become engrossed in worlds 
they know to be 'unreal': they not only follow events in these worlds, but even become
32 The term Untransformed reality' does not imply events within this 'reality1 have not actuallybeen 
transformed in some way by a perceiver. All experience (or at least, all shareable experience) is 
mediated by cognitive frameworks of interpretation. The label Untransformed' alludes rather to the 
perceivcr's own separation of the 'real* world from less real ones: it is he who would label it so.
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emotionally involved in them. The theatre, film, and fictional literature are obvious 
and familiar examples within our culture, but the range of ’non-real' types of realities 
commonly available to experience is truly vast, and the potential range infinite. These 
genres are not absolutely removed and disconnected from the primary frameworks that 
perceivers use to interpret an otherwise meaningless universe. If they were, they 
would cease to have meaning themselves. Rather, each of them constitutes a 
transformation, a particular type of frame with certain standard, consistent, and well- 
known deviations from reality, which are conventionally disattended in order to 'enter 
into the spirit' of the framed reality. To enjoy a film properly, one must forget about 
the seat he is sitting on, the room in which the film is projected, the people with whom 
he has come, the events before and after the projection, the technical and stylistic 
considerations of the film, the scandalous love lives of the flesh-and-blood actors on 
screen, and all other distractions. If successful, he becomes an observer and even 
participant of another social world.
Within transformed realities, all manner of events may take place, and varied 
emotions elicited in perceivers. Tragic deaths of the virtuous may lead to tears, the 
triumph of underdogs may provoke joy, and the threat of violence may frighten. More 
relevantly to this thesis, the quirks of eccentrics, the clumsiness of oafs, the downfall 
of the pompous, and fooling of the gullible may bring on the audience's laughter. 
Discreditings do not necessarily have to be 'real* to provoke laughter, so long as the 
perceiver has accepted the conventions of the transformed frame and finds himself 
engrossed within it.
3.232. Types of Transformations
Transformations can take many forms. One way of classifying this variety is 
according to the relationship between the perceiver of transformed events and the 
production of the frame by some actor or group: a retelling is a transformation 
observed by a passive perceiver, a play act is a transformation observed by a 
perceiver who collaborates in its very production as part of a group who perform to 
each other; an imagined sequence is a transformation observed by a  perceiver who 
mentally produces it for himself. In the following analysis, I will describe each of
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these in more detail, identifying some of the further variables which might be used to 
generate sub-categories.
a. Retellings
A retelling is the exhibition of a strip of activity to a passive audience. In this 
case the perceiver merely observes a reality that has been transformed and presented 
by others.
Retellings can vary according to the medium of retelling. Events may be 
recounted,
• by written description in notes, letters, newspaper and magazine articles,
books, advertisements, faxes, encyclopedia entries, e-mails.
• orally in conversation, after-dinner speeches, conferences.
• in static visual depictions: photographs, drawings, paintings, comics.
• in moving visual depictions: feature length films, shorts, cartoons,
documentaries, 'home movies,' closed-circuit TV images.
• by role-playing: theatrical productions, imitation during talk, and instructive,
examined, practiced, or commercial demonstrations o f an activity.
The purposes of an exhibition may also vary widely: entertainment of the 
audience, instruction of pupils, persuasion of consumers, ridicule of political figures, 
enlightenment of the masses, deceiving a 'mark,' obtaining criminal evidence, 
shocking the art world.
The complexity of the exhibition may range from the improvised anecdote 
told by a fellow conversationalist to the staging of a lavish London W est End Musical.
The exhibition may be more or less grounded in 'reality ,' i.e., in events that 
did actually take place in untransformed reality. It may consist of (in approximate 
order of decreasing depth of grounding),
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• a direct recording of real events: 'live' filming or videotaping, audio 
recording, recorded measures of bodily changes recorded in real time, sonar 
records.
• a description of observed fact: a fieldworker's notes, a diary, an eyewitness 
police report, an oral recounting of observed events.
• an description of unobserved but allegedly true facts: reported 'hearsay', a 
'gossip column', urban myths.
•  a fictional description based on some verified facts: films or novels based on 
a true story,' police 'reconstructions’ of a crime.
• fiction in a relatively factual world* 'realist' fiction
• fiction in a relatively fictional world: fantasy, science-fiction, surrealism and 
other similar genres.
A final variable concerns the intentionality of the exhibition. Most are 
designed for display (conversational contributions, scientific research, art and 
literature), but there may be limits on the audience for whom display is intended. An 
anthropological text may be targeted for social science circles, less so to the general 
public, and certainly not (in most cases) to the natives under observation.
b. Play Acts
A play act refers to the acted exhibition of a strip of activity by a group of 
participants to which the perceiver belongs. In these cases, the actors who create the 
transformed reality also react to the events within it. The perceiver is part of the team 
who transform and present the framed events in question for the appreciation of all 
participants of the encounter.
Some purposes of play acts include:
• Entertainment: child's play, 'role-playing' and board' games.
•  Improving mental health: psychoanalytic role-playing sessions.
•  Practice: simulations of surgical operations, fire-drills, play or concert 
rehearsals, football training, military exercises.
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• Ceremonial: rites de passage, etc.
With regards to other variables suggested above, play acts are by definition 
intentional and role-played, but, the complexity of the frame's production may vary 
widely, from that of a child's game of 'police and thieves' to a sophisticated and costly 
military exercise over a whole continent. Also, the play act may be more or less 
grounded in reality. A simple game of 'police and thieves' is more 'realistic' in this 
sense than elaborate fantasy role-playing games such as Dungeons and Dragons.
c. Imagined Sequences
An imagined sequence is the mental exhibition of a strip of activity by a 
perceiver for himself.
These exhibitions include what we call 'reminiscing about' or 'remembering' 
past events, 'daydreaming,' 'imagining' stories, 'fantasizing' about future possibilities, 
dreaming, and hallucinating. Another possibility is merely the distorted (i.e., poetical, 
symbolic, or metaphoric) interpretation of currently observable or reported events. For 
example, animals or natural objects might be anthropomorphized (a group of penguins 
seen as a 'black tie' party).
The intentionality of these sequences may vary, from conscious attempts to 
recall a particular experience to unbidden associations, drug-induced hallucinations, or 
dreams during sleep.
They may also be more or less grounded in reality. For example, memories 
are usually considered to be deeply rooted in fact (however illusory this may turn out 
to be), whereas predictions for the future have only weak ties with confirmable truths, 
which become increasingly tenuous the further in time one projects.
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3.23.3. Frame Structures
Transformations may be retransformed. A boy may blow out the candles of his 
birthday cake. The candle-blowing scene may be videotaped; this home video may be 
used as evidence in a child-molestation trial; the using of this video may be 
commented upon in a legal text; this commentary may be photocopied for use in a law 
course.... Such recursive 'nesting' of frames can continue almost indefinitely, though a 
perceiver may not necessarily be aware of all intervening transformations. Increasing 
depth of a particular frame within such a layered frame structure may create greater 
difficulties for involvement, but perceivers nevertheless routinely penetrate even quite 
complex structures: The reader of the abovementioned 'final photocopy' may be able 
to imagine the child-molestation trial, various legal hypotheses, and the initial candle­
blowing scene quite 'realistically,' even when many of these imaginings might be 
objectively different from the original sources.
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4. Conclusions
I have provided a basic statement of a proposed causal hypothesis of 
amusement, an alternative to the more well-known theories listed in Chapter Two. It 
follows the line of the claim-discredit accounts described in Chapter Three:
Amusement is provoked only and always in a subject when he perceives that a 
self-claim put forward by a claimant has been discredited, provided that 1) the 
perceiver does not identify himself as the claimant at the moment o f 
perception; 2) the perceiver is sufficiently involved in a definition of events 
which places the discrediting in the foreground.
Dividing this statement into an initial central assertion and two subsequent 
amendments (points T  and '2'), it is the former which has been the topic of this 
chapter.
I have clarified in detail the concepts of ’self-claim’ and 'claim-discredit,' as 
well as what their perception entails. Furthermore, I have identified five variables 
which account for the vast heterogeneity of claim-discredit situations: the origin and 
content of self-claims and the cause, claimant, and location of claim-discredits.
A self-claim has been defined as a skill, quality, emotion, mental state, 
identity, object, relationship, territory, or any other attribute ascribed to a claimant 
by a claim-maker who is either the claimant himself or someone seen to legitimately 
represent the claimant. These verbal or non-verbal attributions are the basis of the 
self-presentations constructed by participants before each other.
Self-claims may be classified according to their origin and content. The origin 
of a self-claim (i.e., how it has been made) is independent if the claimant was not 
bound by rule or expectation to have made it. Otherwise, a self-claim may derive from 
membership to a particular role which implies it, or merely due to the consideration of 
its content as a universal possession.
Self-claims may also be distinguished by content into those concerning 
competence in specific skills; mental content, attitudes, abilities, dexterity and other 
possessions of the mind; control over and/or respect for various types of territory; 
appearance and physical condition; and details of biography.
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I have distinguished between the concepts of claim -m aker, the agent who 
actually executes the attribution in question by word or deed, and the claimant, the 
participant(s) to whom the self-claim applies, and who will be responsible for 
maintaining it. Though often equivalent, the claim-maker and claimant may be 
separate in cases of independent assertions.
The requirements and variables concerning the perception of a self-claim’s 
discredit have also been discussed. Noticing a discrediting event follows an 
assessment of a self-claim’s truth by a perceiver, a judgment arrived at by the 
comparison of the claim’s meaning with all available relevant facts. The shortfall 
between the self-claim and the reality disclosed by the discrediting fact constitutes the 
seriousness of the discredit. The claim discredited may have been intended for the 
perceiver himself or for other audiences present Perception of a  discrediting event 
requires the physical perception of relevant informations and the possession and 
timely application of appropriate social interpretative frames.
Claim assessments, though a normal part of social participants' mental 
routines, may also be stimulated by specific events, such as new arrivals, others' 
laughter, humour cues, and collusive or overt signaling. The assessments are subject 
to indecision, uncertainty, bias, and disagreement regarding two questions: 1) Has a 
self-claim in fact been made by the claimant?; and 2) Has the claim been discredited 
by facts? Though such questions are not normally confronted rationally, but rather 
settled by prejudice or immediate appearances, they may be strongly biased by the 
social context. The opinion of other -an d  especially socially close— participants has 
an important influence on the perceiver’s assessment.
Variables of discredit include the cause o f discredit, the personal identity of 
the claimant discredited, and the location of discrediting events within the various 
possible cognitive frameworks used by a perceiver to interpret reality. The cause of a 
self-claim's discredit may be pure chance or accident, or else the intentional actions of 
some agent. The claimant whose self-claim is discredited may be either the perceiver 
himself or else some o th er actor. The location of the discrediting event may be either 
what is seen as untransform ed reality or else any number of transform ed realities. 
The latter category refers to the exhibition of a strip of activity, based on but removed 
from what we would consider 'real' events, either to a passive audience of perceivers 
(retellings), by a group of participants to each other (play-acts), or by a single
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participant to himself (imagined sequences). Transformed events may be 
retransformed.
Table 1 summarizes the variables relating to the perception of a discrediting
event.
Object of Variation Variable Possible Values
Discrediting Event
Location Untransformed Reality /  Transformed Reality
Cause Accident /  Agent
Claimant Other /  Perceiver
Origin Independent I Role / Universal
Self-Claim Content Skill/ Mind / Territory / 
Appearance /  Biography
Table 1. Variables relating to the perception of a discrediting event.
Combining the possible outcomes of each of these five variables results in 120 
categories, which provide a  starting point for coping with the immense variability of 
claim-discredit situations (See table 2). The viewed televised accusations of financial 
corruption by one politician to another could be described as a transformed agent- 
caused discredit of an other's role claim to respect certain material territories (•). A 
stutterer's perception of his own linguistic troubles could be described as the 
accidental discredit (in untransformed reality) o f the perceiver's own self-claim to the 
universally required skill of correct speech production (*). In Chapter Five, this 
multiple intersection of variables will be used as the basis of a classification of funny 
stimuli.
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1. Introduction
In this Chapter I will describe, illustrate, and classify self-claim discredits 
which stimulate amusement when perceived: funny claim-discredits. As has already 
been conceded, not all perceived discredit events are experienced as funny. In Chapter 
Six, unfunny claim-discredits will be considered, including those where the main 
focus of attention is other than the discredit itself (the boy’s bleeding head rather than 
his clumsiness on the bike), and those where discredit affects the perceiver himself 
(‘the real me is discredited* rather than ‘someone else is discredited’).
It will be argued, however, that amusing claim-discredit percepts exhaust the 
set o f amusing stimuli. A typology of funny claim-discredits is also a typology of all 
funny events. This does not mean that jokes, tickling, irony, Punch and Judy shows, 
and banana-peel slips should be treated ‘in the same way* or that they are, in the end, 
‘the same thing.* The crude application of a single-cause explanation to lists of funny 
stimuli can only meet with disappointment, as the heterogeneity of such phenomena is 
real and evident. I will try to demonstrate, however, that this variety arises from the 
natural diversity of self-claim discredit situations, as they may appear to a single 
individual, the perceiver of the discredit. It is not 'the same thing* to crash into a 
lamppost while walking, distracted by the simultaneous reading of a fascinating 
historical article about the sinking of the Titanic, as it is to read the article itself, in 
which the Titanic promoters* loud boasts about their ship’s ‘unsinkability* are 
recounted. The reader of the Titanic article and victim of this crash could interpret 
both of these events as claim-discredits, and find both funny. However, in one case the 
discredit is perceived in the primary interpreted world of the individual himself, in the 
'real* here and now, requires self-observation, affects his own universally claimed 
skill o f sensory-motor coordination, and it is perceived while still reeling from a bump 
on the head. In the second case, discredit took place decades before, is experienced 
through the symbolic world created by a magazine writer, and involves the failure to 
keep a bold, verbal, independent claim of appearance and condition about the 
claimant’s property. Different again would be the perception by the crash victim, 
momentarily impressed by the synchronicity between reading about a crash and 
crashing in reality, that he has mentally accepted some kind of causal connection 
between the collision of a cruise liner and an iceberg in the remote past and the impact
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between his own body and an urban lighting fixture. Such a violation of his self-claim 
to appropriate interpretation of natural events could also lead to an experience o f 
hilarity. I believe that all manifestations of amusement can be accounted for in a  
similar way, as reactions to claim-discredit perceptions of one type or another.
This chapter represents a protracted demonstration of how a claim-discredit 
theoiy of amusement can be used to account for funny stimuli of all the types 
imaginable. In the literature of humour theory, as has been noted in Chapter Two 
(3.3), such demonstrations have been standard practice, and have been the main tests 
of theory validity. The reader is invited to consider the plausibility of the descriptions 
offered, and thus test for himself the usefulness of the classification for the task o f 
engaging in thought and discussion about amusement, humour, and laughter.
The typology has been developed directly from the two self-claim and three 
claim-discredit variables identified in Chapter Four (2.2, 3.2), and thus adds little 
theoretical novelty to the preceding discussion. In fact, it is identical in form to the 
typology of claim-discredit situations provided in the ‘Conclusions* of this previous 
chapter (See Table 1).
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Chapter Eve iA lYPO logv of Funny Events Section 1
The first three variables relate to the perceiver’s interpretation of the claim- 
discredit event, and their combined possible values result in eight main types of funny 
stimuli (referred to as Types I-VIII):
•  Location o f Discredit: Untransformed Reality /  Transformed Reality
A discrediting event may take place either in what the perceiver takes 
to be 'real’ everyday life (Untransformed Reality) or in some 
'transformation* of real life: retelling, play act, or imagined sequence 
(Transformed Reality).
•  Cause of Discredit: Accident /  Agent
The discrediting may occur accidentally —by mere chance- (Accident) 
or may be caused intentionally by a conscious agent (Agent).
•  Claimant Discredited: Other /  Perceiver
The claimant discredited may be or may have been the perceiver 
himself (Perceiver), or another participant (Other).
Each of the eight main types of funny stimuli has been subdivided into 12 classes on 
the basis of two further variables, this time relating to the self-claim discredited:
•  Origin of Self-Claim: Independent /  Role /  Universal
A self-claim may be seen to have been made independently 
(Independent), by virtue of a role which the actor assumes (Role), or by 
mere virtue of being a social actor who must interact in society 
(Universal).
• Content of Self-Claim: Skill /  Mind /  Territory /  Appearance and Condition / 
Biography
Self-claims may be made in regard to five basic types of attributes: 
specific levels of competence in particular skills (Skill); specific 
mental contents, attitudes, abilities, and dexterity (Mind); control over 
owned territories, and respect for the territories of others (Territory); a 
specific physical appearance and condition (Appearance and
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Condition); specific facts about the actual history of the individual
(Biography).
Table 1 shows how the combined outcome possibilities of these five variables 
result in 120 types of funny stimuli. In addition, some of the content classes for self- 
claims of universal origin will be subdivided in the discussion according to the basic 
types listed in Chapter Four:
•  Universal Self-Claims of Skill:
* Language production -
* Sensory-motor coordination
* Control over the body
* Other culturally-specific skills considered 'universal*
• Universal Self-Claims of the Mind:
* Immediate perception
♦Possession/correct application of natural interpretative frameworks.
* Possession/correct application of social interpretative frameworks.
* Language interpretation
* Appropriate cognitive and emotional involvement
• Universal Self-Claims of Territory:
* Material territories
* Spatial/bodily territories
* Interactional territories
* Informational territories
* Ego territory
In the remainder of the chapter I will provide numerous examples of funny 
stimuli to illustrate the classification. Many categories will be left blank,' in the sense 
of no illustration being specifically provided. This has been purposefully done in order 
to avoid excessive redundancy. Once the full range of Type I stimuli has been
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illustrated, providing an equivalent coverage for each of the remaining eight main 
classes will be unnecessary. The differences between discredits affecting claims of the 
three 'origin* and five 'content' types should have been made clear, and the possible 
resulting combinations of these variables should be imaginable for Type II stimuli, as 
for the remaining classes. In other words, Type I illustrations may serve as Type II 
illustrations in all but a single aspect —the identity of the claimant discredited; Type I 
and Type II illustrations, in turn, map onto Types ID and IV, but for the existence of 
an agent causing the discredit; and I-IV, of course, can be transformed into IV-VHI by 
a shift in the location of the discredit. Successive examples, therefore, will focus 
primarily on the effects o f each new complicating variable introduced, with occasional 
reference to particularly novel or interesting categories.
As a preliminary guide, a short sketch of the Eight main types can be 
advanced:
• Type I: The Accidental Discredit of an Other fin Untransformed Reality)
Here are included the spontaneous everyday errors, slips, accidents, 
failures, gaffes, faux pas, unwanted revelations, misinterpretations, stigmas, 
deformities, awkward moves of those around us (friends, acquaintances, and 
co-present strangers). The first-hand observation of a braggart’s failure to fulfil 
his boast, of a sportsman to display elegance and skill on the field, of a speaker 
to construct a decent English sentence —such constitute typical examples.
• Type II: The Agent-Caused Discredit of an Other (In Untransformed Reality)
In this type we find similar events, but for which some responsibility 
can be attributed to the actions of a third party: the tripping of a pedestrian 
with an outstretched leg, the throwing o f a custard pie in a victim’s face, the 
calling of a bluff, the stripping of a friend naked in a public place, the 
questioning or testing of a supposed expert, the publication of a private letter, 
the engineering of a hoax, illusion, or practical joke. Such events, witnessed 
first hand by an observer, can be considered examples of Type II.
• Types III and IV: The Accidental (Type HR and Agent-Caused (Type IV) 
Discredit o f the Self (In Untransformed Reality)
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These two types include the very same sorts of events as Types I and II 
(respectively), but from the point of view of the person whose self-claim has 
been discredited: one's own errors, gaffes, misunderstandings, deformities, and 
the like, whether occurring spontaneously (Type m ) or due to the trippings, 
questionings, challengings, hoaxings, trespassings, or other claim-discredit 
activities of an agent (Type IV).
Worthy of special mention are certain funny events to which the self 
has unique or privileged access, due to his private interior* perspective on his 
own mental and bodily processes: ‘fear games' (from peek-a-boo to horror 
films and rollercoasters) provoke errors of emotional management, tickling 
causes a bodily control lapse, sensory illusions cause perceptual failures, 
magic tricks and coincidences cause natural frame management mistakes, and 
jokes, puns, irony, absurdity, twist endings, and other phenomena cause social 
frame management errors. Each of these errors or failures is experienced in a 
unique way by the subject/observer.
•  Types V-VIIh Transformed Self-Claim Discredits of an Other or of the Self, 
either Accidental or Agent-Caused
Here we find the same types of events listed for Types I-IV, but 
experienced at second or third hand from what the perceiver considers ‘the real 
here and now*: incompetence, gaffes, misunderstandings, debunkings, failures, 
and the like which are recounted in gossip, literature, staged plays, home video 
recordings, and motion pictures; re-enacted in child*s games, group 
psychotherapy meetings, improvisational theatre interaction, ironic and joking 
interchanges; or conjured up mentally in memories, daydreams, fantasies, 
distortions, and the like.
It is worth pointing out that the reader himself will probably not find funny all 
or even many of the jokes and anecdotes listed as illustrations. Some may simply not 
appeal to him, or may be 'badly' retold. In addition and for reasons to be developed in 
Chapter Six, their very location within a 'serious' academic text should tend to dull 
their humour globally. The purpose, however, is not to entertain the reader, and so any 
amusement experienced should be taken as a pleasant epiphenomenon. All
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illustrations fulfil the requirement that someone —a joke-teller, a publisher, a theatre 
critic, an audience, the current author— at some point found them funny. The elements 
which that perceiver reacted to should hopefully be apparent.
More serious would be the impression that the source of amusement has been 
misattributed. For example, it might seem that the explanation provided for a joke is 
insufficient, accounting for perhaps some of the humour, but disregarding what seem 
to be crucial elements. In this regard, I should clarify that actual events, anecdotes, and 
jokes may include several amusing stimuli at various conceptual levels, each of which 
may or may not make an impression on any single perceiver. The telling of a verbal 
joke may include not only an amusing punchline, but also minor silliness, 
disparagement, obscenity, parody, and funny 'faces' and accents along the way. These 
'complex stimuli' will be analysed more fully in Chapter Six. I have avoided them as 
far as possible, but some inclusions have been inevitable. If 'additional sources' of 
humour are noticed, therefore, these should be temporarily ignored in order to focus 
on the type of funny stimulus at hand.
Even after weeding out such irrelevancies, however, it may be felt that a 
particular example has been misclassified, or that it is inherently ambiguous according 
the terms of the model. The purpose of the classification, however, is not to provide a 
convenient filing system into which amusing events can be correctly, unambiguously, 
and unproblematically slotted. I am not claiming the existence of distinct, well- 
bounded categories o f funny stimuli. On the contrary, the aim is to establish the unity 
of such events, while accounting for apparent difference where relevant. The typology 
makes evident some of the common features which actors themselves discriminate, 
and which are used in the configuration of the loose and inconsistent layman 
terminology of humour and amusement. By applying these distinctions consistently, 
and in combination with each other, it becomes possible to establish unexpected 
relations between apparently diverse phenomena. For example, there is no essential 
difference between experiencing what we take to be 'untransformed reality’ and 
experiencing engrossment in ‘transformed realities.* All experience is interpreted, and 
even brushing our teeth in the morning is seen through a severely limiting filter 
similar to that which blacks out the living room while we watch television. However, 
as people do differentiate between the real and the non-real, and between different 
types of reality. These distinctions also have important effects on subsequent thought,
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emotion, and action: interpreting a mentally disturbed individual as a character in a 
joke, for instance, may allow the interpreter to enjoy and exhibit amusement at the 
‘madman’ in a way that might be impossible if the person was seen as ‘real.’ It is well 
worth structuring the discussion of funny events according to a systematic version of 
such distinctions. In this way, it is possible to observe that the differences we see in 
funny events are merely the application of these distinctions to claim-discredit 
situations.
I have attempted to present highly stereotypical illustrations where differences 
will be most obvious; not to reify these differences, but rather, to provide a few 
reference points of the type that participants, including humour researchers, habitually 
employ. I wish to present a way of talking about funny stimuli, a vocabulary that will 
reduce the level of imprecision of commonly available terms such as 'irony,' 'jokes,' 
'satire,' or 'wit.'
Not only am I aware that in-between cases exist for distinctions such as 
‘accident-caused/agent-caused discredits' or 'claims of mind/skill/biography...’; 
demonstrating the continuous nature of such phenomena is the very point of the 
exercise. Thus, it is irrelevant whether a specific illustration could be classified 
elsewhere —or indeed whether alternative classificatory systems could be envisaged. 
The examples are not meant to 'prove* the solidity of the model, but to provide 
understanding of it. It will be sufficient, for the moment, if specific illustrations could 
be interpreted as belonging to the types and sub-types in question, or even if other 
perhaps more representative examples could be imagined. If such interpretations or 
imaginings are indeed possible, and the logic o f the cross-cutting variables has been 
followed consistently, a unitary scheme for the interpretation of funny events will 
emerge. The extent to which this model accords with the observations and experiences 
of actors will determine its validity.
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2. Funny Events in Untransformed Reality
r
The location of a funny self-claim's discredit may be either what is considered 
‘everyday reality’ by the perceiver or else some type of transformation such as a book, 
film, or story. When we think of ‘funny things,’ it is usually jokes, funny anecdotes, 
stand-up performers, televised sit-coms, comedy films, animated cartoons, comic 
strips, and similar transformations of everyday events that come to mind. In Section 3, 
I will seek to show that the humorous elements in such productions consist of 
transformed claim-discredit events. However, many of the occurrences which 
stimulate our amusement take place at what we would consider to be the most basic 
level of reality, what is ‘really going on’ in a  situation (Goffman, 1974): flesh-and- 
blood individuals have displayed self-claims which fail to be sustained before co­
present observers. Everyday life is foil of such moments, when we or others appear 
ridiculous in the eyes of someone, and amusement is evoked by events in the ‘here 
and now.’ These will be the focus of the present section.
As advanced in the introduction, four of the eight main types of funny events 
include events in untransformed reality: the accidental discredit of an other (Type I), 
the agent-caused discredit of an other (Type 13), the accidental discredit of the self 
(Type ED), and the agent-caused discredit of the self (Type IV).
Categories will be illustrated mainly with examples of true discreditings from 
real life. In most cases, these are taken from published sources which claim to recount 
true happenings and which treat the particular instances quoted as humorous. Some 
are entries from the 'humour diaries' of university students who participated in a study 
conducted by Polyxenie Kambouropoulou in 1930. A few will be taken from my own 
collection of real-life observations, taken from either my own experiences or those of 
trusted others, and in this case they will be selected either because I or someone else 
was amused in reaction to them. These anecdotes will be identified by the words 
'personal observation' and will be recounted as factually as possible, apart from the 
substitution of names. Finally, a small remainder will be illustrated with hypothetical 
examples.
It should be pointed out that the examples provided do not necessarily 
represent actual instances of funny stimuli which were perceived in untransformed 
reality. They constitute events which actually occurred and have been found fonny by
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somebody, but not always somebody who was present at the time and place of the 
event itself. When no actual amused perceiver was present, he must be assumed or 
imagined. Furthermore, to the reader o f this paper, inevitably, they represent 
transformations of the original event, descriptions within an academic text; and even 
to myself, the author, the large majority have been experienced only ’second hand.'
Nevertheless, they did occur (as far as we know), and they conceivably could 
have been experienced as funny by a 'live' observer. Interpreted in this light, they may 
serve their purpose, which is merely that of elucidating the structure of the 
classification proposed. Hopefully they will prompt the reader to recall additional 
examples which he or she will have experienced in real life.
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2.1. Type I. The Accidental Discredit of an Other’s Self-Claim (in Untransformed
Reality)
Funny EventsUntransformed Reality Transformed RealityOther Perceiver Ot ier PerceiverAccident Agent Accident Agent Accident Agent Accident Agent1 R u 1 R U 1 R U 1 R U 1 R U 1 R U 1 R U 1 R U• 'k*’
. . . .
-
j-*r Jj,
- ,'é * C1 II hi IV V VI VII VIII
Table 2. Type /  Funny Events. See Table 1 (p. 200) for full chart.
Type I represents the simplest case. The claimant discredited is some person or 
group other than the perceiver (i.e., student sees professor misspelling word on 
chalkboard), so that there is no question of him feeling embarrassment at the event. 
Secondly, the discredit is not intentionally caused by any agent, but rather occurs 
spontaneously (i.e., no one attempted to lure or trick the professor into making this 
error).
For this basic type, I will provide a detailed breakdown of sub-categories based 
on origin and content of the self-claim discredited, in order to illustrate the variety of 
possibilities within each of the eight main types. I will treat independent, role, and 
universal self-claims separately, giving examples of discredits of skill, mind, territory, 
appearance, and biography self-claims for each. The reader will then be able to apply 
these distinctions to the remaining situation types, for which only certain specific 
amendments will be made.
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2.1.1. Type I  - Independent Origin
As seen in Chapter Four self-claims of independent origin are those which a 
participant is not bound by rule or expectation to make. The self-attribution of such 
claims is assumed by the perceiver on the basis of an explicit statement seen to have 
been made by the claim ant When an independent self-claim of skill, mind, territory, 
appearance, or biography seen to have been made by a claimant is discredited 
publicly, bystanders may find the situation hilarious. Let us explore these possibilities 
in some empirical detail.
During a performance in 1977, Romarck the Hypnotist uttered the following 
words: "Ladies and gentlemen, I shall now drive this car blindfold through the centre 
of Ilford” (Nown, 1985: 10). This statement represented a bold self-claim of skill, 
committing Romarck to an unusual competence, successful driving despite wearing a 
blindfold over the eyes. Approximately two minutes later he collided with a  parked 
police van (ibid.). Though Nown does not report if any bystanders laughed at the 
accident, or whether the crash was serious enough to have inhibited amusement (See 
Chapter Six, 3.2), he himself includes it in a book of humorous anecdotes.
Independent self-claims may also be non-verbal. One of the students taking 
part in Kambouropoulou’s study (1930: 23) reported the following as a source o f 
amusement: "A girl who plays bridge well and who often talks about the theory of the 
game and comments upon other people's poor plays, played a poor hand in which she 
did just about everything wrong." Here, theorizing about bridge and criticizing others* 
play seems to have been taken by the diarist (quite reasonably) as an implicit self­
claim of skill along the following lines: “I am an excellent bridge player.” An extreme 
episode of poor playing (“she did just about everything wrong**) is then taken as a 
funny discredit of this claim.
Independent self-claims of the mind may also be made verbally (“I have an IQ 
of 149,” ‘T m  an expert on basketball trivia,**) or non-verbally. As an example of the 
latter case, making statements of fact (“Rome is in Italy,** “It is impossible to build a  
perpetual motion machine**) commits the speaker to a self-claim of knowledge about 
the topic. Discovering or knowing the falsehood of such statements may lead to 
amusement. With hindsight it is funny to read that Professor Erasmus Wilson, on the 
first demonstrations o f  electric light in 1878, confidently sentenced its doom: "With
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regard to electric light, much has been said for and against it, but I think I may say, 
without fear of contradiction, that when the Paris exhibition closes, electric light will 
close with it, and very little more will be heard of it” (Nown, 1985: 75). A similar but 
more immediate discredit awaited sports commentator Harry Carpenter when, during a 
boxing match, he declared: "That's it. There's no way Ali can win this one now..." 
That very moment, Muhammed Ali knocked his opponent out for the count. 
(Complete, 1989: 100)
Self-claims of territory , it has been proposed, may relate to the claimed 
control of or the claimed respect for a certain territory. An example of an independent 
self-claim of control is provided by the case of Joshua Abraham Norton, a 40 year-old 
bankrupt man, who declared himself in 1859 his Imperial Highness Norton I, Emperor 
of the USA, and maintained a kind of court in his small town (Nicholas, 1990: 28-30). 
Thé evident falsity of Mr. Norton’s claims to power over the United States of America 
may result in amusement. An independent self-claim of respect for the physical 
integrity of innocent people is implied in the following excerpt from a report by an 
assault victim delivered in April 1983: "Suddenly I was subjected to a particularly 
nasty, totally unexpected and unprovoked attack.” The aggrieved tone of the speaker 
could be taken to suggest that violent surprise attacks, especially of an unprovoked 
nature are morally wrong, or in any case, that he would not engage in such actions. It 
is thus funny to discover the identity of the speaker -Peter Sutcliffe a British serial 
killer also known as the 'Yorkshire Ripper/ who spoke these words after being 
attacked by a fellow inmate (Jones, 1985:188).
When an individual sports a new hairstyle, garment, or Took/ he thereby 
makes an independent self-claim of fashionable or stylish appearance. In the eyes of 
some observers, however, the style exhibited may fail to support the self-claim, and 
thus lead to amusement (personal observation). 'Tve never felt better" were the last 
words of Douglas Fairbanks (Nown, 1985:63), his death immediately discrediting this 
independent self-claim to a healthy physical condition.
Discreditable self-claims of biography include those minor falsehoods which 
participants occasionally include in their reports of past or present events, often to 
prevent being discredited on other grounds: "That's funny. I posted it over a week 
ago", "Yes, I have seen Citizen Kane. Rosebud was the sled! Brilliant!", 'Tve been
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meaning to phone you...", "I can't make it today; I've come down with the flu", "...but I 
didn't inhale." The following true story is a typical case.
A group of friends are cleaning up a kitchen after a meal. Linda 'advises' Frank 
to find a top for a bottle of olive oil "or it will go bad," implying that Frank is the kind 
of careless housekeeper who leaves bottles of olive oil untopped. Frank, however, 
finds that a makeshift paper towel 'stopper' has been inserted into the neck of the 
bottle. Believing it to have been work of his flat-mate Steve, and wishing to avoid 
Linda's derogatory implication, he bluffs: "I wasn't going to leave the bottle 
uncovered, you know. Look, we've corked it up with this paper towel until we find a 
proper top for it." Linda bursts into laughter: "I did that!!". The falsehood of Steve's 
biographical self-claim to have corked the bottle is the source o f amusement here, 
(personal observation).
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2.1.2. Type I  - Role Origin
As seen in Chapter Four, role self-claims are those made by virtue of 
membership to a role held by the participant: policemen claim the ability to apprehend 
criminals, butchers to chop meat skilfully. The accidental discredits of such tacit 
claims in untransformed reality are no less funny (assuming the identity and 
involvement conditions hold —see Chapter Six, 2-3) than those which are made 
explicitly.
For example, a basic skill of aeroplane pilots is the ability to guide a plane to 
its destination by the use of cockpit instruments, flight charts, and an excellent sense 
of orientation. It must have therefore been quite funny for all those who followed the 
bizarre flight of an aeroplane pilot since known as "Wrong Way" Corrigan, who took 
off from a foggy NY airport headed for California, but ended up in Ireland (Complete, 
1989: 18-19). A similar example is that of stage actor Robert Coates, who in the 
seventeenth century became well-known due to his appallingly bad acting. He would 
forget lines, invent scenes, and even repeat sections, causing "riots, uproars, threats of 
lynching --and gales of laughter." It is reported that on one occasion his acting was so 
poor that several people laughed themselves ill. (Nicholas, 1990:115-118)
Turning to role self-claims of the m ind, certain pools of knowledge are often 
expected of particular role holders. Those responsible for a patent office, for instance, 
claim expert knowledge about the scope for technological advance, explaining the 
inclusion of this statement made in 1899 by the American Patent Office in a book of 
funny anecdotes: "Everything that can be invented has been invented” (Nown, 1985: 
75). An American vice-president claims, among other things, an exceptional 
knowledge of history, politics, geography, and current events. Dan Quayle was a 
laughingstock and an embarrassment to President Bush for his whole term in office, 
seeming to lack very much indeed in terms of required mental contents. His foot-in- 
mouth quotes became so popular that there continues to exist a Dan Quayle homepage 
on the Internet, with hundreds of anecdotes and classic quips, such as the following:
"I love California; I practically grew up in Phoenix"
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"Mars is essentially in the same orbit... Mars is somewhat the same distance 
from the sun, which is very important. We have seen pictures where there are 
canals, we believe, and water. If there is water, that means there is oxygen. If 
there oxygen, that means we can breathe"
(Walker, 1995)
The roles of criminal and police officer are both associated with important 
self-claims of territory control In the former case, control is generally claimed over 
the booty, victims, and any obstacles to the completion of a crime. Mason and Bums 
recount numerous amusing discredits o f such claims (1985: 18). In one story, a first­
time bank robber was obviously nervous and could hardly see with three stocking 
masks and a scarf on his head. Pulling out his spectacle case instead of his gun, he 
provoked a general outburst of laughter by threatening to shoot The police found him 
"cowering behind a parked car.” In various complementary stories of law-enforcer 
discredit, Mason and Bums implicitly make reference to the territorial self-claims of 
police officers, namely of control over the perpetrators of crime (especially once 
identified and located). For example, a particular task force besieged a house for 2 
hours, shooting tear gas into the windows and shouting at the gunman to turn himself 
in, until an observer pointed out that the gunman had escaped and was standing "just 
behind the police marksmen begging himself to come out and give himself up" 
(Complete, 1989: 13). An example of the discredit of a role self-claim of territorial 
respect might be the running over of a pedestrian by an ambulance (medical workers 
claiming extreme respect for people’s bodily health).
Hockey players, due to the nature of their sport, claim a physical appearance 
and  condition of physical strength and toughness. Perhaps for this reason, an entry in 
one of Kambouropoulou's humour diaries records amusement at an "abnormally thin 
player on Buccaneers [hockey] team” (1930:30).
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2.1.3. Type I  - Universal Origin
Universal self-claims are those expected by a perceiver to be made by 
'everyone,' by mere virtue of being a person. Failures to maintain such self-claims are 
a common cause of amusement in others. Specific Universal* claims vary from one 
society to another (fishing and igloo-building proficiency are basic in Eskimo society, 
car-driving and home account-keeping in the urban West). However, certain general 
categories are likely to be found everywhere, such as the ability to walk, talk, control 
one's body, protect one's things, respect those of others, look 'decent,' and have 
‘common sense' and ‘common knowledge. I  will identify many of these categories in 
the following pages, under the usual content headings of skills, mind, territories, 
appearance, and biography.
Certain skills are taken to be claimed by members in all societies. Proficiency 
in language production is one such skill34. Numerous amusing examples may be 
given of faults at various levels of linguistic ability. Windsor (1979: 35) lists 
misspellings of English words found on foreign menus: “Wild duck in orang 
sorts...Biftek Gordon Blue.Xhees and biskiss." Rees (1983: 14) quotes the following 
overheard redundancy from one woman to another "Well,’ I says to him, I says to 
him, I says, says I, W ell, I says,’ I says." Hardy (1983: 120) provides this passage from 
the 1959 National Insurance Bill, an example of risible opacity: "For the purpose of 
this part of the schedule a person over pensionable age, not being an insured person, 
shall be treated as an employed person if he would be an insured person were he under 
pensionable age and would be an employed person were he an insured person." Lack 
of substance may be another cause for amusing linguistic failure, as in this quote from 
the Department of Technical Co-operation's "Departmental Fire Precautions and 
Instructions": "Most fires are caused by some igniting source coming into contact with 
combustible material." (Hardy, 1983: 127)
Another basic skill demanded in all societies of members can be called 
acceptable sensory-motor coordination, and involves the ability to perform basic 
bodily tasks of motion along typical terrains, handling of objects, balance, and the 
like. Awkward movements, falls, collisions, spills, and drops are among the most 
obvious causes of amusement Nancy Reagan, during an American political
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convention, while walking across the stage to take her place by her husband Ronald, 
tripped and fell, disappearing from the view of the television camera that picked up 
the stumble, and causing the amusement of many viewers (Staveacre, 1987: 9), 
Kambouropoulou’s humour diaries include several cases: “Roommate sitting down 
hard on chair and hurting the end of her spine. I felt badly, but laughed loudly” (p. 27); 
“ The awkward way B. stumbled over a nit in the road” (p. 29); “One member of the 
[hockey] team lived up to her reputation o f taking innumerable falls” (p. 30).
A separate universal skill is bodily control, the ability to keep the body’s 
’automatic* activities —such as excretions, emotive outbursts, noisy processes, and 
nervous movements— in check. Robert Morley has recounted the amusing failures of 
actor Lloyd Cole to  maintain this universal self-claim (Morley, 1978:47). He was told 
off by Alistair Sim, his director in a play, for not controlling his own strength. He 
"broke parts of the set,...broke props, and two of the girls in the play had bruises 
where [he] had taken them gently by the arm.” While trying to defend himself, Cole, 
who was driving the car in which they were travelling, suddenly found himself with 
the gear stick in his hand, which came off with a "terrible noise." Another extreme 
case was Richard Whately, former Protestant archbishop of Dublin, who has been 
described as "one o f the most restless men who ever lived." His limbs were in constant 
motion. At the home of a certain Lady Anglesey, he "dislocated half a dozen of her 
most elegant chairs by whizzing them round and round on one leg while he talked, and 
there were patches of bare carpet in front o f the fireplace where he would shuffle to 
and fro while wanning his bottom." (Nicholas, 1990:167-71). In Hornsby (1989: 72), 
a more typical spontaneous discredit is reported: The TV presenter Sally Magnusson 
noticed, a few seconds before the start of a  televised live report, that milk was leaking 
from her breasts and causing plainly visible stains on her dress. She gave the report in 
this condition.
Finally, there are numerous culturally-specific skills which are demanded of all 
members and may be found funny if discredited. The complex set of abilities 
(timetable-reading, ticket-buying, train-identifying, stop-checking, information- 
asking, language-speaking) necessary to travel successfully on a train is one example 
for Western society, relevant to the following story (in Hardy, 1983). Mr. & Mrs.
u  For a discussion of the cross-cultural types of universal skill self-claims, see Chapter Four, 2.2.2.1.
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Thomas Elham went on a day trip to Boulogne, but when they tried to get to Paris on 
the way to Dover they took the wrong train —to Luxembourg. Trying to return to Paris, 
they overslept, missed a connection, and arrived in Basel. They finally reached Paris 
but then mistakenly took a train to Bonn (pp. 12-13). In 16th century China, such a 
specific ‘universal’ skill would not have been applicable.
Universal self-claims of the mind can also be subdivided into numerous 
typical mental attributions, including ‘immediate’ perception, possession and correct 
application of natural and social frameworks of interpretation, language interpretation, 
and appropriate cognitive and emotional involvement . Immediate perception refers 
to the sensory detection of salient events in the surrounding environment and within 
the body: seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and feeling35 6. To a group of students 
sharing a flat, the frequent complaints of a neighbour about imaginary noises coming 
from their apartment —’loud stomping,’ ‘moving of furniture,’ and even a ‘pendulum 
clock’— were often reacted to with amusement (personal observation). A more 
extreme example appears in Hardy (1983: 34), a woman who did not notice her 
pregnancy until delivering a healthy 7-pound daughter.
Another universal mental expectation is the ownership and application o f 
whatever is considered to be the 4correct* natural frame of interpretation —i.e., to 
interpret events according to prevailing ideas about the natural world and its laws of 
causality. Children often provoke the amusement of adults with their unscientific 
ideas. When a child was asked, during a handwriting lesson, "Where's the dot that 
should be over the T ?", he answered, "Oh, that's still in the pencil" (Muir, 1984: 15). 
This reply is funny because to us the child misframes events by believing that written 
words pre-exist within the writing implement, rather than within the writer’s mind. A 
similar natural frame error is reported by Linkletter, occurring during an interview 
with a small boy:
"I'm going to be a doctor"
"What if I came to you with a broken arm, what would you do?"
35 For a discussion of the cross-cultural types of universal mental self-claims, see Chapter Four, 2.2.2.2.
36 It is not being proposed that such perception is indeed ’immediate' or 'direct,* as I assume all 
perception is mediated by cognitive interpretation. Nevertheless, there is a common everyday 
distinction between 'seeing* and 'interpreting,' loosely based perhaps on more or less abstract/deep 
levels of cognitive processing, which may lead to apparent differences between amusing stimuli. It is 
these subjective differences which are being drawn in the discussion.
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"Put it in a cast." ,
"What if I had a stomach ache?"
"I’d give you a pill."
"And what if I had a hole in my head?"
"I’d put a cork in it."
(1978; back cover)
Children arc not the only targets of amusement of this type. Adults with different or 
erroneous ideas about the natural world also often provoke the hilarity of others. There 
exists a wide range of so-called 'crank* books which propose theories or ideas 
considered ludicrous by scientific standards. One popular science writer, for instance, 
has derided publications on "how to lose weight without cutting down on calories, on 
how to talk to plants, on how to cure your ailments by rubbing your feet, on how to 
apply horoscopes to your pets, on how to use ESP in making business decisions, on 
how to sharpen razor blades by putting them under little models o f the Great Pyramid 
of Egypt" (Gardner, 1983; xiv). It is also well known that many theories about the 
natural world now accepted as sound contradicted 'common sense' when initially 
proposed by scientific pioneers, and were therefore "greeted with howls of laughter" 
(Koestler, 1964; 95).
Equally funny are the failures to own and apply the correct social frames o f  
interpretation held by the perceiver, these relating to the social worlds —history, 
culture, and behaviour. Everyone is attributed the self-claim to know about basic 
historical events. For this reason, outrageous mistakes from history exams can be 
listed in books of hum our "The Great Fire of London was caused by someone 
dropping a match into a tin of petrol in a garage" (Muir, 1984: 37). Knowledge of 
important current events is also universally required. Hardy includes among his funny 
anecdotes a 1969 survey which showed that "over a fifth of the population of Morocco 
were unaware that man had set foot on the surface of the moon. Over 50% angrily 
accused their questioners of trying to hoax them" (Hardy, 1983:100).
Knowledge must also be accompanied by appropriate application of relevant 
social frames. For example, if one knows a person, one must be able to also recognize 
them without fail on encountering the person face-to-face. Morley (1978: 67) recounts 
that Lord Portarlington uttered the following words to a woman he met at a social 
occasion: "Damn it, Ma'am, I  know your face, but I cannot put a name to it." The great
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fame of this particular individual —she was Queen Victoria— makes such forgetfulness 
funny, as a serious violation of the self-claim to social frame application. A similar 
blunder was committed by pop singer Dana, during a tour of Europe, who couldn't 
understand why a hotel receptionist seemed so baffled when he asked about how to 
get to the gondolas or canals —it turned out he was in Vienna, not Venice (Snelson, 
1990: 39).
Applying social frames includes also judging items from a frame according to 
relevant descriptive terms (i.e., a good-bad/funny-dramatic/cliched-original film). The 
following conversation was overheard on a bus: "And what are your neighbours like?" 
"Oh, quite normal. He's a French foot-juggler who's doing a summer season at 
Scarborough"(Rees, 1983: 94). This item is included in an anthology of funny remarks 
on the basis of the supposedly evident abnormality of what is described as a ‘normal* 
neighbour. A similar error of judgement is imputed by Morgan and Langford (1981: 
72) to Gene Simmons, of the rock group Kiss, regarding this critique of the English 
language's most renowned playwright:
I think Shakespeare is shit. Absolute shit! He may have been a genius for his 
time, but I just can't relate to that stuff. Thee' and 'thou' —the guy sounds like a 
faggot. Captain America is a classic because he's more entertaining. If you 
counted the number of people who read Shakespeare, you'd be very 
disappointed.
Mixing social frames incorrectly is another possible violation of this self­
claim. Though it may be acceptable to drink tea while shaving, other intersections of 
these two spheres simply jar, such as the following comment overheard in a North 
London pub: "An* if there's one ring I can't stand, it's razor blades in me tea" (Rees, 
1983: 94). In the same vein is the unusual medical case of a woman who ate a box of 
tissue paper and a cigarette pack every day for 12 years (Hardy, 1983: 35). Hardy also 
considers laughable that women's rights groups demonstrated against the road signs 
along Oxford's new environmentally-conscious cycle-ways because they showed only 
men's bikes (p.124). According to his interpretation, applying the frame governing 
sexual egalitarianism to bicycle icons on road signs is excessive and petty. Attila the 
Hun, Pope Leo VIH, Cardinal Jean Danielou, Monsigneur Roger Tort, and Nelson
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Rockefeller all died while engaged in sex. (Jones, 1985: 108-11). If this be considered 
funny, as Jones does, the humour stems from the clash between the frames relating to 
death and sexual intercourse, which makes it something of an etiquette breach to die 
during sex, or to have sex on the deathbed.
Language interpretation, due to its importance in everyday interaction, can be 
considered a separate universal mental self-claim, though it is in a sense a subset o f 
social frame interpretations. An example of a funny failure to maintain such a claim is 
this quote from the transcript of a court proceeding:
Q. And lastly, Gary, all your responses must be oral. OK?
A. Oral
Q. How old are you?
A. Oral (Lederer, 1989: 26)
Here the witness (a child) has misinterpreted the phrase “all your responses must be 
oral“ as “you must say ‘oral’ in response to every question,” an absurd demand.
Another basic mental self-claim required of all individuals is an appropriate 
level of cognitive and emotional involvement in the current situation as socially 
defined. Participants of interaction should seem to be sufficiently (but not excessively) 
engrossed in the activities they puiport to undertake. An entry from one o f 
Kambouropoulou’s humour diaries reports: “I laughed when I happened to see D.B.* s 
face in choir rehearsal. The altos were practicing a certain part to the words 4And a 
fair old man’ and as she sang, she had a very sad and rather absent-minded expression 
as if she were thinking of something entirely different” (1930: 21).
Finally, all individuals claim the ability to reason logically, to combine the 
elements from various natural and social frames according to certain basic rules o f 
coherent thought This self-claim seems to have been violated by the inventor of US 
Patent 1,087,186 (1914), “a device, consisting of two intertwined helices or springs, 
which was supposed to demonstrate the existence of God" (Morgan and Langford, 
1981: 112). Though the inventor’s reasoning is not provided, any conceivable 
argument seems ludicrous. A more explicit error is quoted by Lederer (1989: 6) from 
part of a child's explanation of heredity on an exam read: "if your grandfather didn't 
have any children, then your father probably wouldn't have any, and neither would 
you, probably."
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Universal self-claims of territory  can be divided into claims of material, 
spatial/bodily, interactional, informational, and ego territories37. For each of these 
types of territory, self-claims may be made regarding control of or respect for these 
preserves. Often, as will be seen in some of the illustrations, incidents involving 
failures of respect also include complementary failures of control.
Universal self-claims of material territories include control over one’s own 
personal possessions, one’s ’things’ which no one else should handle or take without 
appropriate permission; and respect for the things of others. Pulling out a wallet and 
calmly counting out large bills in the middle of an urban centre is a failure of control 
which visitors from safer quarters of humanity sometimes commit, and one which 
may inspire amusement as well as crime (personal observation). A funny anecdote 
illustrating a failure to respect others* material territories is reported in Complete 
(1989:21). A woman bought a coffee and a Kit-kat at a cafe. She went off to get some 
sugar and on her return found an elderly couple had taken her Kit-kat and were eating 
it. Furious, she took the Kit-kat and snapped a wafer off for herself, called them 
thieves, and stormed off. Later, she found her own Kit-kat in her handbag (Complete, 
1989: 21).
Universal spatial/bodily territories include the body of an individual, the space 
immediately surrounding it, and all spatial preserves which he considers his, such as 
his living quarters, his fields, and other buildings, vehicles, and spaces of his own. 
Funny control claim-discredits take place when spaces or bodily parts -especially 
sensitive ones— are trespassed by persons or objects, sometimes to the point of 
damage. Jones recounts the story of how club singer Ian Whittaker, walking around 
naked in his dressing room, caught "his privates" as he closed the drawer of a sewing 
machine, looking for a screwdriver (Jones, 1985: 13). A less painful but no less 
embarrassing discredit befell astronomer Dr. Patrick Moore, who was speaking before 
the television cameras when a fly flew into his mouth and was swallowed whole 
(Hornsby, 1989: 73). In the same collection of anecdotes can be found an illustration 
of a funny bodily territorial invasion (i.e., a failure to respect another’s body). Alan 
Titchmaish, presenting a section on gardening within the Breakfast Time television
37 For a discussion of the cross-cultural types of universal territorial self-claims, see Chapter Four, 
2.2.2.3.
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program, was suddenly faced with the Princess of Wales, his hands covered in  
manure. They shook hands. (Hornsby, 1989: 98)
Interactional territories are the rights to engage in joint activity with o th e r  
individuals, such as the right to speak during a conversation, to attend a funeral, o r  t o  
participate in the cooking of a meal. Universal self-claims o f control include c la im s  
over the rights to approach strangers for small requests (the time, cigarettes), to o p e n  
and maintain more general and prolonged states of conversation with acquaintances 
and friends, and to be politely disattended (i.e., not stared at) by strangers. Self-claim s 
of respect provide the complement of the form er respect for strangers* small requests, 
for the moves of acquaintances and friends to open conversation, and for the rights o f  
others to be disattended. An entry in one of Kambouropou 1 ou’s (1930) humour d ia ries  
provides a twin example of both control and respect failures: "Yelled loudly at a  g irl 
out of the window only to find that she wasn't the right one" (p. 15). This event can b e  
found funny both as the victim’s failure to protect her right to be left alone b y  
strangers, and as the shouter’s failure to leave strangers alone38.
Universal informational territories include the facts, ideas, or feelings w hich 
an individual is expected to maintain private, or secret, concealed from others in  
public situations, such as potentially damaging information, the view of private bodily  
parts, sexual knowledge and experience, toilet activities, physical blemishes and  
deformity, immoral or criminal acts and attitudes, and other taboo subjects. A funny 
incident involving both loss of control and lack of respect for such territories is  
recounted by Jo Anne Williams Bennett, Canadian author. While spending a weekend 
in a mountain cabin with her friend Jackie, she began a conversation which treated 
topics such as pregnancy, periods, internal examinations, suppositories, douches and 
"other embarrassments of being female ” "We started giggling,” she writes, “because 
we had never talked about these things with each other.” At one point, in a fit o f  
laughter, Jo Anne shouted out that her worst experience was being told by a doctor 
that she had "warts on [her] cunt!". At that veiy moment, a young stranger who had 
been timidly knocking on the door walked into the kitchen. Jackie went into a  
hysterical fit, and Jo Anne, at first "dismayed," eventually joined in (Kurc, 1990: 14- 3*
3S The latter case is actually an example of a self-discredit, rather than an other-discredit (See 2.2).
Nevertheless, we can imagine that a friend of the diary writer (for whom this would be an other-
discredit) could have also found amusement at the episode.
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18). Here both Jo Anne —by revealing such intimate information— and the timid 
stranger -b y  trespassing on this private talk— are discredited for their territorial 
violations and thus become targets of amusement.
Finally, there are universal self-claims to protect one’s own and respect others* 
ego territory, the symbol or idea of the very self. Japanese Hitachi executives, when 
presented with a US flag by the Governor of Kentucky during a meeting "carelessly 
dragged it along the ground," unaware that this was interpretable as an act of 
intolerable disrespect by the Americans (Ricks, 1993: 3). This incident, though grave 
to the participants, can be found funny as a violation of Americans* ego territory 
(symbolized by their flag) —both as a failure to protect it, and as a failure to respect it.
Universal self-claims of appearance and  condition include the claims to look 
’presentable* in public, wearing attire, carrying belongings, and sporting a hairstyle 
an ^ cleanliness suitable to the occasion. Failures in this regard can be quite humorous. 
The actress Maureen Lipman spent 45 minutes trying to get some help to jump start 
the car, unaware of the novelty reindeer antlers she was wearing on her head, which 
she had put on to amuse some friends (Snelson, 1990: 62). The amusement of 
observers can well be imagined. The actor and writer George Baker was forced to 
travel for 6 months with a toy panda put in his suitcase by his young daughter. 
Searching his luggage, customs officers found it "to [his] horror and their 
amusement.” (Hornsby, 1989: 3) Attention to appearance can also become ludicrous if 
excessive. An outstanding case is that of George 'Beau* Brummell, the 'king of the 
dandies* in Regency Britain, who would daily spend three hours tying his cravatte. 
(Nicholas, 1990:135)
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2.1.4. Summary o f Type I Funny Events
In this section, I have set out and illustrated in detail the first and most simple 
type of self-claim discredit: the accidental discredit of an other’s self-claim in 
untransformed reality. I have considered self claims of independent, role, and 
universal origin, and within each of these classes I have illustrated the funny 
discrediting of self-claims of skill, mind, territory, appearance, and biography. A 
deathbed claim to feel fine, a police team ’s inability to find its besieged prey, a 
pedestrian’s clumsy step, the bizarre theories of cranks and crackpots -examples such 
as these have been integrated into the analysis as Type I claim-discredits of varying 
self-claim origin and content.
These differences can be transposed to the remaining seven types of claim- 
discredit situations. An awkward stumble may be accidental (Type I) or caused by an 
agent’s trap, trip, or shove (Type I I ). Either of these possibilities may be found funny 
by other observers (Types I and II) or by the pedestrian as an observer of himself 
(Types HI and IV). Finally, any of these four cases may be witnessed directly (Type I- 
IV) or else as retold stories, video-recorded images, staged Fiction, or drawn comic 
strips (Type V-VIH). What works for awkward stumbles, can work also for universal 
frame-managements, independent skill claims, or role-related appearance.
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2.2. Type II. The Agent-Caused Discredit of an Other’s Self-Claim
(In Untransformed Reality)
Funny EventsUntransformed Reality Transformed Realityo t h e r Perceiver o t her PerceiverAccident Agent Accident Agent Accident Agent Accident Agent1 R U 1 R U 1 R U 1 R U 1 R U 1 R U 1 R U 1 R U
.’t ' X i
M r - ,
* v  i -!?■***•s* .vAv* « f i r - . Sí1 » in IV V VI VII V III
Table 3. Type II Funny Events. See Table 1 (p. 200) for full chart.
Self-claims can be discredited not only by accidental or unintended 
happenings, but also by intentional actions, by discrediting or ‘uncovering* moves (see 
Goffman, 1969: 11-27). I will use the term agent of discredit, or merely ‘agent* to 
refer to a person who is seen by the perceiver to have intentionally carried out a course 
of action with intent to discredit another participant’s self-claim, or at least with 
complacency in the knowledge that it will cause such a discrediting if the action or its 
consequences are observed. The identification of such an agent by a perceiver 
introduces a new element of influence on the possibility and degree of amusement 
which the perceiver may experience. As has been mentioned in Chapter Two (2.1), 
numerous studies suggest that amusement reactions vary with a perceiver’s affective 
disposition towards the agent of discredit39, as well as with his disposition towards the 
victim.
Type II claim-discredits include those where an agent discredits a self-claim 
made by someone other than the perceiver, including such typical cases as practical 
jokes, hoaxes, creation of obstacles, insults, invasion of privacy, interruptions, and 
physical aggression. The events which may be classified here are thus identical to 
those belonging to Type I, except for the perceiver’s identification of this agent of
39 Generally, these studies have been phrased in terms of agents of 'disparagement* or ‘misfortune*.
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discredit. Examples will now be provided of amusing Type II discredits, in somewhat 
less detail than for accidental discredits o f others.
Chapter Five: A Typology of Funny Events Section 2.2 (Type II Funnv Events
2.2.1. Type II - Independent Origin
An agent can cause the discrediting of an independent self-claim in one of two 
ways. The first possibility is for the agent to somehow make a false self-claim for the 
claimant, or else to force him to make it. Hypnotists are able to make their subjects 
claim all manner of absurdities, such as speaking foreign tongues or being a four­
legged animal, to the great hilarity of audiences (personal observation). Another 
curious possibility is recounted in Mayo (1993: 43-45). A Royal Marine officer, 
extremely keen about his job, was forced to leave the corps for medical reasons. On 
his last night, his fellow officers got him drunk and had his arm tattooed with the 
words M43rd Commando Royal Marines,” finding this very funny. Here we are made 
aware that a false self-claim tattooed on the flesh is difficult to explain away as the 
work of unauthorized claim-makers.
A second and more common method of discrediting an independent self-claim 
is to question or debunk the fulfilment of the claim itself. For instance, James Randi 
and Martin Gardner are two magicians who have deflated many self-claims of 
supposed telepathic, telekinetic, and other ’supernatural' powers exhibited by various 
charlatans (Randi, 1987; Gardner 1983). These debunkings usually involve the 
provision of alternative 'rational' explanations for the performance, replication of the 
act by the magician, and the application, where possible, of controls on the faker 
which would prevent him from carrying out the feat if the magician's explanation were 
correct (and no supernatural powers were involved). Many readers, at least judging 
from the critical praise of the books cited on the back covers, have found the reports 
of such debunkings very funny to read.
For example, in the 1960's a young Russian girl called Rosa became widely 
famous for her apparent ability to 'read' with her fingers. In Science, Good, Bad and 
Bogus, Martin Gardner (1983: 63-73) describes her amazing feats performed even 
under strict scientific controls. Then he explains that magicians are familiar with the 
fact that however tightly one ties a blindfold, there always remain a couple of small 
holes down each side of the nose. Mentalists use what is called a 'sniff position to 
obtain a better view, and various tricks to improve visibility even further. Finally, he 
describes the photo shown in Time magazine of "Rosa wearing a conventional 
blindfold...seated, one hand on a newspaper page...comfortably within range of a
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simple nose peek.” (Gardner, 1983: 65) At this point amusement is sought (and I 
would suppose often achieved) among readers.
2.2.2. Type II  - Role Origin
Self-claims of role origin may be discredited by agents who put these claims to 
testing trials, perhaps with previous knowledge of their falsity. The world of hoaxes 
and forgery provides one domain for research of these kinds of discredit. For example, 
Hans van Meegeren in the 1930's fooled art experts with lost 'masterpieces' o f some o f 
the world's greatest artists (May, 1984: 26), thus discrediting the knowledge self­
claims of these supposed experts. Similar must have been the embarrassment o f 
physical anthropologists after Charles Dawson (1864-1916) found a skull of a 
supposed 'missing link* between man and ape near Piltdown Common in Sussex, 
leading to the naming of a new species of hominid, Eoanthropus Dawsoni. It turned 
out to be a hoax (May, 1984: 29). In these examples, Meergen and Dawson can be 
considered agents who carry out their activities in full knowledge of their discrediting 
potential.
2.2.3. Type II - Universal Origin
All of us have more or less serious failings with regard to the universal 
requirements of our own society, which may be revealed by mere exposure to others 
or by unintended circumstances. It is also possible, however, that others may seek to 
expose deficiencies they are aware of, to test our capacities in search for failings, or to 
subject us to unfair conditions under which success will be practically impossible.
Practical jokes, wind-ups, hoaxes, and various other tricks provide examples 
of agent-caused discredits of this type, when observed by third parties. Tongue 
twisters (“She sells sea shells on the sea shore”) cause the victim to mispronounce 
words, discrediting his self-claim of linguistic production skills. Numerous ploys may 
be used to spoil a person’s sensory-motor coordination: drugging or inebriating the 
victim, physically tripping or pushing his body, altering his environment (the
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schoolboy trick of pulling out the chair from behind a person), or merely distracting 
his attention (i.e., with a loud sound) at a crucial moment of activity requiring 
concentration.
Self-claims of the mind may also be discredited with more subtle tricks. 
Professional hypnotists may cause their subjects to see, hear, touch, smell, and even 
taste imaginary objects and substances, to the great amusement of audiences (personal 
observation). Charlatans may fool large populations with preposterous crank theories 
and claims of paranormal ability, discrediting their self-claims of applying the correct 
natural frameworks of interpretation (Gardner, 1983; Randi, 1987). Most familiar of 
all are wind-ups and practical jokes, ritualized in the institution of 'April Fool's Day', 
which cause the victim to believe an outrageous proposition.
In such jokes, the victim’s holding of an evidently false frame and the resulting 
misadjusted words, actions, and emotional expressions are found hilarious by 
audiences. A laughable fabrication40 is one which anyone with 'any common sense' 
should see through —or at least this is how it should appear to observers. Some April 
Fools Day news stories should serve to illustrate: "Big Ben is Going Digital," BBC 
overseas radio claimed one year (Boston, 1982: 134). "Hovercraft services from 
Heathrow Cancelled Because of Low Tide”, announced Capital Radio (ibid.). And 
then there is the infamous case of Richard Dimbleby’s Italian spaghetti harvest,' with 
televised images of field labourers picking pasta directly off the 'spaghetti trees' 
(ibid.: 125-27). A person who is taken in by any one of these fabrications is exposed 
as lacking or mismanaging basic social frames. Heathrow has no seaport, pasta does 
not grow on trees, and the value of Big-Ben is symbolic, architectural, and historical — 
not related to the accuracy of its timekeeping.
Hoaxes and confidence tricks resulting in similar frame mismanagements, 
though not intended specifically as jokes, may provoke amusement also. A book of 
funny anecdotes includes the story of Doctor James Barry (1795-1865), a skilled army 
surgeon who reached the rank of Inspector General. Upon his death, it was discovered
40 Goffman distinguishes between a "benign" and an "exploitive" fabrication40, but this distinction is not 
useful for discriminating between the types of fabrications which are amusing, and those which are not 
There are "exploitive" fabrications which are nevertheless funny to many others (see the following 
example of Michel Chasles and the document forger). There are also unfunny benign fabrications. For 
example, a newspaper could run an April Fools Joke claiming that Queen Elizabeth II was to inagurate 
and unveil a monument to world peace, or something of the sort This lie might deceive many people, 
but it would hardly be found amusing, as it would be well within the realm of the plausible.
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that he' was a woman. Our amusement here is directed not only at the discredit o f 
Doctor Bany’s gender identity, but at the countless others who were taken in by this 
lifelong deceit (May, 1984: 24). Even more amusing is the case of French 
mathematician Michel Chasles (1793-1880), who bought thousands of forged 
manuscripts from a hoaxer, including writings supposedly penned by Isaac Newton, 
Pascal, Queen Cleopatra, Socrates, Galileo, Shakespeare, and Lazarus. The most 
astounding detail is that all of these were written in French.
There is a genre of puzzles and 'brain teasers' whose solution is obvious if the 
question or the elements involved are interpreted in the correct way. For those 'in the 
know,' the victim will seem lacking in reasoning techniques. For example, figure 1 
includes three cut-out figures41. The victim is asked to position them so that each 
jockey is sitting up on one horse. The solution, shown in figure 2, involves placing 
each rider on a horse formed by the front of one of the cut-out horses and the back of 
the other. This is an unexpected resolution, but obvious once seen (In fact, the cereal 
packet from which this example was taken [Kellogg’s, 1996] includes the blurb "It's 
easy when you know how!"). In the meanwhile, a victim may spend many minutes 
shifting the three figures around in frustration, perhaps in vain, to the amusement of 
observers aware of the ‘obvious’ solution, (personal observation).
Territorial self-claims to protect a particular preserve are very often caused by 
intentional agents who trespass on a claimant’s property. Some sleight-of-hand 
magicians perform acts in which a volunteer is asked to hold a coin, card, or other 
object, and yet somehow the illusionist is able to make it disappear or to exchange it 
for a different item. This often results in much laughter from the audience at the 
expense of the volunteer who has failed to keep control of his universal material 
territories. The series of tricks sometimes ends with the magician producing the 
volunteer's wallet or other personal possession from his own pocket, or 'from thin air1, 
as if to demonstrate further the volunteer’s carelessness. Brandreth (1979: 86) 
describes such a magic trick as an amusing ‘practical joke* to be played on friends.
The classic trick of placing a bucket o f water or paint balanced on a semi-open 
door (Brandreth [1979: 11] suggests a less dangerous ‘pillow’ version) is aimed at 
ruining the victim’s bodily territory. Spying through private windows or keyholes, 
reading private mail, intentionally walking into ‘backstage* areas (bedrooms, toilets)
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or forcibly removing clothing from a victim would constitute agent-caused 
discreditings of informational territories. Malicious interruptions during conversation, 
and ‘gate crashing* a party are examples of interactional territory violations. As for the 
agent-caused violation of ego territory, this category is perfectly synonymous with the 
intentional insult.
Agent-caused discredits of territorial self-claims of respect are also possible, 
though less common and rather more awkward. An agent, through misinformation, 
may cause his victim to take or damage a third party's material territories. He may 
cause a violation of spatial/bodily preserves by physically pushing his victim across a 
boundary. Nown (1989: 83) provides an amusing example relative to informational 
territories: A Scotsman on a Monarch Airlines flight, having drunk half a litre of 
scotch whisky, bared his private parts to the whole plane, thereby forcing passengers 
to intrude on universally forbidden informational territories. It is also possible to 
engineer situations by which a victim unintentionally insults a third party, causing a 
violation of his ego territory.
Finally, many practical jokes are designed to ruin the victim's physical 
appearance. For example, the joker tells the victim that he has a smudge on his nose, 
pretends to wipe it off, and in so doing puts one on. (Brandreth, 1979: 37). 41
41 All figures in this chapter can be found on its last page (275).
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2.3. Types 111 and IV.
The Accidental (III) or Agent-Caused (AO Discrediting 
of the Perceiver’s Own Self-Claims (in Untransformed Reality)
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Table 3. Type III and TV Funny Events. See Table 1 (p. 200) for full chart.
In this section I will treat funny stimuli sharing the same features as those of 
Types I and II, except that in this case the self-claim discredited has been made by the 
perceiver in whose perspective we are interested.
A self-claim —o f whatever origin and content- may be discredited in the eyes 
of the person who is (or was) the claimant. Indeed, many of the illustrations provided 
for Types I and II include specific reference to the fact that the discredited individual 
also became aware of discredit. As will be seen in Chapter Six (2), perception of one’s 
own claim-discredit frequently leads to embarrassment rather than amusement. 
However, it is possible for such discredits of the self to be found funny if there is a 
sufficient perceived distance between the current or permanent self of an individual 
and the self discredited. For example, with the passing of time, embarrassing 
situations may be recalled with less embarrassment and greater amusement, as past 
selves become increasingly remote from who the person is at present. Some of the 
illustrations for Type I stimuli were drawn from collections of embarrassing moments 
retold or shared with the editors by the victims of embarrassment themselves 
(Complete, 1989; Snelson, 1990; Jones, 1985; Kurc, 1990). Presumably, these people 
are able to share their anecdotes with a humorous spirit due to their achievement of a 
distanced perspective from the event The children quoted as believing that a hole in
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the head can be cured with a cork, that words flow out from pencils, or that the G reat 
Fire of London began with a tin of petrol, as adults will be able to laugh with genuine 
amusement at their recorded errors, which do not discredit their present self-claims to  
knowledge. We know also from experience that victims of practical jokes and hoaxes, 
such as those listed for Type II, can also be amused at their own other-effected 
discredit. In fact, such victims are usually expected and even coaxed to ‘take' events 
‘with a sense of humour’ and share in the enjoyment at their own expense. In other 
cases, the discredited individual may perceive his own discredit but be unable to  
distance himself sufficiently from it to experience amusement, feeling only 
embarrassment W e might suppose such a  reaction of the ‘psychic* charlatans 
unmasked by Randi and Gardener (p. 229) or of the physical anthropologist who, 
taken in by Charles Dawson’s hoax, excitedly announced and catalogued a new 
species of hominid (p. 230). In both these cases, discredit concerns a strong 
commitment made by a central part o f the individual’s self.
I will not give illustrations for all the categories of self-claim origin and 
content specified in the previous sections. It should be clear, upon reviewing these 
examples, that many of the discredited claimants could have found their own situation 
funny, either at the time or at some later period. This might be the case, for instance, 
of Maureen Lipman upon the discovery of the novelty reindeer antlers on her head (p. 
225). In some of these cases, of course, the discredited claimant would never even 
have reached the stage of detecting the discrediting. Either he would not have noticed 
it, or he would not have agreed with the interpretation that casts it as an event which 
has indeed discredited the self. Professor Erasmus Wilson (p. 212) would have to  
come back from the grave to realize the extent of his folly when predicting that 
electric light would never catch on. On the other hand, Harry Carpenter (p. 213) would 
have 'swallowed his words' predicting Muhammed Alt's defeat almost instantaneously. 
The women’s rights activists who protested about the men's bikes on cycle lane signs 
(p. 221) might continue to assert the importance of banning such chauvinistic 
iconography. On the other hand, the individual who once believed (as a child) that a 
cork could cure a hole in a patient's head (p. 220) would now probably be able to 
appreciate his error.
Instead of a full catalogue of funny accidental self-claim discredits of the self, I 
will draw attention to a number of possibilities which are specific to this type. An
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actor has a unique subjective perspective into his actions and states, specifically into 
their mental, perceptual, and emotional component. Thus, when the circumstances of a 
discrediting are discernible largely or entirely through this subjectivity, we encounter 
types of funny events not immediately available to outside observers. Examples 
include frame-mismanagement errors and bodily control failures which are perceived 
‘from the inside,' which will be said to include such amusing phenomena as jokes, 
irony, absurdity, puns, brain teasers, visual illusions, coincidences, astounding events, 
amusement rides, monster masks and films, ‘peek-a-boo,* and tickling. For the rest of 
cases we can imagine discreditings identical or similar to those listed for Type I, 
viewed from the hypothetical perspective of the discredited individual.
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2.3.1. Bodily Mismanagement: Fear games (i.e., ‘peek-a-boo’), horror and ‘sob* films, 
amusement rides, tickling.
Here the self-claim discredited refers to a universally expected skill: 
appropriate bodily control (See 2.3). Being startled or even terrified by a loud sound, a 
prickly something that touches the body, or the unexpected sight of a person can result 
in self-amusement if the source is subsequently interpreted as harmless: the wind 
slamming a door shut, a brush, a pile of clothes. Amusement rides (i.e., 
rollercoasters), horror films and a few other devices and events have been designed to 
provoke strong emotional reactions in perceivers which do not correspond to a real 
and appropriate stimulus. For instance, a rollercoaster simulates a rapid fall that 
normally would mean probable death, triggering off intense fear in riders. At the same 
time, these riders know rationally that the ride is safe. As the cart speeds downhill, 
horrific screams are common. As it reaches the bottom and curves upwards, the 
screams fade and laughter takes over (personal observation). Such cultural 
productions may be considered to produce accidental discreditings. Those responsible 
for creating and giving access to the productions, however, could be identified as 
agents of discredit, as could the perceiver himself as a self-deceiving agent who 
collaborates in the process.
The game o f ‘peek-a-boo,* in which a parent ‘disappears* from his baby*s view 
by covering his face, and similar infant fear-laughter games (“I’m gonna get you!”), 
produce victim reactions which belong more clearly to the category of agent-caused 
discredit o f the self (Type IV). Related chasing and fighting games of slightly older 
children, with their continuous accompaniment of shrieking and laughter sounds, 
often seem to take up much of a playground’s physical and aural spaces. Adolescents 
and even adults may also engage in similar playful fear-provocation, such as stealthily 
approaching a friend from behind and hugging or shouting at him (personal 
experience).
These types of stimuli have often been interpreted as evidence for a tension- 
release mechanism of amusement. It should be noted, however, that it is not only the 
subject of inappropriate fear who experiences amusement. The event may also be 
found funny by observers: parents of the baby who find his innocent shock hilarious, 
experienced rollercoaster riders in the midst of shrieking companions, horror/*sob*
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film audience members who turn around to watch the tears/grimaces in the cinema, 
with the distance of knowing ‘it's just a movie/ In this model, such amusement would 
be classifiable as belonging to Type I or II: accidental or agent-caused discredits of 
others. Under the tension-release interpretation, the introduction of some notion of 
sympathy or identification with the aroused individual would need to be introduced -- 
an unlikely description, as other-amusement seems as strong or even stronger in many 
cases.
In the examples which have been cited, amusement at the self is possible in the 
perceiver because he is able to attend to his error (as opposed to the fear-provoking 
elements of the scene, for instance). A novice rollercoaster rider who failed to trust the 
safety of the ride, or who was unable to overcome the sensation of extreme danger, 
would not be able to find the event funny —though others could laugh at him for this 
failure (Type I discredit). Moreover, amusement is possible because the error is seen 
as temporary or not affecting the ‘real* self. A terrified rollercoaster rider might 
further experience embarrassment before his friends and bystanders for his more 
extended and genuine failure to control himself.
The laughter (exteriorized spontaneous amusement) brought on by the practice 
o f 'tickling' can also be included within Type IV, though this concerns the failure to 
control gross bodily movement as opposed to mere emotional expression. Tickling- 
related amusement results from the perceiver noticing a loss of control over his own 
body when certain areas are physically touched or handled in certain ways, or when he 
perceives the threat of such contact. These areas of the body are precisely those where 
protective defense reflexes exist: "the soles of the feet, the arm pits, the ribs, and the 
solar plexus" (Black, 1984: 3000)42. The reflex behaviours, which consist in a forceful 
withdrawal of the bodily part in question from the offending contact, are only to a very 
limited extent subject to conscious control.
In many cases —such as when the agent stimulating the reflex is hostile, not 
completely trusted, or merely unseen— no laughter follows whatsoever. The reflex 
performs its biologically foreseen function, and its subject experiences automatic 
withdrawal with no additional sensation than perhaps pain or fear. Thus, the
42 Koestler (1964: 79-81) has proposed a similar interpretation of tickling which, however, ignores the 
existence of independent defensive reflex mechanisms. On his account, the amusement emerges from 
the perception of an incongruity between two cognitive frames, that of an attack, and that of friendship 
or trust.
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mechanical actions of ’tickling* are not in themselves a sufficient stimulus fo r 
amusement —’tickling’ is not a physical production of the laughter reflex, as is often 
supposed.
When a trusted person threatens or carries out his threat to stimulate these 
reactions, however, the victim finds that he is helpless to stop his body from  
responding to an illusory threat. He draws back, writhes, jolts this way and that —even 
though the ’aggression' is only pretend. It is this loss of the universally attributed 
ability to control the body which results in amusement and its expression as laughter. 
Moreover, a vicious circle may be initiated, as the laughter itself may be perceived as 
a laughable loss o f control.
Additional evidence confirming this interpretation can be observed. F or 
example, congruently with the other agent-caused control failures cited above, it 
happens that the person tickled is not the only amused participant. Both those who 
carry out the tickling as well as other bystanders tend to display laughter, and to  
experience corresponding amusement I would argue that all participants react to the 
same loss of control by the victim. Also, the subject of a tickling episode often feels 
embarrassment as well as amusement at his behaviour, a common feature o f Type EH 
and Type IV stimuli (See Chapter Six, I). Finally, frequent victims of tickling report 
that the experience consists of two contradictory sensations —on the one hand the 
amusement, but on the other a disagreeable and even quite painful physical sensation,
which is capable o f eliciting in them extreme and atypical aggressive behaviours.
\
Moreover, very similar behaviours can be induced which affect different reflexes, 
suggesting the non-uniqueness of the tickling phenomenon. For instance, having a 
very cold but harmless object (such as an ice cube) placed in contact with cold- 
sensitive areas of the body (i.e., the spine) can provoke a similarly unwarranted o r 
overstated withdrawal reflex and subsequent laughter or contemporaneous giggling.
It is worth noting that self-perceived bodily mismanagements (of both 
accidental and agent-caused varieties) constitute the very first stimuli of amusement 
which human neonates experience. Rothbart (1973), summarizing an extensive 
observational study, provides the following list (p. 247) regarding the first 
manifestations of amusement at the age of four months:
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a baby laughs when he is tickled, during a mock attack from a parent, when 
thrown in the air or bounced on a bed, at the sight of a dog, or the sound of a 
sneeze or cough. As might be expected, these situations also sometimes lead to 
crying rather than laughter.
This fact is unsurprising if we consider that for a neonate (I) the neonate himself is his 
main social environment and (2) his most important behavioural manifestations are 
expressions of pleasure and displeasure (calmness/crying). A baby’s own 
misinterpretations of a situation as safe/threatening are the first behavioural errors it 
may observe as such. Only from the fifth or sixth month do babies begin to display 
laughter also at the improprieties of parents, such as crawling on the floor or sucking 
on the baby’s bottle (Sroufe and Wunsch, 1972: 1332). Even then however, this type 
of amusement continues to dominate the life of children throughout the pre-school 
years:
Laughter is a highly contagious reaction that may suddenly erupt in the midst 
of rough and tumble play, running, jumping, chasing, and so forth.... Children 
are especially likely to laugh following the successful completion of an activity 
viewed as dangerous, threatening, or ‘scary.’ For example, exaggerated 
laughter is likely after jumping off a high platform, going down a big slide, or 
climbing a ‘difficult’ tree.
(McGhee 126-27; see also Jones, 1967)
An intriguing link may also be made with animal studies, as an expression which 
looks very much like laughter has been observed in several species of monkey in 
response to both tickling and “the boisterous mock-fighting and chasing involved in 
social play” (Van Hooff, 1972), which Jones describes as “almost identical” to the 
rough-and-tumble play of human children. Bodily mismanagements of the self provide 
the only stimulus of amusement in the primate world, and the first o f the human being.
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2.3.2. Perceptual Mismanagement: Sensory Illusions
Sensory illusions are stimuli which, by exploiting certain vulnerabilities o f  
human perceptual systems, lead to erroneous perception. Such illusions, sometimes 
designed intentionally for entertainment, educational, artistic, or research purposes, 
lead to discreditings of the universal self-claim to correct immediate perception (See 
Section 2.3):
Illusions are misperceptions. They are interpretations of stimuli that do 
not follow from the sensations received by the eye. When we witness an 
illusion, we perceive something that does not correspond to what is actually 
out there —what exists in the real world. Illusions fool us; they convince us of 
things that are not true. The interesting thing is we seem to enjoy being fooled 
in this way.
(Block and Yuker, 1991: 11-12)
Illusions are not normally cited in works of humour research (Paulos, 1980, is 
an exception). However, I have noticed in my own reactions and those of other 
persons who experience such illusions the appearance of amusement at the moment in 
which the illusion takes effect For example, at the 1992 World Expo at Seville, the 
Fujitsu Pavilion included an innovative LCD three-dimensional projection system 
which produced a thoroughly convincing illusion of witnessing non-existent objects 
before the eyes. The cinema, throughout the showing and particularly in the first few 
minutes, was filled with amazed laughter (personal observation). These types of 
illusions lose their humour with habituation —the mind seems to learn to catalogue the 
illusion as an exception or trick. However, unfamiliar illusions continue to fool the 
mind. The cutting-edge of virtual reality research and of motion picture 'special 
effects' will continue to produce ever more realistic illusory worlds to deceive the 
senses. Drag-induced or other types o f hallucinations and delusions, when noticed as 
illusory by the subject, can also be found funny.
The reader can test his own reaction with figure 3 (Richard and Yuker, 1991: 
63) which consists o f eight black circles with missing areas. Do you see a cube? Or is 
it just a series of incomplete black disks? Is the cube in front of the disks or behind
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eight holes? Is the upper right face of the cube in front, or is it the lower left face? The 
configuration of the circles and the missing areas creates the illusion of a three 
dimensional cube floating over the circles (or sometimes behind them). The illusion is 
complicated by the fact that the three-dimensional figure is an 'unstable figure,' a 
■Necker cube' whose 'front' side switches when looked at for a few seconds, flipping 
the cube inside-out. The failure to achieve a 'real' or 'stable* interpretation of the figure 
can result in amusement, and perhaps also bewilderment or surprise (See Chapter Six, 
4). An example of a non-visual sensory illusion which may be familiar to the reader is 
nevertheless worth testing consciously: putting your hands in cold water with rubber 
gloves on makes your hands feel wet even though they are completely dry (Cobb, 
1981).
Though the behavioural results of erroneous immediate perception (i.e., Don 
Quixote charging against a windmill seen as a giant) can sometimes be observed by 
others (i.e., Types I and II), the subject of the misperception, assuming he does notice 
his state of error, obtains a view on the event which is unique to himself: the world 
convincingly appears one way, yet is definitely another. In many cases, in fact, the 
error is visible exclusively to himself, apart from his own reports of it or his 
spontaneous reaction to its discovery. Moreover, the possible accompanying 
subjective experiences of interpretative shift, puzzlement, surprise, wonder, and the 
like may colour the amusement feeling with hues distinguishing this sort of event 
from other types of amusement (See Chapter Six, 4). It is for this reason, I would 
argue, that such amusement has often been seen in humour theory as deriving from 
incongruity, dissonance, surprise, or delight. It should be kept in mind, however, that 
to the extent that the cognitive error is observable by others (i.e., the words and 
actions springing from Don Quixote’s hallucinations), they may result in amusement 
of Types I or II (depending on whether it is seen as accident or agent-caused). Amused 
delight at a sensory illusion is only different from hilarity at an other's perceptual 
mistake due to the difference of perspective towards essentially similar events.
It should also be noted that sensory illusions, as extremely unusual exceptions 
to the norm of perceivable objects, cause errors which normally do not lead to serious 
discredit or embarrassment of their perceiver. Anyone will recognize that failures to 
perceive these phenomena are equally exceptional, and not a reflection on a person’s 
normal ability to see things as they are. Moreover, the fooled subject often actually
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plays a pan  in deceiving himself, or in any case anticipates the fooling, which he can 
classify as an unusual trick or exception. The discredit is thus very short lived, the se lf 
discredited easily cast off by the subject of misperception, and thus self-amusement 
easily possible (See Chapter Six, 2). Embarrassment is possible, however, when a 
person has committed himself more strongly to an evident misperception.
Visual and other sensory illusions may be seen as accidental (Type HI) or as 
caused by some agent (Type IV), such as the originator or presenter of an ambiguous 
or deceptive sensory stimulus. A clear example of the latter might be the classic 
research experiment carried out by Nerhardt (1970) to support the 'incongruity' theory 
of humour. Three weights were presented to subjects for them to lift, each larger than 
the previous. When they tried to pull up on the largest, they found it was unexpectedly 
light. The wider the gap between expected and actual weight, the greater was the 
laughter recorded. The experimenter here could be regarded as an agent of discredit. 
Hypnotists who cause sensory illusions in their subjects through suggestion techniques 
provide a further example.
2.3.3. Natural Frame Mismanagement: Coincidences and 'Unnatural* Events
An event may be witnessed which so strongly calls upon our tendency to 
associate similar occurrences, or so strongly challenges interpretation by scientific 
schemes, that we come to conclusions that fly in the face of our rationalistic natural 
frameworks —magic or supernatural connections seem to be responsible for the 
anomaly. In other societies, and even by many individuals in Western society, these 
events would not be found funny, but rather confirmation of a 'magical' primary 
framework. To a disbeliever in the supernatural, however, they may provoke a risible 
acceptance of what is deemed absurd. He witnesses his own self-claim to 'rational' 
explanation of events temporarily discredited, and experiences amusement at this part 
o f himself.
Astounding coincidences are one example:
As a child in school, French poet Emile Deschamps shared a table with 
a Monsieur de Fortgibu. The man offered Emile his first taste of a novel 
dessert, plum pudding, which M. Fortgibu had acquired a taste for in England.
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10 years later Deschamps passed a restaurant and saw a plum pudding being 
prepared inside. He entered and asked for a slice, but the pudding was being 
saved for someone -who turned out to be M. de Fortgibu, Many years later, at 
a dinner party where plum pudding was being served, Deschamps, about to 
have this dessert for the 3rd time, told his amusing story. And lo and behold, 
Fortgibu arrived at the door! He too had been invited to dinner, to another 
apartment in the same building, and had lost his way.
(Wallace & Wallechinsky, 1994:455)
Bizarre or 'unexplainable* happenings also challenge our natural frameworks: 
A dried fish found inside a tree when the trunk was split open, for instance; or a man 
who lost his eyesight and hearing after a severe head injury -then  recovered it after 
being struck by lightning (ibid.: 448).
Again, the unique experience of observing one’s own mental frame-struggle 
subjectively differentiates this kind of amusement from the essentially identical 
funniness of others' irrational beliefs (i.e., in the supernatural, in a flat earth, etc.). 
Amusement is possible here when the erroneous interpretation has not been 
committed to strongly, as in the case of these astounding phenomena which cause no 
more than a momentary lapse of reason (See Chapter Six, 2). Embarrassment would 
be the result of discovering that such an erroneous framework had been held strongly 
and publicly, as in the case of a believer in a psychic healer or mind-reader who is 
subsequently revealed as a hoax.
'Magic tricks' may produce agent-caused discredit of self-claims to proper 
natural frame application (Type IV). These illusions are designed to deceive an 
audience -b y  such techniques as sleight-of-hand, mechanical devices, and 
misdirection of attention— into apparently witnessing events which defy the known 
natural laws: an assistant is sawn in half, rabbits appear out of empty hats, a wand is 
transmuted into a bunch of flowers. One of the emotional reactions experienced 
during such performances, triggered by awareness of the mind's acceptance of (or 
strong mental tendency to embrace) the impossible, is amusement at the self43. 
Interestingly, humour is very often integrated into magic acts. 41
41 Magic tricks are not commonly discussed by humour researchers. Morreall (1982: 243) is one 
exception.
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2.3.4. Social Frame Mismanagement: Intentional and Unintentional Jokes, Puns, 
Absurdity, Irony, and ‘Twist' Endings.
The funniness of verbal humour and the analysis of joke structure have been 
the focus of a large proportion of humour research, and have provided the starting 
point for the most popular theories in the field. I will treat such phenomena as elicitory 
of discredits of the se ifs  universal mental claim to proper (normally social) frame 
management, either accidental (Type ID, ‘unintentional’ jokes) or agent-caused (Type 
IV, ‘intentional’ jokes created or told by comedians, etc.). In other words, it is not a 
joke itself which is funny, but rather what a joke does to its listener when it ‘works’ 
and he ‘gets* the joke.
As discussed in Chapter Two, many writers have characterized the source o f 
amusement, or of some cases of amusement, as the mental juxtaposition or ‘clash’ o f 
two incompatible frames of thought (schemas, scripts, universes, worlds, planes, 
systems...), or in some cases the mental ‘resolution* of the incongruity. Though 
preceded by a long history, Arthur Koestler’s eloquent exposition of this argument in 
The Act o f Creation has been largely responsible for its current popularity:
It is the sudden clash between these two mutually exclusive codes of rules —or 
associative contexts— that produces the comic effect. It compels the listener to 
perceive the situation in two self-consistent but incompatible frames o f 
reference at the same time; his mind has to operate simultaneously on two 
different wavelengths. While this unusual condition lasts, the event is not only, 
as is normally the case, associated with a single frame of reference, but 
‘bisociated* with two. The term bisociation was coined by the present writer to 
make a distinction between the routines of disciplined thinking within a single 
universe of discourse -o n  a single plane as it were— and the creative types of 
mental activity that always operate on more than one plane. In humor, both the 
creation of a subtle joke, and the re-creative act of perceiving the joke involve 
the delightful mental jolt of a sudden leap from one plane or associative
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context to another.
(1964:5-6)
An unintentional joke which can be used to illustrate this process is the following real 
answer from a child's exam: "Philatelists were a race of people who lived in Biblical 
times" (Windsor, 1979: 13). The reader of this phrase receives inputs belonging to 
separate spheres of thought: stamp collecting on the one hand, biblical history on the 
other. There are some valid connections which could be made between these two 
frames, such as runs of postage stamps picturing nativity scenes during Christmas 
time. The proposed link between these frames, however, is obviously unacceptable. 
Stamps and mail systems are relatively recent cultural developments, and in any case 
stamp collectors are not a ‘race’ of people related by blood but a hobby group related 
by common interest. The similarity between the word “philatelist” and “philistine,” 
however, provides a link between the two frames, and facilitates the ‘clash’ of frames 
in the mind. If this connection is made, amusement may result.
Koestler’s explanation, however, overlooks or mischaracterizes a vital part of 
the joke-processing experience, which has been identified by numerous other authors. 
What happens in the mind of the amused individual can be described as a ‘clash* or a 
‘bisociation’, but also as a ‘union’ or an ‘integration/ For at least a split second, the 
individual joins or makes an effort to join the two inconsistent frames, which only 
subsequently does he experience as inconsistent, as a jarring, clashing, incongruent 
pair. In other words, the joke ‘fools’ the listener or reader into making a logical error, 
like a visual illusion ‘fools' the observer into making a perceptual error, or a 
rollercoaster ‘fools’ a rider into making an emotional error. According to this version 
of incongruity theory, the mind is actually deceived into accepting the two 
incompatible frames as compatible, the incongruous elements as congruous, the 
absurd or impossible as reasonable. It is the perception of this error by the self, this 
momentary lapse of reason, which leads to amusement
Let us return to the child’s exam answer and its unintentional joke. For the 
reader of this sentence, stamp collecting and the ancient Middle East are suddenly 
thrown into the same mental image by the purely visual and aural resemblance of the 
words Philistine' and Philatelist* Following the workings of the automatic and 
unconscious language-processing faculties of the brain, a blatantly mistaken
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proposition for a moment seems to 'make sense': stamp collectors play a part in the 
stories of the Old Testament. When the mind catches itself for having accepted such 
an absurdity, however, amusement immediately results at the inappropriate mixture o f 
social frameworks. Another example from Windsor (p. 16) is a real warning sign 
which read: "Beware! To touch these wires is instant death. Anyone found doing so 
will be prosecuted." Touching a high-voltage live wire might be both deadly and 
prosecutable, but this does not mean that the dead transgressor can be prosecuted. It is 
the momentary acceptance of this latter illogical supposition by the reader which 
causes him to find amusement at his own mental failure. Again, a certain trickery is 
involved, exploiting in this case the standard format o f 'Beware' signs used 
(“Beware !”/Waming message against doing X/Punishment threat against doing X). A 
final example is the following newspaper headline: HERSHEY BARS PROTEST 
(Lederer, 1989). This headline leads the reader to imagine a group of ‘Hershey Bars* 
(chocolate bars produced by an American sweets company) carrying out a political 
demonstration, an absurd notion. The idea, in fact, is extended and reinforced by a 
pictorial representation included in Lederer*s book (See Figure 4). In this case, it is 
the ambiguity of the phrase (chocolate bars cany out a demonstration /  a sweets 
company prohibits a demonstration) which provokes the error. The acceptable second 
meaning facilitates assent with the unacceptable former interpretation, which due to 
typical language-processing preferences is that intuitively favoured by most readers. 
There exists a whole genre of humour based on collecting these unintentional double­
meanings, as exemplified by such books as Anguished English (Lederer, 1989) or 
Barbara Windsor's Book o f Boobs (Windsor, 1979).
Though commonly subjected to an incongruity-resolution type of analysis in 
humour research, jokes such as these have not been related to amusement stimuli less 
amenable to incongruity ideas. I would argue, however, that such a relationship exists, 
as perception of such jokes -which provoke social frame mismanagements of the self- 
- can be linked to the frame mismanagements of others (see 2.3), and subsequently to 
other kinds of self-claim discredits. A person who could actually believe that stamp 
collectors were an ancient Middle Eastern people, that chocolate bars can cany out a 
political demonstration, that the dead can be prosecuted in a criminal court, would be 
discredited as a rational or sane individual, and could well draw the derision o f others. 
Such extremes of unorthodox belief are certainly not unknown in human society,
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among children and the mentally unhealthy» or in remote societies» rural areas» and 
pseudoscientific» religious, and supernatural cults and groups within our own. Spotting 
them in oneself, if only fleetingly, is enough to spark off an episode of amusement at 
the fool inside.
Canned jokes, puns, wit, plays-on-words, and other forms of intentional joking 
can be analysed in an identical manner, only the cause of discredit (agent rather than 
accident) varying. A joke creator or exhibitor can be considered an agent of his 
audience's discredit, who uses various tricks, lies, and ambiguities to deceive their 
interpretative mechanisms. A successful joker shows each audience member that a 
part of himself lacks the universally expected self-claim of appropriate frame 
management, while allowing him enough distance from this part to achieve 
amusement (See Chapter Six, 2). Unintentional jokes, such as the philatelist/philistine 
conjunction, can be considered to result in accidentally caused discredits of the seifs 
mental claims (Type IE). Intentional jokes -which may of course be based on 
unintentional ones- lead to agent-caused discredit (Type IV).
This version of incongruity theory is hardly new. Aristotle and John Locke are 
only two of the major thinkers who stressed or implied the deceptive element of jokes, 
and the subsequent fooling of the listener
Most smart sayings are derived from metaphor, and also from misleading the 
hearer beforehand.... The same effect is produced by jokes that turn on a 
change of letter; for they are deceptive.... For instance, when Theodoras said to 
Nicon, the player on the cithara, “you are troubled” (eparta)44; for while 
pretending to say “something troubles you,” he deceives us; for he means 
something else.
(Aristotle, Rhetoric, HLxi. 6-7)
For wit lying most in the assemblage of ideas, and putting these together with 
quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, 
thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy; 
judgement, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in separating them 
carefully, one from another, ideas wherein can be found the least difference,
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thereby to avoid being misled by similitude, and by affinity to take one thing 
for another.
(Locke, 1690: n.xi)
It is noteworthy that in all such cases the joke must contain some thing that can 
deceive us for a moment. That is why, when the illusion vanishes, 
[transformed] into nothing, the mind looks at the illusion once more in order to 
give it another try, and so by a rapid succession of tension and relaxation the 
mind is bounced back and forth and made to sway
(Kant, 1790:1,334)
Aristotle and Kant’s explicit references to deception and interpretative error are clear 
enough. Locke similarly suggests that wit causes the listener to be “misled by 
similitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another,” in other words, to make an 
intellectual mistake. More recent analyses have also framed the workings of joke 
material in this way. According to Marvin Minsky for instance, jokes lead to “logical 
mistakes,” “absurd reasoning,” “stupid thoughts,” “intellectual failures” for which, in 
his opinion, amusement and subsequent laughter act as “censors” (1985: 274-81).
No less interesting is the testimony of experienced joke writers and tellers. 
Stand-up comedians and other performers who employ humour are often well aware 
of the deceptive skills essential to their work, not to mention the role of the audience 
as a ‘mark*:
I call a joke a curve. See, a curve is a ball that starts out to the plate, and then it 
bends to fool the batter. That’s exactly what you do with a comedy line and the 
audience. You throw what seems to be a perfectly straight line and then curve 
it.
(Abe Burrows, in Wilde, 1976:95)
Before you can expect to draw the audience in, you must believe tour own joke 
-you  will sound much more convincing if you do. You want them to believe 4
Chapter Bve: A Tvpoloav of Funnv Events________________ Section 2.3 (TypfiS III qnd 1Y))
44 A phrase which sounds like “you are no better than a  Thracian slave girl” (p. 410, footnote).
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that your story actually happened to you. Share something truly personal with 
the audience and they’ll accept you more easily. Then you can pull the rug out 
from under them —and they’ll love it.
(Iapoce, 1988:23)
This interpretation is also consistent with evidence regarding the variation in 
amusement which results from different levels of ‘comprehension difficulty* of jokes 
(see Wyer and Collins, 1992: 673-676). It is well known from personal experience 
that these types of humour can be too ‘stupid* or conversely ‘too obscure’ to be funny 
-ideally, they are ‘clever.* Several studies have documented this fact empirically, 
showing that subjects tend to rate jokes lower if they require either too much or too 
little ‘cognitive processing.* According to the proposed interpretation of jokes as 
deceptive, these ‘comprehension difficulty* effects can be explained differently. In 
order for a joke to be found funny, it must be (1) elaborate enough for the victim to 
accept its premises and be deceived by the joke; (2) not so elaborate that the absurdity 
to be accepted is either not arrived at or not immediately evident to the victim.
The variety of genres and styles of intentional jokes (Type IV) is truly 
immense. An intentional joke can be defined as a verbal, pictorial, or other symbolic 
production by an agent which may cause an audience member to momentarily 
mismanage his social frameworks. A brief example and discussion will be provided 
for a number of common types: riddles, one-linen, puns, irony, absurd humour, 
jesting, and twist endings.
• Riddles: "What's orange and sounds like a parrot? A 031x0 1 ."
A listener of the above riddle knows that a 'trick' ending will follow the initial 
question. Nevertheless, to properly enjoy the joke he must enter into the spirit of the 
game and try to imagine a reasonable answer: "Sounds like a parrot? Orange? Some 
kind of strange tropical bird or animal? Someone repetitive —but orange?...". He thus 
creates an expectation, an empty conceptual space for a 'something* which will fit both 
requirements.
The answer, 'carrot' indeed fits both requirements, but on a different reading of 
'sounds like.' Once the new interpretation is understood, the solution provided is 
immediately accepted: 'a carrot' is indeed orange and 'sounds like’ [is phonetically
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similar to] 'a parrot'. This slots 'a carrot' into the conceptual space opened up earlier —a 
space for 'something' which can make sounds similar to those of a certain species of 
bird. The perceiver, in this way, accepts the notion that a root vegetable may squawk 
and imitate sounds.
This mix-up of frames, however, is almost instantly recognized as being 
incorrect, indeed ludicrous -n o t merely because its absurdity is evident, but more 
importantly due to the perceiver's antecedent knowledge that the riddle would end 
with a 'joke.' In situations of announced humour, the audience collaborates with the 
performer first by allowing itself to be fooled and abused in various ways, and second 
by seeking and reflecting upon the resulting discredits.
•  One-liners: "Seriously though, there are some great advantages in being sixty-five. 
One is that you are no longer bothered by insurance agents" (Bob Hope, quoted in 
Humes, 1975)
Here the perceiver is fooled into temporarily accepting the outrageous notion 
that the nearing of death, an almost unmentionable disadvantage of old-age, is actually 
a benefit. Amusement (plus, perhaps, a twinge of fear) follows from awareness of the 
mistake. Introductory words such as ‘really folks,* ‘seriously,* ‘no, but actually* and 
the like are standard devices of such performances, serving to refresh the comedian*s 
image as sincere before each joke in order to deceive the audience once and again.
• Puns: "Eating bear meat is a grisly experience" (Crosbie, 1982)
Puns represent the minimal version of this genre. Here the joke hinges on the 
identical pronunciation of the words 'grisly* (frightful) and 'grizzly' (a kind of North 
American bear). In this case, once the secondary meaning of this phonetic string is 
detected, the mind of the perceiver is deceived into accepting the truth of the initial 
statement ("Eating bear meat is a frightful experience"), on false grounds —i.e., the 
fact that a 'grizzly experience* has something to do with bears. The automatic, 
unreflective nature of the human language-processing faculties can be easily exploited 
in such ways.
•  Irony: “Well, that was entertaining!** (On exiting from a grim, tedious, and
incomprehensible 3-hour film projection)
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Ironic statements are propositions which are implicitly marked or intended as 
evidently false, improper, or in any case not to be understood as the real thoughts of 
the speaker. After watching what is known to have been a tedious film for all, a 
statement such as “that was entertaining” cannot be accepted as given. Furthermore, 
ironic words often refer to propositions which for some reason may have been 
expected in context (Mizzau, 1984). For example, a common view of motion pictures 
is that they are meant to entertain audiences, making “that was entertaining” an 
immediately recognizable reference to this expectation. Irony may be funny because 
participants o f conversation, expecting co-participants to follow the rules of bona-fide 
communication, tend to accept that others, will mean what they say, and may even 
accept as reasonable certain typical or expected phrases even when obviously 
inappropriate. In fact, irony is usually delivered in a mock honest tone or even with a 
‘straight’ rendering o f honest delivery, in order to better fool the listener and even the 
speaker himself. A pair of film-goers may develop an extended ironic conversation on 
how ‘clever’ the film was, what bits were ‘particularly interesting,’ how much they 
appreciated the ‘subtle humorous undertones,’ and so on, following the well-known 
pattern and jargon of a favourable critical review. Amusement will depend on 
continuing serious delivery of such lines (which fool the minds of the two ironists into 
believing their own silliness), while this may become more and more difficult as 
amusement grows within.
•  'Absurd' comedy: The classic BBC television programme Monty Python's Flying 
Circus featured such bizarre conjunctions as a cycling race in which cyclists were 
modem art painters (Picasso, Ernst...) painting on large canvasses as they raced 
around English roads. The otherwise realistic simulation of the 'live' TV coverage of a 
sports event was able to deceive the minds of viewers into accepting the absurdity. •
•  Jesting: The conversational practice of Tddding,' 'fooling,' 'joking,' or 'jesting' is an 
attempt to deceive the listener into believing an unreasonable proposition, which lasts 
only for the duration of the phrase or for a few conversational turns. These are 
common in conversations among friends, where absurdities are often bandied around 
and built upon for mere entertainment, as in this excerpt relating to a witnessed insect:
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Ned:
Frank:
Ned:
Frank:
Ned:
Frank:
Ned:
Brandon:
Ned:
Frank:
Ned:
Frank:
Brandon:
Frank:
Ned:
Frank:
Ned:
Frank:
I keep hearing people call them things like hornets.
Let me tell you. That dude was big enough to take off with a 
payload of about twenty tons.
Well what do you call it?
I didn’t know what to call i t  
I had never seen [an insect] that big. Ever.
[He he.]
The only thing I could think to [call it-]
[He he] he he
Call it, “get thee hence”. Hehheh.
Call it sir.
Heh heh heh heh hehhehheh.
Let me tell you what I call it. “My God look at that big bug.” 
It had a fuselage that big. {holds up fingers)
Ehhehheh ha ha ha.
Yeah. Brandon, I’m not exaggerating, am I?
Oh no. No. Easy.
It had a fuselage like that.
Eh huh huh huh.
And a wingspan like that. Oh man.
Never seen [one like that]
[So we’re talking] primordial here.
It was just slightly smaller than a hummingbird.
(Norrick, 1994:17-18)
It may be noted in this exchange that the two witnesses of the event, Frank and 
Brandon, tell their story in mock seriousness, while it is only their audience, Ned, who 
laughs out loud. The play earnestness of the storytellers, stressed by exclamations such 
as “oh man” and “I tell you” and by the appeal for and achievement of confirmation by 
each other (“I’m not exaggerating, am I?” “Oh no. No. Easy.”), is enough to allow for 
a listening friend who normally trusts the speakers to accept, if only partially or 
momentarily, the truth of what is spoken. This acceptance, however, contrasts with the 
simultaneous knowledge or belief that estimates of insect size and situational danger 
are being grossly exaggerated, and that the attitude (i.e., of Shakespearean defiance — 
’’Call it ‘get thee hence*”-  or of humble submission “Call it ‘sir’”) offered as 
appropriate, is in fact grossly misplaced.
W ind ups' (or ,put-onsr) as discussed for Type E, are more extended versions 
of these foolings, in which the victim is actually led to accept blatant falsehoods for a
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more extended period of time. They often result in the amusement of the victim when 
he discovers the falsity of the frame he has accepted as real. Smith has conducted a 
study of the wind-ups carried out over the telephone by Steve Penk, the DJ of a local 
radio station (in cahoots with the friends of the victim). The following excerpt is from 
the transcript of such a conversation, in which Penk has made Joanne Crawley believe 
he is a travel agent demanding the return of a ninety-four-pound compensation she and 
her friends had obtained after a booking error. The exchange takes place at the end of 
the wind-up, when Penk reveals his true identity and blows open the deception.
SP: Anyway they've written to me and this isn’t really ((pause)) Ian Cooper
from the travel shop, this is Steve 
/Penk from key one-oh-three.
JC: /Oohhhahahahahahahahaha you're joking, you are joking...
(in Smith, 1996:281)
• Twist* endings: Short (and sometimes longer) stories may contain ironic ’twist' or 
'trick* endings. The initial framings lead the reader to misinterpret events in a certain 
way, despite building evidence for the correct interpretation revealed in the final 
moments. The motion picture Angelheart (Parker, 1987) is an example: Harry Angel 
is a detective hired by Louis Cypher to find the once-famous singer Johnnie Favourite. 
It turns out, however, that Harry Angel is Johnny favourite (who suffers from 
amnesia), and that Louis Cypher is Lucifer, who at last has found the man who once 
sold his soul to him for musical fame. The film is riddled with clues that point to these 
facts —dreams, a recurring musical tune, Angel's emotional involvement, his phobia of 
chickens, his recurrent habit of looking into mirrors with a puzzled expression, the 
discovery that Angel and Favourite share a  birthday, the words and demeanour of 
Louis Cypher (not to mention his give-away name). These hints, however, are usually 
only identified as such once the ending is revealed and the story is re-inteipreted by 
the viewer, (personal observation)
• Play: Make-believe and play, even when involving incongruous or impossible 
events, can be taken very seriously by children or by adults engaged in their fantasy 
worlds. However, when the player’s focus o f attention turns to the impossibility of
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events itself, the previous acceptance of the absurd becomes funny. McGhee (1979: 
63), in a discussion of humour in play, uses as an example the incredible feats 
performed by a toy car in the play world of a small child:
Such fantasy play would remain humorless play as long as the child*s attention 
was directed toward what he could do with the car in his make-believe world. 
The play would not trigger humor until attention was shifted towards the fac t 
that the child is imagining the car to do something that he knows is nonsense, 
absurd, or impossible.
All of these stimuli of amusement —intentional and unintentional jokes, puns, 
one-liners, riddles, twists, play— as well as other related varieties, fool the mind and 
thereby provoke self-amusement. When they work, they cause the mind which 
interprets them to make a frame management error, discrediting the owner of this 
mind regarding his universal mental self-claims. Normally, these varieties of joke are 
evident enough to allow the person to immediately distance his ‘real’ self from the 
part of himself that is momentarily fooled. Thus, embarrassment is not often 
applicable (See Chapter Six, 2). Ironic statements, however, may sometimes be 
misinterpreted as honest proposals, and even agreed with in ways which might 
discredit mental self-claims more seriously. Victims of wind-ups and put-ons may also 
feel embarrassment if they committed strongly to an implausible fabricated scenario. 
Even being spied or ‘caught* treating the absurd as serious during make-believe play 
can be found embarrassing by a child. These phenomena are not essentially different 
from events which result in the more evident self-claim discredits of Types I and Ü.
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3. Funny Events Within Transformed Realities {Types V-VIII)
Funny EventsUntransformed Reality Transformed RealityOt 1er Perceiver ot 1er PerceiverAccident Agent Accident Agent Accident Agent Accident Agent1 R U 1 R U 1 R U 1 R U 1 R u 1 R U 1 R u 1 R ute' iiâ. ík •VJ- :1fr' r/i
tB. •T*» iüry - ' ' u* u , *m 3£ ié vV '&■ ’C*.- - m*'- ^*3?.SB* £-7 ** & m M  ** j» Vu m 5* «*5a t J .W .fBöSr ‘/■ if% tC-' T- *I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Table 3. Types V-VIII Funny Events. See Table 1 (p. 200) for full chart.
I will refrain from attempting to present anything like a detailed classification 
o f funny stimuli in transformed reality. In Chapter Four, three basic types of 
transformation were presented —retelling, play-acting, and imagined sequence— as 
well as numerous complicating variables relating to these exhibitions: medium, 
purpose, complexity, intentionally, and grounding in reality. These variables, in 
combination, and added to the previously illustrated ones applying to types of self­
claim  and discredit, would produce a staggering array of diverse categories which 
indeed conforms to our experience of transformed funny stimuli as hugely varied.
Any instance of amusement by the reader of this chapter which was provoked 
by one of the anecdotes cited in Section 2, reacted to an event embedded in a 
transformation. These stories can be considered retellings of actual discredits, in many 
cases retellings of retellings. Moreover, it would be a simple task to retransform them 
into comic strips, verbal stories, or filmed scenes. Thus, in a sense, the illustrations 
already provided for Types I-IV can be re-interpreted as illustrations of Types V-VIII.
I will, however, attempt to give some idea of the range of transformed funny 
stimuli, which of course go far beyond the rather unusual category of 'illustrations in 
an academic text.'
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3.1. Funny Events Within Retellings
Retellings are probably the most obvious place to look for transformed funny 
stimuli, as they are often physically available in the form of texts or recordings.
It is worth making a couple of general points about retold elicitors of 
amusement. Firstly, it has been suggested that the purposes behind the production and 
exhibition of retellings may vary. Among these may be that of making the audience 
laugh and/or experience amusement, or of discrediting or mocking a particular 
character within the retelling. In some retellings (i.e., ‘humour*), these may feature 
among the principal purposes. In others, they might be secondary side-effects. In 
some, however, they may not be expected at all, or even desired.
Secondly, it should be noted that different media of retellings lend themselves 
to representing different categories of error. Print lends itself more easily to language 
and framing errors, but not so easily to problems of physical appearance, emotional or 
bodily control, or motor skill failures. Silent film, on the other hand, handles the latter 
topics best, and the former worst43.
True or allegedly true stories of discreditings that occur in everyday life are 
commonly sold commercially as ’humour.' In fact, many of the examples cited in 
Section 2 were taken from written collections of this type. Some offer examples of 
mainly universal discreditings of well-known or anonymous individuals: "the most 
embarrassing moments of the famous...an hysterical collection of goofs and gaffs!" 
(Complete, 1989: back cover), “famous faux pas: embarrassing moments, gaffes, and 
clangers” (Snelson, 1990: title), "amazing blunders and bungles...the most hilarious 
mistakes and miscalculations" (Elding, 1987: title; 1), "self-inflicted disasters, 
blunders, and super goofs...actions which rebounded mightily, savagely —but always 
amusingly— on their makers" (Jones, 1985: front cover, 11), "the greatest galaxy of 
mistakes, mishaps, and misfortunes ever assembled...simple, humorous cases of 
ordinary people whose errors of judgement would otherwise be forgotten," (Blundell, 
1980:7), "the world's greatest cranks and crackpots" (Nicholas, 1990: title). 45
45 Incidentally, the fact that humour research is published in print form may be partly responsible for a 
bias towards data that is more easily reproducible in this format, and theories which are based on such 
data.
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Others present instances of independent claims that have been discredited: the 
"world's worst predictions" (Nown, 1985: title), "[colossally mistaken] predictions, 
generalizations, and categorical statements which people...love to make about past, 
present and future" (Morgan and Langford, 1981: 9) or "staggering display[s] of 
egotism from some of the world's most shameless self-proclaimed geniuses" (Cole, 
1995: back cover).
Finally, we find books devoted to the discreditings of specific role holders: 
criminals, policemen, judges and lawyers in Criminal Blunders (Mason and Bums, 
1985); aeroplane pilots, passengers, and air stewards in A Wing and a Prayer (Nown. 
1989); film-makers in The Fifty Worst Movies of All Time (Drcyfuss, 1978); pop 
music artists and producers in Slipped Discs: The Worst Rock 'n Roll Records o f All 
Time; stage actors, directors, and other artists in No Turn Unstoned (Rigg, 1983); 
scientists in Science: Good, Bad, and Bogus (Gardner, 1983); inventors in Edwardian 
Inventions: An Extraordinary Extravaganza of Eccentric Ingenuity (Dale and Gray, 
1979); poets in The Stuffed Owl: An Anthology of Bad Verse (Wyndham Lewis and 
Lee, 1930).
In media other than the printed word we find similar humorous compilations 
of real events. Goffman illustrated his article "Radio Talk," which deals with the 
mistakes of radio announcers, with "eight of the LP records...produced by Kermit 
Schafer from his recording (Jubilee Records) of radio bloopers" (Goffman, 1981: 
197). On television and on videocassette, I am aware of productions at least in the 
USA, the UK, Spain, and Japan which have exhibited videorecorded home movies' 
sent to the program's producers by viewers. They feature mainly examples of 
"accidents, mishaps, and misfortunes" (FouVe Been Framed video, back cover) which 
occurred unintentionally during the videotaping of everyday scenes. There have also 
been dozens of programs and video collections centred around filmed or taped errors 
committed by screen actors/presenters during the preparation of a film, newscast, or 
other television or film production. Red Dwarf: The Smeg-Ups (BBC Enterprises, 
1994), for instance, contains the "fluffs, bloopers, hitches, and smeg-ups" from a 
popular British televised science fiction series: "the crew forget their lines and giggle 
uncontrollably, ...props fall apart and doors refuse to open, ...model space ships self- 
destruct when strings break and chamaleonic mutants can't get anything right" (back 
cover). Failures by sportsmen is another popular genre: Jimmy Tarbuck's Nightmare
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Holes o f Golf (Transworld, 1995) Motor Sport Mayhem, (Astrion, 1995) Super Duper 
Baseball Bloopers (Major League Baseball Properties, 1995), Sports Funnies 
(Wienerworld, 1993), Danny Baker's Own Goals and [Football] Gaffes (Vision 
Video 1992).
Many non-fiction books, articles, and documentaries which are not specifically 
intended as humour nevertheless include many amusing anecdotes of this type: 
biographies, ethnographic films, news reports. The book Blunders in International 
Business (Ricks, 1993), part of a series of texts on business management, uses a 
serious tone throughout, and emphasizes the "valuable lessons" that can be learned 
through its study (p. vii). However, the blunders recounted are indeed very funny 
("wonderful" and "entertaining" are the euphemistic terms employed on the *back 
cover’ description). Critical review of any nature —sporting, artistic, academic— will 
be found particularly promising as a hunting grounds for discredit accounts. A bad 
film can elicit amusement both in the cinema and in the homes of those who have not 
even seen it. The following concern Chef (Fleischer, 1969) with Omar Sharif in the 
role of the South American revolutionary, and are taken from a humorous compilation 
of true celluloid atrocities, The Fifty Worst Movies o f All Time:
"The consistency of strained spinach...actually seems to diminish the sum total 
of knowledge with which one enters the theater...a timeless, placeless 
jumble_” —Vincent Canby, New York Times
"BOMB: Lowest rating....one of the biggest film jokes of 1960's. However, 
you haven't lived until you see Palance play Fidel Castro." —Leonard Maltin, 
TV Movies
"Frequently becomes ludicrous...laughable. Retakes should have been done on 
numerous scenes in which the lighting by photographer Charles Wheeler 
seems more appropriate to a comedy than a political drama...." —Variety
(Medved and Dreyfuss, 1978:58)
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The present paper, of course, and humour research in general, also present potentially 
funny material for purposes other than entertainment, in this case academic ones.
Much of everyday talk consists of the recounting of stories about the speaker 
himself, about people in the speaker's circle of family, friends, and acquaintances, and 
about others the speaker knows of. Many of these stories will contain events that make 
one or more of its characters appear as discredited. This is not always the intention of 
the raconteur, but it often is, as sharing amusement through laughter with other 
participants is an enjoyable and bond-forming activity, whether the claimant 
discredited be one of the participants present or an outsider (See Chapter Eight, 4.2.2):
Vera: Were you talking about you having a girl friend when you were 
little and writing her this letter.
Jim: Yeah. Yeah.
Vera: Well tell me about it.
Teddy: Uhhhuh.
Jim: As I recall, she and I had matching Superman suits
[and we’d-]
Vera: [Ahhahahahaha]
Teddy: [Hhuh huh huh]
Pamela: [Heh heh heh heh heh heh heh]
Jim: and we’d lie on the back lawn
[and pretend to be flying and stuff.]
Vera: [The basis of true love. Yes.]
(Norrick, 1994:424)
In this example, the storyteller and his girlfriend’s wearing of ’‘matching Superman 
suits” is interpreted as a discrediting fact regarding their self-claims of appearance. All 
share amusement at one of the participants, or rather, at who he was many years 
before.
When, on the other hand, a story concerns the discredit of someone not 
present, but who is known to participants, we have the ingredients of what is 
commonly known as ’gossip.1 Jorg Bergman (1987) has argued that gossip is one of 
the most widespread of social phenomena, as common in remote Polynesian islands as 
in large industrial centres, and just as universally condemned. According to Bergman, 
"the gossip information must concern something that does not agree with the subject 
of gossip's self-presentation and whose 'public disclosure* for the subject of gossip
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would probably evoke a feeling of embarrassment or shame." Very often, interaction 
during which gossip is shared is punctuated with smiles, giggles, and loud laughter46:
[11] [High-Life: GR: 29]
[The transcript begins at the end of a gossiping session between Mrs. R. and  
Mrs. H. about Mrs. S.]
H: She's a little touched!
R: She's nuts
H: She's totally, completely crazy! <cvehemently>
G: <faint laughtei>
R: They imagine—
H: <grinning> Well...the dilemma was more or less (—) my fault. I brought it 
on, even though I didn't want to.
R: Yeah, yeah ()=
— H: yeah
G: =what then? What happened then?
R: the word got round, =got round—
H: I can’t possibly repeat what part 1 played.
G: <laughing faintly>
R: The rumor went around that she—
G: This is getting exciting^
G: =hehehe
R: That she's always got some guy in the sack.
? hah ahaha
(Bergman, 1987: 95-96)
It should be noted that 'telling a story' often involves more than mere speech. 
Many theatrical elements, including mime, imitation of tone, accent, and other speech 
particularities, and production of sound effects, may be employed:
We spend most of our time not giving information but giving shows.
(Goffman, 1974: 508)
46 Another variety of gossip concerns moral sins, which are reacted to with indignation, anger, 
disapproval, pity, and/or moral outrage. The distinction is between ‘substantive* and ‘ceremonial* 
norms (Goffman, 1967: 47-55) or between self-claims the emptiness of which may have serious (ie, 
harmful, threatening) implications independent of the possible resulting social judgements and 
sanctions, and those the emptiness of which are merely informative.
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A joke should be acted out. When telling a tale about something dreadful that 
happened to you or to a friend the impact is greatly heightened if the comic 
appears genuinely appalled or frightened or embarrassed as the case may be.
(Kilgarriff, 1975:2)
The sharing of travel diaries, photo albums, slide shows, and *home videos* with 
friends is another familiar everyday method of retelling past events.
Turning to fictional retellings, we find that many types of comedy consist of 
invented stories in which the characters’ self-claims are continuously discredited by 
themselves or others, or are exposed to be less than what they claim by the teller.
Some verbal jokes are simply "the bare gag lines lifted from a real humorous 
situation" (Humes, 1975:1), or at least of a potentially real one:
J
A man goes to the psychiatrist to ask for advice about his brother. 'He 
thinks he’s a chicken,' he explains. W ell, you'd better turn him in,' says the 
shrink. '1 can't,' says the man, '1 need the eggs.'
(Woody Allen, cited in Staveacre, 1987:125)
By going to the psychiatrist for advice about his brother, the man in the story claims 
his own sanity, which both the psychiatrist and the hearer of the tale accept. The 
punchline discredits his self-claim.
As we have seen, raconteurs may act out the parts of the characters in their 
stories. Comedians often interpret the roles of individuals who manage to lose their 
dignity at every step, yet continue to reclaim it after every fall: the drunk, the clown, 
the Harlequin, the Pantaloon, the bungling criminal. Physical 'slapstick' comedy 
literally revolves around the slips, falls, drops, crashes, and territorial invasions of the 
actors in the fictitious world created. Consider the following sequence from a Three 
Stooges' film as an illustration of the failure to protect bodily spaces:
Larry, Curly, Moe are trying to get through a door, simultaneously. Larry gets 
cross, Larry slaps Moe (SPLAT!)
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Curly: Here, don't do that! [Larry pokes Moe in the eye (BOING!). Larry turns 
to poke Curly, but Curly covers his eyes, so Larry slaps Curly's head (BAP!). 
Curly covers his head, uncovering his eyes, so Larry pokes Curly in the eye 
(BOING!). Curly covers his eyes, so Larry slaps Curly's head, again (BAP!)]
Moe: Here, don't do that! [Larry turns to poke Moe, but Moe covers his eyes, 
so Larry punches Moe in the belly (BOOF!) Moe clutches belly with both 
hands. Larry pokes Moe in the eye (BOING!). Moe covers belly with one hand, 
eyes with the other. Larry slaps Moe on the head (BAP!).]
(Staveacre, 1987:48)
Eccentric dress and appearance, extreme emotional expressions, unusual 
accents and speech faults, strange mannerisms and styles of walking, sexual innuendo, 
insults, illogical thought, awful singing voices, unintentional revelation of secrets, 
mistaken identities, misinterpretation of situations, and defeated pretensions generally 
have been the staple features of comedy since recorded times. In Aristophanes' 
Lysistrata (411 BC) the claims of power and control o f the warring Athenian men are 
defeated by their wives, who refuse to have sex with them. The sex-starved men spend 
a good part of the play in a state o f continuous erection (discrediting bodily control 
claims) which is furthermore available to all observers due to the swollen size of the 
members (an informational territory slip). They are reduced to begging and pleading 
with the women for pity, and eventually give in to their demands (discrediting their 
role self-claims as dominant Ancient Greek husbands). In a climactic scene, Cinesias 
is seduced by his wife Myrrhine, who falsely leads him to believe she will break the 
'strike' with him (showing him to be a gullible fool), and instead pours a cold jug of 
water over his genitals at the last moment (seriously violating his bodily territory).
The unsustainable pretensions of a  self-deluded character fuel the humour in 
many comedies. Cervantes' Don Quijote de La Mancha rides across the Spanish plains 
in a rusty suit of armour on a scrawny horse under the unshakeable delusion of being a 
paladin of legendary stature. The earthy common sense of his sidekick Sancho Panza 
and the disastrous consequences of his every action continually contradict his 
fantastical self-claims about himself and others, but the man adventures on unabated. 
In a  similar way, Peter Seller's cinematographic Inspector Clouseau,' an unbelievably 
clumsy, inept, and clueless sleuth, nevertheless "thinks of himself as one of the 
world's greatest detectives" (Sellers, cited in Staveacre, 1987: 49). A recurrent theme
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in British comedy is the snob who claims a higher social class than actually appertains 
to him: the sitcom characters Mildred o f George and Mildred (Thames, 1976) and 
Hyacinth Bucket (pronounced 'Bouquet,' as she insists) of Keeping up Appearances 
(BBC, 1990) are two examples (see Taylor 1994).
Misunderstandings (misapplications of the correct social frame) must also 
receive special treatment. In Shakespearean comedy, "spectacular misalignments to 
the world across the events of many scenes and several acts" take place (Goffman, 
1974: 444), and similar misalignments commonly take place in Hollywood comedies. 
The evidence for the false frame is invariably thin, and fooled characters seem ever on 
the verge of discovering the truth. They appear as fools for failing to properly interpret 
a situation which to the audience seems obvious. Furthermore, if the false frame is 
being consciously sustained by some of the characters (i.e., as a fabrication), the latter 
will be projecting easily discreditable selves, and will need all their efforts to maintain 
control of their informational territories. In the classic film Some Like it Hot (Wilder, 
1959), for instance, Tony Curtis and Jack Lemmon play two musicians who adopt 
disguises to join an all-female orchestra. The disguises are poor, and constantly falling 
apart, yet they somehow avoid discovery time after time. To complicate matters, Tony 
Curtis adopts a second false self, that of a millionaire on a holiday, to woo one of the 
female musicians. He must consequently carry out the well-known comedic 
shenanigans of changing from one disguise to the next, and appearing to be in two 
places at once, without his true identity being revealed.
Another common humorous technique is adopting the role of an incompetent 
producer of the type o f retelling itself, bringing into relief the rules of the genre in 
question. Such is the case of Rasputin Fish, the World's Worst Poet (Lea, 1989), a 
book throughout which the narrator, Rasputin Fish, claims to be "the world’s greatest 
poet” (p. 9) while offering ample proof of the contrary:
Things in London are just fíne,
Except when they’re just awful.
While looking for a pen today,
I found Td got a drawerful.
(Excerpt from 'Dear Dacha', p. 64)
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It Was a Dark and Stormy Night (Rice, 1986) is composed o f entries from the annual 
Bulwer-Lytton Contest, in which participants attempt to pen the "the opening sentence 
to the worst of all possible novels," (p. vii) with hilarious results:
The lovely woman-child Kaa was mercilessly chained to the cruel post of the 
warrior-chief Beast, with his barbarian tribe now stacking wood at her nubile 
feet, when the strong clear voice o f the poetic and heroic Handsomas roared, 
"Flick your Bic, crisp that chick, and you'll feel my steel through your last 
meal." ».
(Steve Carman, winner of the 1984 contest; p, xiii)
Numerous live comedy acts have been based on the premise that the performer is in 
fact incapable of providing a proper performance:
The printed program announces [George] Carl as a genius of comedy, and the 
ring master introduces him without comment but in a tone of voice which 
indicates star status. By contrast, his entrance is undistinguished and 
unassertive. He wears a drab, not too well-fitted tuxedo and a black, floppy 
hat. He looks uninterested and slightly worried; he pays little attention to the 
audience, walking toward the right, then the left, aiming at the exit, coming 
back toward the centre where the microphone stands; he whistles as when one 
walks leisurely or is somewhat embarrassed, in order just to do something or 
break the silence.
He does a few dance steps, nods at the audience informally, walks a bit, 
nods again twice, comes to the microphone, steps on the tangled wire, pulls the 
wire, gets his feet caught in a mess o f wires, says 'alio* in the microphone, as if 
he were testing the sound; he looks pleased, but glances toward the exit as if 
ready to leave the ring (...)
(Bouissac, 1990:417-418)
266
Chapter Five: A Typology o f Funnv Events Section 3 (Types V-Vlin
I have referred in this section mainly to Type V  funny events, transformed 
accidental discredits of an other, though some examples of agent-caused discredits 
(Type VI) have also been offered, such as the Three Stooges* slapstick battles or the 
sexual teasing and abusing of Athenian men by their wives in Lysistrata. Types V and 
VJ are, in fact, the most common types o f transformed funny events, as it is relatively 
rarer that a perceiver observes himself as the laughable character of a story told by 
others (Types VII and VIII), especially when considering such media as literature, film, 
and television.
A note might be added regarding Type V7, funny transformations involving an 
agent of an other’s discredit. The prankster is a common figure in comedy, as the 
agent of many intentionally-caused self-claim discredits. Anthropologists have 
identified the ‘trickster* in the oral literature of many simple societies, especially in 
North America and Africa (Apte, 1983: 192). Though they also often have their own 
self-claims discredited, tending to be ineffectual, boastful, and stupid, they are defined 
by their disposition to break taboos, violate and insult the persons and properties of 
others, and play cunning tricks, hoaxes, and pranks to achieve their goals (ibid.).
Tricksters can also be observed in our own culture. An example more familiar 
to Western readers might be the Marx Brothers, a “trinity to whom nothing is sacred” 
and in whose world “things and people exist solely in order to be subverted, 
overwhelmed, ridiculed” (Staveacre, 1987: 127). A collage of some classic scenes 
evokes a pattern which we recognize as widespread in our own experience of 
humorous retellings more generally:
The unwelcome interior decorators (Harpo and Chico), invading Groucho’s 
midnight tryst with man-trap, Esther Muir, and wallpapering everything in 
sight, including Miss Muir....A costume ball (‘the beer is warm, the women are 
cold, and I’m hot under the collar’), where somebody is inside a detachable 
bustle, clamping himself to the rear of any passing lady....The captain’s table, 
with three uninvited guests circling ravenously, filling their pockets with hors 
d’oeuvers....An operating theatre, where three mad surgeons, endlessly
handwashing, rush around not examining Mrs. Upjohn_A train, feeding on
itself as the trio demolish the carriages to fuel the boiler.... An opera sabotaged 
by piratical invaders from the flies.... A horse-race that must be stopped....
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3.2. Funny Events Within Play Acts
Funny events may occur within the unreal world created by the role-play of all 
participants in a situation. This is perhaps most common and most intentionally so in 
the case of 'games,' so I will use this case to illustrate.
The playing of games gives rise to many opportunities for amusement (O f 
course, it can also lead to anger, fear, dejection, joy, embarrassment, and other 
emotions). Players o f competitive games often make specific claims of superiority 
(T m  invincible! No one can defeat me now!") and predictions of future events 
("You're dead in three moves...") which may be negated by actual outcomes. By virtue 
of their role as game players, they also claim a knowledge of at least basic rules and 
some skill in playing. Finally, games provide players with opportunities to 
demonstrate sufficiency in universal skills and characteristics: logical thought 
(strategy), correct interpretations of events (guessing the strategies and conditions of 
opponents), emotional control (bluffing, keeping poise), territorial protection 
(defending squares, tokens, cities, properties, men or other game materials). Some 
games test specific universal self-claims: possession of basic social frames ('question' 
games such as Trivial Pursuit), language production {Scrabble), acting ability 
(Charades), production and interpretation of visual representations (Pictionary). Some 
seem even specifically designed to provoke discreditings: 'truth' games (protection of 
informational territories), Twister (protection of bodily territories; appearance [bodily 
posture]).
3.3. Funny Events Within Imagined Sequences
There is little need to elaborate on the possibility of memories, fantasies, and 
speculations being found funny by the perceiver. To the extent that he becomes 
engrossed in them, they have some sort of 'real' status to him, and can trigger off any 
number of emotional reactions, including amusement. Joy Fielding, in writing about 
an embarrassing anecdote, makes reference to this fact: “Over twenty years later, I 
can't think of that time without laughing” (in Kurc, 1990: 44). One point that will be
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further developed in Chapter Six (2) is that past embairassments may for the first time 
be experienced with amusement as memories.
A less obvious type of imagined sequence is the metaphorical or symbolic 
transformation of one strip of activity for another. A set of events normally 
interpretable only under a natural (i.e., deterministic) framework —a sunset, a pride of 
lions, a seismic movement in the earth's crust— might be interpreted metaphorically in 
terms of a social framework: respectively, the quiet death of an old man, a royal court, 
an untimely bowel movement. Funny events may thus be perceived where they would 
not normally be found, by merely accepting a set of transformational rules. Children 
have difficulties in distinguishing between rational and non rational creatures, or even 
conscious and unconscious objects; often, adults behave towards non-human things in 
similar ways: pets, cars that won't start, computers, and television sets. Though we 
may have no rational reason for expecting a duck to walk in the 'elegant' manner we 
expect of social human beings, its 'waddle' may be found funny because we are able to 
imagine it as a waddling human.
Comics such as Garfield, Calvin and Hobbes, or Peanuts, animated 'cartoon' 
shorts such as Bugs Bunny or Tom and Jerry, and most Disney animated features 
present non-human characters -animals, dolls, clocks, candlesticks— who within the 
frame of the exhibition behave in human-like ways, and are treated by the audience as 
social beings. Their discreditings (i.e., Jerry causes Tom to fall out of the window) 
inspire as much amusement as those of human characters in fictional accounts.
A social event may also be reinterpreted as another social event. An argument 
between two children might be re-imagined as a political debate in parliament, and the 
irrational stubbornness of the real children be transported to a forum where such 
absurd behaviour would be laughable. Similarities between the two situations can be 
focused on by the perceiver, and differences ignored, so that the politicians imagined 
appear discredited by the words and actions of these unintentional child 'mimics.' In 
the comic strip Calvin and Hobbes by Bill Watterson, such transpositions between the 
world of children and the adult one to which the reader belongs are often intended by 
the author, who comments on this aspect of his work in his Tenth Anniversary Book 
(1995): “Many of Calvin’s struggles are metaphors for my own. I suspect that most of 
us get old without growing up, and that inside every adult (sometimes not very far 
inside) is a bratty kid who wants everything his own way. I use Calvin as an outlet for
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my immaturity, as a way to keep myself curious about the natural world, as a way to  
ridicule my own obsessions, and as a way to comment on human nature.” In the strip 
pictured on page E rror! Bookmark not defined., figure 5, (ibid.: 103) many readers 
may recognize and find amusement in their own ridiculous self-claims to control over 
things and events. In the Tenth Anniversary Book, Watterson added to it the caption 
‘The illusion of control.”
Satirists and caricaturists, of course, specialize in making such comparisons. 
The Ulliput-Blefuscu war over "the Way of breaking Eggs" in Gulliver’s Travels 
(Swift, 1726) continues to provoke amusement in the modem reader as a symbol for 
the absurd wars and other conflicts that various social groups engage in. Political 
cartoonists (and comic 'imitators' of politicians) similarly distort and exaggerate the 
physical shortcomings, behavioural inconsistencies, and other embarrassments o f 
political figures and institutions to the delight of readers. Such jokes and their 
accompanying amusement and laughter are ambiguous, perhaps even deliberately so, 
as Mulkay (1988) has argued. They are directed in the first instance at a fictional 
character, as no one will seriously suggest that the presentation is objective and literal. 
However, the satirist claims a connection between the fictional version of the figure 
lampooned and the flesh-and-blood person. The strength of the connection may be 
weaker or stronger, and may be perceived as weaker or stronger by different parties. 
But to the extent that the connection is accepted, the self of the real person alluded to 
is damaged47.
A similar analysis can be applied to the 'parody' of film genres, writing styles, 
art or musical movements. These forms of humour present a certain work as a 
supposedly genuine example of a particular creative style, and will indeed resemble it 
in many ways. However, certain conventions of the style will be exaggerated to such 
an extreme, or made so obvious, that they will constitute failures by the fictitious 
'author' of the work to abide by the requirements of his role. Again the fiction will be 
close enough to real examples of the genre for some of the amusement to be directed 
at true representatives.
47To complicate matters further, the acceptance of the fictional character as the real target of satire will 
constitute a frame mismanagement by the perceiver, which could result in (simultaneous?) self­
amusement (Type IV). Such ‘complex' humour -integrating numerous potentially amusing stimuli- will 
be treated further in Chapter Six (5).
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Humorous fictional retellings generally often contain some references to 
people and institutions which may be recognizable to perceivers, though generally less 
explicit than in the cases of caricature, satire, and parody. Individual perceivers may 
also make idiosyncratic connections between a certain character in fiction (or non­
fiction) and one known in real life. Common examples of Types VII and V m  funny 
events (transformed claim-discredits of the self) are those where the audience member 
sees himself, or a part of himself, in the laughable character. In The Best Excuse..And 
How to Make /r, Donald Carroll provides a supposedly serious ‘how-to’ guide to 
excuse-making, an essentially amusing topic, as the activity involves the making of 
false (usually biographical) claims about the self..
THE FAMILIAL EXCUSE
The familial is really an umbrella category, a sort of holding company for other 
excuses, which can always be depended on to furnish you with a silent partner 
whenever one is needed to shore up another excuse. For example:
I  can *t understand why you haven *t received it. I  gave it to my son to post over 
a week ago.
Sounds like a super evening. You two always bring back such beautiful slides. 
Let me just check with John to see if  he has anything planned.
Vve been dying to hear all about your operation. Wait, hang on a second. 1 
think I  just heard a scream from the kids* room. Let me ring you back
(Carroll, 1983:4)
Here, the reader, as the student who must put the teachings of the book into practice, 
is placed in the position of imagining himself practicing such excuses, and may also 
be reminded of his own similar everyday falsehoods. Both of these imaginings contain 
an image of himself providing self-claims which are discredited from the start. In 
many cases, Carroll goes further and conjures up situations where bad excuses can 
lead to the reader’s public discrediting:
Beware of killing [family members] off at a pace that exceeds their actual 
mortality rate.... At some future date you could find yourself in the
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embanassing position of being challenged when you claim to have been in the
company of a beloved aunt whose funeral you attended several years and many 
excuses ago.
(ibid.: 5-6)
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4. Conclusions
I have attempted to illustrate the apparent differences and underlying similarity 
of funny stimuli, on the basis of the proposed claim-discredit account of amusement. 
The method has consisted in (1) tracing out the possible categories of perceived 
discrediting events according to types of self-claim and discredit situation; and (2) 
providing instances o f funny stimuli which exemplify the various categories. An 
extremely wide range of funny stimuli has been represented, from puns to banana-peel 
slips, from visual illusions to satire. All such stimuli can be described as perceived 
claim-discredits, whether accidental or agent-caused, affecting another person or the 
perceiver himself, seen in the ‘real here and now* or in some transformed reality, 
affecting universal, role, or independent self-claims of skill, mind, territory, 
appearance, or biography.
The links between various examples of funny stimuli can be traced along the 
various axes of the classification, so that extremes of diversity can be found to share a 
common base. For example, the experiences of perceiving an astounding coincidence 
and of being tickled by a group of friends seem far removed. It could be said in both 
cases, however, that the subject is amused upon noticing the discredit of his own self­
claim , moreover a claim he applies universally to all individuals. In the case of the 
coincidence, he fails to correctly interpret natural events, due to a fortuitous 
conduction of two percepts which his mind is deceived into linking. In the case of 
tickling, a group of others intentionally activate defensive bodily reflexes which he is 
helpless to stop, despite the inappropriateness of fearing such aggression from trusted 
friends. His self-claim to maintaining his own body under control is discredited, and 
while he laughs and writhes the discredit worsens, causing a growing spiral of amused 
laughter and control-loss.
Verbal jokes, like tickling, are the work of others who attempt to discredit the 
perceiver. In this case, however, the method consists of verbal ‘tricks' which, as with 
coincidences, deceive the listener into mismanaging his interpretative frameworks.
The watching o f a slapstick comedy film, again, seems distant from each of 
these three phenomena, and yet the genre is nothing more than the continuous fictional 
re-creation of clumsy movements, territorial invasions, illogical reasoning, and other 
actions which discredit the film characters’ self-claims to be as normal, rational, and
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competent individuals. Instead of being amused at his own failures, the perceiver 
reacts to those of others, in one 'gag' after another.
This classification allows for a unitary account of funny stimuli without 
sacrificing the empirical diversity of such phenomena. Unlike monolithic explanations 
such as ‘incongruity/ ‘superiority/ or ‘play/ the claim-discredit account can 
accommodate differences as reflecting the natural diversity of self-claims, claim- 
discredit situations, and their perception by an observer.
This chapter has illustrated the necessary condition for amusement: the 
perception of a self-claim’s discredit It has been assumed that the perceiver was 
amused by this perception, and illustrations have been chosen which fit well with this 
assumption. However, not all discredits are amusing. Serious territorial violations can 
be imagined: robbery, knife-attacks, rape. Actions which discredit the actor may often 
be tragic, or lead to tragedy: poor judicial decisions, incompetent driving, physical 
deformity, or substance abuse. Embarrassment is often the main emotional reaction 
associated with discredit, for example as felt by the audience, let alone the speaker, at 
a conference where the latter stumbles and stutters at the podium. Such non-funny 
discredits must be accounted for.
Also, the experiential quality of some types of humour may well seem 
incomparable with that of others. Black humour, sexual innuendo, clever wit, crushing 
witty retorts, tickling —the appreciation of each seems subjectively unique.
In Chapter Six, I will address each of these questions, which will round out the 
proposed causal theory of amusement by providing the necessary conditions for this 
emotional mechanism. I will also consider the possibility of complex funny stimuli, 
which integrate numerous comic elements within a single given strip of activity.
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1. Introduction
In Chapter Four, I presented the following alternative to the traditional causal 
theories of amusement:
Amusement is provoked only and always in a subject when he perceives that a 
self-claim put forward by a claimant has been discredited, provided that 1) the 
perceiver does not identify himself as the claimant at the moment of 
perception; 2) the perceiver is sufficiently involved in a definition o f events 
which places the discrediting in the foreground.
In Chapter Five, I attempted to demonstrate how a description of the comic as ‘self­
claim  discredits’ could account for the widest range of amusement stimuli, by 
ordering such phenomena according to a five-variable classification of claim-discredit 
situations. To avoid excessive complexity, however, the latter two amendments of the 
hypothesis were simply assumed to hold: the requirements that the perceiver: (1) not 
be identified with the claimant discredited; and (2) be fully engrossed in the 
discrediting events. In this chapter, I will complete the proposed causal model with 
these and other complicating issues.
The perceiver-claimant identity relationship will be presented as a fulcrum 
balancing the two ends o f an amusement/embarrassment scale. The proposed notion 
that self-claim discredits result in amusement jars with Erving Goffman's well-known 
and convincing depiction of interactional disasters, where the unpleasant emotion of 
embarrassment plays the dominant role (1967:97-112). The drunken misbehaviour of 
a  guest at a black tie party may lead to the chagrin of both himself and other guests. I 
w ill argue, however, that the question of whether amusement or embarrassment are 
experienced in such circumstances depends on the perceived relationship between the 
observer and the claimant whose self-claim is discredited. Specifically, an observer 
may find funny the discredit of a claimant as whom he does not feel identified: “I 
laugh at the source of your embarrassment/You laugh at the source o f mine.” 
Amusement at the ‘self,* as described in Chapter Five (Types HI, IV, VII, VH[), is 
possible when the observer regards the discredit of a part of himself not considered 
truly his own --for example, himself ten years before.
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Amusement, as any emotion, further depends on the involvement of the 
perceiver in the interpretation of events as a self-claim’s discredit. Numerous 
competing drains on attention may stifle amusement, including the simultaneous 
discredit of the perceiver, misfortune which has befallen the claimant, other cognitive 
or emotional implications of the discrediting fact, self-consciousness regarding the 
amusement process itself, intentional distractions, cognitive and emotional ‘carry­
overs 1 from preceding events, as well as others. Depending on whether one regards the 
sinking of the Titanic primarily as a tragic loss of human life or primarily as the 
deflation of its makers’ boasts of ‘unsinkability*, the event may elicit sadness or 
amusement.
A third complicating issue is closely related to the previous. The subjective 
quality of various particular instances of amusement intuitively seem to vary from 
joyful to malicious to any number o f different emotional and cognitive hues or 
shadings. This will be explained as reflecting the essential impurity of experienced 
affect, which is ever a swirling mix of impressions. The same competitors to attention 
which may stifle amusement may in weaker form simply produce reactions which 
coexist with this emotion, in greater or lesser intensity.
Finally, as an extension of this point, competing foci of attention may include 
additional sources of amusement, when several claim-discredits are perceived within a 
short space of time. In comedy, audiences are typically bombarded with funny stimuli, 
both in close succession and even simultaneously.
These amendments to the model as discussed so far will permit, in the 
conclusion, a complete statement of the hypothesis I am proposing. This will set the 
stage for the third and final part of the thesis, where this model of amusement will 
serve as the source from which an account of laughter and humour will be derived.
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2. The Requirement of Identity Distance
The identity relationship between the perceiver of a discredit and the 
discredited claimant is a crucial variable of humorous appreciation. If an individual 
perceives the discrediting of a self-claim fo r  which heisa  claimant, he experiences 
not amusement but rather the unpleasant emotion known as embarrassment, 
exteriorized by "blushing, fumbling, stuttering, an unusually low- or high-pitched 
voice, quavering speech or breaking of the voice, sweating, blanching, blinking, 
trem or of the hand, hesitating or vacillating movement, absentmindedness, and 
malapropisms" (Goffman, 1967:97). His self-presentation partially or wholly ruined, 
he finds himself disqualified from a scene of social interaction and, if currently 
present at such a scene, is unable to continue his performance normally. He may 
experience the disagreeable subjective aspect of this emotion as an intense desire to 
escape from the social situation. Lowering of eyes, turning away of head, covering of 
face with hands, or even a hurried exit may signal this forced withdrawal from 
interaction. As the outcome and tell-tale sign of discredit (or mere fear of discredit), 
embarrassment lies at the heart of Goffman’s influential ideas regarding impression 
management and the resulting ‘interaction order.* Moreover, this account of 
embarrassment has become the leading view in studies of the emotion48.
Over one thousand self-reported cases of embarrassment analysed and 
classified by Gross and Stone (1964) have confirmed Goffman's description of 
embarrassing situations (p. 15):
In this paper, we have inquired into the conditions necessary for role 
performance. Embarrassment has been employed as a sensitive indicator of 
those conditions, for that which embarrasses incapacitates role performance. 
Our data have led us to describe the conditions for role performance in terms 
of identity, poise, and sustained confidence in one another. When these 
become disturbed and discredited, role performance cannot continue.
48 In a recent book integrating up-to-date research findings and theoretical approaches, Rowland Miller 
identifies as the ‘real contenders' to an account of embarrassment “two explanations...that spring 
directly from Goffman's analysis of social life, with both assuming that embarrassment hinges on the 
presence of others, either as interactive partners or as evaluative critic$...the dramaturgic model and the 
social evaluation model." (1996:121-122). See also pp. 111-112 and Oatley and Jenkins, 1996:90.)
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Norbert Elias (1939), T.J. Scheff (1990; 94) and others have also attributed to this 
emotion a crucial role in the psychology o f social behaviour. Ekman and Friesen's 
cross-cultural studies suggest that embarrassment may be one o f the basic universal 
emotions (Ekman, 1980). Displays which resemble its expression have also been 
observed in other higher primates (Oatlev and Jenkins, 1996:90; Miller 1996:156).
Despite the value and success of Goffman’s account of embarrassment, I 
would argue that he exaggerated its reach throughout a social situation:
...while a gaffe or faux pas can mean that a single individual is at one and the 
same time the cause of an incident, the one who feels embarrassed by it, and 
the one for whom he feels embarrassment, this is not, perhaps, the typical case, 
for in these matters ego boundaries seem especially weak. When an individual 
finds himself in a situation which ought to make him blush, others present 
usually will blush with and for him, though he may not have sufficient sense of 
shame or appreciation of the circumstances to blush on his own account.
(1967:99-100)
Embarrassment is not always contagious in this way. Though Goffman does admit the 
existence of what he calls "gaffes" and "faux pas", in practice he ignores these and 
similar cases, giving no detailed examination of the circumstances under which 
embarrassment might or might not cross 'ego boundaries.'
It is possible for individuals to feel embarrassed fo r  another participant during 
interaction, but this may be said of any emotion. Empathy is the ability "of entering 
into another's personality and imaginatively experiencing his experiences" (Chambers, 
1990:464). This empathy or 'closeness1 is thus a temporary attempted or felt adoption 
o f another's perspective. Things are seen from the other's position and felt as the other 
would feel them; 'ego boundaries', to use Goffman's phrase, are crossed -o r  at least 
this is how the process is imagined. Not only embarrassment, but also disappointment, 
relief, joy, anger, fear and even pain may be experienced in this manner. (Consider, 
regarding this latter case, the winces of cinema audiences at certain fictional knife 
wounds or medical injections). Such vicarious experience is a transformation of'real' 
experience, and thus normally of a much lesser intensity.
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I would disagree with the assertion, however, that embarrassment is 
particularly prone to empathic appreciation49. In a study by Stonehouse and Miller (in 
Miller, 1996:46-70), reports of empathic appreciation of embarrassment by keepers of 
an ‘embarrassment diary* (3% of the total) suggest that only a certain breed of 
individual finds space in his emotional life for the social pain of others. The three 
examples given of such occasions all include reports of bystander laughter.
...I felt embarrassed and sony for him because everyone laughed at him!
...As I walked behind her I could hear people laughing and saying, ‘Someone 
please tell her!* I felt so badly for her...
...I just laughed so hard. I was embarrassed for him and knew how awkward he 
must have felt. Other people did not think it was embarrassing at all.
(p* 69)
Moreover, the very experiential quality and exterior signals of embarrassment seem to 
imply the existence of'others' who will not be embarrassed by the discrediting fact: 
the observers whom the flustered individual shies away from. In the imaginary horror- 
house of the embarrassed, the staring, pointing, and laughing crowd of fellow social 
actors looms large and menacing. In a recent study, the phrase "I felt that other people 
were laughing at me" was selected by 89% of respondents as a typical descriptor of 
embarrassment (Miller and Tangney, 1994). Many of the common signs of the 
emotion --lowering of the eyes, covering of the face with the hands, escaping or 
desiring to escape-- orient the discredited individual away from the observational 
range of these implied others.
Furthermore, embarrassing situations constitute the core of much everyday as 
well as commercial entertainment. In such stories and circumstances, non-empathic 
appreciation of events is easily achieved by audiences. The result is enjoyable
49 What sometimes may happen is that the action of one participant actually discredits several others, 
leading to generalized embarrassment, though perhaps for different reasons (See Section 3.2.1). This is 
not the same as merely appreciating another’s embarrassment due to imaginative perspective-taking.
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amusement at the expense of the spoilt self. In Chapter Five, I made reference to 
numerous anecdotes in this vein: a boastful card player’s failure to play well, an 
aeroplane pilot’s flight in the wrong direction, a vice-president’s displays of 
ignorance, etc. Another typical example has been provided by Canadian author D.M. 
Clark, who recently recounted his first attempt to buy a pack of condoms (in Kurc, 
1990). A close examination of this episode will help clarify the relationship between 
amusement and embarrassment
The stoiy takes place in a crowded pool-hall in the 1950’s, during Clark’s 
early teenage years. After much dithering, the teenage Clark approaches Ben, the 
manager of the establishment (pp. 22-23):
”Huh, Ben?" I said. It was now or never.
"Yeah?" he asked over his shoulder.
"Ben, I...uh...need somethin' here."
"Yeah?" He turned from the window and came over to the counter.
"What?" he said.
"I...uh...need some...” I waved my hand as though he could read that 
gesture as well as my mind.
He aped the gesture. "An' what the hell is that supposed to mean?"
"Uh, I need some.-.'safes.' 'Frenchies.' Sort of."
He got this look on his face that made me sorry I'd ever asked. I figured 
I'd rather be shot and pissed on than be where I was right then.
"Three for fifty cents," he said.
"Yeah, I know." Like I'd been doing this for years.
He bent over beneath the counter. Then a second later peered at me 
with his chin resting on the edge.
"What size?" he asked. "Men's or boys’?"
"Men's size," I said.
At that precise moment a God I  wasn’t sure I even believed in stilled 
the universe so that everyone in that pool hall would hear this exchange. The 
pop machine stopped gurgling, the ubiquitous radio conked out. Not a soul 
shooting pool in the back made a sound or a move. No balls clacked. The 
lights over the pool tables ceased humming. Out on the street no car honked a 
horn.
I sent up a silent prayer, promising to dedicate what was left of my life 
to God's Works, if He'd just get me through this.
But a second later the house came down. Ben whooped and hollered. 
Old guys who hadn't laughed at anything since their wives died gagged on 
their juices. Pool players doubled. Some slapped their thighs, others banged 
their cues on the floor. Some did both. Fat guys had strokes. Smokers coughed 
themselves to death. Grown men wept with laughter. In the very back by the 
exit doors, two guys I knew from high school yelled and called my name. I was 
now famous. I'd have to leave town, buy they'd never forget anyway.
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In this example, Ben provokes the discrediting of Clark's independent self­
claims to sexual experience and 'manhood.' The boy has entered a pool-hall (primarily 
an adult venue), has attempted to purchase something which only sexually active 
adults have use for, has assented “yeah, I know” to the price (“Like I ’d been doing this 
for years”), and finally, when challenged by an agent of his soon-to-arrive discredit, he 
not only displays an ignorance which discredits all of the preceding, but 
simultaneously makes a further empty self-claim of possessing adult-sized genitalia. 
Throughout the exchange, his embarrassment is obvious through his continuous 
stammering, hesitating (“Ben, I...uh...need somethin' here”, “Uh, I need some...'safes.' 
Trenchies.' Sort o f ’) and at one point his inability to say clearly what he wants. As 
narrator, the feeling is also spelled out for us: “I figured Td rather be shot and pissed 
on than be where I was right then.” The final discredit intensifies the feeling to 
complete mortification (“I’d have to leave town”), which justifies the inclusion of the 
story in a collection of ‘most embarrassing moments.*
Clark's intense embarrassment, however, does not spread to Ben, let alone 
others in the pool-hall. Rather, a general outburst of spontaneous laughter, recalled in 
vivid detail by the author,- follows the event. Moreover, the laughter does not stop at 
the scene of the crime. The reader who encounters this scene, at one remove from 
reality, may also share in the amusement, and it seems likely that the story will have 
been recounted before, not only by Clark but by many of the others present. Clark's 
discredit is funny to us because it is someone else's discredit —to him it is 
embarrassing because it is his discredit. Most people are likely to fulfill the criteria of 
identity distance from the discredited claimant, and thus will find the story amusing. It 
is the story of a teenager in 1950's Canada, and one who commits an outrageous bluff. 
Though empathy with the mocked boy is possible, it is unlikely to be veiy strong.
The very existence of a book, and indeed a whole genie (See Chapter Five, 
3.1), devoted to retellings of true-life 'embarrassing moments' is significant, especially 
when these sorts of books are catalogued as 'humour* in bookstores and libraries. In 
the above story, one participant blushed under the crushing laughter o f a whole crowd; 
in others embarrassment is shared by several or even all participants. In every case, 
however, at least the reader of the anecdotes is expected to find them "hilarious," as
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they are described on the back cover of Martha Kurc’s collection. One person's most 
embarrassing moment is always, at least potentially, another’s source of amusement.
I propose that a self-claim’s discredit will be funny to an observer who does 
not identify himself as the discredited claimant (and embarrassing to an observer who 
does). Identifying the self ‘as’ another person is to say ‘1 am, in some way, that 
person/ This usage is to be distinguished from the concept of identifying ‘with’ 
another person - a  question of empathic understanding which can lead to vicarious 
embarrassment, happiness, sadness, pain, or any other sensation or emotion. To 
identify as someone does not lead to vicarious emotion, but to ‘first-hand’ emotions.
The complementarity of amusement and embarrassment has been noted by 
various theorists and researchers, or else is evident in their work. The case of Erving 
Goffman's study of interactional failures has already been noted in Chapter Three, 4.
In Rowland Miller’s book on embarrassment (1996), references to laughter and 
humour are also frequent, though they are not given theoretical importance. The 
"catalogue of embarrassments” he develops, which closely resembles the typology of 
funny events I presented in Chapter Five, is full of amusing anecdotes of others* 
mistakes and public disclosures. In relation to a study discriminating between 
embarrassment and shame, he notes that,
Light hearted, funny predicaments were almost always embarrassing rather 
than shameful. People often found embarrassments to be “kind of humorous” 
and said they smiled and “felt like laughing” at themselves.... People often 
made jokes about embarrassing predicaments....Embarrassed people recalled 
that observers had been laughing at them.”
(pp. 23-24)
In further chapters, Miller also gives evidence for the importance of smiles, 
amusement, laughter, and humour as responses of both victim and audience of 
embarrassment (pp. 146-48,166,171-173,177-81,197). For Thomas Scheff (1985), 
who does not distinguish between embarrassment and ‘shame’, his preferred term, 
“the feeling of shame is a result of bodily preparation for laughter, but preparation that 
is not discharged by laughter” (p. 258). In Scheff s view, the release of ‘laughter’ (i.e., 
amusement) is also dependent on an identity relation between observer and the
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discredited claimant, though he proposes that ‘catharsis' takes place when one 
achieves a state of both observation and participation:
Comedy evokes shame and anger through graphic depiction of mistakes. Since 
the mistakes and scorn seem to belong to the characters and not to the 
members of the audience, they feel free to partly identify with the characters, 
allowing their own unresolved shame and anger to surface, and to laugh about
it.
(ibid.)
fc.t
Superiority theorists of amusement (See Chapter Two, 2.1.1) have also given weight 
to embarrassment, ‘shame,* and ‘humiliation* as the fate reserved for the defeated or 
inferior victim of amusement: “In the person ridiculed the concomitant feeling is one 
o f embarrassment, in its milder forms; and abject humiliation, in its stronger" (Rapp, 
1949: 85). Even Thomas Hobbes' own description of amusement as “sudden glory 
arising from some conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the 
infirmity of others, or with our own formerly" (1640: ix, 13) appears the perfect 
complement of his ‘shame,' which takes place when a person “discover[eth] in 
him self some defect or infirmity, the remembrance of which dejecteth him” (ibid: ix, 
3).
An important question has yet to be addressed. If the discredit of an individual 
causes his embarrassment, rather than his amusement, how can the self-amusement 
described in Chapter Five be accounted for (funny event types III and IV, VII and 
V m )?  The above analysis may seem inconsistent with the major variable regarding the 
‘claimant discredited* (See Chapter Four, 3.2.2), who will be either another person or 
else the perceiver himself. The incongruity is only apparent however, and due to the 
common (Western) conception of identity as an indivisible unit, rather than as the 
shifting, multipart entity which it actually is in everyday experience. D.M. Clark 
himself, for instance, probably finds the above story funny —its publication suggests 
that he is now able to see the ’lighter side' of that once-terrifying moment. This is 
possible because identity is not fixed, the configuration ’who am T evolving over time 
and from one situation to the next. Individuals do not identify themselves as every part 
o f who they can be or have been at different moments. The adult Clark, for example,
287
Chapter Six: Elaborations of the Model Section 2
is clearly not the teenage Clark, at least not in terms of personal characteristics. The 
effect of distance from the self on recalled embarrassments was noted by Thomas 
Hobbes: "Men laugh at the follies of themselves past" (1640: IX, 13). What is 
embarrassing today may be laughable tomorrow, next week, or in a few years — 
whenever it becomes possible to say that 'I was not then what I am now.'
To be more accurate, it is not time itself but merely the adoption of a distanced 
perspective which is necessary. Once a particular self or persona has been 'shed' by the 
actor, and he views it as such (i.e., as a character rather than his 'real self), any 
discredits may be recalled with amusement The ending o f a social situation during 
which embarrassment was experienced may allow actors to achieve the required 
distance:
Funny things are always happening in TV studios or out on location. Usually 
they don't seem so funny at the time, but we can get a laugh when the 
programme is over.
(Sally Magnusson, in Hornsby, 1989:72)
Some discredits of the self may allow an easy and almost immediate 
distancing, as when discredit is produced by evidently unfair means or when the 
discrediting fact is generally known not to affect the 'true* self of the individual. Such 
is the case of many verbal jokes, tongue-twisters, pranks, visual illusions, wind-ups, 
jesting, tickling, and similar pretend discredits. On the other hand, not always are 
actors able to shed their spoilt selves, even after much time has elapsed, as Martha 
Kurc implies in the introduction to her collection of embarrassing stories: “Naturally, 
when I sent out my call for authors' most embarrassing moments, I didn't expect 
anyone to respond with the really painful, never-to-be-discussed memory, the type that 
wakes you up at 5:00 am with an 'oh my god’ feeling, nor did they” (1990: xiii).
A common phenomenon is the experience of amusement and embarrassment, 
apparently simultaneously50. Here it appears that the actor views himself both from 
the perspective of disattached perceiver and from that of discredited subject: “Over
^It is unclear whether the two reactions truly occur simultaneously or perhaps altematingly, perhaps as 
a kind of'gestalt switch' experience.
288
Chapter Six: Elaborations o f the Model. Section 2
twenty years later, I can’t think of that time without laughing —and without turning a 
bright red” (Joy Fielding in Kurc, 1990:44).
The identity of a perceiver as a given self he has been (or might be) is partly 
self-imposed and partly imposed upon him by the observers present. An interesting 
socio-psychological phenomena to be considered in this respect is the well- 
documented ‘actor-observer divergence* (Jones and Nisbett, in Brown 1967), and its 
relationship to the work on first impressions and stereotypes. It appears that observers 
of an actor tend to treat specific actions as representative of his personal traits (i.e., his 
'real' self); an actor, on the other hand, tends to treat his actions as punctual responses 
to particular situations (i.e., not necessarily his 'real' or 'normal' self)- This divergence 
of views is widest when actors deal with complete strangers, and smallest when the 
interactants are close companions who know well the various facets o f the actor. Thus, 
we might say that a person finds it easiest to 'detach' himself from a particular action 
or verbal utterance, to 'cast off or 'shed' a self, when he finds himself on his own or 
among close friends than in a highly 'public' situation. Consequently, it is also easiest 
for him to find himself funny, and be less embarrassed, when he finds such a 
'detachable' self discredited. 'Role distance' (Goffman, 1961) is not only something 
actors display to each other, but also something they may or may not achieve by these 
displays.
In conclusion, in order for the perception of a self-claim’s discredit to elicit 
amusement the perceiver must not find  himself closely identified with the claimant. 
Identification can occur by considering oneself to actually be the claimant (or one of 
the claimants) —unless sufficient distance from this self is achieved— or by empathie 
appreciation with the claimant.
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3. The Requirement of Involvement
3.1. Definition
The detection of a self claim’s discredit, like any other perception, can have 
greater or lesser cognitive, emotional, and behavioural consequences on the observing 
individual. Partly, this will depend on the content of the perception itself —in this case, 
as discussed above, the type of self-claim, seriousness of the discrediting, identity of 
the claimant, etc.... However, there is also the issue of the individual's involvement or 
engrossment in the perception (See Goffman, 1961:37-74; 1974: 345-495). Though a 
framework appropriate to the detection of a  discrediting may be applied as it occurs, 
its application may be fleeting and/or superficial, so that the potential mental and 
bodily repercussions are not given full expression. Competing drains on attention may 
weaken the impact o f any specific perception.
Involvement has two dimensions: duration and intensity. On the one hand, an 
individual's perception of an event may have a greater or lesser extension in time, 
either allowing its various consequences to mature and develop fully or otherwise 
condemning them to be prematurely shunted. The joy obtained from noticing a friend's 
letter in the post box, for instance, may be suddenly cut short or severely 'dampened' 
by an unexpectedly ugly bill read closely afterwards.
On the other hand, an individual's involvement in a particular perception may 
be of greater or lesser intensity. In certain moments, particularly when the individual 
is in a state of mental and emotional calm, he may be able to focus a great part of his 
concentration on a single task, perceptual or otherwise. All elements in the 
environment considered irrelevant by the frame applied can be ignored completely. At 
other times, however, numerous distractions and competing frames may prevent full 
involvement in a particular task: preoccupations about an exam may mar the proper 
enjoyment of a meal, a toothache may min a chess-player's vital concentration, the 
spotting of an ex-lover in the crowd may cause a politician's rhetoric to falter. 
Returning to the previous example, if an ugly bill were read before noticing a dear 
friend's letter in the mail, the intensity of the latter perception, and thus the associated 
positive emotional experience, could well be reduced by the displeasing distraction 
(which could go even further and 'ruin' an entire morning or longer).
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Involvement is subject to at least some conscious control by the individual. 
Attention may be allotted in various ways according to priorities or desires. One may 
attempt to forget about an ugly bill, ’not look down’ to avoid vertigo while driving 
along the edge of a precipice, ignore someone's physical deformity in order to treat 
him 'normally,' concentrate fully on the exam question at hand, keep the doctor's 
warnings about unhealthy eating always 'in mind’ at the table, or 'maintain a distance* 
from a certain social situation to avoid overinvolvement. Such attempts are not always 
successful. In fact, techniques for mental self-control are available commercially to 
improve the relevant abilities, which vary from person to person.
It is worth noting that this feature of the amusement mechanism has been 
among the most widely discussed within the literature of humour theory. For 
adherents to the ‘play* school (See Chapter Two, 2.1.4), distance from unpleasant or 
serious events has been identified as the source of amusement itself. Almost all 
theorists, however, have made some mention of the fact that amusement requires a 
certain distance, emotional calmness, or detachment from events to be appreciated 
properly, or that these events be free from tragic elements. Aristotle specified that an 
amusing event was a mistake or deformity “not productive o f pain or harm to others” 
(On Poetics, V, I). Henri Bergson commented on the “insensibility” which normally 
accompanies amusement:
It seems that the comic cannot produce its shock wave unless it drop on the 
surface of a calm, well unified spirit. Indifference is its natural environment. 
Laughter has no greater enemy than emotion. I do not wish to say that we 
cannot laugh at a person for whom we feel pity, for example, or even affection: 
only then, for a few moments, he will make us forget this affection, make 
silent this pity.
(Bergson, 1900: 388; my translation)
Baillie (1921) argued that “detachment from a situation...is certainly necessary to free 
laughter.” Hazlitt (1818:411) was even more specific in describing the requirements 
concerning attention.:
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as long as the disagreeableness of the consequences of a sudden disaster is 
kept out of sight by the immediate oddity of the circumstances, and the 
absurdity or unaccountableness of a  foolish action is the most striking thing in 
it, the ludicrous prevails over the pathetic, and we receive pleasure instead of
pain
Herbert Spencer (1891) integrated these facts into his theory of tension-release, 
suggesting that when other emotions are present laughter is not discharged, as 
accumulated tension simply continues along the new emotional channel:
Among the spectators of an awkward tumble, those who preserve their gravity 
are those in whom there is excited a degree of sympathy with the sufferer, 
sufficiently great to serve as an outlet for the feeling which the occurrence had 
turned out of its previous course. Sometimes anger carries off the arrested 
current; and so prevents laughter.
(p. 462)
In my own account, I simply propose that in order for amusement to be 
experienced, the perceiver must be sufficiently involved in a definition o f events which 
places the discrediting o f an actor in the foreground. Furthermore, the degree and 
temporal extension of amusement will vary positively with the intensity and duration 
o f such involvement. Though any number of distractions may mar humorous 
appreciation, there exist a few common and noteworthy obstacles: the independent 
discredit of the perceiver, misfortune which befalls the discredited claimant, other 
emotional implications of the discrediting fact, competing interpretations of events as 
non-discrediting, excessive self-consciousness regarding the amusement process itself, 
intentional distractions sought by the perceiver, and cognitive and emotional ‘carry­
over* from previously perceived events. In section 3.2,1 will discuss each of these in 
turn.
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3.2. Causes o f Insufficient Involvement 
3.2.1. Independent Discredit o f the Perceiver
Special circumstances arise when the perceiver and claimant are engaged in 
mutual interaction simultaneously with the perception of the discredit, or where the 
two are considered somehow associated by third-party observers. In such cases, if the 
discrediting events are noticed by several or all participants, the perceiver himself may 
be discredited as well. Rather than being embarrassed fo r  the discredited claimant, due 
to empathic identification, here the perceiver is embarrassed in his own right, his own 
self-presentation having been damaged in some way51. In such situations, the 
perceiver may fail to be amused because he is too *busy' being embarrassed himself.
What Goffman labelled 'contagious* embarrassment actually referred, in many 
cases, to situations where one discrediting leads to further discreditings —rather than 
directly to general embarrassment. A guest at a formal drinks party who drunkenly 
insulted an important dignitary by removing his toupee would not only discredit 
himself but also the victim whose honour and demeanour had been transgressed. The 
host who invited this unruly guest, let alone the latter’s spouse and/or other 
companions, would also be to some extent discredited by association with the latter, 
not merely embarrassed for  him. Moreover, anyone present directly at the scene —i.e„ 
within the conversational circle where the offense took place— might be discredited as 
well.
Each of these discreditings would be based on different types of self-claim. In 
the case of the transgressor, the self-claim to proper behaviour at a formal party, 
including appropriate respect for others' (and especially important dignitaries') bodily, 
informational, and ego territories. In the case of the victim, control over his own 
bodily, informational, and ego territories. In the case of the host, the role-self-claim of 
prudence and taste in the choice of guests and the self-claim to respect for others’ 
territories (put into question by his invitee's behaviour). In the case of the spouse 
and/or accompanying guests, the self-claim to prudence and taste in the choice of 
spouse/associate and the self-claim to respect for others' territories (put into question 
by the behaviour o f their partner). In the case of others present at the scene, the self­
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claim to be able to cany on a normal social encounter of this type (made almost 
impossible to sustain by such a disruption) and to respect the informational territories 
of others (the 'secret' toupee revealed to all by the transgressor).
Any of these affected individuals, upon observing this episode, might be too 
overcome with embarrassment himself, and perhaps too concerned with managing the 
difficult social situation at hand, to be able to appreciate its amusing aspects. Only 
with time and distance from the scene might they come to laugh back at the evening's 
embarrassing moment. Other guests at the party, however, as well as friends of the 
guests made privy o f the news soon afterwards, might well enjoy the situation -even 
if open laughter at those involved is tactfully concealed or suppressed.
3.2.2. Misfortune for the Claimant
Discrediting facts often result in or are associated with minor or major 
tragedies for the claimant, due to their intrinsic characteristics: carelessness or 
uncoordinated physical movement can cause accidental death or injury, speech faults 
may be due to a degenerative brain disease, poor thinking can lead to economic ruin, 
violating others' territories can be followed by brutal retaliation, social ineptness may 
provoke virtual ostracism of an individual and give rise to a terrifying solitude. If such 
circumstances come to the attention of the perceiver, either before or after perception 
o f a discrediting, empathic appreciation may reduce or stifle amusement32.
Consider the following story, included in a collection of humorous ’blunders':
In 1979 a Spanish Air Force ace managed to shoot himself down: his bullets 
ricocheted off the practice target in the Iberian hills, and then hit his jet, 
forcing him to eject to safety —and ridicule.
(Hardy, 1983: 82)
Part of our ability to appreciate the humour in this anecdote with a clear conscience is 
the fact this pilot was able to "eject to safety." Many readers would be less amused by 512
51 Miller (1969: 34,48,69) makes a similar distinction.
52 In Section 3.2,1 have analyzed empathy with one type of discredit-related misfortune: the public 
disclosure of the discrediting fact itself and its resulting embarrassment. I will thus refrain from 
discussing this particular category (embarrassment for the discredited individual) further.
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a variant ending according to which the bullets 'hit his jet, killing him,’ or, even worse, 
’hit his jet, causing the engine to explode through the cockpit, incinerating the 
horrified youth before the plane smashed to the ground, a raging fireball.' Such grim 
circumstances might engage a reader's empathy and elicit a tragic interpretation of 
events.
This is not to say that a grim outcome would render the story 'not funny’ in 
absolute terms. On the contrary, it would not only maintain its comic potential, but 
could even gain a new comic element: the inappropriateness of making a joke out o f a 
horrific story. Its comic status would become controversial, however, both 'technically' 
and on moral grounds. Some perceivers would argue, even vehemently, that such 
things are simply 'no laughing matter,’ that they do not (or, in any case, should not) 
inspire amusement53. Others would say that it constitutes *black' or 'grim humour,' and 
defend their right to experience a kind of restrained amusement, a wince and a smile, a 
disgusted chuckle, a mix of horror and appreciation of the absurd (See Section 4). 
Finally, some would be able to experience amusement unproblematically —an ability 
which might be judged cruel by more empathic individuals.
Laughter at 'cruel' discredit stories or events depends on the ability of 
perceivers to focus on the discreditings themselves rather than on the pain of a fellow 
human. I suggest that four main factors will affect this ability: cultural and individual 
differences in the distribution of this required 'distance' or lack of empathy; 
interpretative concurrence by perceiver and victim; affective relationship between 
perceiver and victim; and the specific context in which the discredit takes place.
Regarding the first factor, it may be noticed that certain social environments 
value and promote distance from own and other suffering (i.e., 'toughness,' 'hardness'). 
A Royal Marine Officer admits (in Mayo, 1993:43), “It will come as no surprise to 
you when I say that the humour of the [Aimed] Forces in general can be rather cruel 
and harsh sometimes’*. This anonymous officer retold, on Simon Mayo's BBC Radio 1 
program 'Confessions,' how he and some others played a practical joke on an overly 
keen officer who was not allowed to continue in the Corps for medical reasons. 
Having lured him into a  state of complete inebriation, they had his arm tattooed with
53 Boston (1982), for example, provides the following opinion in a compendium of practical jokes: "To 
cause actual bodily harm...is not a laughing matter.... The dictionary and the House of Lords rightly 
distinguish between what causes the victim(s) to be embarrassed and look foolish and what might cause 
him, her, or them to suffer personal, physical, financial and any other real injury."
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the words ”43 Commando Royal Marines.” With hindsight, the episode which had 
seemed "funny at the time" years later seemed simply "cruel," prompting the 
confession on Mayo’s program.
More extreme cases are possible, of course. Beyond mere slapstick 
disparagements, tasteless jokes and black humour of the darkest hue we encounter the 
chilling laughter of those considered truly 'evil.' Hollywood 'bad guys/ literary 
demons, and even real-life 'beasts* can laugh at misery, torture, and death -indeed are 
monstrous on this account alone. Ugandan leader Idi Amin, for instance, murdered 
hundreds of thousands of his people —some having to sledgehammer each other to 
death- often for mere pleasure: u
What deepens the sense of shock in learning of Idi Amin's misdeeds is the 
knowledge that so much human suffering was inflicted by a man with a broad 
smile and a ready, if heavy-handed, sense of humour. It is said that many of his 
victims died with the sound of his laughter in their ears.
(Regan, 1984:63)
Young children, who have not yet learned empathic skills, also find it simple to laugh 
in the face of others' suffering:
Toddlers in playgroups quite often laugh after they hit each other. There is no 
"play face", the violence is real and the laughter is hostile.
(Cohen, 1994)
The young child's egocentrism makes it impossible to take another person's 
point of view, and this has a major effect on reactions to humor. In short, 
younger children seem to be more cruel in their humor because they laugh 
directly at another person's limp, unusually shaped nose, distorted speech, and 
so forth. It simply does not occur to them that they might be hurting the 
feelings of people in such conditions.
(McGhee. 1979:78)
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Empathy is also partly dependent on the coincidence of interpretations 
between perceiver and 'victim.' If the former does not happen to view the latter’s 
condition as such a tragedy after all, he will find amusement easier. An extreme 
example is that of parents who laugh at a baby's misinterpretation of a dear uncle 
(with a new bushy beard) as a horrible monster. Empathy may be possible with the 
neonate’s desperate tears, but it is unlikely to be very strong.
In fact, intentional humour can be used as a technique for minimizing the 
importance of a specific misfortune. A category of individuals who often engage in 
cruel humour are those who experience great suffering themselves. As was seen in 
Chapter One, the use of 'gallows humour' often emerges among those in desperate or 
tragic circumstances. Among the patients of an experimental metabolic ward, for 
instance, Fox (1959) found that jokes were made about the experimental surgery, the 
drugs' and their roles as human subjects, but those about death were the "most 
frequently made and most relished of all" (p.173). For these people, tragedy has 
become the norm, a taken-for-granted element of daily existence. Or, perhaps more 
accurately, this normalization of certain tragic events has become a central aim for all 
actors. The distancing requirement of black humour, normally disapproved of in such 
doses, here becomes a means of escape, a blase acceptance of the inevitable, a 
therapeutic instrument of relief. He who can laugh at death and misery has conquered 
their hold over his mind. He transforms himself from a pathetic victim living a daily 
horror to a mere figure of fun (See Chapter Eight, 4.3).
It would be expected that a third important factor regulating empathy by a 
perceiver towards an aggrieved actor should be the former's affective relationship 
towards the latter. If  I am quite fond of someone, I am more likely to feel pained when 
he suffers, and happy when he succeeds. If I detest someone, the reverse will be true. 
In the case of potentially amusing events where a discredited actor suffers pain or 
misfortune, it would be expected that a perceiver should be more amused at 
misfortunes befalling disliked individuals or groups than at those which affect liked 
individuals or groups. This should be so due to the perceiver's increased distance with 
the former, and increased empathy with the latter.
In fact, as was seen in Chapter Two, this is precisely what dozens of 
experiments in the psychology of 'disparagement humour* have repeatedly confirmed. 
Wolff and his collaborators pioneered the field by conducting experiments in which
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the appreciation of disparagement jokes by subjects 'affiliated1 and 'unaffiliated' to the 
victims was measured. In accordance with their predictions, it was found that Jews 
were found to enjoy anti-Jewish jokes less than non-Jews, among other findings 
(Wolff et al., 1934). Zillman has summarized the results of the numerous replications 
that followed these early efforts with the following interpretation: “Mirth...is said to 
vary proportionally with the negativeness of the affective disposition toward the 
disparaged party” (p. 92).
Whereas most of these experiments have considered the disparagement of one 
fictional character by another, there is also some evidence that extends these findings 
to cases of real-life 'unprovoked' accidents. An experiment by Zillman and Bryant 
(cited in Zillman, 1983), for instance, found that subjects laughed more at an 
'experimenter' (actually an actress) who spilled a cup of tea over herself in the 
condition where they were led to develop a negative disposition towards her.
The manner in which participants contextualize a potentially amusing event or 
story is another crucial influence on perceiver response. There exists a publishing 
genre composed of books which list true stories of great mistakes54. Most of them are 
explicitly classified by authors, editors, publishers, and libraries as "humour", while 
some are more ambiguous in this regard. All of them, however, include anecdotes of 
dubious or controversial 'humour status.' It is their contextual frames, however, which 
direct attention and guide interpretation. In the introduction to The World's Greatest 
Mistakes (Blundell, 1980), for instance, we find the following warning:
There is also a more serious side to this book...stories of mistakes so 
monumental that they have altered the course of history. They are mistakes 
that have cost dearly in money, honour, and human life. They include the 
sinking of the Titanic, ...Custer's Last Stand...
(P-7)
On the other hand, in the introduction to Own Goals Graham Jones explains that the 
book includes "items which have two things in common: Yes, they're fu m y . But
54 Some titles include: Amazing Blunders and Bungles (Eldin, 1987), The World's Worst Predictions 
(Nown, 1985), ¡000 Blunders (Brandreth, 1983), The World’s Greatest Mistakes (Blundell, 1980), 
Facts and Fallacies (Morgan and Langford, 1981), What a Mistake! (Hardy, 1983), Own Goah (Jones, 
1985), The Guinness Book o f Historical Blunders (1984).
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Ouch! they hurt...actions which rebounded mightily, savagely —but always amusingly- 
- on their makers" (Jones, 1985: 11-12; my emphasis). The back cover of The World's 
Worst Predictions informs us that "prediction is a very risky business —or at least a 
very funny one" (Nown, 1985).
The tone of the writing in each of these two types of book is consistent with 
these divergent statements of purpose. The former intends to entertain but also adm its 
the tragic side of human mistakes, and expects the reader to identify with misery and 
suffering where appropriate. The latter merely intends to 'get a laugh.'
Blundell mentions the sinking of the Titanic and the defeat of General Custer 
as two mistakes with a serious 'side.' In his own depiction o f the Titanic episode, he 
describes the "horror for the 2,300 passengers of the White Star liner" and gives space 
to the human and tragic aspects of the story. Though the absurdly defiant claims about 
this engineering wonder being 'unsinkable' are also included within the account, an 
average reader would not laugh heartily at the resulting discredits —a sensation o f 
'tragic irony' and a stunted smile might be elicited at most. In The World's Worst 
Predictions, however, the story is reduced to the following one-liner (Nown, 1985:
7 6 ) :
"Madam, God himself could not sink this ship..."
Crew member o f the Titanic 
to a passenger, 1912
In this presentation, the story itself disappears altogether. No deaths, no grief, no 
choking on sea-water are to be seen. It is the self-claim itself which is offered, cleanly 
decontextualized, accompanied only by the barest reference to time, place, and actors 
involved. Quickly read, the Titanic tragedy may thus become a source of unconcerned 
laughter, particularly when placed amidst other equally awful forecasts in a chapter on 
travel mispredictions ('"Nothing is more ridiculous than the claim to build a 
locomotive which will travel at twice the speed of a mail coach' —British Engineering 
Journal 1825"; p. 76)
'Custer's Last Stand' is similarly dehumanized in Own Goals (Jones, 1985: 25), 
where it is the absurdity of sending 215 men against "1500 warrior braves" which is 
stressed, rather than the pain, young stunted lives, and families of the victims. Jones
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gleefully reveals, for instance, that Custer took out more than 5000 dollars of life 
insurance before the battle. He also questions the fact that these men were particularly 
heroic: "Some say that they were the bravest of the brave. Others that they were 
suffering from too much drink and sun."
One contextual aid to obtaining emotional distance from a victim is physical 
distance in space and/or time. Laughing at 'old' fiascos like the Titanic and the Light 
Brigade will be easier for Americans than chuckling at similar examples from the 
Vietnam War. Jokes about forced child labour in the present-day third world seem 
more controversial than those about Egyptian slaves at Pyramid building sites. The 
former might be found even more objectionable by someone who has witnessed such 
practices personally (provided, of course* he finds the practices themselves 
objectionable). A suffering individual who is within direct and close physical presence 
o f the perceiver should have the greatest hold over the latter's empathy.
Another common distancing method is the overt fictionality of either the 
misfortune or the victim in question. In much potentially controversial humour, 
characters and events are often removed from reality by grotesque distortions of every 
type. Techniques used to maintain slapstick violence ’harmless' to the audience 
include the use of caricatured drawings or cartoons, especially of animal figures; the 
bizarre antics, outfits, and settings of slapstick worlds; and standard alterations in the 
laws of physics and biology by which falls from cliffs, dynamite explosions, and all 
manner of stretchings, piercings, and crushings result in nothing more than temporary 
discomfort and chagrin:
Tom and Jerry, or all the other cartoon heroes and villains, can be cut up to 
slices, burned to death, or crushed to mush —in the next moment they will, of 
course, pop up alive and well....Hostility, brutality, and cruelty, ultimately have 
no apparent ill-effects.
(Dolf Zillman, 1977; in Chapman, Smith, and Foot, 1980:146)
If the guarantee of this fictionality is found to be lacking, comedy may turn into 
something quite other:
301
C o p te r Six: Elaborations of the.Modet .Section 3
Willson Disher, a noted historian of the comic arts* once observed a 
performance by a trick cyclist, where 'a well intentioned rumour made it 
known that he had not yet recovered from a broken rib. In consequence his 
tumbles were watched in the silence of deep concern.’
(Staveacre, 1987:41)
Even more extreme audience reactions can be imagined to the hypothetical case of 
Donald Duck or Wile E. Coyote bleeding to death.
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3.2.3. Other Implications of the Discrediting Fact
A wide range of discredit side-effects may interfere with the perceiver’s 
involvement in the amusing elements of the situation. Tragedy may strike the 
perceiver himself —as when a ridiculously careless act causes the death of a 
scatterbrained family m ember- so that the emotion felt would be far from vicarious. 
Moral disapproval or outrage with the actions of the agent of discredit or the 
discredited claimant is another possibility. Fear and anger may also interfere. Nown 
(1989) has recounted the story of an airline pilot fond of socializing with passengers 
during long flights while the automatic pilot guided the aircraft. A sudden quake of 
turbulence caused the terrorist-proof cabin door to close and lock shut. According to 
Nown, passenger "anxiety" quickly turned to "undisguised fear" as "the pilot, smiling 
reassuringly, attacked the lock on his hands and knees with a plastic spoon from the 
galley" (p. 89). It is unlikely that many on board laughed before the door had been 
charged down by a group of passengers. Even then, anger at the pilot's irresponsible 
behaviour may have taken precedence for some. To the airline company directors, the 
story was also probably anything but amusing. The pilot's incredible lack of foresight 
can nevertheless be found funny by a reader safe at home —though a twinge of 
airtravel apprehension is more than likely.
Many kinds of humour, apart from the ‘black humour* discussed in 3.2.2, may 
fail to amuse certain sectors of an audience due to competing emotional involvements. 
'Sick' humour, designed to provoke strong disgust, may be too successful in this 
regard to allow for any amusement at all. Sexual humour is another risky category, 
which may embarrass and/or offend some listeners. 'Blasphemous' humour may 
provoke offense, moral outrage, and even fear (i.e., of divine retribution) in the 
faithful. For example, when Monty Python released their 1979 biblical parody Life o f 
Brian, Christian and Jewish groups denounced the film as blasphemous, immoral, and 
offensive, and picketed many cinemas where it was showing (New York Times, 1979, 
30/8, m , 13:1; 4/9, m , 7:1). Professional comedians are all too aware of the dangers 
o f material which could provoke unintended emotional disinvolvement: “If you offend 
and/or embarrass your audience you will have a very hard time winning them over 
again.” (Kilgamff, 1973:3)
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Some types of humour are intended by their creators to make a particular 
’point,’ to communicate a specific message or assertion. For example, an old Yiddish 
proverb states that “If triangles had a God, He’d have three sides.” Though the 
statement is humorous, and involves the absurd proposition of triangles having Gods, 
it is not meaningless. It draws attention to the fact that the deities believed in by a 
society tend to resemble the members of the faithful themselves. This leads to the 
thought-provoking and -fo r  any believer— worrying conclusion that gods, or at least 
their representations, have been fancifully invented by humans. To some believers, 
who in fact are the targets of implicit discredit, the implication might even be found 
offensive or the reasoning unfair and malicious.
Humorous appreciation o f such wit depends on the ’catching’ of the intended 
message, and thus understanding stimulates amusement. Nevertheless, it is possible 
that excessive attention to the message of wit could reduce involvement in its 
humorous aspects, especially if the point is anxiety-provoking, tragic, hostile, or 
contrary to the perceiver's beliefs or opinions.
3.2.4. Non-Discredit Interpretations
Not only may different participants disagree on whether a particular 
circumstance discredits an actor; such disagreement may take place within a single 
perceiver. As discussed in Chapter Four, it is possible for an observer to be uncertain 
regarding the fit between a proposed self-claim and the relevant facts. Thus, he may 
both find a situation funny and simultaneously entertain a definition of events under 
which the discredit disappears. Partial involvement in such a competing frame would 
reduce amusement resulting from the humorous interpretation.
I once participated in a lively argument between several university students 
regarding the question of whether it was acceptable to nap on the library floor if one 
felt tired, especially after the lunch hour. One student, who actually practiced this 
unusual behaviour, seemed to waver between a serious defense of sleeping on the 
carpet ("it's much more comfortable than slumping over the desk, and it doesn't bother 
anyone") and an amused acceptance of its ridiculous side. This instability of 
interpretative frameworks was accompanied by an alternation o f serious and amused 
expressions.
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3.2.5. Amusement-Consciousness
A fifth type of distraction associated with potentially funny stimuli is an 
excessive concern with the humour process itself. For example, apprehension about 
whether one should laugh in public at a particular event could reduce or suppress 
amusement. Guilt at finding a 'sick' or 'dirty'joke funny might actually be effective in 
curtailing the perceived impropriety. Aesthetic appreciation of the 'cleverness* of a 
well-constructed witticism may detract from pure enjoyment of its a i t  Mere interest in 
the mechanics of a particular joke, its reception by other participants, or the subjective 
characteristics of hilarity may decrease involvement in the experience itself - a  
personal complaint voiced by more than one humour researcher.
3.2.6. Intentional Distraction
In some cases, perceivers may attempt to ignore the amusing aspects of an 
event consciously, in order to suppress mirthful reactions. During a courtroom trial 
against American comedian Lenny Bruce, the jury was requested to suspend all 
humorous appreciation during the viewing of a videotaped comic act. The viewing 
proceeded in silence (Goffman, 1974: 65-70).
More commonly, participants of interaction may attempt to ignore funny 
elements of a scene when such elements clash with the established definition of the 
situation. Where laughter is not permitted or not appropriate, manoeuvring attention 
away from amusing stimuli will be safer than suppressing its visible signs (See 
Chapter Seven).
3.2.7. Cognitive and Emotional Carry-Over
The 'wrong' mood can spoil amusement Potentially amusing events may be 
witnessed by a perceiver too preoccupied with other affairs, or engulfed in other 
feelings, to take proper notice. A married couple who quarrel minutes before the start 
o f a  comedy show, or a student with an important exam only hours away, may find it 
difficult to enjoy the proceedings.
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3.2.8. Additional Causes
This list of common causes for reduced involvement can be completed by a 
'remainder' category, containing an assorted set of situational miscellanea —a startling 
noise, the appearance of an unexpected friend, an insect bite, a sudden lapse of 
concentration, an aesthetically pleasing sight. Indeed, any attention-engaging percept 
that closely precedes, accompanies, or follows that of the discrediting event may 
dampen or drown out the bodily expression of amusement. A professional comedian 
includes in a list o f reasons for 'no laughs' from an audience that they "may be 
physically cold" and that "the seating may be uncomfortable" (Kilgarriff, 1973: 15). 
That elusive and undefinable of comic skills, 'timing,' may well be directed, at least to 
a considerable extent, to harnessing the attention of audience members away from 
irrelevant distractions and upon the flow of the comic presentation itself.
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4. Amusement Modifiers
It may appear that some of the irreducible subjective qualities of amusement 
experience have been missed by the analysis provided. Beyond the differences that 
may arise from amusement at others versus amusement at the self, or the funniness 
one type of self-claim versus another, we continue to distinguish between triumphant 
guffaws and nervous tittering, haughty snorts and nostalgic smiles, guilty giggles and 
sarcastic grins. A number of these categories could be dismissed as external appraisals 
which attribute attitudes or pass moral judgement on observed displays of laughter3*. 
On the other hand, some descriptive modifiers seem to have a subjective basis which 
challenges the assertion of a single unitary account for amusement It feels different to 
laugh nostalgically about the 'good old days' than to smile at a dark irony.
I would argue, however, that these phenomena merely reflect the essential 
impurity of affects. As we have seen, an individual may be more or less involved in an 
emotionally-engaging perception. In other words, he may also be partially involved in 
a number of additional such perceptions, each with its cognitive, emotional, and 
bodily consequences. The bodily consequences of previous perceptions may yet be 
active when those of current ones take hold of the individual; the consequences of 
current perceptions will interact with those of forthcoming ones.
In short, emotions and feelings do not follow each other sequentially, despite 
the convenience of such an arrangement for both actors and computer models of the 
mind. Anger does not neatly give way to guilt, guilt does not neatly give way to 
nostalgia, nostalgia does not neatly give way to a toothache56. Nor are these affects 
and sensations easily separable from each other when co-present. Even some of the 
observable bodily aspects of laughter -such  as increased heart rate— are identical to 
those of emotions as disparate as anger or fear. Various impressions accumulate and 
coexist, mix and dilute, a continuous challenge to the mental cognitive processors (of
53 Such appraisals will be analyzed in Chapter Seven.
36 In these and other discussions of feeling and emotion, I make no claims about the accuracy or reality 
of such concepts as "nostalgia,” "guilt," and other affects -with the exception of amusement and 
embarrassment Ekman and Friesen have provided convincing evidence that at least some cross-cultural 
emotions exist, which in our culture correspond to happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, and disgust 
(Ekman, 1980). Lacking —beyond such simple findings— a well-accepted cross-cultural classification or 
theory of emotional reactions, I will fall back upon the terms used in common speech for the sake of 
simplicity. It should be noted, in any case, that the argument concerns emotions as experienced by
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both actors and scientists) which attempt to interpret and modify them. The realm o f  
experience resembles more a pool of whirling coloured dyes than a Turing machine 
tape of separate printed symbols. The possibility of ’emotion blends' is increasingly 
becoming recognized in the psychological literature on emotions (Scherer, 1996: 299).
One consequence of this fact is the uniqueness of each 'emotion' felt, a 
proposition already suggested by William James (1890: 743-746). One bout of anger 
is never identical to another, due to the interaction between the psycho-bodily 
processes provoked by the angering perception and preceding/subsequent psycho- 
bodily processes. Similarly, an injection of amusement into the emotional pool will 
modify, but not replace, its current hue, and will in turn be diluted and altered by 
further additions.
With observations selected from a few cases, some theorists have attempted to  
reduce laughter to the expression of another single affect, especially surprise, joy, 
hostility, and relief. A much wider range o f emotional and sensory shadings may 
colour the amusement experience, however, including fear, admiration, sadness, 
disgust, sexual arousal, embarrassment, pain, nostalgia, and guilt. As I have argued 
above, such competing affects may reduce, suppress, or prevent spontaneous laughter 
by interfering with the subject's involvement in the relevant frame of interpretation. In 
many cases, therefore, one or more of them may coexist with some measure of 
amusement, resulting in a potentially infinite range of unique combinations.
Many of the typical conjunctions have either been alluded to in the previous 
discussion or arise from the categories o f the typology developed in Chapter Five. A  
crucial distinction, for example, regards the relationship of the discredited claimant to 
the perceiver. Laughing at oneself may well differ experientially from laughing at 
others, particularly the more responsible one feels for the self-claim discredited. As 
considered in Section 2 of this chapter, embarrassed 'giggles' may arise when an 
individual simultaneously perceives himself as the claimant of a  discredited 
attribution and as a  distanced observer of this claimant. More specific categories may 
give rise to particular details of experience. Tickling, as we have seen, results from a 
perception o f an inappropriate defense reflex, and thus by definition the subjective 
quality of this joking torture includes the feelings and bodily events associated with
subjects, and thus the use of native terms is not altogether unjustified. The topic of emotion will be 
discussed further in Chapter Nine, 3.
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this automatic wince. Anxiety or fear of suffering a tickles 'attack,' embarrassment 
from the public loss of control, or —in romantic contexts— sexual arousal, are other 
typical modifiers.
Extensive discussion of empathy for discredit-related tragedy has also been 
provided above. Clearly, in some cases, pity, sympathy, and/or vicarious pain may be 
felt with amusement. A staple comic aggression, the kick to the testicles, provokes in 
male viewers both spontaneous laughter at seeing the most sacred of bodily territories 
violently abused, and a no less spontaneous empathic flinch at the groin. Black' 
humour, similarly, may result in recoilings o f a more subtle nature:
"Mommy, why are we having this Christmas tree in August?”
"I've told you twenty times if I told you once, Sheldon. You’ve got leukaemia."
(Davis, 1993: 142)
Funny stimuli may contain additional cognitively and emotionally-engaging 
implications unrelated to the fate of the discredited individual. For example, it can be 
both funny and frightening (for any air-traveller) to read that in a study of pilots 
conducted by the Institute of Aviation Medicine in 1985, one hundred respondents 
mentioned tiredness as a daily problem, while twelve "confessed to falling asleep at 
the controls’' (Nown, 1989: 90). Eye-widening disbelief and outrage or head-shaking 
moral disapprobation, if  they do not prevent humorous appreciation completely, may 
certainly colour the experience of reading about Old Bailey judge Michael Argyle QC, 
who let off a man found guilty of physically assaulting, forcibly undressing, and 
attempting to rape a woman with the following words...
You come from Derby, which is my part of the country. Now off you go and 
don't come back to this court..For goodness sake make this the last time. Once 
you put your hands around a woman's neck when you are in drink anything can 
happen.
(Mason and Bums, 1985:57-58)
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Much intentional humour is meant to be thought-provoking, containing a serious 
’point' conveyed in amusing form:
I picked up a woman last night and took her to my house. "Make me
feel like a woman," she said. So I cut her wages 40 percent.
(Larry 'Bubbles' Brown, 
in Davis, 1993:126)
Such humour thus provides a 'deeper' experience, —though not necessarily funnier— 
than mere wordplay or absurdity57. The perceiver, though perhaps entertained, is 
additionally prompted to consider the criticism, social problem, philosophical 
hypothesis, or logical relation proposed. Such intellectual stimulation may or may not 
be accompanied by further emotional consequences such as moral 
approbation/disapprobation.
Disgust commonly accompanies discreditings where territories of the self are 
violated by objects of revulsion, or where control of bodily excretions is lost by the 
claimant: food fights, spitting in the face o f a rival, medical student jokes with body 
parts, retrieving dropped keys from a dirty toilet, vomiting in public. This combination 
may also arise when a felt or expressed reaction of revulsion is deemed inappropriate 
by its subject, such as when a witnessed medical injection, minor cut, harmless insect, 
or blatantly fake 'gory' film scene provokes excessive disgust. 'Sick,' and 'dirty'jokes 
discredit the perceiver by forcing him to witness or conceive of taboo thoughts and 
ideas, which may elicit revulsion (among other reactions):
Q: What's grosser than gross?
A: A baby eating its way out of a  cartful of babies.
Q: What's grosser than that?
A: The same baby coming back for seconds.
57 This is not to say that wordplay or absurdity may not, too, be intellectualized. Davis (1993:14), for 
instance, considers the difference between 'quality humour’ and 'mere silliness' as a question of degree 
rather than essence, both provoking a "comic attack on culture" (of which language is an essential 
element).
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Attention to the discrediting and/or amusement process itself may also alter its 
result, with a number of cognitive and affective elements: anxiety about whether a 
joke will be understood, indecision over whether laughter should be expressed, guilt 
or doubt regarding the appropriateness of amusement
More pleasant emotions may also act as modifiers. Admiration or aesthetic 
pleasure at the cleverness of a particular witticism/comic novel/mathematical puzzle 
or the gestural abilities of a skilful comic performer may add to the enjoyment of a 
humorous perception. Surprise, awe, and wonder at seeing the impossible 
accompanies the Tm-being-fooled-here' amusement during a magic show (though 
unpleasant frustrated curiosity is another typical side-effect). Joy at the sharing of 
laughter with a liked participant, of course, gives the amusement a particular tone. In 
contexts of courtship or amorous interaction, excitement, love, and sexual arousal may 
be further stimulated.
Tension-release theories have been based on the observation that amusement is 
sometimes associated with a sensation of relief. This phenomenon often arises when a 
disagreeable emotion is found to have been based on erroneous perception or 
interpretation: fear at a rollercoaster fall, anger at reading a letter that turns out to be a 
practical joke, dejection over a misfortune which is suddenly seen as a mere trifle. I 
would argue that in these cases amusement itself either is or results in relief —a relief 
from  accumulated anxiety, fear, anger, sadness, pain, boredom, or other discomfort If 
relief were a cause or aspect of amusement it would become difficult to explain not 
only the numerous cases where previous negative sensations were absent but 
especially those where positive affects have been found superfluous. For example, the 
optimistic mishearing of a lottery number could result in a perceiver's temporary belief 
that he possesses a fortune. The eventual disillusionment might stifle any amusement 
at the error, but might on the other hand allow a weak and whiny chuckle of 
resignation.
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5. Combinations of Funny Stimuli
In Chapter Five, examples were provided to illustrate specific categories of 
funny event. The humorous aspect of some o f these examples, however, may have 
seemed more elaborate than warranted by their simple classification. Real-life stimuli 
o f amusement often contain numerous potentially funny elements, each of which may 
have its effect on a perceiver. Consider the following amusing incident from real life:
A child was overheard praying, “Please God make Paris the capital of Turkey!"
-which is what he had written on his geography exam.
(Muir, 1984:26)
This child is funny to us on two counts: firstly, for believing Paris to be the 
capital of Turkey, an outrageous social frame mix-up in itself; but secondly for 
believing that praying to a supreme being could have Him change the basic facts of 
geography merely in order to save his grade, an equally serious natural frame error. 
Hither comic 'half could provoke amusement —though not as much— on its own:
1. Child’s answer on an exam: "Paris is the capital o f Turkey".
2. A child was overheard praying, "Please God change my exam answers so
they’re all correct."
Neither of these elements is likely to escape the attention of the perceiver, each adding 
comic value to the anecdote. And yet the amusement generated will normally be 
experienced as a seamless whole.
Unsurprisingly, complex stimuli are particularly common in humour, where 
the intention is to amuse by whatever means possible. Verbal jokes which fool the 
perceiver into erroneous interpretations or illogical reasoning may also include the 
discredit of characters within the more or less fictional world of the joke, as well as 
other elements.
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Reagan had a cancer taken out of his colon and a cancer off his nose. You figure out 
how he got them.
(Will Durst, in Davis 1993: 123)
Here Durst provokes the listener into making an absurd and completely unwarranted 
connection between Ronald Reagan's tumors. Believing that the cancers are related in 
the way suggested (i.e., by some sort of barely imaginable contact) can lead to self­
amusement at the mental lapse. In addition, of course, the comedians implication 
involves the former American President in disagreeable mutual violations of two of 
his own —highly incompatible— bodily territories by each other. This can be 
considered a separate humorous elem ent Finally, the taboo nature of the very concept 
entertained and shared by comedian and audience discredits their self-claims to guard 
and respect a trio o f informational territories which are strictly off-limits in our own 
society: cancer, sex, and the anus. Again, however, the amusement achieved by a 
perceiver of this joke appears to him  as a  single, undivided experience.
More extended comedic structures, such as humorous novels, films, or live 
shows, normally combine and vary numerous techniques. A comic performer may, 
during his act, 1) discredit his own self-claims (or rather, those of his comic 'persona') 
with tacky or ridiculous outfits, impossible self-claims, facial expressions, extremes of 
ineptness and stupidity, self put-down jokes, and stories about past discredits; 2) 
discredit the self-claims of the audience (and/or of specific singled out members) with 
clever verbal foolery, visual tricks and illusions, stories of common embarrassments 
we all share, deliberate put-downs and insults, and the breaking of taboos; 3) discredit 
the self-claims of third parties by telling ethnic jokes, satirizing politicians, recounting 
embarrassments o f his supposed acquaintances, and imitating various real or fictitious 
characters in an unflattering manner. Many of these varied elements can be combined 
within the space o f a few seconds, even simultaneously.
Tommy Cooper, for instance, entertained audiences for thirty years with the 
same 'incompetent magician' act. During performances, 'his' (or rather, his character's) 
role self-claims of conjuring skill, stage poise, and appropriate appearance were 
continually discredited by his demeanour and botched tricks. This main emphasis, 
however, was supplemented by various additional humorous techniques, observable in 
the following description of an act;
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[Cooper makes] an entrance with a huge pile of plates. One falls from the 
bottom, and shatters. A manic cackle, and suddenly, he throws the remaining 
plates into the audience! Screams, hysteria -relief, it's only a clever inflatable! 
He closes the show two minutes in; changes his mind, lurches to his props 
table.
"Magic wand -white tip here, white tip there. The reason for the white 
tips is to separate the centre from the ends. Now I’ll make it disappear."
Wraps wand in paper, loosely. Paper out of control, Cooper loses patience, 
breaks wand, breaks table. Roaming dangerously, he walks through another 
table (which opens like swing-doors)...
"My feet are killing me. Honest -  every night I wake up in bed, and 
they’re wrapped around me neck!"
Now he's striking matches, which won't light; now he's wrestling with a 
covered dish, to produce a grotesque cloth turkey. Throws it off in disgust...
"IVe got something in my eye... It's my finger!"
(Staveacre, 1987:79)
Simultaneously with the persistent evidence of his incompetence on stage -the manic 
laughter, disrespect of the audience, wild appearance and movements, failed tricks, 
incoherent patter, shows of anger and disgust- Cooper throws in the following bits of 
humour: •
• A practical joke with an inflatable pile of plates, which causes the audience 
to panic inappropriately (i.e., to mismanage their social frames).
• An instance of illogical reasoning; "The reason for the white tips is to 
separate the centre from the ends." This absurd explanation may cause 
amusement at Cooper, and/or at the perceiver who momentarily accepts the 
explanation as reasonable.
• A visual gag involving a trick table. Here Cooper treats the audience to a real 
magic trick - fo r  a  split second, a miraculous parting of matter seems to have 
taken place, causing self-amusement.
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• A conventional double-meaning joke: "My feet are killing me...". Here the 
listener is tricked into maintaining an absurd notion —Cooper's feet actually 
trying to kill h im - due to the initial acceptance of a conventional expression.
• A clever bit of verbal and visual foolery: Cooper puts his finger in his eye, 
and states, quite truthfully T v e  got something in my eye.*' The audience — 
deceived by the mimic and the conventional meaning of the phrase, mistakenly 
takes this to mean that some tiny speck has entered his eye, despite the 
'plainness* of Cooper’s words. M ost incredibly, however, Cooper himself 
seems surprised at finding that the bothersome object in his eye is none other 
than his own finger, shattering his own self-claims to the universal skills of 
language production and frame management.
Such combinations of technique are typical, rather than extraordinary.
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6. Conclusions: The Full Hypothesis
In this chapter, the proposed causal hypothesis of amusement has been 
polished and rounded off, bringing Part Two of the thesis to a close. I have considered 
a number of factors crucial to the emergence, degree, and perceived quality of 
amusement, permitting a more sophisticated understanding of actual humorous 
experience. These factors, moreover, have emerged naturally from the possibilities of 
social and perceptual experience relevant to self-claim discredits.
Firstly, in cases where the discrediting of a self-claim has been detected, the 
relationship of perceiver to claimant —specifically, the identity distance between 
them - will determine whether embarrassment or amusement (or what degree of each) 
will be provoked in the former. The individual discredited, as a perceiver of his own 
situation, will normally suffer embarrassment If he considers himself distanced from 
the part of his self that has been discredited, however, he may be amused. The passing 
o f time has been mentioned as one important factor in allowing such distance. For 
many observers of a discrediting, therefore, amusement will be possible, and thus ’the 
embarrassment of others’ constitutes a major theme of intentional humour. A 
combination of these two complementary emotions may arise if closeness and distance 
to the discredited individual are alternated by the perceiver.
Secondly, the degree of involvement in the perception of the funny stimulus 
will clearly influence the resulting degree of amusement Excessive attention to any 
competing perception may reduce or suppress hilarity entirely, of which certain types 
are common: the independent discredit of the perceiver, a misfortune suffered by the 
claimant, other implications of the discrediting fact which impinge on the perceiver's 
interests, consciousness of the amusement process, intentionally-provoked 
distractions, and mental activity carried over from previous events.
Thirdly, the cognitive and emotional consequences o f such side-involvements 
may coexist with amusement itself, colouring the experience with any number of 
subjective feelings, sensations, and cognitions. These amusement modifiers account 
for some of the apparent differences between intuitively distinct 'types' of funniness.
Finally, among the side-involvements of one amusing stimulus may be another 
such stimulus. Various elements within a single strip of perceived reality may provoke 
amusement, resulting in combinations of funnies which are nevertheless experienced
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as undivided episodes of hilarity. Producers of humour commonly concoct 
sophisticated structures, incorporating numerous funny elements, with which to 
entertain their audiences.
At this point, it becomes possible to  state the proposed causal amusement 
hypothesis in full:
1. Amusement is provoked only and always when a perceiver observes that a 
self-claim put forward by a  claimant has been discredited provided that,
a) the perceiver does not identify himself as the claimant at the moment 
of perception.
b) the perceiver is sufficiently involved (in both intensity and length of 
time) in a definition of events which places the discrediting in the 
foreground.
i
2. The degree of amusement experienced at any given moment varies,
a) positively with the shortfall between self-claim made and reality 
implied by the discrediting fact
b) negatively with the degree of identification between perceiver and 
claimant
c) positively with the intensity of involvement by the perceiver in the 
relevant definition of events.
d) negatively with the length of time expired since the perception of the 
discrediting
3. The quality of experience of any given moment during the manifestation of 
amusement varies with,
a) the degree of amusement experienced.
b) the degree and quality o f each other sensation, emotion, and 
cognitive activity experienced, including additional amusement from 
other sources.
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As suggested in Chapter Two, the validity of this account will depend in great 
measure on how useful it is found in describing the experience of amusement in 
everyday life. Another test, however, can be made of its usefulness in explaining 
varied phenomena within the discipline of humour research. In Part Three, I will 
derive a theoretical description of laughter and humour, the other two members of the 
laughter triad, from this causa] explanation of amusement. The explanatory power of 
this alternative approach will hopefully be demonstrated by integrating broad areas of 
scattered research within a single conceptual scheme.

Situating Laughter:
Amusement, Laughter, and Humour in Everyday Life
PART THREE
In this concluding part of the thesis,
I provide an account o f laughter and humour as communicative 
signs, describe and classify the effects o f  amusement, 
laughter and humour, and attempt to ‘situate' 
the ‘laughter triad* and its field on the basis o f results.
Chapter Seven
A Hypothesis o f Amusement
Chapter Eight
Effects of Amusement, Laughter, and Humour
Chapter Nine
Situating the Laughter Triad
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1. Introduction
Part Three of the thesis, including this and the following two chapters, 
broadens the focus of inquiry from the emotion of amusement to the whole of the 
laughter triad, with a particular emphasis on the expressive signs of laughter and 
humour. It may be recalled that in Chapter One, these three terms were defined as 
follows:
Amusement: the pan-human emotion responsive to 'funny* or 'comical*
objects.
Laughter (display): its visible and more-or-less faithful expression.
Humour (display): the attempt to stimulate amusement.
Imagine a superior told you a poor joke to which you laughed more loudly than you 
might have. According to these definitions, the telling of a joke would constitute the 
humour display; the resulting weak bodily reaction of hilarity (perceived subjectively 
as funniness and a tendency to smile or chuckle mildly) would be the episode of 
amusement; and the observable partly-feigned laughter emitted would be the laughter 
display.
The shift from amusement to laughter and humour signifies a step from more 
psychological to more sociological realms, from the private and abstract to the 
observable and concrete, from cause-effect explanation to the world of human 
decision-making and rational action. In Part Two, no single case o f amusement was 
offered for dissection. Rather, a concept of this elusive emotional state was distilled 
from  innumerable real-life events, and from our own subjective experience of similar 
events. On the other hand, laughter displays —the 'ha-ha' sounds, the shaking body, 
the open mouth, the upturned lips— and humour displays —telling jokes, pulling faces, 
being sarcastic, performing a stage comedy— are objective phenomena commonly 
encountered in everyday life and easily subject to recording and analysis. The 
following transcript from a recorded conversation provides examples of both:
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Lynn: Do you need me to help you diy?
Joe: If you want to get in the dishwasher.
Penny: Heh heh heh heh.
Gail: Huh huh oh yeah.
Lynn: Oh you’re putting them in the dishwasher. 
Okay.
[humour display] 
[laughter display] 
[laughter display]
(Norrick, 1994:22;
bracketed comments added)
Amusement here is not visible, though we might suggest three elements of Joe’s 
humour display which could conceivably trigger off hilarity: (1) the mild discredit of 
Lynn’s universal self-claim to correct social frame management, by asking to dry 
dishes despite the existence of a dishwasher at their disposal58; (2) the serious 
discredit of a fictitious Lynn’s self-claim to correct social frame management, by the 
absurd request to get into the dishwasher and ‘help with the drying’ there; (3) the 
serious (but temporary) discredit of the perceiver’s self-claim to correct social frame 
management, by accepting the absurd notion that Lynn actually meant her offer to help 
in the sense suggested by Joe. W e can imagine and identify with the amusement which 
might result from such a joke; perhaps even experience some of our own. The displays 
of humour (“If you want to get in the dishwasher”) and laughter (“Heh heh heh heh”; 
“Huh huh”), on the other, hand, are readily observable. The data of social scientists — 
particularly those employing ethnographic methods and those most concerned with 
social interaction and communication— is often scattered with such examples.
Another difference concerns the type of explanation required for these 
phenomena. Whereas episodes o f amusement were attributed to an automatic, 
unconscious, inherited psychological reflex mechanism, laughter and humour are (or 
can be) deployed consciously. From the above conversational snippet, we cannot 
know whether Penny and Gail experienced any actual amusement, or to what extent 
their displays of laughter reflect felt emotion. But we can imagine that they may have 
altered the timing, volume, extension, intensity, and form of the display, for all sorts 
o f reasons: for instance, appreciating the joke to stay in Joe’s favour, limiting 
expressed mirth to avoid offending Lynn, or adapting volume to the size of the room. 
In the case of Joe’s teasing remark, it can be seen even less problematically as an
58 Lynn additionally appears to be aware of its availability, as she later comments “Oh you’re putting 
them in the dishwasher” rather than “Oh there’s a dishwasher”.
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intentional communicative act. Laughter and humour displays may be influenced by 
personality, culture, goals, norms, power, and other pressures on willed behaviour. 
They may be used strategically by groups and individuals, and they may be shaped by 
the forces of cultural and socio-structural change. It is also worth noting, though it will 
become evident in the coming pages, that these phenomena have been the object of 
substantial empirical research.
In this chapter, I will expand upon the initial definitions given for humour and 
laughter displays, which will be treated as communicative expressions. I will 
comment on the relationship between the displaying individual and his audience; 
suggest the meanings which, as signs, they transmit to observers; and examine the 
process by which an individual carries out a display move. This will prepare the 
ground for an analysis of the effects and uses of amusement, laughter, and humour in 
Chapter Eight.
Laughter and humour displays can be analyzed as signs with nearly 
synonymous meanings. Both refer to an alleged episode of amusement either 
experienced at the time of display or possible at some time for the displaying 
individual and/or for others.
Laughter (at X) = "I am experiencing amusement at cause X"
Humour (directed at X) = "I can experience amusement at cause X (and so can
you)"
In the preceding example Penny’s “Heh heh heh heh” and Gail’s “Huh huh” 
commit them to claims that they have experienced some amusement at the 
immediately preceding comment. This comment itself, “If you want to get in the 
¿/¿rAwasher,” which in context cannot be taken as a serious proposal, is a humour 
display which also commits Joe to the claim that he himself finds this notion funny. 
The dual reference to amusement provides a common link to the concepts discussed in 
the previous chapters. It also suggests that a full understanding of the effects and uses 
of laughter and humour -which follow from the interpretation of their meanings— 
requires their grounding in a theory of amusement If every participant of social 
interaction intuitively ‘knows* the conditions for amusement (perceiving a self-claim 
discredit, not being identified as the claimant, being involved in the discredit frame,...)
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then the meaning of laughter (an expression of supposed real amusement) and the 
meaning of humour (an expression of potential amusement) include such implications
as:
• The discredit connotation: "According to my current interpretation, 
claimant C's self-claim S has been discredited by fact F"
•  The knowledge connotation: '1 possess the knowledge necessary to 
appreciate the amusing elements referred to by the laughter"
• The identity  connotation: "I do not feel identified as the claimant(s) 
discredited"
• The involvement connotation: "I am (or can be) sufficiently involved in the 
funny elements of the situation to enjoy amusement"
Humour displays include an additional submeaning:
• The entertainm ent connotation: "I am delivering a communication which 
can produce amusement at cause Y in my target sharing audience"
With their displays of humour and laughter, any of the following meanings can be 
read into Gail, Penny, and Joe’s displays, either by the observing social scientists or 
by each other:
• (Discredit): the real Lynn’s offer to help with drying mildly discredits her 
universal mental self-claims; (and/or) the fictional Lynn’s offer to get into the 
dishwasher to help dry seriously discredits her universal mental self-claims; 
(and/or) my fleeting belief that Lynn actually meant her offer in this sense 
discredits my own universal mental self-claims.
• (Knowledge): I know enough about the functioning of dishwashers, the 
meaning of ‘helping out with the drying*, about Lynn’s sanity, etc., so as to 
appreciate the various funny elements of the situation.
• (Identity): I do not feel identified as the fictional irrational Lynn, the real 
Lynn, or the irrational part o f myself that erred.
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• (Involvement) I am involved in the ongoing conversation and (in the case of 
the audience) in the funny aspects of Joe’s comment.
• (Entertainment — for Joe only) My comment will be found funny by Gail and 
Penny (and perhaps by Lynn?).
The fact that Lynn does not exhibit laughter (or at least audible laughter that was 
integrated into the transcript), could also be analyzed in terms of these connotations. 
In this case it is most likely that the fact part of the humour is directed at herself may 
have prevented her from enjoying the joke (i.e., the identity condition does not hold).
These various elements of meaning may result, through the process of 
communication, in any number of interpersonal and social effects. Consequently, they 
must enter the reckoning of actors as they monitor and manage their expressive output 
in line with their goals. Effects and uses of laughter and humour, the subject of much 
humour research, will be treated in Chapter Eight. This third part of the thesis can thus 
be viewed as an additional test of the model of amusement presented. 1 will seek to 
demonstrate the usefulness of the explanation in organizing the field of humour 
research and interpreting its findings within a single coherent scheme.
The actual process of display will also be discussed. For both laughter and 
humour (as for any public act), an actor should take into account the requirements of 
the official framework of interpretation shared with other participants before making 
his move. Thus we may speak of an officially required  display (‘what 
laughter/humour is appropriate’?), which may be in conflict with the display desired 
by the actor ('what laughter/humour do I want to exhibit’?) —influenced additionally 
by his aims and the distribution of power. In the case of laughter, expression is 
complicated by the natural display ('what amusement do I feel?*), the bodily signal 
which would be expressed spontaneously due to the current level of aroused 
amusement. These and other factors finally converge to produce what I will call the 
achieved display (‘what laughter/humour did I actually exhibit?*), the display which 
actually arises and becomes available for observation: "Heh heh heh heh.” In the case 
o f Joe, Peggy, and Gail’s displays, as in many informal interchanges between friends, 
it is likely that natural, official, desired, and achieved displays are closely equivalent. 
At formal parties and encounters between persons of different status, such an 
equivalence is relatively rare.
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2. The Meaning and Deployment of Laughter Displays
2.1. Laughter as Communication
Amusement, like all emotions, shakes the human body into actions which — 
unless hidden or suppressed- are legible by other human actors. I have reserved the 
term laughter or laughter display to identify the visible and audible signals of 
apparent uncontrolled amusement: the grin and (in cases of relatively intense 
amusement) the quivering lower jaw, the spasmodic movements of the upper body, 
and the ha-ha' sounds. These signals, however, are not only the endpoint of a 
physiological mechanism; they may also be the starting point of interpersonal 
communication. Laughter, to observers, conveys meaning. It can be analyzed as a 
communicative sign59.
As signs, emotional expressions are interesting in two ways. Firstly, because 
despite the appearance of spontaneity, they are in fact subject to voluntary control by 
actors. Laughter may be manifested in the complete absence of amusement, or may 
fail to correspond faithfully with the degree and temporal development of the emotion:
Full well they laughed with counterfeited glee
At all his jokes, for many a joke had he.
(Oliver Goldsmith; 
in La France, 1983:1)
Amusement itself may also be 'managed' to increase or decrease the production of 
laughter according to the actor's purposes (see Hochschild, 1979). Secondly, 
emotional expressions are interesting signs in that, unlike linguistic signs, they are 
only partly controllable by actors. Adjusting bodily reaction to desired response is a 
learned skill that must work within the limits of the individual's cognitive and bodily 
faculties. Attempts to control the display of laughter may be unsuccessful. It may 
'burst out' against the subject's wishes.
For this reason, observers attribute a greater credibility to such signs than to 
words and overt gestures. Emotional expressions are considered less controllable, less
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intentional, and thus, more trustworthy signals of actual attitudes and mental states. In 
case of incongruence between spoken word and feeling display, it is the latter that will 
be trusted. Actors, however, are aware of such interpretative strategies, and may 
devote substantial energy to improving their emotional control. Such efforts, in turn, 
reduce the trustworthiness of visible facial and bodily expression (See Goffman, 1969: 
58-70).
2.2. The Audience of Laughter
The audience (i.e., the set of perceivers) of a laughter display can vary in size 
from a single member -the  actor himself—, to a small group of participants in the 
situation, to untold masses through televised images or published verbal descriptions. 
In the typical case, actor and audience are co-present in the same situation —i.e., 
simultaneously within each other's observational range— and even within the same 
encounter -sharing the same focus o f attention. Nevertheless, it is possible for 
observation to occur at a distance, or merely without the laugher's awareness. In 
Chapters Five and Six, for instance, the laughter displays of several individuals were 
recounted, such as the giggling of Jo Anne Williams Bennett and her friend Jackie 
while discussing the “embarrassments o f being female” or the explosion of hilarity in 
the pool hall where DAI. Clark tried to purchase his first condoms. A few minutes o f 
watching television or the diners at a restaurant will provide further examples. Even in 
more conventional situated interaction, however, targeting displays can be 
complicated by the possibility o f 'virtual* participants. These include eavesdroppers, 
non-present friends of observers, or others who may come to know of the events that 
take place in the situation (i.e., through gossip).
It is possible, therefore, to distinguish between the target and the effective 
audience of laughter. The target audience is the set of observers whom the laugher 
hopes will perceive the behaviour and interpret it as such; the effective audience, those 
who actually do. Unintended laughter, brought on by amusement which is not 
successfully suppressed, can be defined as a display which has no target audience. 59
59 Numerous social scientists have independently proposed such a view (Martineau, 1972: 102).
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The target audience of a laughter display is commonly equivalent to the subset 
with whom the laugher claims or wishes to share the alleged amusement: the target 
sharing audience. This may include the humourist who brought about or identified the 
amusing stimulus, like-minded individuals sharing the same focus of attention, or 
those laughing already. The equivalence of target and target sharing audience does not 
always hold, however: a display may overtly exclude the butt of a joke, or a section of 
the audience who would not be able to share the amusement A distinction can 
similarly be drawn between the effective audience and the effective sharing audience - 
-those members of the effective audience who actually experience the amusement at 
the object pointed to by the laugher.
The American President William H. Taft was once giving a speech when a 
cabbage was thrown at him from the audience, missing its mark. Taft’s witty reply, “It 
appears that one of my opponents has lost his head,” was greeted with a roar of 
approving laughter. This laughter was meant to be heard throughout the hall, its target 
audience being everyone present in the situation. Its target sharing audience, on the 
other hand, was restricted to the subset who would agree that Taft's political 
opponents could be referred to as 'cabbage heads,' excluding at least the thrower of 
the vegetable and perhaps other like-minded individuals present. The effective 
audience of this display was in fact much larger than those present in the hall, as it 
includes many persons who did not attend the political speech, including the present 
reader of this thesis. The effective sharing audience of this roar of laughter includes 
those, both in the hall and without, who also found Taft’s joke amusing. It may also 
have included some of Taft’s opponents, not included in the target sharing audience, 
who found his quip amusing despite themselves; and it may have excluded some 
members of the target sharing audience who despite supporting Taft did not appreciate 
the joke. (See Table 1 for a summary of this example).
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Type o f Audience Identity o f Audience
Target All those present in hall
Target Sharing Taft supporters in the hall
Effective All those present in the hall +  Others who came to know of events
Effective Sharing Observers who were amused, within and without the hall
Table 1. Identity of the four audience types for the laughter display which took place in response to 
William H. Taft’s ‘cabbage head’ joke.
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2.3. The Meaning of Laughter
If we consider laughter as a sign, we encounter the problem of its 
interpretation: What does laughter mean? Or rather, as the interpretative possibilities 
are varied, what might it mean? As will be seen, the question of meaning is tied to a 
number of further basic issues in the field of humour studies, including the effects 
which laughter displays might have when deployed in public, the uses to which they 
may be put, and the dilemmas facing an actor when considering what emotional 
displays he wishes to deploy.
Language is a system of relatively arbitrary relations between certain sounds — 
‘house’-  and certain culturally-specific concepts —‘a building for dwelling in, usually 
inhabited by a single nuclear family* (Saussuie, 1916). Translations of words from 
one language to another are never exact, as words apply to concepts within local 
systems of cultural classification. There is no universal ‘meaning* for some word such 
as ‘house,’ as nomadic hunter-gatherers use only temporary huts (or nothing at all), 
and in other societies dwellings provide shelter for large extended families, or are used 
for additional purposes. In the case of pan-human signs of feeling and emotion, 
however, a universal meaning can be provided, even though these displays can be 
used consciously and intentionally in a way similar to language. Cries and facial 
grimaces indicating ‘pain* refer to experiences similar in all comers of humanity, no 
matter what additional interpretations or values are associated with the concept. I will 
not dwell for the moment on the variety of cultural meanings and associations relevant 
to laughter60, but rather on this universal root present in all cultural understandings of 
the sign.
The meaning of laughter can be stated simply. Whatever else it may imply, a 
laughter display by a given individual signifies “I am experiencing amusement of X 
degree [at cause Y],** or, to be more complete, “I am experiencing the bodily process 
of amusement (of X degree), including both pleasant subjective sensations of 
funniness and any spontaneous bodily manifestations visible to yourself (and evident 
also to me).**
This bodily statement will be either close to the true state of affairs, more or less 
incongruent with reality, or completely false. Amusement may or may not actually
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have taken place; it may have been o f greater or lesser intensity than would seem from 
the display; it may have been due to the alleged cause or to a different source. 
Laughter represents a biographical self-claim regarding bodily events which no 
ordinary observer can confirm with full certainty. Regardless of its truth, however, as 
a statement its meaning is constant. I will refer to this most evident surface meaning as 
the denotation of laughter.
The fact and degree of claimed amusement is indicated by the characteristic 
facial expression, bodily movements, and sounds of laughter, which correspond to 
greater or lesser intensities of the emotion (See Chapter One, 3.2). The cause of the 
alleged amusement may be pointed to by the direction of the actor’s gaze, the 
immediate context (i.e., salient events directly preceding the laughter), and/or 
additional communications (a pointing finger, the upraised or otherwise displayed 
source itself, a  verbal identification). Though it is possible for the source of 
amusement not to be indicated by the laughing individual, or for this indication not to 
be clear, in practice most laughter does refer to an explicitly identified or otherwise 
obvious cause. Moreover, when this aspect of the laughter is not understood, an 
observer feels that his understanding is incomplete. Full reception of the message 
requires comprehension of the alleged cause of claimed amusement.
It will be noticed that in order to fully understand the denotation of laughter, 
comprehension of the term 'amusement* is central. Most individuals probably do not 
develop a sophisticated cognitive description of this concept —i.e., a description that 
could be shared and verbalized. Nevertheless, all possess a profound intuitive 
understanding o f what is or is not funny, why something might be or not be amusing, 
and what funniness consists of at the experiential level, among other relevant features. 
Each of us 'knows,* at some primitive level of knowing, what the state of being 
amused signifies and entails.
A theory o f amusement (such as that proposed in Chapters Four to Six), as an 
attempt to formalize some aspects of such intuitive knowledge, consequently makes 
certain claims regarding the meaning o f specific laughter displays to observing 
individuals. For a  superiority theorist, laughter presumably signifies to people that the 
laugher suddenly feels superior to some diminished other; for an incongruity theorist, 60
60 Some discussion of the variety of cultural interpretations will be provided in Chapter Nine, 3.3.
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that an incongruity has been detected or resolved. But these presumptions will fit more 
or less well with how people actually do interpret laughter, according to their first­
hand experience of amusement. Such corollaries of amusement theory can be tested 
against the actual meanings attributed to laughter by actors, and by the effects and 
uses which result from these interpretations.
From the denotation of laughter suggested, and according to the causal 
hypothesis developed in the previous three chapters, a number of separate and 
noteworthy secondary meanings can be derived. These connotations of laughter are 
implied in every display of this type:
4’
• The discredit connotation: "According to my current interpretation, 
claimant C's self-claim S has been discredited by fact F"
• The knowledge connotation: "I possess the knowledge necessary to 
appreciate the amusing elements referred to by the laughter"
• The identity connotation: "I do not feel identified as the claimant(s) 
discredited"
• The involvement connotation: "I am sufficiently involved in the funny 
elements of the situation to enjoy amusement"
These connotations could be expanded upon, and others arrived at, by specifying more 
fully (as has been done in Chapters Four, Five, and Six) the various implications of 
terms such as 'self-claim,* 'discredit,' and 'involvement.' It suffices, however, as a 
starting point for the analysis of laughter uses and effects.
Clearly, an observer of laughter does not receive its message in such a 
cumbersome and explicit format. Indeed, he would be unable to verbalize much of this 
information, or might express it in radically divergent terms. Nevertheless, 
participants of interaction do appear to assimilate the various elements of this message 
when interpreting the meaning of a laughter display. This fact becomes especially 
apparent when misunderstanding or disagreement exists over the funniness of a 
specific alleged cause of amusement
For example, a  news item recently filled the pages of the Italian press for a 
number of weeks (January 1997), the throwing of rocks from a motorway overpass by 
an unidentified group of youths, causing the death of Letizia Berdini as well as danger
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and damage to other drivers and vehicles. One newspaper entitled a story T h e re  w e re  
three of them, throwing stones and laughing”, quoting from an eyewitness report (L a  
Repubblica, 3/1/1997)61. In the article, the image of the "killers” on the overpass, 
cheering and laughing after every h it’ is juxtaposed with the human tragedy o f th e  
Berdini family. The laughter of these individuals here, as all laughter, communicates 
to observers that the laughers are sufficiently involved in the funny aspects of a scene 
to be amused, disregarding or unaffected enough by others (See Chapter Six, 3.2.2). In  
this case, the actual killing of another human being, as well as the general possibility 
of death and damage to property, trust, and health of numerous individuals, are  
included within the disregarded 'other aspects' of the situation. Thus, to readers o f th is  
article, the involvement connotation of this laughter display is particularly salient, as 
most of them would not have been able to experience such emotional distance from  
suffering - in  fact would see it as immoral. The laughter o f the stone-throwers seem s 
(and is meant to seem) the epitome of heartless cruelty and evil. The fact that the 
intended readers should react in this way, however, reflects not only their m oral 
attitudes, but also the intuitive knowledge of what amusement entails -inc lud ing  
emotional distance from the misfortune of others, when relevant.
Most individuals would not describe the cause of alleged amusement pointed 
to by a laughter display in terms of 'discredited self-claims'. Nevertheless, their 
intuitive knowledge of the causes of amusement may be congruent with such terms. 
For example, if  I witness another's tickling, I might offer 'tickling' as the cause o f 
observed laughter, as might all other participants in the scene. If I tell a joke and 
others laugh, both they and I might agree that 'the joke* or 'the punchline' was the 
source of humour. Though sufficient for ordinary purposes, these attributions are 
superficial. In each case, all observers have a further intuitive understanding of what 
'tickling' or 'being amused by a joke' entails. These intuitive understandings are built 
on years of personal subjective experience with the emotion of amusement, and o f 
observing signs o f a presumably identical experience in others. As each of us 'knows' 
that being tickled is amusing, understands exactly in which way this is so, and 
assumes others do as well, there is little need to trace the causes of amusement further
61 With reference to the previous discussion, this newspaper article brings readers into the effective 
audience of a laughter display originally targeted by the stone-throwers for each other. Needless to say, 
most of the effective audience will be non-sharing.
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during ordinary social interaction. The existence of a deeper understanding, however, 
is supported by the facts that (1) professional and lay humour theorists can (and do, at 
times) argue over how to characterize the specific elements in the interpretation of a 
joke or in the experience of tickling that produces amusement; (2) participants of 
interaction often engage in debate and reflection over what a particular instance of 
laughter reveals about the laugher. A good theory of amusement should provoke in its 
readers the recognition of their intuitive understandings of what 'funny' refers to, and 
this should provide a solid basis for an analysis of laughter's meanings.
A laughter display may be qualified by additional verbal or non-verbal 
messages. For example, it may be delivered explicitly as 'fake' (i.e., acted) laughter, as 
both Ken and A1 do in the following transcript of a conversation after the punchline of 
what they consider to be a bad’joke:
45. Ken: ...third girl, walks up t'her -w hy didn'
46. ya say anything last night. W you told me it was
47. always impolite t'talk with my mouth full,
(2.0)
48. Ken: hh hyok hyok,
( 1.0)
49. Ken: Hyok.
(3-0)
50. AI: HA-HA-HA-HA-HA, (Sacks, 1974:339)
Sacks characterizes the laughter of these two participants as "mirthless" and 
"specifically mocking". How is this fakeness apparent to Sacks (or to other 
participants of interaction)? Presumably, the rhythm, intonation, and perhaps facial 
expression of the laughings were too distant from a typical response to be taken 
seriously. Indeed, the transcript itself conveys some of the cues provided by the 
imitators of laughter. 'HA-HA-HA-HA-HA' seems much too close to the stereotype of 
laughter, with a beat much too precise. ‘Hyok* is an even more evident transformation 
o f the natural sounds of laughter. Comparison with more spontaneous examples 
reveals the difference:
8. Roger Ehhh//hehh hhh hhh
(...)
51. Ken: ehh heh heh // hehhh
52. (Al): hehhhehhheh hhh (Sacks, 338-339)
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When a laugh is qualified in this way, the original meaning of laughter continues to be  
relevant, but undergoes a transformation: “I pretend that ("I am experiencing 
amusement o f X  degree [at cause Y]")’\  The implication of such an utterance, indeed, 
is that the laugher is positively not amused.
There are other ways in which laughter may be qualified, by intentional o r 
unintentional signs. Difficulties or incompetence in feigning a display may be evident 
to observers, who may doubt its authenticity. In response to a 'sick' (but allegedly 
amusing) joke or occurrence, a participant may combine laughter with signs o f disgust 
such as a grimace or 'yuk'/’ugh' sound. Cruel or tragic elements could be appreciated 
with similar expressions or even with verbal statements such as "that's not funny,'* 
"that's awful," or "poor thing." By covering his eyes with his hand and 
lowering/shaking his head, a laugher could convey simultaneous embarrassment. 
Explicit pointers to the source of amusement may also be offered, verbal or non­
verbal, particularly when the source is ambiguous or when an apparent source wishes 
to be denied: "No, Butch, I wasn't laughing at your car, I was just thinking about 
something that happened to me the other day.".
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2.4. Main Connotations
Specific instances of laughter can be given countless meanings. If Tom laughs 
after Jill's mocking comment about Frank, different observers could give a range of 
interpretations: Tom  is amused,' Tom likes Jill', Tom is trying to get something from 
Jill', Tom and Jill have similar ideas about people,' Tom  thinks Frank is ridiculous in 
some way,' Tom hates Frank', Tom  is drunk', Tom has forgotten his troubles', Tom is 
heartless' (for laughing at such a cruel joke), Tom's English is quite good' (or he 
would not have understood the clever play on words), Tom has no tact' (or he would 
not have laughed in front of Frank's friend Brian), Tom  is listening to the 
conversation', Tom  is pretending to have understood the joke', Tom  is hiding his 
distaste for such a comment'.
It will be my contention, however, that such interpretations can be derived 
from the denotation o f laughter proposed above, and from our intuitive understandings 
of amusement, when considering a specific situation from a specific angle. What 
follows is a short description of the four fundamental derivations introduced in the 
previous section, the ‘discredit,* ‘knowledge,’ ‘identity,’ and ‘involvement* 
connotations. The most commonly cited effects and uses of laughter displays can be 
traced directly to these four sub-meanings, as will be done in Chapter Eight (4).
2.4.1. The 'Discredit' Connotation
A laugher communicates that he has found something funny. Following the 
given definition for amusement (See Chapter Four), he thus declares to have detected 
the discredit of a self-claim made by a specific claimant. One meaning of a laughter 
display, therefore, can be stated as follows:
"According to my current interpretation, claimant D's self-claim C has been
discredited by fact F \
An observer may be already aware of the values for D, C, and F, or they may 
be immediately apparent given the current circumstances. For example, immediately 
previous to the laughter, a friend may have clumsily dropped an entire tray of food on
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the floor, with much clattering of cutlery and smashing of plates. In this case, the 
abstract formulation is fleshed out along some such lines: "According to my current 
interpretation, Jamie's universal self-claim to competence in handling objects has been 
discredited by the dropping of his tray on the floor."
On the other hand, it could happen that the source of amusement is not 
immediately clear, the values for D, C, and F remaining unknown. The above meaning 
structure would then for the moment remain in some such abstract form for the 
observer who —if interested- could investigate further. Partial information may be 
available. The laugher may be seen to direct his gaze or even his pointing finger at a 
passing group of foreign tourists, apparently amusing in some respect, even if the 
exact nature of the alleged discredit remains temporarily unclear. The laugher may 
conversely reveal the nature of the discredit before the discrediting facts are known: 
"Look at Bill in this photograph; you can pick him out by his ridiculous haircut!!". If a 
common focus of attention is shared by a group of participants (i.e., in an 'encounter'), 
laughter generally refers to the current or immediately preceding event in the common 
focus of attention: the revelation of a 'full house' by a poker player, the last words 
spoken by a speaker in a conversation, the unfolding comedic shenanigans on the 
television set62. Sometimes, of course, such situational clues are insufficient for the 
observer to understand the full significance of the laughter, even when the source of 
alleged amusement has been pinpointed with some precision. Loud laughter by a 
whole group may strongly indicate that the 'punchline' to a  joke has taken place, 
without the observer having yet understood what precisely is to be found funny.
2.4.2. The 'Knowledge' Connotation
Laughter, as a claim to having been amused, implies the existence of certain 
mental possessions —i.e., frameworks of interpretation (See Chapter Four 3.1.1). A 
second sub-meaning of laughter can be stated as follows:
62 Harvey Sacks comes to the following conclusion on the basis of a close examination of recorded 
conversations: "laughings are very locally responsive — if done on the completion of some utterance 
they affiliate to last utterance and if done within some utterance they affiliate to its current state of 
development" (Sacks, 1974:348)
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"I possess the knowledge necessary to appreciate the amusing elements 
referred to by the laughter."
Let us consider, for instance, the following opening sentence from a (serious) 
novel by Bulwer-Lytton, which Scott Rice considers laughably poor writing:
It was a dark and stormy night; the rain fell in torrents -except at occasional 
intervals, when it was checked by a violent gust of wind which swept up the 
streets (for it is in London that our scene lies), rattling along the housetops, 
and fiercely agitating the scanty flame of the lamps that struggled against the 
darkness.
(Rice, 1986: ix)
A person who laughs after reading this passage, as an example of cliched and 
melodramatic prose, expresses his possession of (1) a good understanding of the 
English language, (2) the ability to read, (3) knowledge of the self-claims attaching to 
a  writer of prose, including economy, dramatic restraint, and originality, and (4) a 
code by which to assess the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of such self-claims.
Laughter always implies the knowledge of both the making of relevant self­
claims and of the conditions for their fulfillment: in the case of independent self­
claims, the fact that the relevant claim was made, and its content; in the case of role 
self-claims, the requirements of the relevant role; in the case of universal self-claims, 
the basics of human competence (as judged by the laugher's culture).
Laughter at satire, caricature, irony, puns, tricks, and jokes expresses 
knowledge of the relevant frameworks inappropriately mixed or distorted:
Where does electricity come from?
The wall. (Doug Kehoe, in Davis 1993,75)
Someone who, by a display of laughter, claims to 'catch* this joke, thereby claims to 
know that (1) Electricity is cabled to our buildings (and walls) from power stations, 
which generate it in various ways; (2) Most people's main outlet to electric power is 
from  sockets in the walls of buildings; (3) Questions of the type 'where does X come
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ufrom?' (especially when delivered with an air of puzzled mystery) require answ ers 
relative to 'final causes' (in this case about the nature o f electricity, its generation, 
etc...) and not to immediate ones which are well-known by everyone.
Interestingly, laughter at this joke may also imply an admission of a gap in th e  
listener’s knowledge: his ignorance of where electricity does actually ’come from’ in  
the final analysis. It is this ignorance which allows him to accept the initial question as 
puzzling, setting him up for a risible assent with the erroneous notion that electricity is 
actually generated in the wall behind the socket (or, alternatively, for a risible failure 
to come up with the answer to an obvious question).
As well as these specific bits o f knowledge or ignorance, of course, the listener 
further claims to understand the conventions of joke-telling, without which he m ight 
have failed to adopt the necessary 'fool-me* attitude.
Non-laughter in a situation which an observer perceives as amusing does not 
necessarily signify that the serious individual lacks some of the vital mental 
possessions. Nevertheless, this is one possible interpretation.
Chapter Seven: Laughter and Humour______________________________________ Section .2
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2.4.3. The Identity' Connotation
A person who laughs expresses his identity-distance from the target of alleged 
amusement. He states,
"I do not feel identified as the claimant(s) discredited."
He purports to be unaffected or insufficiently affected by embarrassment, and thus to 
be able to enjoy amusement at the discredit of another (See Chapter Six, 2).
In a large number of cases, such a meaning will be too obvious to warrant 
notice. When two friends laugh over a new piece of gossip regarding a third party, 
there is normally little question of either being touched by the discredit. This 
connotation of laughter achieves its relevance when the person laughing has some 
potential link with the discredited party: when he gaffes or causes a ’scene,' when he is 
the butt of a joke, belongs to a mocked social category, has familiar or other ties of 
affinity with a dishonoured individual, or makes similar self-claims which might well 
be challenged. In such cases, the laughter display expresses distance from the 
associated self, role, or person.
Chapter Five (2.3.4), for instance, included the example of ‘wind-up* victims, 
who commonly laugh upon discovery that they have been deceived. Their laughter 
communicates, among other things, that it is not the victim’s ‘real se lf who has been 
gullible and has behaved improperly, that normally his interpretations of events are 
accurate and trustworthy, and his actions appropriate and measured. A victim who, on 
the other hand, merely blushed and displayed mortification at the end of such a joke, 
would disclose that he considers himself identified as the discredited claimant
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2.4.4. The 'Involvement' Connotation
Laughter expresses a certain level of engrossment in the framework within 
which discredit has taken place (See Chapter Six, 3). The following is communicated:
"I am sufficiently involved in the funny elements of the situation to enjoy 
amusement"
Again, this signification is often unremarkable. It becomes salient when laughter is 
exhibited in spite of clear obstacles to involvement One example has been provided 
in the previous section, the newspaper report of the jeering motorway stone-throwers. 
In this case, involvement in the funny side of events jarred with additional emotion- 
relevant elements of the situation, namely the death of a young woman and the 
potential damage to property, physical injury and/or death of other human beings. 
Thus, the display was portrayed as a  sign of cruelty and heartlessness. It could be 
speculated that to the stone-throwers themselves, this sub-meaning of involvement 
may have been equally salient, the distance shown from potential victims interpreted 
as signs of 'toughness' and a valued disregard/disdain for others.
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2.5. The Display of Laughter
The meaning of a laughter display refers to its alleged cause: U., unmanaged 
amusement. A further question concerns its actual cause: 'when and how is laughter 
displayed?'. Laughter does not transparently reveal an individual’s emotional state, the 
granting of such information not always being in his best interests. The margin of 
control human beings have over emotional expression allows for numerous additional 
influences to become relevant.
The question of laughter's expression is a complex one41, involving a number 
of conceptually distinct levels: emotional, situational, cognitive, and factual. Each is 
relevant to a potential or attributed expression of laughter, a stage in the process of 
display (See Figure 1). The final and observable laughter display I will refer to as the 
achieved display, which may differ from the desired display of an actor, the ideal 
expression towards which he strives but does not always reach. We can also 
distinguish between this personal ideal and the situational idea], the officially 
required  display, which is the expression or range of expressions that would be 
considered appropriate to the current social situation. Finally, it is possible to speak of 
the natural display of laughter, the level of laughter which would emerge 
spontaneously due to any amusement present at the time (See Chapter One, 3.1).
Imagine, for instance, that a joke is told in a group situation which a certain 
participant finds extremely funny. His natural display, if unmodified, would be very 
intense. This display would fit well with the officially required display for joke 
audiences, which is generally a certain level of appreciative laughter. This particular 
listener, however, may aim for a desired display of seriousness, for example to insult 
or show dislike for the joke teller (perhaps after a recent argument). His achieved 
display, therefore, might be more intense than he might have desired, less intense than 
it might have been if  amusement had been freely released, and within the acceptable 
limits of the official definition of the situation. Actors often consider these various 
levels of display quite consciously, and even bring them into conversation, as when 63
63 This complexity has not often been recognized or treated in the literature (La France, 1983: 2). In 
much traditional humour theory and research, observable laughter seems to be equated with genuine 
amusement In the field of conversation analysis, on the other hand, amusement often seems to be 
ignored altogether, and laughter treated as a sign which is unproblematically employed by speakers at 
will.
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struggles to ‘keep a straight face’ in the classroom, or attempts to laugh at ‘awful’ 
jokes, are recounted.
In the following four subsections, each of these levels of display will be 
discussed in turn: natural, officially required, desired, and achieved.
2.5.1. The Natural Display64
Amusement has been defined as an emotion which includes both a subjective 
feeling of 'funniness' and a set of bodily events, some of which are readily observable. 
The 'natural display' of laughter refers to the latter, most evident, signs of amusement. 
This natural expression, of whatever degree, is only a potential manifestation. Like the 
ideal flight path o f a feather, it develops fully only in a vacuum, in this case a  social 
and emotional vacuum. Though it is one of the major influences that may affect an
The adjective 'natural* here refers to the innateness and universality of the amusement emotion itself. 
Though no less unsatisfactory than other choices (ie, 'genuine', 'emotional', 'transparent'...), some of the 
undesirable connotations of the term should be specifically mentioned.
As has been seen in Chapters Four to Six, the cognitive process which sets off amusement 
relies on socially inherited and situationally relevant frameworks of interpretation. Thus, this 'natural' 
expression is in fact an expression of a 'social'judgement
It is ironic also that the 'natural' display should be most observable under highly artificial -  
'unnatural'— conditions.
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achieved display of laughter, the natural display is never or very rarely visible or 
audible, for two reasons.
Firstly, it is most likely to be observable when least likely to be observed: 
when the individual believes himself to be alone (or perhaps in the exclusive presence 
of highly trusted participants). In these cases achieved expression may closely 
resemble natural expression, laughter being more 'spontaneous.' As amusement most 
often occurs in social situations, however, numerous pressures normally interfere with 
the spontaneous flow of emotion.
Secondly, the common presence of simultaneous emotion during an 
occurrence of amusement (See Chapter Six, 3-4) will distort an otherwise ‘pure* 
laughter display. Competing emotions and other somatic processes (i.e., pain, 
digestion, nervous tension) affect the same face and body on which the movements 
and sounds of laughter are displayed.
Amusement, and thus also the natural display of laughter, is the result of a 
particular interpretation of events by a subject (See Figure 1), an assessment which 
has been specified in detail in chapters Four to Six.
There seem to exist highly localized areas of the brain which either trigger off 
or convey the neural signals which result in amusement. According to Duchowny, 
stimulating the hypothalamus and diencephalic region provokes "well-developed 
laughter” (1983: 97). The natural display of laughter at any one moment could be 
defined as the observable bodily manifestations provoked by the neural signals from 
such a localized amusement centre/pathway, in the absence of additional neural 
activity.
The distinction can perhaps be made more clear with a real-life example. Joy 
Fielding (in Kurc, 1990) has written an autobiographical account of an embarrassing 
situation that happened to her during a play in which she was performing. At a certain 
moment of the play, a song was supposed to be heard on a radio —but the tape which 
was to supply the music did not work. Fielding improvised by singing the song 
herself, despite having a poor singing voice:
Occupying centre stage, my shoulders thrust proudly back, my head loftily
raised, I belted into that fragile little hymn for all I was worth. The audience
grew absolutely still. And then, mid-way through my performance. I became
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aware of muffled sounds from somewhere behind me. I turned around —still 
singing— to see [co-stars] Hersh and Nomi absolutely doubled over with 
laughter.
(M 2)
In this case, it is clear from the ‘muffled’ character o f Hersh and Nomi’s laughter that 
Fielding’s fellow performers were struggling to conceal a natural display which could 
not be repressed despite their efforts. Fielding’s poor singing, and her false claim to be 
following the script, constituted hilarious circumstances o f discredit which elicited 
amusement too strong to conceal. > ,
2.5.2. The Officially Appropriate Display
Laughter, as a signal that a self-claim's discredit has taken place, is the 
expression of an alleged individual cognitive judgement (See Chapter Four, 3). It has 
been suggested that this judgement is subject to social influence through the frames of 
interpretation central to the assessment process. For instance, Hersh and Nomi’s 
laughter, mentioned above, referred to amusement that depended on ideas of what 
constitutes ‘good singing’ and what constitutes a ‘proper performance’ of the play in 
course. These cognitive frames are to a greater or lesser extent social in origin, and 
become relevant to the individual according to the social situation in which he locates 
himself. Additionally, however, the expression of the judgement through laughter 
undergoes further social pressure, as dictated by the 'official' framework of 
interpretation (See Chapter Three, 3.3).
During social interaction, each participant adjusts his behaviour to numerous 
situational requirements, in line with certain shared understandings of what is going 
on, who each actor is, and what role each is playing within the various active 
proceedings. These shared understandings comprise the official framework or 
definition of the situation, constructed on the basis of the unfolding events and the 
interpretations of these events by participants (See Figure 1), including general social 
understandings, overt role membership of participants, time and setting, past self­
claims and arrangements made by participants, and current decisions regarding mles
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and selves (See Goffman, 1974). In Joy Fielding’s anecdote, for instance, the 
situational context was defined as ‘the public performance of a stage play/ with all 
the behavioural norms and expectations associated with the theatre, audiences, and 
related features of such events.
Participants who outwardly commit themselves to the official framework often 
also adopt their version of this frame as their own cognitive outlook on the situation, 
at least to some extent and for the duration of interaction. They attempt to become 
involved in the perspective openly agreed to by all participants, so that there will be 
minimal discord between their individual cognitive frame and the official frame. 
Nevertheless, any individual will occasionally be unable or unwilling to adopt some 
aspects of the official definition as his own at a cognitive level, even while 
committing himself to it outwardly. Some individuals may routinely maintain such a 
distance in certain situations (Secret service agents representing an extreme example).
Laughter, as a behaviour, is subject to regulation by the official framework, in 
three related ways. Firstly, these shared understandings include guidelines regarding 
which elements within a situation are to be relevant or irrelevant to the proceedings. 
Laughter at (or indeed any attention to) objects outside of the field of relevance may 
be considered out of place. Cackling at an irrelevant memory association during a 
two-party conversation, for instance, would require some sort of explanation or 
excuse. Secondly, the permissible level of emotional expression, or of a subset of 
emotional expression, or specifically of laughter, may be circumscribed by the official 
framework. Someone may be 'too serious* at a party or comedy club, or 'too merry* at a 
funeral. Thirdly, the official definition of a situation determines what it would take for 
any element within the frame to be found funny or not. A superior's speech deficiency 
might be considered laughable among colleagues, but not in a gathering including the 
superior himself. The official frame includes understandings regarding all of the 
relevant variables of amusement: the self-claims made by specific individuals, role- 
members, and people in general; what it would take for these self-claims to be 
discredited; the level of identification of participants with each other and outside 
entities; the appropriate levels of empathy to be plied in cases of misfortune; etc.
Whatever cognitive frame actually used by a single participant to interpret 
events at a given moment, he must be aware o f and take into consideration the official 
definition of events before acting or blurting out his thoughts and opinions —at least if
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he is to achieve any level of social competence. As we shall see in Chapter Eight, the 
individual judgement to which laughter refers may be re-judged by observers as more 
or less relevant, more or less accurate, more or less fair, more or less thoughtful, and 
more or less congruent with the laugher's claims about himself. Participants adjust 
their displays of laughter accordingly, or else risk losing face.
The degree of adjustment required varies with the gap between the natural 
display forthcoming and the amount o f laughter appropriate at the time; this gap, in 
turn, varies with the distance between the individual and official frameworks. Often, 
of course, there may be a close congruency between actual amusement and 
interactional requirements. At other times, however, actors may be sharply aware of 
an effort to maintain an appropriate exterior show.
In the case of Joy Fielding’s ad-libbed singing, we can safely say that the 
official framework strictly forbade laughter at on-stage errors, which during a 
theatrical performance lie well outside the boundary of attendable objects. Any 
attention to events outside the fictional frame being enacted on a theatrical stage is a 
serious threat to the illusion which the theatre creates, and which (paying) audiences 
expect and come to enjoy. Normally, unscripted laughter by the actors of a play will 
min its magic.
The official definition of a situation is not, o f course, a fixed entity, nor one 
independent from the participants affected by i t  Participants usually have some 
leeway towards modifying the framework during interaction, and sometimes conflict 
and negotiation over definitions becomes an ongoing, active process. Any act of doubt 
or deviance is a threat to the frame as currently defined and could potentially lead to 
its reframing —though mechanisms of control may reassert the previous 
understandings.
Clearly, some elements of a  frame are more subject to change than others. The 
fact (observed by all participants) that the cat is on the mat is less vulnerable in this 
sense than the judgements of whether the mat is in need of cleaning, who owns the 
cat, whether the animal is a ’cute' member of its species, or whether cats should be 
allowed into the house. Even the initial 'fact* could be doubted however: the apparent 
cat-on-mat could be a  stuffed fake, a hologram, or a hypnotically- suggested illusion. 
Interestingly, the laughter by Hersh and Nomi in Joy Fielding’s anecdote managed to 
change the official definition of events. This was possible because the dramatic
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production in progress was not well-known and moreover belonged to the theatre of 
the absurd, where unexpected events and incoherence which even challenge the very 
framing of the play itself are often scripted. Thus, the laughter, which in normal 
circumstances could have spoilt the play as an unacceptable intrusion, in this case was 
accepted by the audience as an intentional and keyed intrusion. As Fielding writes, 
“the audience, bless their confused little hearts, had no idea what was going on. 
Because the action seemed no less puzzling than anything else in the play up until that 
point, many thought my singing and the accompanying laughter was part of the show” 
(42-43).
Not all participants have an equal, influence on the official definitions. A 
totalitarian dictator by sheer threat of violence may skew public displays of opinion, 
practice, and belief in desired ways: tormented citizens may be heard to use only the 
official language, profess the national religious (or non-religious) faith, praise their 
■benevolent' leader, and even assert historical inaccuracies ("no cat has ever touched a 
mat!") -often in contradiction with private ideas and practices. A school bully may 
achieve a similar outward conformity, at least while he is physically present to enforce 
it.
Power, in any form, is the principal mediator of interpretative influence. Any 
relationship o f dependence entails an imbalance in the relative inputs towards official 
frameworks. To a shopkeeper, who depends on customers for his livelihood, 'the 
customer is always right.' Similarly, it might be said that for an employee 'the boss is 
always right* and that for a wife/child in a traditional household 'the husband/father is 
always right.' An interesting study of a hospital setting by Coser (1960) suggests that 
within a hierarchy, joking is used most often by the upper ranks, and that all humour 
(or at least that which is deployed before the targets of humour themselves) tends to 
be ’directed downwards' —those above mock those below.
Persons or entities of achieved and/or recognized authority on specific topics 
may be allowed a greater influence on the definition of certain events: scientists on 
science, historians on history, Tidy men’ on moral behaviour, well-established 
newspapers on current events, the 'well-educated' on a variety of topics, a trusted 
friend on facts of his own life. Such authority may depend, in turn, not only on 
personal talent and achievement but also on external factors, including access to 
relevant education and cultural definitions of social roles and prestige. Situational
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roles are also endowed with varying levels of definitional influence. A public speaker 
or performer on stage has a tremendous degree of influence on the current goings on -  
-within certain limits of the genre. Other powerful situated roles include hosts, 
moderators, referees, organizers, 'masters of ceremonies,' and (as in Fielding’s 
anecdote) stage actors. To a lesser extent, any speaker during conversation may sway 
interpretation while he holds the floor.
At a broader level, of course, economic and/or directive control over scientific 
research, artistic production, educational institutions, and communications media 
allows a more subtle influence on the frames of interpretation adopted by society at 
large. Culture defines reality both directly (i.e., lightning comes from Thor's hammer’, 
'people should get married before their thirties') and indirectly, by laying out structures 
of rank and authority which will determine the distribution of interpretative influence 
(i.e., babies bom to this group will be mute slaves', 'our holy leader speaks the divine 
truth’).
Individual skill, however, cannot be overlooked. Though not easy to 
disentangle from issues of power, there are elements o f charisma that go beyond mere 
natural beauty and prestige. The arts of self-presentation and rhetoric can in 
themselves have an effect on prevailing definitions, generating power out of sheer 
communicative dexterity. Politicians, advertisers, missionaries, intellectual pioneers, 
and salespersons o f every description have employed similar techniques to lead their 
audiences for as long as possible on their persuasive pitch. When unusual skill in this 
respect is combined with the solution to some incongruence or failing in prevailing 
definitions, large-scale change may be provoked, even by the 'powerless.' In practice, 
however, it is the initially powerful who obtain the best training and outlets for such 
power-generating talents.
2.5.3. The Desired Display
The official requirements of the situation constitute one element which the 
individual should take into account when deciding on a display. In Joy Fielding's 
anecdote, we can imagine that Nomi and Hersh were mainly considering this aspect 
when attempting to suppress their highly inappropriate outburst Another three
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elements may affect the actual expression an individual will attempt to produce, 
however: his relative power, his guiding aims, and his assessment of the feasibility of 
the display task (See Figure 1).
Power allows for greater interactional risks to be taken. A participant in a 
subordinate relation to another will have more to lose from an improper display than 
the latter would. For example, a stonefaced shopkeeper who fails to appreciate 
customer humour may not be making the most of his business. On the other hand, a 
jarring emotional expression by a superior may simply revise the previous official 
understandings. Customers may rebuff salesmen's jokes with relative impunity. To 
continue with the example of Fielding’s play, it can be imagined that for a struggling 
professional actor during the opening night of an important production, where career 
prospects could depend crucially on an engaging performance, breaking frame by 
laughing at a stage error could spell disaster. On the other hand, if the actor were the 
son of a theatre impresario and the play were a little attended production in its final 
days of a long run, a relatively comfortable power position could allow this individual 
to take greater risks.
The participant's guiding aims may also affect the expression desired. As we 
have seen, laughter displays carry with them a number of connotations: the fact of 
someone's discredit, the displayer's mental contents, his involvement in the funny 
elements, and a certain level of identity distance from the discredited individual. Each 
of these potential meanings may enter into the displayer's reckoning process, as each 
implies a set of interactional effects which may be beneficial or harmful to his 
interests. For example, while laughing at another's joke might normally be seen as 
'proper', a person who feels hostile towards or threatened by the joke-maker may wish 
to avoid the affiliative implications of laughter (See Chapter Eight 4.2.2) and therefore 
minimize or abstain from a laughter display. In the circumstance of Fielding’s 
improvised singing, it could be imagined that her co-stars could have maliciously 
engineered the whole situation merely to embarrass Fielding or ruin the play, the open 
laughter serving as an additional element of sabotage. Strategic use of laughter will be 
discussed further in Chapter Eight, where many of the effects and possible uses of 
laughter displays will be enumerated.
Finally, once a desired level of expression has been arrived at, the individual 
may also consider the realistic probability of the expression being achieved,
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considering the strength of emotional resources and pressures, the physical energy 
available for voluntary modification, and an assessment of emotional management 
skills. At the point when a certain level of amusement is desirable, actual mirth m ay 
be:
1. Nonexistent, in which case the desired level of laughter should be 
counterfeited entirely.
2. Available for display through laughter, though not to a sufficient degree. In 
this case, laughter should be overstated, exaggerated, more of the expression 
being produced than would naturally emerge.
3. Available for display through laughter, though to a degree exceeding desired 
levels. In this case, laughter should be understated, partially suppressed, less o f 
the expression being produced than would naturally emerge.
A final possibility concerns events which are perceived as funny by the participant 
when display is undesirable. In this case amusement is:
4. Available (and pressuring) for display through laughter, when such laughter 
is unwanted. The expression of amusement should be suppressed.
The balance of emotional resources and pressures on the one hand, and of physical 
and mental skills and energy on the other, will determine the possibilities of effective 
display. An exhausted and irritated individual may find situational demands to feign 
laughter beyond reasonable effort. Conversely, intense urges to laugh may be deemed 
impossible to suppress or conceal for long enough too avoid detection. This in fact 
turned out to be the case with Hersh and Norm's strong feelings of amusement during 
Joy Fielding's stage bluff, though under the circumstances, they attempted in vain to 
achieve their desired display. In other cases, if a desired display is judged unfeasible, 
an alternative strategy may adopted (See next section).
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2.5.4. The Achieved Display
The achieved display is the observable display, equivalent to the unmodified 
term a laughter display. As anticipated in Chapter One, there are two methods which 
social actors commonly employ to achieve a desired emotional expression 
(Hochschild, 1979).
Shallow acting involves either interference or interaction with the output 
process of the relevant emotional system (i.e., amusement). The individual may 
consciously manipulate facial, vocal, respiratory, and bodily organs in order to 
replicate the target display mechanically. Superfluous laughter movement and sound 
may be suppressed by opposing motor activity; clenching the mouth shut, tensing 
abdominal muscles, resisting exhalation. It may also be concealed behind hands or 
other screens such as books, walls, or fans. Insufficient laughter activity may be 
supplemented with voluntary movements and sound production/modulation.
Deep acting, on the other hand, can be used to directly stimulate or reduce 
amusement itself. It is unclear exactly how this might be achieved, and specifically 
what level(s) of the amusement process might be vulnerable to influence from the 
conscious will. One procedure might be a simple concentrated effort to direct attention 
at the relevant elements of the official framework. At this level, deep acting hardly 
resembles 'acting' at all, approaching equivalence with mere situational involvement. 
Another could be to consciously frame these elements within an imagined sequence 
that would lead to an appropriate expression (i.e., as a caricature, exaggeration, or 
understatement of the original events). A third might include the deliberate 
introduction of unrelated ideas (i.e., family deaths to reduce amusement; the 
nakedness of fellow participants to increase it) which might set off the desired level of 
laughter. Finally, it may be possible for individuals to develop the ability to access the 
neural pathways of'involuntary* amusement itself.
Either deep or shallow acting, or a combination of the two, may be employed 
by an individual in order to execute a desired expression. These may be additionally 
supplemented by verbal signs, before, during, or even after the relevant reaction. For 
example, insufficient laughter can be modified with such phrases as "good one," "very 
funny," or "that’s hilarious," or excused with reasons such as a  sudden thought, 
tiredness, or having Tieard the joke before.' Superfluous laughter can be minimized
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with offerings like "that’s no laughing matter," "oooh —awful," or "what a stupid 
joke," or it can simply be attributed to a different stimulus, such as a passing thought 
or an event behind the co-participant's head.
Joking may also be used to deflect an apparent source of amusement, either 
after an outburst or to allow for a release of amusement. For example, a television 
presenter has recounted to me an anecdote regarding the interviewing of a holy man of 
the ancient Indian Jain religion. The interviewee arrived to the location of the filming 
completely naked, which for many of the crew was in itself a risible violation of 
appearance and territorial self-claims. W hen the sacred man, mid-interview, lifted his 
leg and relieved his flatulence with a loud burst, the interviewer doubted that either his 
or the crew's hilarity could be contained for very long. He quickly intervened with a 
joke to allow for a genera] release.
~ Achieved expression is a function o f (1) the emotional display desired, (2) the 
quality and intensity of the natural display (available as resources or hindering display 
goals), (3) the acting strategies and procedures employed to achieve the desired 
display, (4) the level of competence acquired in using these strategies and procedures, 
and (5) the energy resources available (See Figure 1). Returning to Fielding’s 
anecdote, Nomi and Hersh’s achieved display (including 'muffled sounds' and 
'doubling over’) was influenced by (1) their desire to maintain a 'straight face* as 
demanded by the script, (2) intense amusement, and thus an intense tendency to laugh, 
(3) the use of muscular suppression of the bodily reaction, and either (4) insufficient 
skill or (5) insufficient strength to achieve their target.
It should be noted that efforts to achieve a desired expression may be more or 
less conscious. In Fielding’s anecdote, Nomi and Hersh were undoubtedly well aware 
of their own inner struggle, but more routine (especially successful) attempts can pass 
by less noticed by a participant o f interaction. Being such a routine interpersonal 
activity, the controlled display of emotional expression becomes habitualized to such a 
degree that actors may carry it out with little or no awareness of the control applied. 
The situation is similar to such response cries as 'damn!' or 'ouch!', which appear 
automatic and uncontrolled and yet display features (i.e., appropriate volume, 
language, and type o f expression) clearly adjusted to the audience present (Goffman, 
1981:78-120).
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3. The Meaning and Deployment of Humour Displays
3.1. Humour as Communication
Humour has been defined in Chapter One as 'communicative presentations 
intended (by the communicator) to provoke amusement,' following the most common 
explicit or implicit use of this term in the humour research literature. The notion can 
be much refined.
As a type of communication, this concept can be divided into either units of 
abstract meaning or units of concrete usage65. Beginning with the latter, a situated 
presentation of humour by a participant, bounded in space and time, can be referred to 
as a hum our display: the making of an ironic comment by Bill to his friends, the 
inclusion of a political cartoon in a daily newspaper, or the playing of a prank by a 
group of students on their schoolteacher. This can be distinguished from a hum our 
piece, which is the actual content of a display, independent of specific instantiations: 
the ironic statement, the graphic caricature, the prank. Consider, for instance, the 
following exchange:
Jason: That painting in our livingroom of the boat in the-
Margaret: Yawl in the channel? Maine?
Jason: There’s a little boat and an island.
Roger: Y’all in the channel? Huhhuh.
Jason: Yawl. [Yawl.]
Margaret: [It’s a] boat, y ’all.
Roger: What are y’all doing in the channel. Huh huh huh.
Margaret: I need a little port.
Roger: Huh huh huh huh huh.
Trudy: Haw haw haw haw.
Margaret: Y ’all in that channel huh huh huh.
What ar y’all in that channel for. I know.
Roger: Sorry. Who painted yawl in the channel?
Jason: It’s a painting by a painter named...
(Norrick, 1994:416)
Here the same pun on the words ‘yawl* (a small boat) and ‘y’all* (i.e., American 
[Southern] slang for ’you all'), which can be considered a humour piece, is repeated in 
at least five separate displays by both Roger and Margaret.
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This distinction represents one inner boundary within the field of humour 
research* 66. Psychological, linguistic, cultural, gender, and literary analyses of humour 
have tended to focus primarily on humour pieces —the mechanisms which bring about 
amusement, the techniques used, the skill of the performer or author, the beliefs and 
attitudes of the humourist or his social class/identity group, the meanings of a piece, 
the historical development of genres and styles. Sociological research, on the other 
hand, has concentrated on humour displays: the effects of joke-use on social norms, 
the use of teasing to maintain conformity, the cohesive and divisive results of humour 
use (See, for reviews, Martineau, 1972; Fine, 1983).
Humour pieces and displays are structures of greater or lesser complexity. A 
comic play can be considered a humour piece, but each of its acts, dialogues, and one- 
liners can count as sub-pieces at various levels of nestedness. A performance of the 
work, as a humour display, could be subdivided in a similar manner.
3.1.1. Humour Pieces
A humour piece is the meaningful content of a humour display, the amusing 
composition or creation considered independently from the display situation itself. A 
joke
about an Irishman in a brothel, a plastic flower that squirts water, a pun on the words 
‘grisly/grizzly’, Monty Python's ‘parrot sketch/ Jeremy's ‘burnt beans' story -these 
potential triggers o f amusement can be deployed at different times by different actors. 
Hot gossip and verbal jokes on current-event topics 'spread' from one person to the 
next. Professional comedians 'lift' material from each other and repeat the same 
routines night after night. Friends exchange the amusing catch-phrases of popular 
comedy shows.
These abstractions cannot, however, exist independently of some humour 
display. A humour piece must be exhibited as such at least once if it is to count as
63 The distinction is congruent with Ferdinand de Saussure’s languefparole — language/speech (1916).
66 A lull outline of this field, with its various borders and distinctions, will be provided in Chapter Nine
(4-3).
360
Chapter Seven: Laughter and Humour Section^
humour at all67. The amusing unintentional pratfall of a novice skier does not in itself 
qualify as a humour piece —only its causation by an agent of discredit or its 
subsequent recounting as an anecdote would so qualify.
The humour piece is a subset of the range of funny stimuli as classified in 
Chapter Five. It includes all amusing transformations which are intentional displays 
with amusement as one of their purposes: funny anecdotes, humorous fictional novels, 
film parodies, gossip, theatrical comedies, distorting caricatures, satirical imitations, 
'clowning around,' ironic speech, improvisation games, and intentionally imagined 
discredits. It further includes all funny stimuli caused by an agent, types II and IV in 
the classification: verbal and visual 'double-meaning'jokes, wind-ups, practical jokes, 
stories with 'twist' endings, tickling, magic tricks, pranks, exposes, and debunkings. It 
excludes, therefore, spontaneously occurring claim-discredits which are observed 
directly (types I and II).
Humour pieces can be more or less contrived, in the sense of planned or 
invented. Originality, fictionality, exaggeration, elaboration, preparation, complexity, 
length, and ingenuity are some of the elements which might be said to characterize the 
contrivedness of a particular piece. A theatrical comedy, a deliberate prank, or a 
standardized joke are all highly contrived pieces, in the sense that their amusing 
quality originates from the results of a creative effort by some author or performer, 
rather than simply arising independently from events in untransformed reality. This 
effort could relate to the arrangement of specific semantic elements, imitatory 
prowess, drawing skills, perceptive discernment of self-claim or claim-discredit 
information, ingenious trickery/argumentation, or other areas of artistic or 
communicative dexterity. A true funny story, accurately retold, would be an example 
of a relatively uncontrived piece of humour. Even less contrived would be the verbal 
mention, in a group situation, of some funny event currently within the potential view 
of all participants. Finally, a mere laugh or meaningful glance could be considered a 
pointer to a fimny stimulus (i.e., 'intended to provoke amusement') and thus qualify as 
a humour piece, though of minimal contrivance.
67 It is possible, in marginal cases, that a humour piece is never displayed with the intention to amuse 
(for example, when created as an example in a humour theorist's essay). Nevertheless, to be understood 
as ’humour’ the piece must be imagined as having been displayed with such an intention.
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The question of contrivedness points up an ambiguity in the definition given 
for humour: when considering a specific humour piece, what is it that is 'intended to 
provoke amusement', the communication or its referent? Is the humour piece funny in 
itself or does it serve merely as a pointer? It would seem that in the latter case, the 
humour piece becomes less humour-like, if it can be considered humour at all. If a  
statement or action merely identifies an obvious feature of reality which can be 
considered funny in itself, it is the latter rather than the former which provokes 
amusement.
The distinction between a communication intended to be funny and one 
pointing to the funny is not, in practice, clear-cut. There exists a continuum o f 
contrivedness from mere transparent symbols to elaborate interpretations or 
distortions, and thus a continuum of humour from examples which are less to more 
humourlike.' For example, books which list 'embarrassing stories' constitute a  
relatively uncontrived genre, as they report on 'reality.' Nevertheless, the selection, 
arrangement, framing, and narrative style of such works provide a great margin for 
creativity and difference. Martha Kurc's book (1990), in which professional authors 
recount a personal embarrassment over several pages and in their literary prose68 seem 
more contrived than the 'bare bones' accounts of similar collections.
In the present thesis, while bearing in mind the differences in the degrees o f 
contrivedness, I will treat even relatively empty pointers of amusing stimuli as humour 
pieces. The ’humour'/'funny events' distinction seems to me a useful one, despite the 
intervening gray areas.
M Excerpts from this collection were provided in Chapter Six, 2 -D.M. Clark’s condom-buying story— 
and in this chapter, section 2.5.1 -Joy Fielding’s theatre story.
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3.1.2. Humour Displays
A humour display is the actual presentation of a humour piece by an actor to 
an audience of observers.
Whether a behaviour counts as a humour display for a given observer depends 
on his assessment of the intentions underlying it. Specifically, varying opinions may 
exist on whether a statement or an action was meant to provoke amusement or not. In 
some cases, the humour status is deemed obvious by all participants, based on their 
understanding of the official definition of the situation. In the following conversation, 
three individuals are engaged in the task o f cutting paper, when one makes a teasing 
pun:
Arnold: An exact c u t (2.5) Oh no. This one is a little off centre.
Judy: That’s because you’re a little off centre.
Beth: Heh heh he heh.
Arnold: No it’s Tom’s print. (Norrick, 1994:414)
Judy’s remark to Arnold makes an absurd link between Arnold’s imperfect cut and his 
supposed eccentricity or insanity, based on a double meaning of the phrase ’off 
centre’. Moreover, in the transformed reality created by accepting this improper link, 
Arnold’s self-claims to universal mental abilities are discredited. Among friends, such 
a statement can only be interpreted as humour, and in fact Beth immediately laughs in 
response to the tease.
Often, unambiguating evidence is provided by the displaying individual: 
humour cues. Numerous authors have noted the use of such signs, which inform 
observers that amusement is being sought (Fry, 1963: 138; Zillman, 1983: 100-104). 
A performance within a comedy club predisposes an audience to interpret statements 
as 'intended to be funny’. Similarly with conversational talk prefaced by such 
statements as have you heard the latest joke?' or 'Something really funny happened to 
me...'. Standard joke formats can perform a similar function:
"There's this American, this German, and this Frenchman..."
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"What's grosser than gross?"
Humourist: Knock! Knock! 
Audience: Who's there? 
Humourist: [name] 
Audience: [name] who? 
Humourist: [punchline]
Certain facial movements, such as a wink, a raised eyebrow, or a sudden and 
exaggerated change of expression, can also denote humorous intentions. M ost 
common of all, however, is the inclusion of a laughter display, ranging from an ironic 
smile to full-blown explosive laugher
I
(UTCL D6a. Face to face)
Kate: Betchyou sound really stupid on tape too.
(2.0)
Kate: Bhh hah huh huh (in Glenn, 1995:48)
(TCI(b):7:l:SO)
C: We:ll I::, heard about your accident Im  sorry to hear that.
L: Oh:::: tha:nk you it's sure been the most painful (.) of all my
li:fe puttogether a:ll my: pain does not compa:re to this foo:t 
eh heh-heh,
(in Jefferson, 1984:347)
With such laughter displays, the humourist claims to be amused by the funny elements 
of his delivered communication, simultaneously providing information of his 
humorous intentions. When such cues are lacking, and the behaviour in question is 
ambiguous, observers may be unsure o f its humorous status. Actors may even 
deliberately provide ambiguous behaviours to avoid committing themselves to a 
particular line (See Mizzau, 1984:73-102; and this thesis, Chapter Eight 4.3).
A humour piece can also be presented without intentions to amuse, for 
instance as an illustration in a humour research text or as an example of a 'bad' or 
'tasteless* joke from which the teller distances himself. Such actions would not qualify 
as humour displays, but rather as variously keyed retellings of them.
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3.2. The Audience of Humour
As with laughter displays, the audience of humour displays can vary in size, 
and generally involves co-present participants. For many displays, however, 
observation is inherently one-way, and synchrony between display and observation 
may also be lost. The author of a humorous book, for instance, never meets most of 
his audience, cannot be sure who they might be, and writes months or years before the 
humour is appreciated. Each reading of the book constitutes a separate observation of 
a single display. Again, virtual participants complicate the counting of an audience 
even in ordinary face-to-face displays.
The target audience of a humour display is the set of observers whom the 
humourist wishes will perceive the behaviour and interpret it as humour; the effective 
audience, those who actually do.
As with laughter, the target audience of humour is typically congruent with the 
target sharing audience -the  subset for whom amusement is intended. Again, 
however, exceptions do arise to this norm. The victim of a bully, for instance, is 
included within the target audience of the bully's vicious pranks. Nevertheless, the 
humour is not intended for his enjoyment, nor is he likely to appreciate it. Another 
example is provided by Jefferson (1984), who has analyzed laughter during talk about 
'troubles' and found the following recurrent phenomenon: “A troubles-teller produces 
an utterance and then laughs, and the troubles-recipient does not laugh, but produces a 
recognizably serious response” (p. 346). The conversational humour display (cited 
above, 3.1.2) regarding the 'painful foot* ("puttogether aril my: pain does notcompa:re 
to this foo:t eh heh-heh") was included in this study, and is followed by the listener's 
sympathetic question "Can you wa:lk good now?". In these cases the target sharing 
audience is limited to the troubles-teller himself, who expresses with humour, to the 
target audience at large, that he is coping with his problems (see Chapter Eight 4.4.1).
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3.3. The Meaning of Humour
When considering the meaning of humour, a  distinction can be drawn between 
that of the humour piece and that of its display.
The meaning of a humour piece varies radically from joke to joke, let alone 
from pun to theatrical comedy. It regards the content o f humour, the sense of the 
various words or other symbols which together constitute the humorous production. 
The meaning of the humour piece is that which —when decoded by the right sort o f 
audience— may result in amusement There is little more that can be said of such a 
meaning in general terms.
The meaning attributable to the display of a  humour piece, on the other hand, 
is a stable one. A humour display, as a sign, evokes in observers a meaning nearly 
synonymous to that of a laughter display. Indeed, one sense of the expression 'to laugh 
at* is 'to make fun o f  (Chambers, 1990: 808), to intentionally present in such a way as 
to provoke amusement.
Both humour and laughter identify an alleged source o f amusement. In the case 
of laughter, actual amusement corresponding to the display is claimed. In the case of 
humour, only a potential amusement is referred to, though very often laughter is 
appended to the display (see Section 3.1.2).
A humour display signifies the following:
"I am delivering a communication which can produce amusement at cause Y in
my target sharing audience"
This meaning is independent of the particular humour piece presented, though its 
content will determine further meanings. Throwing a cabbage at a politician 
constitutes a humour display, as does the reply “It appears one of my opponents has 
lost his head*’ (See 2.2). Each of these displays can be given a particular meaning in 
context, but both signify, at the very least, that the humourist finds something funny in 
the piece displayed, and expects certain others to share in the amusement. It should be 
noted also that to understand a humour display fully, an observer must identify the 
intended cause of amusement. Usually, this cause is readily apparent, even when 
amusement is not provoked in the observer.
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This meaning of humour varies with the identity of the target sharing audience, 
those for whom amusement is intended. Every display, however, includes the minimal 
signification, "I can be amused by cause YM which is closely congruent with (and 
included in) the denotation of laughter (See 2.3). It communicates the following:
• I can experience the bodily process of amusement in reaction to cause Y, 
including both pleasant subjective sensations of funniness and any 
spontaneous bodily manifestations which may become visible.
As with the meaning of laughter, the reference to amusement included in this meaning 
implies a number of additional connotations, including the same four already 
discussed in section 2.4:
• The discredit connotation: "According to my current interpretation, 
claimant C s self-claim S has been discredited by fact F"
• The knowledge connotation: "I possess the knowledge necessary to 
appreciate the amusing elements referred to by the humour"
• The identity connotation: "I do not feel identified as the claimant(s) 
discredited"
• The involvement connotation: "I can become sufficiently involved in the 
funny elements of the humour to enjoy amusement in reaction to it"
Comparison with the meanings o f laughter reveals two differences. Firstly, it is only 
potential amusement and involvement that are claimed; no claim is made about either 
actual amusement or involvement. Secondly, the degree of amusement is not 
specified. It should be recalled, however, that such information is often included by an 
accompanying laughter display (See 3.1.2).
A further submeaning of humour which is not implied by laughter, regards the 
assertion that the communication will provoke amusement in others. This can be 
referred to as the entertainm ent connotation of humour displays;
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•  "I am delivering a communication which can produce amusement at cause Y 
in my target sharing audience, not including myself."
Reference to this connotation is evident in the conversational snippet cited on page 
339, where Ken finishes a joke which is followed with mocking laughter, both by Ken 
himself (“hyok hyok”) and by A1 (“HA-HA-HA-HA-HA”)* This ironic appreciation, 
while labeling the joke as not particularly funny, alludes to the fact that a joke is 
supposed to be funny. It is significant that the joke-teller him self is the first to ridicule 
this claim of funniness (after two full seconds of silence), as if  to protect himself from 
the discredit of his self-claim to amuse69.
69 See Chapter Eight, 4.3.1, for a discussion of such defensive uses of self-directed laughter and 
humour.
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3.4. The Display of Humour
i
When is humour displayed by an actor? The answer to this question involves 
many of the same considerations relating to the display of laughter, and thus will not 
require much additional discussion (See Figure 2). In the case of humour, of course, 
there is no 'natural display,' and thus no bodily impediments to achieving the desired 
expression70. The official framework, however, similarly determines the overall 
tolerance for humour in the situation, relevant and irrelevant types and sources of 
humour, and what humour is to be considered funny. The goals of the individual, 
including his possible desire for conformity with the official framework, as well as the 
possible effects of humour pieces and displays (See Chapter Eight), will determine his 
display of humour, with more powerful individuals having a greater freedom to 
transgress and modify requirements with impunity. There may also exist a gap 
between the desired and the achieved display, depending on the humourist's skill and 
the contingencies of performance.
Figure 2. The display of humour.
Whereas laughter displays are merely responsive to allegedly amusing stimuli,
however, humour displays actually create them. Thus, there exist fewer 'official' 
constraints on the expression of humour than on laughter, which should simply follow
either humour or a spontaneous funny event. Humour is a framing tool itself: it
provides a particular interpretation and/or selects certain elements of a scene for
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attention. It allows, for example, for an individual who detects an amusing stimulus to 
frame events for others so that they too will perceive it, preparing the official 
definition for acceptance of his own emotional release. In the following excerpt from a 
transcribed conversation, a minor speech error which might have gone by unnoticed is 
picked on by other participants and transformed into (relatively uncontrived) humour.
Joe: How much our shister wastes money,
Lynn: Your s/iirter?
Joe: needlessly-
Penny: Our shister hehhehheh.
Gail: My shister Penny. Ha ha ha.
Penny: All right. Is that my wine glass.
Heh heh ha ha ha. (Norrick, 1994:423)
Though such minor linguistic faults normally lie outside of the official framework of 
interpretation, here the desire to obtain some enjoyment from the teasing of Joe may 
have inspired Lynn and the others to focus on his incorrect pronunciation of the word 
‘sister* as ‘shister.’ The work of satirists and caricaturists, both professional and 
amateur, often involves a similar focus on and exaggeration o f faults normally outside 
the bounds of official attention. It is worth noting here also that informal situations, 
such as friendly gatherings, are characterized by relatively malleable official 
definitions, so that attention to ‘outside* activity can easily be given without a major 
threat to the goings on. 70
70 A strong natural impulse to laugh could, however, pressure the individual to offer a humour display in 
order to give his laughter display a meaningful context It may also provide the individual with an 
opportunity to share amusement with others through laughter, by sharing a private joke.
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4. Conclusions
I have described laughter and humour displays as communicative signs which 
refer to alleged real or potential amusement.
As communications they may have an intended or target audience as well as 
an effective audience -those who actually do observe the display. A distinction has 
also been drawn between the target and the target sharing audience -those expected 
to share in the amusement referred to by the display.
These two displays have closely synonymous meanings. A laughter display 
signifies "I am experiencing amusement of X degree [at cause Y]"; a humour display, 
"I am delivering a communication which can produce amusement at cause Y in my 
target sharing audience [i.e., including myself]." From these basic meanings, I have 
derived a number of submeanings latent in the features of the emotion to which they 
both refer:
• The discredit connotation: "According to my current interpretation, 
claimant C's self-claim S has been discredited by fact F ’
• The knowledge connotation: "I possess the knowledge necessary to 
appreciate the amusing elements referred to by the laughter"
• The nonidentity connotation: "I am not closely associated with the 
claimant(s) discredited"
• The involvement connotation: "I am (or can be) sufficiently involved in the 
funny elements of the situation to enjoy amusement"
Humour displays carry not only these four submeanings, but also the following 
additional implication:
The entertainm ent connotation: "I am delivering a communication which 
can produce amusement at cause Y in my target sharing audience"
A description of the process of display, applicable both to humour and 
laughter, has also been suggested. During social interaction, at any display-relevant
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moment, there will be a range of officially appropriate displays which c o ­
participants would consider normal or acceptable, related to the official s h a re d  
definitions of events. These expectations are one of the major influences o n  a n  
individual's choice of a desired displays, the communication he selects to a c tu a lly  
attempt. Other influences include the situational distribution of power, his g u id in g  
aims, and his perception of the odds relevant to achieving the desired expression. T h is  
desire, modified by the individual's abilities and resources will determine th e  
achieved (i.e., actually observable) displays.
In the case of laughter, an added complication concerns the existence o f  a  
natural display, that which would spontaneously accompany a given instance o f  
amusement, in the absence of any interference. The existence of bodily pressure to  
express a particular degree of laughter complicates the process of display: su ch  
pressure may be used as a resource facilitating the achievement of a desired display, o r  
may be suffered as an obstacle towards achievement.
In the following chapter, a description of some of the effects and uses o f  
amusement, laughter, and humour will be provided. In the case of the latter tw o  
phenomena, 'effects' will be based on the meanings they communicate to others, as 
listed above. These effects, in turn, may be included among the 'guiding aims’ o f  
individuals when selecting a desired humour or laughter display, becoming 'uses.'
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1. Introduction
In this chapter, I will attempt to link the amusement theory developed in 
Chapters Four to Six with the considerable research literature concerned with the 
effects (and by extension with the uses, ‘functions/ habits, and institutions) of 
amusement, laughter, and humour, the three components of what I have called the 
‘laughter triad/
It was suggested throughout Chapter Two that the cause of amusement had 
generated plenty of theory but little empirical research, given the intractability of 
emotional processes to traditional scientific paradigms. The bulk of work in this field, 
consequently, has focused on more easily observable and measurable phenomena, 
notably among these being the effects of amusement, laughter, and humour on 
individuals, interpersonal encounters, and society as a whole. The study of effects, 
moreover, is also at least implicitly the study of strategic uses that can be intentionally 
made of effects, as well as of the personal habits and social institutions which may 
spring up from patterns of such uses (and vice-versa, the study of institutions, habits, 
and/or uses is in root the study of underlying effects on which these may be based). 
For example, if the ridicule of a co-present individual may have the effect of eliciting 
his public discredit and embarrassment, then it may be intentionally used by 
individuals or groups to control the behaviour of others, and such use may become 
institutionalized in practices such as ritualized public mockery or satirical cartoons in 
print media.
It may be noted that the study of effects of amusement, laughter, and humour is 
also relevant to the study of their causes. As we have seen, humour displays are 
intentional behaviours, laughter displays are semi-intentional, and amusement, though 
unintentional, may be stimulated indirectly by the skillful employment of humour. 
Thus, their release or deployment is a question, to various extents, of individual 
decision-making. In Chapter Seven, I listed the aims of an individual among the 
influences relevant to his desired display of humour or laughter. These aims, however, 
must be calculated in relation to the possible utility these displays may have towards 
attaining them, and thus in relation to the effects which displays may have.
The majority empirical work on effects has been done in the spirit of 
functionalist analysis, which assumes and emphasizes an additional effect-cause link:
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the effects of a particular phenomenon are (unintentionally) responsible for its very 
persistence71. Thus, instead of merely describing the affiliative effect which a joke 
may have between two guests at a party, or between two disputants brought together 
by an arbiter, the analyst would describe that in these cases humour served an 
affiliative ‘function,* implying that the beneficial side-effect of affiliation was 
responsible for the practice of joking, or of this type of joking. In this thesis, I have 
preferred to avoid such terminology in favour of ‘effects,* ‘uses,* and ‘institutions.* 
Though I will not deny that certain patterns of humour or laughter use may have 
functional significance, such are empirical questions and not simply to be assumed, as 
has often been done. When it is claimed, for instance, that “dozens, if not hundreds, of 
specific functions of humor might be proposed** (Fine, 1983: 173), the value o f the 
‘function* concept cannot be but questioned. This I will do, in greater detail, in 
Section 5 of this chapter.
First, however, I will provide a  catalogue of the primary phenomena on which 
any such function might be hypothesized: the possible effects of the three components 
of the laughter triad. I will describe, in turn, the consequences arising from instances 
of amusement, from the interpretation of humour pieces, and finally from the 
interpretation of humour and laughter displays. Where relevant, I will discuss how 
recurring patterns of such consequences allow social actors to manage these 
phenomena in order to obtain desired results -i.e ., putting them to strategic use. I will 
also note some cases where uses become habitualized by individual actors, transmitted 
across individuals and even institutionalized to become cultural practices.
Consequences of amusement, laughter, and humour are effected across various 
causal channels. Amusement has direct effects on the amused individual, causality 
being purely mechanical. Laughter, the pleasurable sensation o f 'funniness', various 
physiological changes, relaxation, improved health, and the facilitation of further 
amusement can be counted among the consequences which amusement produces in 
this direct manner (See section 2).
Humour and laughter, on the other hand, must be perceived and interpreted to 
provoke their effects —the causal channel here involving symbolic communication and 
cognitive processing. Humour, by definition, is intended to result in the audience's 
amusement. This effect (when it occurs) arises from interpretation of the humour
71 Examples include Stephenson, 1951; Hertzler, 1970; Maitineau, 1972; Fine, 1983; and Ziv, 1984.
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piece, and it allows for the strategic use of humour to indirectly obtain the "direct1
effects of amusement (See section 3).
The interpretation of the humour display, however, is related to a much wider 
range of possible effects, most of which are also applicable to laughter displays: the 
broadcast of discredit, the provocation of amusement and/or laughter in others, the 
transmission and maintenance of social norms, social classification, affiliation or 
disaffiliation, protection from discredit, revealing the displayer's moral character and 
attention focus, rejecting an interpretation offered by another, and claiming the ability 
to amuse.
Discussion o f the effects of laughter and humour displays will be guided by the 
list of connotations which these displays imply, as set out earlier. Achieved through 
the communication of meaning, these effects must be derivable from the significations 
which laughter and humour consistently give off. And indeed, each of the five 
connotations described in Chapter Seven (2.4, 3.3) —’discredit/ "knowledge/ 
‘identity/ ‘involvement/ and ‘entertainment*— can be naturally associated with a set 
of interactional and/or social consequences. Though the same effects have long been 
documented and investigated within the field of humour research, often by separate 
theoretical schools or without an substantial theoretical base, the forthcoming 
discussion will integrate the relevant areas of scattered research within the single 
scheme that has been developed in preceding chapters. The derivation (in Chapter 
Seven) of display connotations from the hypothesis presented in Chapters Four to Six 
provides a link between effects, uses, and institutions of laughter and humour with the 
character and workings of the amusement emotion itself.
The present chapter can therefore also be considered a further test of the idea 
that amusement reacts to the perception of a self-claim’s discredit, when the perceiver 
is not identified as the claimant and is involved in the discrediting events themselves. 
A valid account of amusement should further be able to account also for the meanings 
(and thus for the effects (and thus for the uses, habits, and institutions)) related to 
laughter and humour. In the following pages, I will seek to demonstrate that the 
‘claim-discredit’ tradition can meet the challenge.
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2. Effects of Amusement
Of the three elements of the laughter triad, amusement is the only which has 
direct ‘mechanical* effects on the individual who experiences it. These effects are 
therefore unrelated to the causal process preceding an episode of amusement or to the 
causal theory of amusement proposed. In fact they are compatible with (though 
irrelevant to) any of the competing accounts of amusement72.1 list them in this thesis 
for the sake of completeness, as a suggestion of how and where such effects might be 
placed within the general field of humour research. They include (1) laughter, (2) 
pleasure, (3) physiological changes, (4) relaxation, (5) improved health, and (6) the 
facilitation of further amusement.
Amusement consists of a set of cognitive stimuli related to a set of bodily 
changes, which have been described in some detail in section 3.1 of this Chapter One. 
These bodily changes, with some license (as they form part of 'amusement' itself), can 
be considered 'effects' of amusement:
(1) Laughter.
Sounds and movements which can be interpreted by observers as laughter,' of 
varying degree (i.e.f the 'natural display* of laughter; see Chapter Seven, 2.5.1).
(2) Pleasure
The pleasurable subjective sensation of 'funniness,* the particular quality of 
which we can only know from personal experience.
(3) Physiological Changes
Epinephrine secretions, changes in heart rate, muscle tension, respiration, brain 
activity and other less observable manifestations of amusement.
Beyond these immediate events, three further effects can be posited for amusement 
itself: the state of relaxation which follows an episode of the emotion, the long term
72 ‘Tension release’ theorists would might argue for a special claim to such effects as 'relaxation* and 
‘improved health,* but these consequences can be traced to the characteristics of the emotional 
manifestation itself (see below), which are independent from any account of amusement’s causes.
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health benefits attributed to its release, and the increased susceptibility to further 
amusement which an initial episode creates.
(4) Relaxation
It is commonly held that amusement, especially strong amusement which is 
freely expressed and observable as laughter, results in a state of physical and 
psychological relaxation: reduced tension and stress, feelings of equilibrium or 'well- 
being,’ and the like73. This view has been supported by a growing body of research. 
Arousal during amusement Mis followed by a relaxation state in which respiration, 
heart rate, and muscle tension return to below normal levels” (Robinson, 1983:118).
In one study (Yovetich, Dale, and Hudak, 1990) experimenters falsely led 
subjects to believe that they would receive an electric shock during the procedure. 
Subjects who were exposed to a humorous audio tape of prerecorded comedy reported 
feeling less anxiety than those in a control condition, and were found to have lower 
heart-rates74. Svebak (1975; 1977) has also found that amusement stimulates both 
cerebral hemispheres simultaneously, resulting in an unusually balanced brain state 
which may be partially responsible for the subsequent sensation of well-being.
These effects may be partly due to the physical exertion o f laughter itself:
Haberman (1955; cited by Fry & Stoft, 1971) noted European research that 
showed that vigorous laughter provides an average of over 75% increase in 
energy expenditure relative to a resting state. Given the many muscle systems 
involved in laughter, it should be an effective means of reducing arousal or felt 
tension.
(McGhee, 1983: 20)
However, the release of any physical or psychological impulse -hunger, 
sexual desire, aggression, cravings for a drug, urges to urinate, the 'need' to see a 
friend- may result in a subjective feeling of catharsis. Amusement can be considered
73 This reduction in tension has sometimes been considered a cause of amusement, but the evidence 
from physiological measures refutes the notion (See Chapter Two: I.A.3).
74 See the same paper for further examples of research in this area.
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a member of this set. Uninhibited engagement in the emotion of hilarity leads to a 
release from the urge to laugh, which, as has been suggested in the previous chapter 
(2.5.1), is often contained, rather than channelled into a display.
The specific respiration pattern characteristic of laughter, "a deep inspiration 
followed by short, interrupted, spasmodic contractions of the chest, and especially of 
the diaphragm," (Darwin, 1902: 154) may also be partly responsible for subsequent 
relaxation. This pattern shows a marked resemblance to one of the most important 
breathing exercises practiced as part of the Hindu hatha yoga system of physical, 
mental, and spiritual development. Kapalabhathi is described in one best-selling text 
as follows: t
The exhalation should be done quickly and forcibly by contracting the 
abdominal muscles with a backward push. This sudden contraction of the 
abdominal muscles acts upon the diaphragm; then the diaphragm recedes into 
the thoracic cavity, giving a vigorous push to the lungs, expelling the air from 
the lungs.
This is instantly followed by a relaxation of the abdominal muscles, 
allowing the diaphragm to descend down to the abdominal cavity, pulling with 
it the lungs. This allows the air to rush in. In kapalabhathi, inhalation and 
exhalation are done by action of the abdominal muscles and diaphragm.
(Vishnu-Devananda, 1960: 246)
Numerous benefits are attributed to the practice of such exercises (known generally as 
pranayama) by their practitioners, including stress relief and mental harmony: 
“Pranayama is the link between the mental and physical disciplines. While the action 
is physical, the effect is to make the mind calm, lucid, and steady” (Vishnu- 
Devananda, in Sivananda, 1991:20).
(5) Improved Health
In the long term, amusement may have positive effects on health, a theory 
which has attained recent popularity in the medical world, though is hardly new:
381
Chapter lig h t: Effects of Amusement Laughter and Humour Section 2
A merry heart doeth good like a medicine: but a broken spirit drieth the bones.
(Proverbs 17:22)
Mirth...purgeth the blood, confirms health, causeth a fresh, pleasing colour, 
prorogues life, whets the wit, makes, the body young, lively and-fit for any 
manner of employment
—Robert Burton, 1621, (cited in Russell, 1969:320)
Norman Cousins (1979) was primarily responsible for the revival of the view o f 
spontaneous laughter as "internal jogging" and "that apothecary inside you." An 
outburst of amusement increases blood pressure, oxygenates the blood, massages vital 
organs, facilitates digestion, and causes the release of pain-killing endorphins 
(Goodman, 1983: 3)7i. The most crucial evidence for the therapeutic value of 
amusement, however, is provided by the well-established link between stress (which, 
as argued above, is effectively reduced by outbursts o f the emotion) and a wide range 
of illnesses such as heart disease, cerebral vascular accidents, cancer, depression, 
ulcerative colitis, Crohn's disease, peptic ulcer, essential hypertension, bronchial 
asthma, Graves* disease, and rheumatoid arthritis (Robinson, 1983; Silberman, 1986). 
The physical and psychological relaxation provided by amusement may indeed act 
against such maladies in the long term.
(6). Facilitation o f Further Amusement
I would suggest that amusement may have an additional effect on the 
individual: the facilitation of further amusement. Public speakers and comedians are 
aware of the fact that audiences 'warm up’ gradually to humorous reception75 6. All of us
75 A comparison with some of the effects attributed to the kapalabhati breathing exercise reveals further 
similarities: "As the lungs are cleansed, excess carbon dioxide is eliminated. This permits the red-blood 
cells to suck in more oxygen, increasing the richness of the blood.... The abdominal 
contractions...mas$age the liver, spleen, pancreas, stomach and heart, thus invigorating them.... 
Abdominal muscles are strengthened; digestion is improved.... It creates a feeling of exhilaration....The 
regular practitioner...enjoys blooming vigor and health." (Sivananda, 1991: 19)
76 This phenomenon is also partly due to interactional features of group situations, such as the level of 
trust granted the performer and the level of uncertainty regarding the appropriateness of laughter in the 
relevant context. See this chapter, section 4.1.2.
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have experienced this progressive readiness for hilarity, built up by a succession of 
laughs, and ranging from a strong emotional resistance to amusement, to a continuous 
state of 'giggliness' where almost anything seems funny.
This effect can be attributed to at least two factors. Firstly, the mental and 
physical relaxation provided by an initial bout of amusement reduces some of the 
potential obstacles to involvement in subsequent funny stimuli (See Chapter Six, 3.1). 
Secondly, the perception of one self-claim's discredit may contribute to a mental 
attitude of alertness towards additional discredits, or of critical assessment of 
participants in terms of self-claims.
Chapter Eight: Effects o f Amusement. Laughter, ond Humour_______________ Section 2
Six ‘mechanical* effects which amusement can have on the amused individual 
have been listed. Due to the unconscious and automatic functioning of this emotion, 
however, these effects cannot be exploited strategically by direct and unmediated 
stimulation. As an unconscious reflex, amusement requires a stimulus of a particular 
type --which I have argued can be described as the perception of a self-claim's 
discredit. Thus, actors who wish to produce one or more of the effects of amusement 
must resort to humour. The use of humour pieces to elicit amusement (and its effects) 
will be the focus of the following section.
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3. Effects of Humour Pieces
As seen in Chapter Seven (3.1), it is possible to distinguish between the 
meaning of a humour piece —the content of humour— and that of a humour display — 
the action of exhibiting this content. In this section I will treat the possible 
consequences of interpreting a humour piece, and the uses to which it may therefore 
be put.
The main consequence unique to interpreting a humour piece is the amusement 
of the interpreter77. Humour pieces vary widely: political cartoons, anecdotes, dirty 
jokes, pranks, insults, gossip stories, comic films. By definition, however, they are 
designed for the provocation of amusement, so this is at least one possible outcome 
common to all. In this task they may be more or less successful, depending on factors 
detailed in Chapters Four to Six. Nevertheless, the potential effect of hilarity is 
essential to the concept.
The most obvious use of a humour piece, therefore, is to elicit the amusement 
of an audience, possibly including the humourist himself. This application can be 
guided by any number of further motives, in turn related to the effects listed above in 
Section 2 for amusement: (1) laughter, (2) pleasure, (3) physiological changes, (4) 
relaxation, (5) health, and (6) further amusement.
H ) Laughter
The mere production of laughter may be sought by a humourist. A 
photographer who wishes to obtain a genuine smile from his subjects, for instance, 
may employ humour with such a goal in mind. Similarly with a stage actor attempting 
to achieve 'realistic' laughter for a theatrical scene by presenting himself with
77 This must be qualified.
Sick jokes may provoke disgust, sexual jokes excitement —but these effects are irrelevant to 
the analysis of these productions as humour. Though the content of humour pieces can vary widely 
enough to encompass any cognitive or emotional reaction imaginable, these are not effects which need 
detain us here.
The actual process of interpreting humour additionally provokes cognitive effort, suspense, 
interest, sometimes puzzlement, and often disappointment These effects, however, are not merely 
characteristic of interpreting humour but also of many other types of percept and especially artistic 
displays.
Humour may also provoke outrage at the act of telling an offensive joke, and other reactions 
which refer to the display itself or the humourist behind it These will be analysed below in section 4 of 
this chapter.
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ridiculous ideas or funny memories. As I have mentioned in Chapter Seven (2.5.4), 
everyday actors may also use such tactics. For example, the friends of a singer in a 
choir may seek to cause his laughter by 'pulling faces’ from the audience, in order to 
playfully spoil his performance. Further motives can be derived from the effects of 
laughter displays as described in Section 4  of this chapter, below.
(2) Pleasure
The pleasurable aspect of amusement may be another goal. A humourist may 
wish to provide himself with enjoyment, or he may extend the gift of amusement to 
friends or to fellow human beings, for the more or less altruistic reasons gifts might be 
said to be given more generally. Advertisers, for instance, often use humour —as they 
might use a promotional gift- in order to attract attention to their messages (Brown 
and Bryant, 1983: 164). Similar attention-grabbing practices are common in the 
educational world: textbooks, educational television, and, of course, the classroom 
itself (Zillman and Bryant, 1983). Humour has also been shown effective in 
reinforcing children's behaviour, as a post-task reward (Brown and Bryant, 1983:
161).
The exchange of humour, as all economic transactions, has undergone a great 
degree of commercialization in Western society. It is possible to purchase funny 
stimuli in a number of formats: printed books, comics, and magazines; tickets to live
f
comedy acts and films; audio recordings; home video cassettes. Creators of amusing 
stimuli are paid to invent and/or perform pieces which will provide an unknown 
audience of consumers with enjoyment. The business of comedy, a major sector o f the 
entertainment industry, moves vast amounts of money —a single Hollywood comedy 1
f
can earn more than one hundred million dollars in a single year (Brown and Bryant, ^
1983:143). i
I
i
(3) Physiological changes !
Seeking to generate the less-observable bodily processes associated with ^
amusement —in themselves— seems a less likely objective of humour. Nevertheless, at |
f
least researchers interested in the physiological aspects o f hilarity have been moved by
f
such a purpose to present jokes and comic films to their subjects. .
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<41 Relaxation
The psycho-physical relaxation which amusement appears to induce is another 
common aim of humour use. It might be sought to combat the ordinary accumulated 
day-to-day stress of modem life, or more specific sources of tension. As with the 
'pleasure' aspect of amusement, this effect can be produced on the self or as a gift to 
others. Joel Goodman (1983: 2) has recounted the tension-relieving deployment of 
humour by a hotel-to-hospital shuttle bus driven
The driver had the wonderful ability to joke with, tease, and invite laughter 
from people wrapped in fear and tension (as they went to visit relatives and 
friends who were hospitalized). His sense of humor helped others to come (o 
their senses...of humor. It didn't take long for the laughter to melt through the 
people frozen with fear and tension. People facing (in some cases) grave 
situations were discovering humor as a beautiful giver of hope and reliever of 
tension.
Several studies have examined humour use in tragic or precarious situations, such as 
Obrdlik (1942) in the context of the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia and Coser 
(1959) in a hospital ward. Undoubtedly, much of the consumption of humorous 
products mentioned above is fueled by the desire to 'unwind' from the psychological 
strains and conflicts of daily existence in our society.
As was argued in Chapter Six, appreciation of amusing stimuli depends on the 
ability of a subject to concentrate on the relevant funny elements, to the exclusion of 
other emotionally-engaging percepts. A tense, angiy, or fearful audience, therefore, 
represents a challenge to the humourist And indeed, those who are able to 
systematically break through the 'ice* of such audiences can be considered 
extraordinary. The bus driver described above, named Bellman of the Year* by his 
employers, is clearly regarded as such by Goodman. The skills required to achieve this 
effect include the sufficient communicational influence to either 1) alter definitions of 
events so as to demonstrate the inappropriateness of negative emotions felt by the 
audience; or 2) strongly involve the audience in specific elements of the current 
situation or of a recreated framed universe.
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The relaxation of the audience can be sought for ulterior motives. For instance, 
teachers might use humour to "free up the attention [of students] by allowing for the 
release of stressors that might otherwise have preoccupied them" in order to improve 
retention of information imparted (Goodman, 1983:4).
(5s! Improved Health
Humour can be used explicitly to improve the state o f a person's health, as has 
been done at least since the Middle Ages (Moody, 1978). Norman Cousins (1979) 
applied on himself a structured programme of laughter sessions to combat ankylosing 
spondylitis, a collagen disease, with apparent success. In recent years, with the 
increasing recognition of the close relationship between mental and bodily processes, 
and the shift from health care to health promotion, laughter therapy' has become an 
increasingly popular form of alternative medicine, attracting a substantial amount of 
media attention (Robinson, 1983; Baza, 1994; Granados, 1995).
(6) Facilitation of Further Amusement
The knowledge that current amusement facilitates subsequent amusement 
permits comedians and humorists to structure their acts in specific ways. For example, 
'safe' self-denigratory or absurd humour might be used to open a performance, 
reserving topical, risqué, black, aggressive, sick, and other potentially offensive 
material for when the audience has 'warmed up' to the show.
Interpreting a humour piece may result in amusement, and through amusement 
produce one of the six common effects of the emotion itself. Thus, as pornography can 
be used to obtain sexual pleasure or a semen donation, comedy can be used 
strategically to achieve laughter, humorous pleasure, or a decrease in stress. The 
deployment of a humour piece, however, further constitutes a  humour display, which 
may be subject to interpretation in itself as a meaningful act. Humour displays as such 
have their own set o f possible effects and subsequent uses, a set almost identical to 
that of laughter displays. This set of effects will be the subject of the following 
section.
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4. Effects of Laughter and Humour Displays
Displays of laughter and humour produce their effects through the 
communication of meanings. An observer of such a display must interpret the event in 
its context, and his interpretation will be the starting point for interactional 
consequences78. Indeed, calculation of such consequences —in relation to the subject’s 
aim s- is normally part of the decision to display laughter or humour (See chapter 
Seven, 2.5.3,3.4).
The potential meanings of laughter and humour displays, therefore, including 
the five major connotations described in the previous chapter, will be relevant to the 
current analysis:
1. The 'discredit* connotation: "According to my current interpretation, 
claimant C s self-claim S has been discredited by fact F,
2. The Tcnowledge' connotation: "I possess the knowledge necessary to 
appreciate the amusing elements referred to by laughter"
3. The Identity* connotation: "I do not feel identified as the claimant(s) 
discredited”
4. The 'involvement* connotation: "I am (could be) sufficiently involved in the 
funny elements of the situation to enjoy amusement"
5. The 'entertainment' connotation (humour displays only): "I am delivering a 
communication which can produce amusement at cause Y in my target sharing 
audience, not including myself*
A group of effects resulting from laughter and/or humour displays, most of 
which have been extensively treated in the literature of humour research, will be
78 It could be argued that the communication of meaning is in itself a consequence —the primary 
consequence- of displays. It is. Nevertheless, I have preferred to treat communication as preliminary to 
more substantial effects, in order to simplify the 'structure' of effects (primary/secondary/...) in 
discussion, by bracketing the first and most obvious level
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derived directly from one or more o f these connotations. The discredit connotation 
relates to (1) the broadcasting of a discrediting event to all co-participants, perhaps 
eliciting embarrassment and reparatory face-work from the affected claimant if he 
should be present; (2) the subsequent provocation of amusement and/or laughter in co­
participants; (3) the transmission and reproduction of social norms of propriety; and
(4) the maintenance and reinforcement o f these social norms (See sections 4.1.1 - 
4.1.4).
From the knowledge, identity, and involvement connotations can be derived 
the effects of (1) placing the displaying - individual within schemes of social 
classification according to his mental contents, as revealed by the display; and thus 
either (2) affiliation between displayer and audience, if  mental contents are shared; or 
(3) disaffiliation between displayer and audience, if mental contents are not shared 
(See sections 4.2.1 - 4.2.3).
Effects relating to the identity connotation apply when the displaying 
individual is at risk of being identified as the discredited claimant. A laughter or 
humour display in these circumstances, by negating this identity, may protect him 
from (1) unintentional discredit; (2) a discrediting course of action knowingly taken 
by himself; or (3) a discrediting course o f action taken by an agent of discredit. 
Additionally, abuse in seeking these effects may lead to (4) the giving off of an 
impression of evasiveness or insecurity (See sections 4.3.1- 4.3.4).
Audience interpretation of the involvement connotation may lead to a fourth 
group of consequences: (1) the displayer’s giving off of an impression of 'callousness’ 
or ‘toughness,’ when discrediting events are associated with tragedy or misfortune; (2) 
the displayer’s giving off of an impression of moral ‘looseness’ or ‘depravity,* when 
discrediting events are associated with facts which should elicit moral condemnation; 
(3) the denial of an interpretation o f reality, when such an interpretation is the very 
discrediting fact; (4) in the case of laughter displays, the revelation of the displayer’s 
focus of attention (See sections 4.4.1 - 4.4.4).
Finally, the entertainment connotation places the humourist in the position of 
having to fulfill his self-claim to amuse his audience (See section 4.5.1).
Within the discussion of effects, reference will often be made to strategic uses 
of laughter and humour to achieve desired consequences. The potentially ‘affiliative* 
or cohesive effect of humour and laughter, for instance, is often exploited by salesmen
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to establish a friendly bond with a prospective client, in order to further a sale (See 
section 4.2.2). Patterns and institutions of display related to such effects and uses may 
also be alluded to. An example (also included in 4.2.2) is provided by the highly 
formalized ‘joking relationship* — observed in several human societies— where 
habitual recourse to the affiliative effect of humour and laughter reduces tension 
between potentially conflictual categories of individuals.
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4.1. Effects/Uses Derived from the Discredit' Connotation
Laughter and humour displays, among other things, imply that someone's self­
claim has been discredited (See Chapter Seven 2.4.1, 3.3). Such a statement can have 
important consequences for the immediate interactional situation. It may broadcast 
the fact of discredit throughout the situation, alerting those who might be unaware of 
the relevant events. Moreover, if the claimant discredited «an be counted among the 
co-participants, his embarrassment and perhaps some face-saving maneuvers may be 
elicited on his part. The broadcast of such information may also logically lead to the 
amusement and/or laughter o f those present. Further effects can be posited at the 
aggregate level. Laughter and humour displays communicate what is found ridiculous 
by the members of the relevant society, thereby informing new members (whether 
foreigners o r  children) of the social norms of propriety, and simultaneously 
reinforcing and  prom oting conformity to these norms. Laughter and humour can 
thus be used strategically to control the behaviour of others.
4.1.1. Broadcasting Discredit
A laughter or humour display indicates to those within its observational range 
that a self-claim's discredit may have taken place. As self-claims make up the selves 
that populate social interaction, such events are of no small importance, especially if 
the claimants are real and well-known individuals (as opposed to fictional characters 
or strangers). As a visible and/or audible signal, a display of this type draws attention 
to the self-claim's alleged discredit and encourages further valuations by those present.
If the display is directed at a co-present participant79, the self he had been 
enacting is called into question, and reparatoiy face-work will be called for if the self 
is to be salvaged. As seen in Chapter Three (3.2), a discrediting event may set off a 
corrective process consisting of four 'classic moves’: the challenge which calls 
attention to the infraction, an offering by the offender, acceptance of the offering by 
those present, and gratitude by the offender (Goffman, 1967: 19-23). There are various
79 It should be noted that much if not most humour and laughter is directed at non-present actors, and 
indeed often at fictitious or nonspecific targets. Laughing 'behind the back* of a victim is more common 
than direct derision, mocking, or teasing. Nevertheless, these do occur.
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ways in which these moves may be made, verbal or non-verbal, original or 
standardized, but they appear to be based on emotional reactions which are or 'should 
be' present:
Emotions function as moves, and fit so precisely into the logic of the ritual 
game that it would seem difficult to understand them without i t  In fact, 
spontaneously expressed feelings are likely to fit into the formal pattern of the 
ritual interchange more elegantly than consciously designed ones.
(p* 23)
Goffman's essay on Embarrassment and Social Organization' seems to develop 
the emotional substratum of the second move, the offering made by the discredited 
individual. When attention is drawn to a participant's fault by a challenge (or by 
chance), it is seen as proper that he should fluster and stammen
Embarrassment is not an irrational impulse breaking through socially 
prescribed behaviour but part of this orderly behaviour itself....[By flustering, 
the individual's] role in the current interaction may be sacrificed, and even the 
encounter itself, but he demonstrates that, while he cannot present a 
sustainable and coherent self on this occasion, he is at least disturbed by the 
fact and may prove worthy on another occasion.
(ibid.: 110)
Amusement could be viewed as underlying the first 'classic' move of the 
corrective process, the challenge. It is a spontaneous reaction to the perception that 
someone (perhaps even the perceiver himself) has failed to maintain some element of 
his self-presentation. And laughter/humour, the visible and audible flags of alleged 
amusement, announce the supposed fault to everyone in the situation, including the 
deviant himself if he be present.
Indeed, if any observer suspects that laughter or humour may be directed 
towards himself, it may provoke self-consciousness and a search for failings he may 
be exhibiting, perhaps with some preparatory embarrassment and/or amusement. If he 
knows to be at fault already, the display may bring on or heighten embarrassment at
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being discovered. For example, in D.M. Clark's condom-buying story (see Chapter 
Six, 2) the laughter o f the men in the pool hall informed the teenager that his bluff had 
been seen through, leading to intense embarrassment
These expressions work, in this sense, as alarm signals announcing a crack in 
the fabric of 'normal appearances': “When one individual emits a distress cry or shows 
sudden alert in consequence of becoming alarmed, his sound and appearance are likely 
to serve as powerful evidence to the others that something might be wrong”(Goffman, 
1971: 243). In the case of laughter/humour, of course, the 'something' that ’might be 
wrong' is not a direct threat to safety. Nevertheless, the minor improprieties of social 
life are themselves signs of danger “When an individual finds persons in his presence 
acting improperly or appearing out of place, he can read this as evidence that although 
the peculiarity itself may not be a threat to him, still, those who are peculiar in one 
regard may well be peculiar in other ways too, some of which may be threatening” 
(ibid.: 241).
The challenge of derision may be answered by a co-present participant in 
several ways. One option is for the participant to accept the discredit openly, offering 
an admission of the undeservedness of the relevant self-claim, and perhaps displaying 
embarrassment openly. Another is to display laughter, placing a distance between his 
'real' self and the self discredited (See this chapter, section 4.3, below). A third is to 
question the judgement made by the mocking participants:
(Northridge: 2: JP/DP: 1)
Del: What are you doing at ho:me.
(1.7)
Paul: Sitting down watching the tu:[be,
Del: [khnhhh:: ih-huh .hhh
Del: Wa:tching n-hghn .h you-nghn (0.4) watching dayti:me stories
uh?
(.)
Paul: No I was just watching this: uh:m: (0.7) .h.khh you know one 
of them ga:me shows,
(Drew, 1987: 226)
In this excerpt, it is clear that Paul and Del consider the watching of 'daytime stories' 
(i.e., soap operas) improper in some way, perhaps because they consider such
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programs unintelligent or appropriate only for 'women' or 'housewives.' When Del 
playfully attempts to discredit Paul by accusing him of this impropriety, Paul denies 
the fault.
Turning to the negative case, when events have discredited a co-participant, 
non-laughter may be intentionally attempted even against great physical urges to 
express amusement This negative expression, signifying 'no discredit has occurred', 
can be used in order to protect the dignity o f the claimant in question. During most 
interactional encounters, there is a strong pressure for participants to respect each 
other's selves as presented. Thus, open challenges, especially o f important self-claims, 
are often avoided. Unsuppressed and unqualified derisive laughter is experienced as a 
hostile and aggressive ac t and in fact may discredit the laugher as a respectful 
participant. Very often, observers of discredit will await the laughter of the person 
affected -revealing his distance from the discredited claimant (See this chapter, 4.3)— 
before displaying their own emotion.
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4.1.2. Provocation of Amusement and/or Laughter
Whether directed at a co-present target or not, laughter and humour displays 
may have a contagion effect, by calling attention to a self-claim's discredit. A humour 
display by definition encourages and may trigger off the more or less spontaneous 
laughter of its target sharing audience, through the deployment of the specific humour 
piece. Laughter itself, however, is also capable of reproducing further instances of its 
display. In either case, there are at least four separate elements involved in this 
generation of laughter:
a) An episode o f humour, or an initial outburst o f hilarity, by signalling a 
source of the displayed amusement, draws attention to an event which may 
well be found funny by others.
b) Moreover, the event denoted is presented to observers prejudged, thus 
guiding interpretation along a key of amusement. The observer is not merely 
invited to turn his eye to a specific object, but to assess it with a critical, 
skeptical eye.
c) Once amused, or on the verge of amusement, an observer who witnesses the 
laughter or joking of others at the same object finds his suspicions or outright 
interpretations confirmed. This may strengthen his tendency towards 
amusement.
d) Finally, whether or not the observer is amused to the appropriate extent, the 
laughter displays of others contribute to the official definition of events, and 
pressure him to conform to the general line adopted. Also, it allows laughter to 
be displayed when the appropriateness of such an expression is not certain.
Several research findings are relevant to these points. Anthony Chapman and 
Hugh Foot (See Chapman, 1983) have conducted numerous experiments 
demonstrating the influence of others' laughter on a single subject’s reactions (i.e., 
both observed laughter and subjective amusement). This influence is stronger if
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communicational distance between participants (i.e., physical distance, orientation 
towards each other, frequency of eye-contact) is minimized. Also important are 
whether the subject and companion are friends, whether they share the social situation, 
and whether they are of a similar age. In other words, the greater the physical and 
cultural closeness of the two participants, the greater the contagion effect
It may be supposed, as suggested above, that a part of this effect may be due to 
conformity with the companion, and another to actual opinion modification. In the 
social psychology literature on social influence on opinion formation and sharing, 
both elements have been widely documented80. On the one hand, the reaction o f a 
companion, especially if trusted or belonging to an in-group, is likely to affect the 
assessment of such questions as the discredit of a self-claim (See also Chapter Four, 
3.1.3), thus affecting amusement itself. On the other, the definition of the situation as 
more-or-less funny establishes the official requisites of display, placing pressure on a 
companion to conform with a similar display.
The ‘canned laughter* that accompanies intentionally funny moments during 
televised comedy represents one use of this effect Conversation analysts have also 
noted that laughter by a speaker is often used as an 'invitation' for others to laugh:
We can observe that some utterances which we might intuitively understand to 
be candidates of subsequent laughter get laughter, and get it in a particular 
way: speaker himself indicates that laughter is appropriate, by himself 
laughing, and recipient thereupon laughs.
(Jefferson, 1979: 80)
Intriguing examples provided by Gail Jefferson include those where the speaker, after 
displaying humour, pauses as if waiting for audience appreciation, and finally laughs 
himself, obtaining the desired response from the listeners:
(1)
Dan: I thought that wz pretty outta sight didju
hear me say'r you a junkie.
80 Relevant research programmes include Sherif s group influence studies, including the celebrated 
'stationary light’ test (1936) and Asch’s majority opinion studies (1956), both cited in Jones (1985: 64, 
79).
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(0.5)
Dan; hheh heh[
Dolly: rhhheh-heh-heh
(2)
Joyce: Cuz she wz off in the bushes with some 
buddy, tch!
(0.7)
Joyce: ehhfhhhhhhh!
Sidney: [Oh(hh)h hah huh! ■ * (Jefferson, 1979:80)
Such laughter invitations can be considered a subset of what have been called 
‘humour cues* (See Chapter Two 2.1.4), signals used by humourists to let their 
audience know that amusement is being sought.
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4.1.3. Transmission and Reproduction of Social Norms
Communicating that a discredit has taken place simultaneously conveys the 
criteria of assessment used by those who joke or laugh, including the self-claims 
judged to apply to the relevant individual and the conditions necessary for discredit of 
such claims. As discussed in Chapter Four, 2.4, such criteria are often shared widely 
throughout a social group regarding self-claims attaching to standard roles within 
society, and also those which attach to all persons universally. These associations of 
self-claims with particular categories o f person constitute what have been called 
ceremonial norms of ‘demeanour* (as opposed to norms of deference and of substance 
-see  Chapter Four, 2.4). Displays of humour and laughter may therefore lead to the 
transmission of these norms of demeanour or propriety to new or potential members ~  
children, immigrants— as well as to any curious observer —social scientists, interested 
rivals. Humour and laughter mark out a set of boundaries of acceptable appearance, 
thought, and behaviour for specific individuals, social categories, and members of the 
group as a whole. For those who value and claim membership, moreover, the learning 
process is driven by the intrinsic rewards o f conformity to these norms: avoidance of 
painful embarrassment and acceptance as a full and valued member, with all the rights 
and benefits the latter might entail. Thus, laughter and humour continuously 
communicate, reproduce, reinforce, and maintain the standards of social life.
Socialization of Outsiders
Strangers to any society will be the object of laughter (and subject to frequent 
embarrassments). Lacking the competencies, knowledge, values, and/or appearance 
adequate for fulfillment of applicable self-claims, they quickly become aware of these 
deficiencies as direct shows of amusement are witnessed or echoes of hilarity reach 
their ears through gossip. They may also become aware of social expectations by 
observing displays o f laughter and humour directed at others.
Anthropologists in the field, as strangers to societies which are often radically 
divergent from their own, Ieam much about their natives by observing laughter: “In 
anthropological circles, it has long been recognized that the study of humour in a 
society (via fables, legends, myths, proverbs, poetry, songs, jokes and riddles) will 
lay-bare core values, philosophical tenets, and beliefs in that social system.** (Hopen,
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1977). Though specific anecdotes are often edited out of the finished ethnography, 
Nigel Barley's less academic accounts of fieldwork supply many relevant examples. 
The following three, taken from The Innocent Anthropologist (1983) reveal aspects of 
the Cameroonian Dowayo's gender-role beliefs, oath use, and funeral practice, 
respectively:
Dowayos told me with wonder about an American missionary in Dowayoland 
whose wife would run from the house to greet him when he returned from a 
trip. They cackled with amazed amusement at Dowayos having to ask the 
missionary's wife for lifts instead of the husband, and at the way he never 
seemed to beat her.
(...)
Uncircumcised males who use it [Dang mi gere', the strongest oath in 
Dowayoland] are mocked mercilessly and beaten if they persist; it was 
considered hilarious whenever I did it.
(...)
To one side of the special enclosure for male dead sat the widows, staring 
stonily ahead of them. Foolishly, I sought to greet them; they are not allowed 
to speak or move. The men considered this a great joke and giggled and 
sniggered as they wrapped the cadaver.
(1983:76; 74;123)
Barley’s observation of laughter can be considered part of the process by which he 
learned about the self-claims attaching to particular roles within Dowayo society: 
‘men’ claim control over their wives, using certain oaths constitutes a self-claim to 
‘initiated* status, ‘everyone* claims to avoid trespassing the interactional territory o f 
widows at a funeral. Most if not all of us, as strangers to some new social 
environment, have undergone a similar process of learning by trial and (often 
laughable) error.
Socialization of Children
This transmission of knowledge has particular bearing on the issue of primary 
socialization. Children, as 'foreigners' to their own culture, can and do learn many
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facts and standards relative to their social environment by observing laughter and 
applying humour. Several developmental psychologists have noted the close 
relationship between learning and amusement As soon as a child masters a particular 
fact, rule, or skill, he begins to find funny any relevant deviation. Some of the first 
objects of amusement regard the most obvious differences between appropriate 
behaviour for babies and that appropriate for adults:
Once the baby is used to having a dummy, at about nine months old, it will 
giggle if the mother puts it in her own mouth...Similar!y, 10-month-old infants 
who crawl are likely to laugh when they see adults crawling. They are too 
young to speak, but not too young to spot adults acting absurdly.
(Cohen, 1994: 65)
Amusement at discredit, therefore, quickly follows the acquisition of knowledge about 
the self-claims attaching to various roles. The relation is not merely a passive one, 
however. As these examples suggest, adults (and especially parents) are willing to 
undertake such acts of 'silliness' to amuse the youngest of social actors. Recognizing 
the level at which the infant understands the world, they are able to produce jokes 
which violate the rules operating at this level, and which the child can therefore 
appreciate. Though not always intended for this purpose -th e  enjoyment derived from 
sharing in the child’s amusement is motive enough-, these playful interactions may 
result in the reinforcement of recently acquired social knowledge.
It is not only adults, of course, who make reference to social norms through 
playful humour. During play, children themselves consolidate (and transmit to each 
other) the lessons learned by creating rudimentary jokes and distortions which 
separate error from non-error: “Once a child becomes confident of the normal 
relationship between stimulus elements or achieves a new level of understanding 
through acquisition o f new cognitive skills, he/she enjoys distorting that knowledge or 
understanding in the guise of a joke” (McGhee, 1983b: 115).
Though it has been less studied, the disagreeable experience of being 'laughed 
at' by parents, peers, or older children should not be underestimated as a source of 
learning. A lesson learned with embarrassment under the stings of mockery is not 
quickly forgotten. Children can be quite cruel in their open jeering of each other (See
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chapter Six, 3.2.2), and as they become confident in new knowledge and skills, they 
begin to laugh at younger or less advanced children (Schultz and Robillard, 1980). 
Arnold Buss (1980: 231-232) considers laughter, teasing, and ridicule to be ‘‘the most 
potent verbal punishment’' used in the socialization of young children:
The earliest class of behaviour to be treated with teasing concerns self- 
control. During the second year of life,. children are initiated into toilet 
training. By the third year o f life, they are often teased for ‘accidents’ 
involving bladder or bowels.
Laughter and ridicule also start early in the area of modesty. Children 
are taught to conceal certain body parts in public and to reserve nakedness for 
certain occasions (bath) and certain rooms (bathroom, bedroom). When 
children violate the taboo, they are often made to feel silly and foolish. 
Somewhat later in childhood, usually starting with grammar school, children 
are teased and ridiculed for another kind of immodesty: bragging or conceit....
Starting at grammar school age, children are also introduced to 
manners and etiquette. They are taught appropriate social behavior in more 
formal contexts, and they quickly learn about ‘front-parlor’ and ‘eating out' 
manners. Again, the penalty for mistakes is often ridicule and teasing, and 
children become embarrassed when others laugh at them.
Throughout the early years, the link between public discreditings and open jeering 
seems to persist. In a study of embarrassing moments suffered by 11-year olds, 53% of 
respondents answered that onlookers of their plight responded with laughter or teasing 
(Stonehouse and Miller, 1994).
Most fascinating is the active use of humour by children to test their newly- 
acquired knowledge. Horgan (1981; in McGhee, 1983b) conducted detailed 
observations of her daughter Kelly's humour use from 16 to 48 months of age. A few 
days after learning the word ’shoe’, one o f her first twenty words,
she put her foot through the armhole of a nightgown, saying 'shoe,' 
accompanied by shrieks of laughter. Later that day, she put her foot into a  
tennis ball can, saying 'shoe' and laughing".
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Throughout her development, the acquisition of a new word would 
stimulate a joke attempt of this type. When she was 1;11 1 told her I was proud 
of her. She correctly surmised that only people arc proud of you. She used a 
joke to 'show off (and to test) her knowledge: Daddy's proud o f you. 
Grandma's proud of you. Uncle David's proud o f you. Hamburger NOT proud 
o f you. Ha, ha. Of course, sometimes her analyses were incorrect and her jokes 
failed. After asking me why men could not wear dresses and contemplating my 
response about customs, she concluded that customs were something that only 
men had. Daddy has a custom. Uncle David has a custom. Mommy has a 
custom! Ha, ha, mommies can't have customs! The clock has a custom! Ha, 
ha, clocks can't have customs!
This sort of joke-telling is a very effective strategy for a language 
learner: you hear a new word, make a hypothesis about the semantic 
restrictions, and test your hypothesis by violating those restrictions. Thus, 
Kelly learned from our responses that she had correctly analysed proud, buy 
had incorrectly analysed custom.
(Horgan, 1981: 218-19)
Linguistic competence, of course, is one important aspect of a much broader range o f 
universal and role-related self-claims learned at these early ages. Indeed, "socially 
unacceptable behaviour" has been found by Kenerdine to be the second most common 
source of all nursery school children's laughter, and the most common among three- 
year-olds (cited in McGhee, 1979:131).
Humour and laughter can be used explicitly by educators to facilitate the 
learning of material by their students. The participation of parents in children's play 
probably includes, at least for many parents, some recognition of the relevance o f 
playful deviance for learning rules and practices taught. Even at secondary school and 
university level courses, such a recognition is occasionally put to use. One example is 
the annual Bulwer-Lytton Fiction Contest (see Rice, 1986), for which entrants attempt 
to pen the "opening sentence to the worst of all possible novels" (p. vii). Sponsored by 
the English department at San Jose State University, the contest rewards "good bad 
writing, writing so deliberately rotten that it both entertains and instructs" (p. xi). And
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indeed, the hilarious departures from acceptable prose which have been collected and 
published in Rice's book are as good a starting point for a study of English writing as a 
dry list of rules, and much more entertaining. Covering a different topic, but in a 
similar vein, Blunders In International Business (Ricks, 1993), the author's third 
publication listing true avoidable disasters in the world of trade, is touted as "a useful 
and enjoyable teaching tool [which allows students to] remember the concepts...[and] 
learn more about international business" (p. vii).81 These two books can also be 
profitably studied by social scientists as catalogues of the self-claims attaching to 
authors and businessmen, respectively, and of the conditions for fulfilling them.
Direct mockery of poorly behaved, blundering, or failing students is also used 
by educators. The 'dunce cap' was an institutionalized method of singling out 'stupid' 
children for ridicule in the recent history of our own society. Such methods are now 
frowned upon as cruel and harmful to the ridiculed victims, but informal controls of 
this type continue to persist in the world of education (as most of us know from 
experience). Some examples can be found in an article reporting the use of humour 
during the staff meetings of a psychiatric hospital (Coser, 1960). In this context, the 
'junior staff members' of the hospital were in the role of students learning from the 
psychiatrists and associate psychiatrists who led the meetings and directed the 
activities of the institution (p. 90*91):
When a junior member reported that he had used the therapeutic technique of 
accepting a patient's delusions of having killed, the senior member presiding 
asked him: "When was it that you reassured her that she was a murderess?"
When the junior member quoted previously informed the meeting of his new method 
of 'participant1 therapy, the chairman told him:
Let me mention that there were precedents of your method. There once 
was a patient who went around barking like a dog [laughter starts here] 
and the therapist barked back ...[The rest of the sentence is drowned in 
laughter]
81 See Chapter Five for examples from Scott (1986) and Ricks (1993).
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More extreme examples can be found in ethnographic and historical archives, such as 
the following from ancient Greece:
Laughter was also deeply appreciated within the framework of the Spartan 
education as a corrective weapon against those who were not sufficiently 
successful in coping with the challenges of the agoge [educational system] or 
were guilty of some misbehaviour. In these cases the maidens were encouraged 
to mock the 'failures* in public, a  method reported to have been highly 
successful: The sting of their sarcastic jokes was no less sharp than that of 
serious admonitions, especially as the kings and gcrontes, as well as the other 
citizens, were present at the spectacle.' This technique was all the more 
efficient in view of the songs that the same maidens were instructed to sing in 
praise of those who had distinguished themselves.
(David, 1988: 5)
Laughter and humour displays, by revealing the associations made by 
individuals between self-claims and particular individuals, social roles, and humanity 
at large, communicate to outsiders or new members of a social group the relevant 
standards of propriety, the norms of proper behaviour, thought, control, appearance, 
and biography. These displays thus constitute at least one of the mechanisms by which 
norms of demeanour are reproduced from one generation to the next, promoting the 
stability and permanence of the expressive order. In the following section, I will treat 
the complementary effect of social control resulting from laughter and humour 
displays, which further protects the social order by maintaining conformity to the 
norms implicit in these displays.
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4.1.4. Maintenance and Reinforcement of Social Norms
A distinction between the effect of 'educating* members of society and 
'controlling* them cannot be strictly drawn. By observing and participating in 
amusement, laughter, and humour, children learn what is 'normal* and what is 
'ridiculous.' They leam how to avoid embarrassment, how to maintain a certain 
amount of personal dignity, how to manage their self-presentations, how to be counted 
as members of society. This process of education, in turn, reproduces the standards, 
institutions, structures, beliefs, behaviours,.practices, and thoughts of the prevailing 
social order. Education installs control mechanisms in each member of society, and 
this process of 'education* lasts a lifetime.
Many theorists and researchers have argued that laughter and/or humour 
promote social conformity or have a 'control* function (Bergson, 1900; Stephenson, 
1951; Martineau, 1972; Powell, 1977; Jauregui, 1995). Among adults, and within a  
single cultural setting, humour and laughter continue to remind individuals of what is 
normal, known, and expected of each other, as individuals, role-holders, and members 
of society. They furthermore maintain these members up-to-date as standards evolve — 
young children already begin to laugh at their parents for being ’old fashioned* in their 
tastes.
I will argue in these pages that despite the ‘subversive* appearance of some 
types of laughter and humour, their effect tends to be one of conformity to and 
reinforcement of the social standards of propriety. Humour and laughter act against 
the deviance of the madman (as opposed to that of the criminal), those failures in the 
upkeep of demeanour which threaten the fragile worlds of social interaction. The 
ultimate punishment for such violations is the insane asylum, but on the way laughter 
and humour - in  forms such as gossip, ridicule, or teasing— represent minor and 
intermediate sanctions. In the struggle over the official definitions of the situation 
which make up the fabric of social interaction, they will also be shown to play an 
important role. Even in their absence, the mere threat of laughter and humour may 
have a passive controlling effect on behaviour.
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The Illusion of ‘Subversive’ Humour and Laughter
Though laughter and humour have sometimes been portrayed as more or less 
radical tools of social change, in reality they tend to mirror existing patterns and 
institutions. Stephenson (1951), for instance, found that anthology jokes dealing with 
status and economic differentials tended to reinforce traditional American values such 
as equality, ambition, and opportunity. Husband (1977) has shown that racist humour 
in a number of BBC sitcoms, while intended to be satirical, may have actually served 
to “exacerbate racial feeling” already present in British society (p. 271). A joke which 
is to have an appreciative audience will not be found funny without reference to self­
claims attributed to some actor(s) by the audience members. Such shared attributions 
are among the foundations of social structure.
Umberto Eco has expressed the illusory nature o f this ’subversive' aspect of the 
phenomena most lucidly:
The comic seems to belong to the people, liberating, subversive, because it 
gives license to violate the rule. But it gives such a license precisely to those 
who have so absorbed the rule that they also presume it inviolable. The rule 
violated by the comic is so acknowledged that there is no need to reaffirm it. 
That is why carnival can take place only once a year. It takes a year of ritual 
observance for the violation of the ritual precepts to be enjoyed.
(Eco, 1987:275)
Indeed, carnivals —where behavioural expectations are typically reversed or violated 
in numerous ways— have been particularly common in traditional agricultural 
societies, where very fixed sets of self-claims attach to role members and to members 
of society as a whole. Such reversals of practice are very common cross-culturally 
during rites of passage, whether from one calendar year to the next, or from an 
individual's initial status to a new one. By eliciting laughter at such 'wrong' behaviour 
—sexual transgression at a pre-wedding *bachelor party', role-reversals during camival- 
they actually celebrate proper behaviour.
Michael Mulkay (1988) has analyzed this paradox in modem society. In 
Mulkay's view, it is not only mainstream commercial humour which is conservative, 
but even explicitly critical satire such as political cartoons. Cartoons, though
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apparently designed to provoke change in the real world, in fact follow the editorial 
line of their home newspapers, reaching audiences whose opinions concur with the 
points expressed in the humour. They are ‘conservative* within the particular virtual 
society of readers, no matter how radical this readership may be. Thus they tend to 
"confirm existing views and to strengthen the established political structure" (p. 210).
Critical humour merely reflects the existence of critical sectors of society, 
subgroups who share amusement at certain individuals or institutions they collectively 
consider ridiculous or enjoy ridiculing. Undoubtedly, the boss, the king, the president, 
the teacher are laughed at within certain circles (especially in private), and will 
certainly be subject to general mockery if their independent, role, or universal self­
claims are not fulfilled (often a tall order in the upper ranks). Nevertheless, it is 
generally those in power positions who set the laughter agenda. In a study of humour 
use during hospital staff meetings, Coser (1960) found that senior staff members made 
many more witticisms (53) than junior staff members (33), even though juniors spent 
much more time talking at the meetings. He also noted that women made a 
remarkably low number of witticisms, and that humour tended to be directed 
'downwards' (p. 85, original emphasis):
The most frequent targets of the senior staff were junior members; the 
humor of the latter, however, was more frequently directed against patients and 
their relatives, as well as against themselves.... Humor tends to be directed 
against those who have no authority over the initiator. In two cases in which 
senior members were the targets of the juniors, the targets were absent from 
the meetings. Not once was a senior staff member present a target o f a junior 
member’s humor.
Even humour which is directed at power holders or well-established institutions must 
be founded on other institutions, namely, the social norms and expectations held by 
the target sharing audience. It will be radical at large, but conservative (and perhaps 
even funny) at home.
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The Deviance of the Insane
Humour and laughter delineate boundaries o f deviance. Specifically, they 
thrive on the deviance of the madman and the freak, rather than the deviance of the 
criminal. Blundering once is funny; blundering twice may be twice as funny; but 
blundering three or more times will begin to threaten everyday interaction, and such 
threats risk exclusion from society. Goffman's analyses of self-claim maintenance in 
public invariably alluded to the depository o f interactional failures: the mental hospital 
(SeeGoffman 1961; 1963:231-248; 1967:137-200).
More than to any family or club, more than to any class or sex, more 
than to any nation, the individual belongs to gatherings, and he had best show 
that he is a member in good standing. The ultimate penalty for breaking the 
rules is harsh. Just as we fill our jails with those who transgress the legal order, 
so we partly fill our asylums with those who act unsuitably --the first kind of 
institution being used to protect our lives and property; the second, to protect 
our gatherings and occasions.
(Goffman 1963:248)
In the back wards o f mental homes we find individuals who, for whatever reason, 
regularly fail to keep up their own and others* public masks. Here we are made aware, 
by shocking contrast, of the vulnerability and fragility of daily interaction, of all the 
myriad details of behaviour usually so ingrained and automatic as to be taken for 
granted. Consider the following description of mealtime behaviour:
A patient would often lunge at an extra piece o f food or at least eye an extra 
piece covetously. Even when each individual at table was allowed to receive 
an equal share, over-eagerness was shown by the practice of taking all of one's 
share at once instead of waiting until one serving had been eaten. Occasionally 
a patient would come to table half-dressed. One patient frequently belched 
loudly at meals and was occasionally flatulent Messy manipulation of food 
sometimes occurred. Swearing and cursing were common. Patients would 
occasionally push their chairs back from the table precipitously and bolt for
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another room, coming back to the table in the same violent manner. Loud 
sounds were sometimes made by sucking on straws in empty pop bottles.
(Goffrnan 1967:79-80)
Such a description could serve as the basis for a comedy routine. Each of these 
improper behaviours could be seen as funny if the individuals performing them were 
not labelled 'insane/ a classification implying disease or damage which incapacitates 
an individual for normal interaction. In our society, such a state of affairs is 
considered tragic, an unjust deprivation of the basic human right to a happy and 
productive life. We expect such things to evoke empathic pity (See Chapter Six, 
3.2.2). However, this attitude is not shared universally, and a few generations ago, 
laughing at madness was considered acceptable. Morreall (1982: 244) notes that in the 
eighteenth century, "it was common for the rich to amuse themselves by taking a 
coach to an insane asylum to taunt the inmates”. The insane asylum is also the 'funny 
farm.'
In this context, it is interesting to note the shift in the interpretation of 
Cervantes' Don Quixote that took place in the nineteenth century, as documented by 
P.E. Russell (1969). The classic treats at length the delusions, outrageous pretensions, 
and failed exploits of a skinny old man who, having read too many chivalric 
romances, loses his sanity and believes himself to be a heroic paladin. In 1813, 
Sismondi described Don Quixote as "the saddest book ever written" (Russell, 1969: 
325), initiating a romantic interpretation of the work which has continued to the 
present day. According to Russell (p. 323-24), this view derives from "the modem 
reader’s ability (and desire) to identify with the knight...as a would-be, though very 
unsuccessful, do-gooder." For over one and a half centuries before Sismondi, 
however, readers of the book "accepted without cavil that Don Quixote was simply a 
brilliantly successful funny book" (p. 312), following what seem to have been 
Cervantes’ own intentions -" to  move the melancholy man to laughter, and the gay 
man to increased merriment"82.
Today, the empathy we extend to the mentally handicapped normally prevents 
our amusement at their improper or unacceptable ideas and behaviour. Nevertheless,
82 “Que...cl melancolico sc mueva a  risa, el risueno la acreciente.’* (Cervantes, Don Quijote de la 
Mancha, I, Prologo. Cited in Russell, 1969:312.)
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such empathy is a moral ideal not always achieved in practice. Even among the staff 
of psychiatric hospitals, laughter and humour which is directed at patients' behavioural 
anomalies is common (Coser, 1960; Goodrich, Henry, and Wells, 1954). More 
generally, it is the 'mad' behaviour and ideas of 'normal* people which inspire our 
amusement, or else the lunacy o f fictional characters intended to elicit no empathy. 
The world of comedy abounds with explicit references to insanity, particularly in the 
genres where one or more characters exhibit numerous, extreme, and/or recurrent 
faults: clowning, slapstick, and 'screwball' comedy. Indeed, the lexicon of madness is 
one of the most common identifying tags for humorous entertainment. Examples 
abound: The Crazy Gang83, Crazy People84, It*s a Mad, Mad, Mad, Mad World85, Mad 
Magazine86, The Doctor Demento Show87. The madman, fool, zany, or loony is a 
staple comedy character, from which outright confessions of insanity are not rare:
I'm not all there 
There’s something missing.
I'm not all there—
So the folks declare.
They call me Loopy, they call me Loopy- 
Nothing but a great big BOOPY!
Eric Morecambe (in Staveacre, 1987: 121)
Conyers [aggrieved]: Here, are you puttin' it about that I'm barmy?
James: Why —are you trying to keep it a secret?
The Crazy Gang (ibid.: 122)
I’m mad, I'm mad,
It's sad, but it's true,
I froth with wrath,
83 A hugely successful British comedy troupe organized by Fred Kamo in 1932 and retiring in 1962.
84 The original title of the classic BBC radio series The Goon Show (1952-1960).
83 (United Artists, 1963) -A  slapstick film which brought together many of the most important 
American comedians of the century.
86 The most successful American humour magazine, published by E.C. publications since 1952, recently 
turned into a Fox Broadcasting Co. television program.
87 A popular and long-running American radio program in which Barry Hansen plays recordings from 
his collection of "mad music and crazy comedy."
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Bite chair legs in two.... Max Wall (ibid.: 124)
It's fifteen years since I went out of my mind. I’d never go back.
Ken Dodd (ibid.)
Even more telling is the relationship between real mental unfitness and the 
taking up of comedy as a profession. In certain societies, institutions of humour have 
served as social outlets for mentally disturbed individuals. Among the Native 
American Crow, for instance, the thanigratha or tribal clowns, were chosen from the 
naturally eccentric or unruly (Staveacre, 1987: 121). In a complex society such as our 
own, with its competitive markets and tightly structured schedules and procedures, it 
is less likely that a  seriously deficient individual could become a professional 
comedian. Nevertheless, "there is a widespread stereotype that comics are depressed 
people who are more psychologically disturbed than the average" (Fisher and Fisher, 
1983), and at least some evidence supports this view. Eighty-five per cent of 
professional comedians who participated in a study by Janus (1975) had at some time 
in their lives sought psychotherapeutic treatment. Research has also established that 
they are more likely to have been brought up in broken families and to come from a 
low socio-economic class than other types of performers. Moreover, many comics 
themselves attribute their talent to psychological problems:
Some performers think that psychiatry would destroy their art. They'll never 
consider it, for fear that sanity would take away what makes them good 
performers.
(John Geese, in Staveacre, 1987: 124)
Laughing with others draws a boundary between 'us' —the normal, the sane, the 
proper— and 'them* —the abnormal, the insane, the improper“ . Each episode of 
laughter and/or humour is not only a reminder of the constraints within which we all 
live, but also a marker which stigmatizes those who fail or refuse to live by them.
M Incidentally, it is in this sense that one may speak of a laughing individual as 'feeling superior* to the 
target of amusement Such feelings (or, rather, beliefs) of superiority do not cause amusement; they are 
simply revealed or signalled by the laughter, who has (more or less presumptuously) cast himself in the 
role of critic and judge.
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Though occasional faults of propriety are excusable in everyone, any single fault is a 
memorable event which may be added to subsequent ones. Frequent or persistent 
infractions may lead to the labelling of the perpetrator as 'scatterbrained,' 'eccentric,' 
'weird,' 'having a screw loose,' 'thick,' 'awkward,' 'tactless' and the like. Such 
individuals may become frequent targets of humour in a group or 'laughingstocks,' 
living symbols of the social expectations applicable to each member of the group. The 
institution of the 'village idiot' in many traditional societies is an extreme example of 
the "fool-making process" which is omnipresent in society and includes such 
phenomena as teasing, satire, clowning, and ridicule (Klapp, 19S0:159-160).
Laughter. Humour, and Conformity
As we have seen, the endpoint of such a process, the Final punitive sanction for 
impropriety, is the insane asylum. On the way to the 'loony bin,' however, humour and 
laughter may have important normalizing effects on the behaviour of others, and 
indeed may be consciously designed to do so. The fear of embarrassment, of 
becoming the butt o f all jokes, of losing social worth and esteem, of suffering partial 
or total discredit --as well as these feared experiences themselves when they occur- 
appear to be strong enough sanctions to bring most individuals in line with accepted 
practice. Emile Durkheim cited laughter as one of the coercive mechanisms by which 
a ’social fact' imposes itself on the individual: “If I do not conform to ordinary 
conventions, if in my mode of dress I pay no heed to what is customary in my country 
and in my social class, the laughter I provoke, the social distance at which I am kept, 
produce, although in a more mitigated form, the same results as any real penalty** 
(1982:51).
This effect of humour has been widely claimed in many empirical studies, 
especially in the anthropological literature. Gossip, as widely practiced a phenomenon 
as it is denounced, is an indirect but powerful variant. Such private talk about 
another’s private affairs "must concern something that does not agree with the subject 
of gossip’s self-presentation and whose 'public disclosure' for the subject of gossip 
would probably evoke a feeling of embarrassment or shame" (Bergman, 1987). Thus, 
in cases where an aesthetic (i.e., embarrassing, amusement-provoking) rather than a 
moral (i.e., shameful, outrage-provoking) issue is at stake, gossip is a form of highly
414
Chapter Eight: Effects o f Amusement Laughter, and Humour Se c tio na l
uncontrived humour. In the following conversation (p. 94), Mrs. R. and Mrs. P. share 
their amusement at the luridly recounted self-discrediting actions of an acquaintance :
[High-Life: GR: 33]
R: So Breckmann says, "Let's get her drunk.
Then she'll strip for us."
P: <faintly laughing>
R: She was wearing those neat Yokohama-pants, tsk. tsk.
P: <faintly laughing>
R: So there she sat.
and we, uh, we were fooling around*
=pretty soon she was lying on the billiard ta-able.
The more she drank, the wilder she got.
A guy goes over to her and opens his pants and puts his 
thing in her hand.
But I ( ) <boasting>
P: <faintly Iaughing>
R: And without blinking an eye-she-w hen she’s drunk she's so,
well, so (loose)
Undoubtedly, such talk defines and reinforces the standards held by the 
participants who engage in it. Their sharing in such opinions and laughter commits 89
89 It might be suggested in reference to the above discussion that the typing of individuals as 
insane seems commonplace within such gossip, the supposed 'crazies' or 'weirdos' of each social milieu 
being favourite targets:
[High life: GR: 321
H:
R:
P:
R:
H:
R:
R:
(P):
H:
R:
H:
R:
H:
R:
H:
R:
H:
R:
Yeah, that woman's not normal anymore.
And her old man is crazy too.
On our block, in every house, there's a nut 
<laughing faintly>
It's true.
There’s that flat-footed floo[zy the-, the Schuren woman ]
Yeah [( )]
Flat-foot floozy 
<laughing faintly>
Further down the street there's 
Brollo.
Brollo doesn't have all his 
marbles either.
And then there's-, the— 
the Jaspers woman
the Jaspers woman and then there's—, the—
Krysmanski?
Krysmansld 
Yeah, [(that’s)
[And all five on one (block) (Bergman, 1987: 127-28)
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them even more strongly to the relevant norms. It may also affect the subject of gossip 
himself. Though it circulates, by definition, 'behind his back', gossip often does 
nevertheless 'reach the subject's ears' in one way or another: through a confederate's 
words, an overheard snippet of conversation, a graffiti left on the walls of a public 
toilet, the 'looks' that others give him, etc.... Even when he does not have proof of it, 
the subject of gossip may Toiow' or suspect that others speak of him, thus exerting 
pressure on his behaviour.
Open laughter and humour can also lead to similar effects. In everyday 
interaction between friends, such direct teasing and mockery are commonplace. For 
example when, in the following scene (p. 105), Mrs. R defends her claim that the 
Theissen family are dirty and unkept, she reveals a tendency to pry that is immediately 
rejected -an d  laughed at— by her fellow participants:
[High-Life: GR: 23/Simplified]
G: ...It was always rather well kept
R: Yeah,[when you walked in and looked around I would
G: [( ]
R: say it was always well [ kept.
G: [ Hm
R: But you have to look in the comers too.
P: <laughing>
?: ( [ )
H: [You can't really go there
and look in the [ comers.
P: [Hehehehehehehe
G: ( )
R: I'd do that even if I didn't want to.
G: Hm
R: Whenever I go into anyone’s place [ automatically
G: [ <soft!y laughing>
R: my eyes look everywhere.
G: Pau[l! {The conversation takes place in Paul’s apartment.)
H: [Have you checked out the comers [ in Paul's pla]ce=
?: [( )]
H: Hahahaha[haha
G: [Hehe
The above lines exemplify a real discredit o f Mrs. R, who might well have felt some 
embarrassment despite her attempts to maintain her position. Teasing, however,
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generally involves a mention of some participant's discredit which is more or less 
exaggerated. The more caricatured the deviance, the more a tease qualifies as 
'nonserious,' allowing jokers to deny believing the tease literally and permitting the 
target of humour to achieve distance from the discredited self and thus share in 
amusement and/or avoid embarrassment (See this chapter, 4.3, below). In some cases, 
the tease is so far-flung as to not apply much or at all to the nominal transgressor. To 
the extent that the tease makes reference to a real impropriety or implausible self- 
claim, however, it may count as pressure to curb the deviant act:
[Campbell: 4 :5 ]
Arthur: ...you feeling better now.
Bill: Uh:m mNo:.
Arthur: Oh you poor cunt, .hh
(0.4)
Bill: ee I think it was food poisoning (last night) 'cause
I was
Arthur: ( look )
Bill: I'm still gettin:g you know, hh .hh stomach pains I
spewed last ni:ght, ...chronic dianhea as we-e-ll, 
just before I went to bed and ... this morning 
(well) I've had this bad stomach. So I guess the same's 
gonna happen tonight.... I've been getting funny things 
in fron of my eye:s actually..hh A bi:t, just slightly,
Li:ght flashes.
Bill: But uh, (0.3) tsk (sti:ll.)
Arthur: Well you probably got at ¡east a week.
Bill: What of thi:s:.
(0.3)
Arthur: No a week before you die:,
(0.7)
Bill: Ohh yhhe heh heh uh-.hhh[hh
Arthur: [It's a rare disea:$e. see,
Bill: Yeh yeh yeh.
(Drew. 1987: 224/237)
In this conversation, Arthur teases Bill for overdoing the drama of his malady by 
'reassuring' his friend that death is at least another week away -implying Bill was 
worried it would come sooner. Though Bill was certainly not guilty of such an absurd 
thought, the joke allows him to see his real worries and complaints as improper, even
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ridiculous —and pressures him to cease such ‘whining* behaviour, now and in the 
future.
Conformity To Official Definitions
In such exchanges, the importance o f laughter and humour as tools in the 
shaping of everyday definitions becomes evident. During interaction, these 
communicative acts question and sometimes curtail attempts to portray events or 
persons in a way which violate official understandings as defined by the displaying 
individual. One of the most common cases, unsurprisingly, involves a speaker who 
makes an unconvincing claim about himself. In a study of audience reactions to 
political debates (daym an, 1992), such claim-making moments produced the vast 
majority of audience laughter reactions which were not ’affiliative’ (i.e., responding to 
the speaker’s joke, etc...):90
[Bentsen-Quayle: 0:12:53]
JRN: Senator since coming to the Senate you have voted 
against environmental protection legislation about 
two thirds of the time..hhh These include votes 
against pesticide controls, the toxic waste 
superfund, .hhh and health and safety protection 
from nuclear wastes..hhh Senator, do you: consider 
yourself (.) an environmentalist, (.) and if you do 
how do you reconcile that with your voting record.
(2.0)
DQ: I have a very strong (0.7) record (0.4) on the
environment .hhhh[hh[in the United States Senate. ]
AUD: [hh[h-h-h-h-h-h-h-h-h-h-h-h-h-h-]=
=hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh-h-h-h-h (4.1)
DQ: I have a record where I voted for the superfund... (p. 46)
Senator Dan Quayle’s bald and unsupported claim of being an environmentalist, after 
hearing ample evidence of the contrary, produces in Democratic Party supporters a 
wave of laughter, who thereby reject the Republican's portrayal of himself. Quayle 
may attempt to maintain his self-claim, but the audience reaction has warned him that 
he had better provide some solid facts and argumentation to support i t
90 la audience responses, series of *h* correspond to laughter, with hyphenated sequences (ie. 'h-h-h') 
corresponding to milder responses.
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The description of other events or people can also bring on critical displays, as 
in this conversation transcribed by Drew (1987:223):
[NB:II:4:R: 14] (Nancy is describing a man she recently met)
Nancy: VERY SWEET, .hhh VE:RY: (.) CONSIDERATE MY
Emma: (Or he's)
Nancy: NO:? e-MARTHAHAS known CIi:ff, ...((a good 30 years 
and he's an absolute boy scout))
Martha's tease "THEY DO THAT BEFORE AND AFTER THEY DO:n't" throws 
some doubt on Emma's characterization of Cliff as considerate and well-intentioned, 
by suggesting possible ulterior motives of a sexual nature. The line is no more than a 
joking interpretation —a different reaction would have been a well-informed, "Hahaha, 
yes, well he's been pulling that trick for years, the scoundrel!". Nevertheless, it serves 
as a warning against a naive and possibly dangerous acceptance of appearances. As it 
happens, in this case, Emma appears to have good evidence of the man's trustworthy 
nature, but such skeptical moves are a fundamental part of defining and coping with 
our ever uncertain social reality.
Meetings at any frontier of disagreement provide the researcher with excellent 
opportunities for studying the effects and uses of laughter and humour in the realm of 
defining reality. Speeches in the British Parliament, for instance, are frequently 
responded to with laughter from opposing camps, a practice common in such fora 
since our earliest records of them:
Derisive laughter could be used in Spartan politics also as an alternative to
discussion, particularly in the assembly. An example of such use is suggested
GOD ALL I HAD TO DO WAS LOOK AT A CIGARETTE 
AND HE WAS OUT OF THE CHAIR LIGHTING 
(h)IT YhhhOU KNO(h)OW=
Emma: [I: KNO:W IT ]
Nancy: [.hehh-hh One of th]ose kind .hhhhh=
Emma: [Yes
Nancy: [A::nd so[ :butw ew ere ]
Emma: [THEY DO THAT ] [BEFORE AND AFTER]
Nancy:
Emma:
Nancy:
[eeYhhehee AHH ]]
THEY DO.n't. 
HAHHAH.hhhh
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by Xenophon’s account of the 'debate' preceding the adoption of the fatal 
decision to dispatch Cleombrotus’ army on the mission which ended in the 
disaster of Leuctra. Prothous, a Spartan whose name is known only from this 
occasion, tried to convince his fellow citizens to adopt a different (and more 
prudent) course of action. Xenophon relates that the Spartans thought he was 
talking nonsense.
(David, 1988:16)
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Control Campaigns
Certain unacceptable self-claims or deviant characteristics of particular 
individuals or groups may become the object of long-running series of jokes by a 
social group: a colleague's habitual lateness, a politician's poor grammar, an artist's 
over-hyped but actually worthless productions, a religious sect's 'bizarre' beliefs, an 
ethnic group's stinginess. Holdaway (in Powell and Paton, 1988) reports some of the 
humorous campaigns waged against fellow officers within a police team (p. 115):
A constable who is prone to the frequent, highly exaggerated telling of stories 
is 'sent up' with equal frequency because he is so immersed in the excesses of 
the occupational culture that he almost discredits i t  Here, as he begins a story 
about a car chase, ready to lace his account with lavish drama of danger and 
speed, a colleague interjects: Tell us about it, Bill. Dangerous I bet. Great 
chase, eh?'. Another officer who has a reputation for driving at very fast speeds 
whatever the nature of the incident he is heading for, is subject to similar 
remarks, which always draw laughter from colleagues. This PC has just 
returned from a call to premises where suspects might have been attempting to 
enter illegally. Inspector: 'No "Suspects On" then?' PC: 'No.' Other PC: 'Your 
imagination then?' Inspector 'But he was there first.'
Such campaigns of attrition are not necessarily intended as such, of course —at 
least consciously— but some people do engage in ridicule with an awareness of the 
'improvement* in others or in society which may result In Chapter Five, for instance, I 
mentioned the works of such defenders of science as Martin Gardner and James 
Randi, who have written books and articles exposing the emptiness of 
pseudoscientific theories and debunking claims of paranormal ability by various 
charlatans. Gardner believes that ridicule can be more effective than mere 
argumentation (1983: xv-xvi):
In discussing extremes of unorthodoxy in science I consider it a waste of time 
to give rational arguments. Those who are in agreement do not need to be 
educated about such trivial matters, and trying to enlighten those who disagree 
is like trying to write on water. People are not persuaded by arguments to give
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up childish beliefs; either they never give them up or they outgrow them. If a 
Protestant fundamentalist is convinced that the earth was created six thousand 
years ago and that all fossils are records of life that flourished until Noah's 
Flood, nothing you can say will have the slightest effect on his or her ignorant 
mind-set.
(...)
For these reasons, when writing about extreme eccentricities of 
science, I have adopted H.L. Mencken's sage advice: one horse-laugh is worth 
ten thousand syllogisms.
Many caricaturists and satirists, both professional and lay, consider their work 
productive in so far as it may prevent or correct the vanities and deficiencies of 
individuals, role-members, office-holders, institutions, or society as a whole. As 
Highet (1962: 156) claimed in a book on satire, its purpose is, "through laughter and 
invective, to cure folly and punish evil." Again, however, there exist grave limitations 
to such effects. To be effective within a given social context, humour must be based 
on widely accepted standards of appearance, thought, and behaviour. In simple, small- 
scale societies, where many such standards are shared, institutions of ridicule such as 
camp clowns or songs of mockery are common means of social control:
Rasmussen reports instances in which Eskimo nith-songs are used ... as a form 
of public reprimand, bringing home to someone guilty of anti-social conduct 
the disapproval with which his behaviour is viewed. The singer recounts the 
wrongdoing loudly in a public place where all can hear, hoping to shame the 
wrongdoer into mending his ways. Similar means of curbing disapproved 
conduct are very widely reported [in ethnographies of traditional societies], all 
of them involving some sort of ridicule, reproach or public exposure, operating 
to discomfort the wrongdoer and thus encourage him back to acceptable forms 
of behaviour.
(Roberts, 1979:61)
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An example of an Eskimo nith-song gives a flavour of how even a rather serious 
wrongdoing —a man who abandoned his wife and child to perish in the wilds after a 
marital quarrel-- can be punished with words of mockery:
Ay-all who listen,
What do you think of him,
Poor sort o f man?
Is he to be envied, *
Who is great in his anger 
But faint in strength 
Blubbering helplessly,
Properly chastised?
Though it was he who foolishly proud 
Started the quarrel with stupid words* (ibid.: 90)
Passive Agents of Control
As with other types of sanction, laughter and humour may be effective as 
agents of social control even in their absence. The anticipation of others' ridicule by 
potential deviants itself acts as a powerful deterrent. Such fear is a familiar sensation 
to us all, even when ethnographic details seem foreign, as in this desperate speech by a 
New Guinean Busama villager faced with the plight of an unprepared host (in Hogbin, 
1947:276):
who ever heard of receiving important guests without killing a pig for them to 
eat? Where’s that to come from? You know quite well there’s not a pig in the 
place. When these men go home and are asked what we gave them, they’ll 
reply that all they had was just a little taro and rice without pork. Their 
kinsmen will laugh at us, and we'll have to hang our heads in shame.
Recent research has confirmed that individuals will make great efforts to avoid 
anticipated embarrassment91, even at a great cost to themselves and others. For 
example, teenagers will risk AIDS and other sexually-transmitted diseases in order to
91 As seen in Chapter Six, I, the experience of embarrassment is associated by most people to the 
sensation of others laughing at them. Also, as seen in Chapters Four to Six, embarrassing situations are 
causes of amusement for us all. Thus, it is reasonable to equate anticipated embarrassment of the self 
with the anticipated laughter of others.
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avoid the embarrassment of purchasing a condom or of using it at the critical moment 
(Miller, 1986: 163).
Laughter and humour displays imply the discredit of someone’s self-claim. 
This connotation may have effects both at the situational level and, in the aggregate, at 
the social level. Within a situation, a  manifestation of laughter and/or humour may 
publicise the discredit of the claimant —perhaps eliciting embarrassment and/or face- 
work if the claimant be present at the scene. At the same time, it may have an effect 
on the amusement and/or laughter displays of participants present, who are alerted 
about the discredit and about its interpretation by the displaying individual.
In the aggregate, these displays have effects on the social order. They make 
new members and children aware of the social norms of demeanour applicable to 
particular individuals, roles, and humanity at large. Furthermore, they act as a pressure 
for group members to conform to these norms, as a preliminary and most effective 
sanction to a type of deviance ultimately penalized, in our society, by confinement to 
an insane asylum.
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4.2. Effects Derived From the 'Knowledge', Identity', 
and 'Involvement' Connotations
As we have seen (Chapter Seven, 2A2-2.4.4, 3.3), laughter and humour 
displays represent self-claims about the displaying actor’s own knowledge about 
certain particulars, social identity, and ability to become involved in certain ways of 
interpreting reality. These ‘knowledge,* ‘identity,* and ‘involvement* connotations, 
therefore, reveal (or purport to reveal) a substantial amount of information about the 
displaying individual. A humorist who creates a clever wit on the basis of the 
specialized jargon of geologists reveals his familiarity with this discipline. A person 
who laughs at a slanderous ethnic joke reveals his ethnic background and prejudice. 
Showing mirth at a ‘blasphemous* piece of humour exposes a person’s level of 
commitment to and respect for a particular religion or for religious belief and practice 
in general. Often, such information is not particularly noteworthy, merely confirming 
what observers already know about the displaying individual. It becomes salient when 
the mental possessions (or lack thereof) revealed by the display provides new or 
unexpected data.
Three effects can be derived from these considerations. From an abstract, 
outside observer's perspective, laughter and humour displays result in the placement 
o f the displaying individual within schemes of social classification, which in the 
aggregate results also in the creation and reinforcement of these categories. At a 
subjective, interpersonal level, one of two further effects is also likely. An observer 
may feel affiliation towards the displaying individual if mental possessions exposed 
are similar to his own, or disaffiliation if they diverge. These complementary effects 
also allow for an individual to test a relationship, or to achieve greater closeness or 
distance with a  co-participant.
425
Chapter Eight: Effects o f Amusement. Laughter, and Humour ¿oci1onA2
4.2.1. Social Classification
Every society carves up the world according to conceptual typologies, and 
among these can always be found schemes for classifying persons, according to such 
cross-cutting criteria as gender, age, race, class, ethnic background, religion, 
ideology, profession, personality type, hobby interest, and aesthetic preference. 
Displaying laughter or humour situates a  person within such schemes of social 
classification, by divulging mental contents which reveal aspects of his cultural 
background and personality:
A man's laugh betrays the kind of man he is. (Baillie, 1921: 268)
Laughter [is] the cipher-key wherewith we decipher the whole man!
(Carlyle, 1833:24)
The social categories to which the laughing individual commits himself can be 
more or less specific. The joke about electricity cited in Chapter Seven 2.4.2 (“Where 
does electricity come from? The wall.**) reveals relatively little about an appreciating 
listener. Even familiarity with electricity and wall sockets does, however, exclude 
some remote populations of humanity, as does —probably to a greater extent— the 
standard 'question and answer' format of such jokes.
A more accurate gauge of identity might be the films of Woody Allen, which 
for full enjoyment require familiarity with such marks of intellectual 'cultivation' as 
psychoanalytic theory, existentialist philosophy, Greek theatre, Russian literature, 
contemporary politics, and a wide variety o f cinematic genres. ‘Risky’ humour (i.e., 
ethnic, sexual, aggressive, blasphemous, toilet), which is likely to offend or embarrass 
a  certain proportion o f a population, can also classify a displaying individual with 
more precision. Moving towards ever greater specificity, we find culturally local 
comedians who use material closely circumscribed by the world o f their audience and, 
and finally 'inside* jokes comprehensible to or tolerable by only a handful of people.
This classificatory effect can be considered at the interpersonal level: a laugher 
o r humourist reveals his cultural and ethnic background, his allegiances, his ignorance 
o r knowledge about specific pools of information. Such an event may have any of the
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consequences associated with actions which disclose information about the self. An 
adolescent boy unable to decode a sexual joke may be discredited before his friends 
for failing to possess certain status-essential knowledge. More extreme cases include 
the forced resignation of former American Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz for 
telling a joke which revealed racist attitudes, or the prison sentences imposed by some 
totalitarian countries for the use of subversive humour (Fine, 1983: 175). Laughter and 
humour displays can also be used strategically to situate the self within a grid o f social 
categories —i.e., an adolescent boy who tells many sexual jokes and/or laughs where 
appropriate to demonstrate his knowledge of sexual lore. Such self-claims may also, 
of course, be discredited. :
Another possible strategic use of this effect can be made not by the displaying 
individual himself, but by his observer. Eliciting humour, or eliciting laughter at 
particular types o f humour, can be a way of learning about the other. Following 
Freud’s analysis of jokes (1905), for instance, this technique has been developed and 
recommended by several psychotherapists:
There have been many studies since Freud that have dealt with the type of 
humour people prefer and its relation to specific problems they may have, or to 
personality dynamics.... My own work has experimentally and clinically 
demonstrated that both general personality factors and problems of personal 
significance find their means of expression overtly through jokes. Indeed a 
patient's favourite joke has been found sometimes to reveal hidden dynamics 
behind anxiety that is attributed to other causes.
(Grossman, 1977)
Outside of specific interactional situations, and moving to the level of society, 
the frontiers which bind together and divide audiences o f humour and laughter spring 
from but also create and reinforce social boundaries. Sharing laughter within a group 
is not only made possible by the shared knowledge and attitudes of members; it is a 
ritual which maintains and strengthens the group as such, as well as pressuring new or 
deviant members to conform (see this chapter, 4.1.3 - 4.1.4, above). Moreover, the 
ritual is directed against the targets of amusement, out-groups and deviant members
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against whom barriers of celebrated difference are erected. In the aggregate, humour 
and laughter tend to reproduce existing social structures (Mulkay, 1988:210).
The following transcript can be used as an illustration. It records part of an 
interview between a sociologist (G) and the mayor of Conspicua (C), a town in Malta, 
in the presence of two other members of the town hall (J, V). Conversation centres 
around the linguistic situation in Malta, an island culturally rooted in the Arab world, 
though recently a British colony for over one and a half centuries.
G: Mmh. .Hh, but do, do you th..., do you, ee, ...In Sliema, for example,...
J: Ha.
G: ...they speak more English than, than Maltese
V: If you can call it English [smiles].
J: Don’t tell me that! It’s broken...
G: Yes, it’s a broken...
C: Hehe.
V: HI HI HI HI HI.
J : That’s a very sour point. But you ar obli..., obliged there.
V: Hahahaha.
C: HA HA
G: Nppfff.
J: I always start swearing. Because probably, eh, you know,...
C: Ha.
(...)
G: Mmh. Yes. And, and as you said it’s not even real English. It’s...
V: No, no.
G: It’s a mixture...
J: Mmh.-Exactly. When they find a hard word in English they use,
they use the Maltese one.
C: H A H A H A H A  HA.
V: Hahaha.
G: (smiles) (Gerber, 1997)
The Conspicuan mayor and his associates, with their displays of humour and laughter 
at the expense of the inhabitants of Sliema and other English-speaking areas of Malta, 
reveal their own Arab pride and Arab-speaking preferences, and make evident a 
cultural boundary separating an ‘Arab Malta* from an ‘English Malta.’ According to 
their interpretation, the inhabitants o f Sliema are ridiculous in their claims to speak 
proper English, when in fact their ’true* language and culture is ‘Maltese*. It might be 
imagined that in Sliema, a conversation on the same topic might portray Arab­
speaking Maltese as laughable for being ‘less civilized* and for not speaking English.
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Occasions such as these, in which in-group members take the opportunity to share 
amusement together at the expense of an outgroup, are the very occasions where group 
boundaries are defined, revived, and solidified. The presence of a neutral participant, 
an interviewer (G), transforms this particular occasion into one where group 
boundaries are transmitted to a new individual. Moreover, the newcomer seems to 
undergo pressure to adopt the beliefs of the in-group and share in the laughter, 
pressure to which he seems to conform, but only just.
429
Chapter Eight: Effects of  Amusement Laughter, and Humour Section 4,2
4.2.2. Affiliation
The effect of social classification has been presented above from an abstract, 
neutral standpoint: an actor’s laughter or humour display shows who he is. It can be 
further regarded, however, from a subjective point of view: who is the social actor to 
me? Two contrary and complementary interpersonal effects are possible, depending on 
the relationship between the social identity expressed by laughter and that of an 
observer, affiliation or disaffiliation. If the observer has amusement reactions92 
which closely resemble those of a displaying individual, his affiliation towards the 
latter will tend to be strengthened. He will consider the other to be in several ways 
akin to himself, part of the same in-group or groups within particular schemes of 
social classification. If, on the other, a joke is found cryptic, stupid, or tasteless, an 
outburst of laughter puzzling, tactless, or ignorant, or a seriously-delivered 
presentation unintentionally funny, disaffiliation will result. Many reactions of this 
type will lead the observer to feel alienated from the displaying individual, 
progressively seen (at least in the relevant contexts) as an ever more distant outsider 
and out-group member. In this section, I will discuss the effect of affiliation and its 
uses, turning to disaffiliation in Section 4.2.3.
Sharing any emotion —anger, fear, sadness, happiness, nostalgia- creates a 
bond between the sharing individuals. Amusement, however, has a number o f 
advantages over other emotions for creating and strengthening ties of affiliation: the 
gratifying enjoyment it produces, its short duration, and the relative ease with which it 
may be produced (through humour)93. Some emotions —i.e., fear, sadness, anger, lust— 
also carry potential negative connotations for displayers, and thus open expression is 
only possible in rather restricted circumstances. In a book describing The Fifty Worst 
Movies o f All Time, the authors justify the enterprise by suggesting that “when the 
conversation turns to motion pictures, people show greater enthusiasm in laughing 
together over films they despise than in trying to praise the films they admire” 
(Medved and Dreyfuss, 1978: 9). I would suggest that such a conversational bias
92 It is worth noting that unlike other effects of humour and laughter displays, affiliation and 
disaffiliation depend additionally on the experience or non-experience of amusement by a reference 
observer.
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applies very widely indeed. The sharing of amusement is one of our most common 
and enjoyable social experiences.
I am aware of no research that specifically tests the effectiveness of laughter 
and/or humour in modifying interpersonal attitudes. Subjective experience, of course, 
provides ample evidence that we are drawn towards individuals we find funny or have 
a 'good sense of humour' and repelled by those who fail to 'catch' our wit or whose 
jokes annoy us or leave us cold. Some ethnographies have described such processes in 
action:
[Employees in a department storej say they would not care to work in a 
particular department because its members 'take life much too seriously.' A 
member will often say how much she likes another member because the latter 
is 'always ready for a joke' and 'full of fun.' Those who joke readily are 
obviously very much more popular than those who do not. They are 
approached more often by other members. They elicit a more favourable 
reaction than others when they make an approach themselves and they are 
never seen to sit alone during their meal breaks.
(Bradney, 1957: 186)
It is also common to share moments of closeness with complete strangers when an 
amusing occurrence happens in a public place -the speaker on a train station 
megaphone system hiccups- or during a brief interaction of the strangers themselves - 
-momentarily being unable to cross each other on a pavement, due to coincident 
movements to either side93 4. Such moments can serve as the basis for opening an 
encounter -i.e ., a conversation—, thus creating in turn the minimal foundation for a 
personal relationship. And indeed, the progression from stranger to acquaintance and 
finally to friend or lover seems to be marked by levels of ever-more private joking and
93 In relation to the third point, it may be more likely that two individuals coincide in a negative 
evaluation (ie, a claim's discredit) than in a positive one, as failure in all fields tends to be easier, and 
easier to identify, than success.
94 Goffman (1983: 33-35) discusses this phenomenon with regard to ‘dramatic events’ occurring before 
two strangers. These happenings (ie, a car crash, a blackout) allow them to “acceptably assume what is 
in each other’s mind” and thus initiate interaction.
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laughing. In group situations too, the sharing of jokes —especially those intelligible 
only by members— seems a vital part of group life and of its identity formation.
Numerous researchers (reviewed by Martineau, 1972; Fine, 1983: 173-74) 
have drawn upon such familiar experiences as well as ethnographic materials to 
propose the idea that (successful) humour creates and reinforces “social cohesion“ 
(Blau, 1955: 109-112) or “a sense of solidarity and intimacy“ (Middleton and Moland, 
1959; in Martineau, 1972: 108) between individuals and within groups.
Humour. Laughter, and the Development o f Relationships
Laughter and humour often play an important role in the formation of personal 
relationships and in the acceptance of new members into a group. In studies which 
document this role, the relationship between shared mental contents and this affiliative 
effect becomes clear. Martineau (1972: 116) has noted that the type of humour 
employed by first acquaintances are what Pitchford (ibid.) has called "universal short 
cuts to consensus," inoffensive jokes and banter which do not depend on very specific 
types of knowledge. As relationships deepen, humour becomes progressively more 
'private':
The power of the group culture can be recognized by anyone who enters a 
group that has been in existence for some time. Most groups, particularly those 
characterized by informality, develop a set of joking references that may be 
unrecognizable to those outside the group.
(Fine, 1983: 170)
Coser (1959) relates how in a hospital setting, the frequent 'jocular griping' that takes 
place at the expense of doctors, nurses, and hospital bureaucracy depends on 
experience with patient life which bonds patients together and bars outsiders from 
participating in the joking interaction (which they would not appreciate):
Jocular talk...especially the jocular gripe, is based on shared experience.... To 
participate in jocular talk one has to have overcome one's worst fears and be 
somewhat detached, and what is more, participation in jocular talk
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presupposes some common experiences about which consensus is sought.
Jocular talk and especially jocular griping is not being shared with a stranger.
(Coser, 1959:178-79)
In an original study of joke use between waitresses and customers at an all- 
night diner, Walle (1976) developed a scale of joke-types corresponding to various 
levels of increasing intimacy. In their attempts to 'pick up' a waitress before the end of 
a shift, customers would attempt to shorten and assess the social distance through 
joke-telling, success or failure being marked by the reaction of the waitress. Walle 
observed, however, that joke-use tended to follow a continuum from the most general 
humour "dealing exclusively with subjects or topics which no member of the society 
would normally find objectionable" (p. 207) to ever more specific topical humour 
"that deals with a specific person or with a belief system held by one segment of the 
population," (p. 208) and finally to sexual humour which "both the raconteur and the 
audience must admit to a degree of sexual knowledge in order to enjoy" (p. 209).
The progression of a relationship from lesser to greater intimacy, therefore, is 
commonly accompanied by the use of increasingly more ‘private* or ‘risky* 
amusement, laughter, and humour, as partners come to know more about each other — 
discovering new subjects over which to share amusement and laughter- and develop 
common pools of knowledge, experience, identity, and attitude on which to base 
progressively more restricted forms of humour. I will now turn to how humour and 
laughter can be used strategically to regulate this process of intimacy-creation
Strategic Use of Affiliative Humour
Humour use can be employed more or less intentionally to increase or decrease 
affiliation. Those who have most consciously employed humour to 'make friends' are 
those who most systematically attempt to profit from such 'friendship': salesmen. 
Humour is one of the main techniques of advertising, despite the once popular notion 
taught by Claude Hopkins that "nobody buys from a clown" (in White, 1993: 84). In a 
study of television ads broadcast within a single day in 1985 in the London ITV 
region, it was found that "more than a third were designed to make viewers laugh or 
smile” (Clark, 1989: 142). Though not all research has supported the contention that
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humour in general is effective in persuading consumers to buy a product, certain 
humorous campaigns have enjoyed a huge success (in terms of consumer sales) 
apparently related to their amusing content. One finding put forward by several 
researchers suggests that funny advertising works by creating a bond of affiliation 
with consumers: It is humour directed at a spécifie target audience which appears to 
be most effective (Stemthal and Craig, 1973; Seely, 1980; both cited in Brown and 
Bryant, 1983). This may reflect the marketer's dilemma that to create a bond of 
closeness with a joke-sharing audience, the bond must be exclusive of some outgroup 
who would not understand or appreciate the joke. It is pointless for a brand name to 
assert "we are like you" if "you" refers to  anyone at all. In other words, the more 
private the joke, the more reduced the social category committed to, the stronger the 
tie of affiliation. The marketing tradeoff seems to be between higher sales to a smaller 
group and lower sales to a larger group.
The concept of the ’salesman,' o f course, can be broadened to include 
individuals and corporations who offer not only consumer items, but also services, 
political programmes, religious beliefs, scientific theories, and other goods. As many 
of their sales presentations or pitches are delivered at a podium of some type, these 
salesmen tend to converge on the activity o f 'speech-giving.' Public speakers of every 
variety 'sell' some story or idea which may be *bought' by the audience with their 
attention and perhaps even with adherence or conversion to some cause or plan of 
action. Consequently, humour can be observed to be a very widespread speechgiving 
technique, particularly common in the opening lines of a delivery, and clearly aimed at 
affiliating with the audience. Numerous books provide anecdotes and advice for 
would-be podium humourists (Humes, 1975; Brandreth, 1985; Perret, 1989; Iapoce; 
1988), and references to this affiliative use of joking are often explicit;
Humor that encapsulates the situation and defines it is the best type for earning 
that respect. It tells your audience quickly and concisely, 'I know what the 
situation is and I  know you know what the situation is. Now I have something 
to say that's worth listening to.'
(Perret, 1989:21)
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Humor connects you to your audience. Je ts  each audience member know that, 
whatever the differences in your relative power or status, you arc really just 
like any one of them —a human being.... A humorous opening remark...can 
reassure listeners and function as a kind of verbal handshake that shows you 
want to be friends.
(Iapoce, 1988: 3-5)
Another class of agents interested in affiliation are community leaders, 
mediators of dispute, public relations officers, debate moderators, and all those whose 
role demands include the defusing of hostility and/or the establishment of good 
relations between parties in conflict. A comparative study of this field will find 
humour used and appreciated as a fundamental tool of appeasement. In many simple 
societies, especially those in which survival depends on a close cooperation o f 
members, there tends to exist a very low tolerance for any type of conflict, and joking 
emerges as a common form of dispute-resolution (Roberts, 1979: 88). The camp 
clown of the Mbuti Pygmies, for example, occupies the only specialized political role 
within this nomadic hunter-gatherer society:
His function is to act as a buff between disputants, deflecting the more serious 
disputes away from their original sources, absolving other individuals of blame 
by accepting it himself. Frequently he will end a dispute simply through the 
use of ridicule, and although such ridicule may be taken as a form of judgment, 
the essential point is that once again its objective is to divert attention from the 
source of the dispute and also to divert blame from anyone who is clearly in 
the wrong. The major concern of all, except possibly the prime disputants, is 
that the dispute shall be ended, and frequently by creating or reviving another, 
lesser dispute the clown brings the disputants into the same frame of mind.
(Turnbull, 1965: 182)
Similar techniques are used in our own complex society to reduce conflict in various 
environments. In recent handbooks advising businessmen on how to use humour 
effectively in their work (Kushner, 1990; Perret, 1989), joking is recommended as a
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method for resolving disputes. Perret recounts a successful example from his own 
experience, about a tense argument over responsibilities held before a manager (p.30):
I was eager to prove that I wasn't at fault and the marketing rep was just as 
prepared to show that it wasn't his fault, either. Our manager stopped us cold.
"I want all of us to relax and work together on this problem,” he said. 
"I'm the one who's at fault here. I hired both of you.”
According to Perret, the manager's witty resolution was able to make all three 
participants laugh with real amusement, by discrediting all three in equal measure and 
in absurdly exaggerated way. The tension built up by the argument was relaxed, and 
the discussion was able to proceed in a more cooperative manner.
Humour may also be used by an individual who is approached by another with 
hostility, to defuse the other’s emotional charge before dealing with the relevant 
grievance in a serious manner. Role-holders who are routinely faced with aggressive 
questions from clients or customers are advised by Perret (1989: 98-104) and Iapoce 
(1988: 5-7) to develop jokes for this purpose. Perret gives an example of a 
successfully funny and affiliative response to a hostile query commonly directed at tax 
collectors (p. 104):
Q: Why are tax forms so complicated?
A: They're written by the same people who write instructions for assembling 
children's toys.
This reply places both participants on an equal footing before a common object of 
derision (assuming the questioner has had experience with toy assembly or similar 
tasks). It also includes an absurd element in suggesting a kind o f circle of incompetent 
or intentionally malicious writers and designers who are responsible for gibberish as 
diverse as toy assembly instructions and tax forms. A hostile questioner who 
understands and appreciates the joke is likely to consider the tax collector someone 
very much like himself, possessing feelings, an awareness that tax forms are 
inordinately complicated and obscure, and the experience of futile struggling with toy
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assembly and such supposedly simple activities at the hands of the anonymous 
characters responsible for incomprehensible directions.
Interestingly, Perret also includes examples of possible humorous replies to the 
question “why are tax forms so complicated” which would not, however, have 
affiliative effects (p. 104):
A l: Because they're really a secret government IQ test.
A2: Don't worry, we've got a new one for people like you 
-y o u  just connect the dots.
A3: They're actually simple if you don't earn any income.
Though other tax collectors might find these jokes funny, a hostile questioner would 
probably be far from amused by them. The first two answers direct their humour at the 
questioner himself, suggesting a lack o f intelligence he is unlikely to accept. The third 
is not directly offensive, but neither does it provide a strong affiliative tie between 
questioner and tax collector, some basis for a common identity. Furthermore, it 
includes a potentially unsettling or even tasteless reference to income-less individuals. 
These examples clarify the nature of humour’s potential affiliative consequence. The 
effect is wholly dependent on the agreement between humourist and audience with 
regard to the premises on which the amusement referred to by the humour is based.
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Strategic Use of Affiliative Laughter
In the discussion so far, I have dealt mainly with humour displays as creating 
or intended to create affiliation. It should be obvious, however, that the desired 
response to these displays (i.e., laughter) signifies an acceptance of this closeness. A 
salesman who incites his potential client to laughter obtains confirmation of a 
common identity on which to base the sale. The laughter of disputants at a mediator's 
jokes can be considered a sign of decreased confrontation between them. And indeed, 
the intended sharing audiences of salesmen and mediators often resist displaying 
laughter in order to maintain a distance from these control attempts (See also 4.2.3, 
below). On the other hand, persons with an interest in maintaining or strengthening 
friendly ties —inferiors in a hierarchy, salesmen, diplomats— will reciprocate the 
slightest joke with laughter.
The fact that laughter displays signal affiliation can be used by individuals and 
larger groupings to test the state of an existing relationship. Joke deployment before a 
partner may act as a request for information about perceived closeness. In Walle’s 
(1976) study of humour in an all-night diner, the laughter or non-laughter of a waitress 
at the jokes of a customer allowed the latter to gauge the level of intimacy achieved 
between them:
Since a correlation existed between the successful performance of humorous 
folklore and the degree of intimacy between performer and audience, it was a 
common practice for people to use the folklore of humor as an exploratory 
device in the estimation of a potential sexual partner.... By attempting to 
engage the potential companion in certain types of humorous performance, the 
actor could gain information regarding the possibility of a pickup without ever 
mentioning his desires or intentions.
(p. 212)
In this context, it is interesting to consider the large body of literature concerned with 
'joking relationships,' defined as “a relation between two persons in which one is by 
custom permitted, and in some instances required, to tease or make fun of the other, 
who in turn is required to take no offense” (Radcliffe-Brown, 1940: 195). Social 
anthropologists (and some sociologists) have described their existence in many and
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diverse societies, including our own (See Apte, 1983: 185-89; and Martineau, 1972: 
111/17 for reviews).
Two features of the phenomenon deserve particular attention. Firstly, the 
'joking' is directed in most cases at the partner of the relationship, who should display 
laughter at the discredit of his own self-claims: one partner steals the belongings of 
another, deceives him by unfair means, etc. If humour can be used to test a personal 
alliance, this aggressive variety represents a particularly strong (and thus trustworthy) 
sort of trial. Secondly, there is a specific pattern to the emergence of this type of 
interaction. It tends to characterize relationships which, though associated with a 
desire for cooperation or good relations, are subject to inherent or potential tensions 
and conflict (Radcliffe-Brown, 1952). Examples include relations between affines, 
potential marriage partners, and members of neighbouring settlements. Other common 
behavioural alternatives (i.e., to joking) typical of such ambivalent relationships 
include avoidance and extreme respect. Thus, it might be said that partner-directed 
joking - a  strong test of affiliation- tends to emerge when a desire for continuing an 
affiliative relationship converge with motives for doubting its strength.
More informal versions of the joking relationship have been studied in certain 
environments of our own Western society, especially among colleagues at the work 
place and between 'friends.' As observed in section 4.1, it is common for teasing and 
joking to follow the detection of some fault, mishap, or blunder of a friend or 
colleague. The deployment of such humour, however, is only possible where some 
affiliative basis exists, as its content must be based on the shared knowledge, 
identities, and attitudes of partners. Beside their possible control effects on ridiculed 
individuals, these displays and the response of laughter signal the existence of an 
affiliative relationship -and  furthermore constitute one of the means by which the 
very relation is brought into being and reinforced on a daily basis.
It is also the inclusive nature of these types of humour which permits criticism 
to be voiced in a non-threatening way. Pamela Bradney provides an example in her 
study of joking interaction between department store staff (p. 184):
When a new girl appeared to be working overhard and taking her work too
seriously, one of the old hands (to whom the newcomer had put yet another
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query to help her with a sale) said, 'You want to sell up the shop today, don't
you?' —in a friendly joking manner even though it did conceal a reprimand.
The old hands comment, though making the newcomer aware of her deviant 
behaviour, assumes the latter's shared knowledge that such keenness is excessive. The 
discredit implied is framed as temporary and permits the newcomer to distance herself 
from the characterization by laughing along (See Section 4.3.3, below).
I have limited the above discussion to affiliation resulting from, attempted 
with, or reacting to humour and laughter displays. It is equally true, however, that an 
observer who identifies with another's lack o f amusement or humour (i.e., when such 
a display might be relevant) will feel close to the serious individual. Agreement over 
the bad taste, inanity, or incomprehensibility of a comic film can be as bonding an 
experience as coincidence in labelling it funny. A meditated serious -o r  disgusted, 
offended, e tc...- display in certain circumstances may be used to produce such an 
effect. These recognizable 'absences' of display, however, are both less common and 
less observationally salient than positive displays, and thus have been less treated in 
the literature.
For example, when the Monty Python film Life o f Brian premiered in 1979, 
several Jewish, Protestant, and Catholic groups expressed their condemnation of this 
parody of the Christian gospels. The negative feelings shared by certain religiously- 
minded audiences towards this film (and even by second-hand audience members who 
only heard or read about its contents), represented a potential basis for affiliation and 
sympathetic dialogue between groups which in other contexts might feel strongly 
divided. A newspaper title at the time, in fact, grouped these reactions together: 
“Religious Leaders Agree; ‘Brian* Film is Blasphemy” (NewYork Times, 4/9/79, m , 
7:1).
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4 .2 .3 .  D i s a f f i l i a t i o n
Laughter and humour displays (or non-displays) reflecting substantially 
divergent mental contents result in an observer feeling a greater distance from the 
displaying individual. This disaffiliative effect is the logical complement of the 
affiliative consequence discussed above at length, and has in fact been treated in the 
discussion —almost inevitably— alongside the latter. Thus, it should require no further 
elaboration.
Nevertheless, it may be interesting to examine display behaviours specifically 
intended to produce disaffiliation. The possible effect of humour and/or laughter may 
be used strategically in two ways: by avoiding the use of humour and/or laughter 
completely, or by exhibiting humour and/or laughter which will not be shared by an 
audience.
Strategic Disaffiliative Avoidance of Humour and Laughter
In the first case, participants of interaction sometimes refrain from laughing or 
joking in order to maintain a distance from others. Someone in a position of power, 
for instance, - a  teacher, a military superior, a boss- may choose to abstain from 
sharing humour with his subordinates to avoid 'excessive closeness1 that could 
degenerate into a loss of respect towards status differences. Judges, moderators, 
arbiters, and other supposedly 'impartial* observers may also adopt such a strategy to 
avoid excessive commitment to one disputing group over another. The deliberateness 
o f such a display strategy is evident from the following discussion of schoolteachers’ 
theories about how best to interact with students:
So far as humour is concerned, teachers themselves were once divided over the 
question of whether or not to smile or permit their pupils to do so. Even among 
those who felt that humour has a place in the schoolroom, some held that one 
should start off in a serious mood, just to establish firmly who is boss, and 
only gradually drift toward a more jocular disposition as the term wears on.
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Others operated by the rule of thumb that one should ‘never smile before 
Christmas.* > .r.
(Stebbins, 1993: 111)
During specific interactions, it can be observed how the invitation to laugh 
produced by another's humour may be declined by an audience, or followed by a 
minimal reaction, to avoid affiliative implications. A good illustration is Jim 
Schenkein*$ (1978) analysis of the initial exchanges between an insurance salesman 
and his target client. While the former —Alan— deploys a number of procedures to 
establish a more personal relationship, the latter -P ete— resists these attempts with 
more or less explicit defmings of the situation as a salesman-client interaction. During 
this "negotiation o f participant identities" Schenkein notes the particular "kind of 
humour tendered" by the salesman as one resource employed for reducing the social 
distance and creating affiliation (p. 61-62):
Alan: ...And, I give a memobook
out. And also let me put my magic card 
innit.
Pete: Your magic card?
Alan: My magic card, this makes the whole 
thing a s- sort of a kaleida-scopic 
experience-not really it's just, 
y'know, uh two dimensional a(hh)c- 
tually hehh hehh hehh hehh heh ih- it 
all depends on y'know, what you've 
been doing right before you, look at 
the card I guess if it's two dimen­
sional.
Pete: Righ(h)t.
Alan: Uhh,
Pete: I gather you also wanna try t’sell me
some insurance. (p. 65)
In this passage, Alan makes a humorous allusion to drug use ("it all depends on 
y'know, what you've been doing right before you, look at the card I guess"), a risky 
move by which the salesman claims some knowledge and sympathy —if not 
experience— with the world of an essentially secret in-group to which he is gambling
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this young and ’bohemian* student might belong. Pete, however, reacts with barely 
polite disaffiliation (p. 68):
The turn at talking...is ripe for demonstrations of affiliation with the identity 
categories enlivened by [Alan's reference to drug users], but while Pete's 
"Righ(h)t" does not distance itself thoroughly from the unofficial identities 
alluded to neither does it jump to affiliate with those identities. In fact, if 
Alan’s "...a(hh)ctually hehh hehh hehh hehh heh ..." displays animated 
enthusiasm over the identity negotiations conducted through the action 
sequence, then Pete's subsequent "Righ(h)t" is considerably more reserved and 
steps down the animation markedly.
Such uses of non-reaction have been observed in a number of studies. 
Jefferson, Sacks, and Schegloff (1987) analyzed the introduction of ’improper talk' 
(i.e., frankness, rudeness, obscenity) into a conversation as an attempt to increase 
intimacy with a co-participant during conversation, non-laughter signalling a non- 
acceptance of this closeness. Walle’s (1976) article on joke use in an all-night diner 
has already been mentioned above. In the unique setting of the diner during the last 
hours of a shift, where the negotiation of social distance had a particular significance 
(the setting up of a sexual rendezvous), non-appreciation could signify rejection of a 
'pick up' attempt (p. 214):
All the waitresses in the diner enjoyed sexual humor and often employed it 
among themselves and with customers. But on certain occasions, these same 
waitresses would feign embarrassment or shock when a customer would tell 
such a joke. The negative response varied from the humorous ’Oh, my virgin 
ears' to threats to call the manager or the police. In such cases the waitress 
pretended the joke was objectionable because giving the appropriate response 
(laughing) would have transformed the customer/waitress relationship.... This 
type of response usually occurred if the waitress believed a male was 
attempting to pick her up when she wasn't interested in him.
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Strategic Use of Disaffiliative Laughter and Humour
Not only can disaffiliation be produced by limiting the use of laughter and 
humour before a particular audience: specifically disaffiliative displays can also be 
employed. Treating events as funny which another actor considers serious, for 
instance, can lead to disafilliation. This fact allows humour and laughter to be used as 
a sign of distance by participants. One variant involves the use o f laughter or humour 
at some event openly considered unfunny by the actor. A  more direct alternative is for 
the audience to laugh or joke at the seriously intended behaviour of the actor himself.
Openly divisive humour and laughter is rare in ordinary interaction, where 
participants generally strive for some kind of consensus. Good hunting grounds 
include such inherently combative arenas as battle zones, playing fields, and political 
meetings, daym an (1992) has studied audience responses to the 1988 US presidential 
debates as expressions of affiliation or disaffiliation with the speakers. The debate 
setting was characterized by a clear bi-polar division of participants: Not only was the 
object of debates a confrontation between the major representatives of the Democratic 
and Republican parties, but over two thirds of audience tickets "were distributed by 
the campaigns themselves to their staunchest supporters”, who were furthermore 
segregated by the seating arrangements (p. 36). In this context, daym an found that 
disaffiliative laughter from opposing camps tended to follow remarks which “ 1) 
showed the speakers to be talking about themselves, 2) were noncritical and often 
supportive in character, 3) were not marked as laughable, and 4) appeared 
unconvincing, evasive, or otherwise inadequate, particularly in the context of prior 
talk” (p.54). Such moments of claim-making, "clearly meant to be taken seriously" (p. 
46) offer opposing groups who share a common skepticism of the claims and hostility 
towards the speaker an opportunity to demonstrate their distance from him (as well as 
their own unity)93.
Laughter and humour displays, by means of the knowledge, identity, and 
involvement connotations which they imply, represent self-claims regarding the 
possession of specific mental contents. 95
95 An example from dayman’s transcripts was provided above in Section 4.1.4 of this chapter, in which 
the audience laughed loudly at Senator Dan Quayle’s self-claims of environmental concern.
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From a neutral and objective standpoint, one effect of such claim-making is to 
classify the displaying individual as belonging to particular social categories. What he 
laughs or jokes at reveal who he is. In the aggregate, moreover, this social 
classification effect contributes to the creation -and reinforcement of the very 
boundaries separating one social category from another.
From the perspective of a display’s observer, however, one of two 
complementary effects is possible. If the observer can share in the amusement referred 
to by the display, thus sharing the mental possessions revealed by the displaying 
individual, affiliation between the two may result; if the observer does not share these 
mental possessions, the result is more likely to be disaffiliation. These effects can be 
used strategically by individuals who wish to increase or decrease the level of 
intimacy between themselves and others.
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4.3. Effects Derived From the 'Identity' Connotation
Laughter and humour displays communicate to observers that the displaying 
individual does not identify himself»as the discredited claimant alluded to by his 
display --i.e., the ‘identity* connotation (see Chapter Seven, 2.4.3,3.3). Often, the fact 
is so obvious as to merit no attention -there is no question about the teller of an ethnic 
joke being associated with the slandered ethnic group, or about the performer of a 
clown act being tainted by his acted improprieties and silliness. In other cases 
however, there may exist a more or less strong association between a discredited 
claimant (pointed to by a communicative'.display or by mere circumstances) and a 
participant actually present. The participant may be undergoing criticism or teasing; he 
may have committed an act which is improper or out of character, he may be found in 
a compromising situation, or be associated by a social tie to a discredited third party. 
Here, laughter and/or humour displays by the suspect may have the effect of reducing 
or erasing his discredit in others' eyes.
1 have divided this ‘protective* consequence of displays into three separate 
effects depending on the source of discredit. One possibility is the protection from 
discredit which is completely accidental and unintended by the threatened 
individual. Another concerns cases where this individual obtains protection from a 
potentially discrediting action which he has willingly undertaken or wishes to 
undertake. In a third possibility, he achieves protection from discredit imposed on 
the person by an outside agent. The use of self-disparaging laughter and humour is a 
method which exploits these various effects according to circumstance.
I have also listed a fourth effect related to the ‘involvement* connotation, 
actually a ‘second-order* effect resulting from an excessive reliance on the intentional 
use of self-directed laughter and humour to protect the self from discredit. In these 
cases, the individual may be seen as suspiciously or unfairly defensive, giving off 
impressions of cowardliness, insecurity, falseness, etc.
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4.3.1. Protection from Unintentional Self-Discredit
If a person trips awkwardly over a  piece of pavement he may follow the event 
with a number of shows designed to reassure others that he is normally not such a 
clumsy person (Goffman, 1981: 88): the "oops!" expression, a close scrutiny of the 
offending surface, and very often a small laugh or even a display of humour (i.e., an 
ironic "well, that was very elegant, wasn't it"). The stumbler may or may not feel 
actual amusement at his oafish moment —perhaps less than his embarrassment—, but 
the display communicates to bystanders that the event was no more than an accident, 
and wholly unrelated to his real character. Laughing at the self evokes a new self 
untouched by discredit, distanced from the derided claimant. It transforms a person's 
own acts into the improvised performance of a  clown, which he claims to enjoy as part 
of the audience:
A self-deprecator is, in a measure, just that, and in just that measure is not the 
self that is deprecated. He secretes a new self in the process of attesting to the 
appraisal he is coming to have of himself.
(Goffman, 1974: 521)96
This defensive use of laughter and/or humour is extremely common, allowing 
individuals to excuse themselves from some of the many accidental (or not-so- 
accidental) lapses, violations, and failures which occasionally occur or are revealed 
during interaction. Anthony Chapman noted that “sometimes laughter can constitute 
part of a stoic effort to safeguard against loss of face or to disguise embarrassment’* 
(1983: 152). A study by Rowland Miller (1996: 173) found "making a joke or 
laughing at oneself' to be one of the most frequent responses to embarrassing 
situations, second only to 'evasion.'
Self-directed humour and laughter are commonly used by individuals training 
in some skill or trapped in a role for which they are not fully prepared. For example, 
Coser (1960) found that over 36% o f jokes made by the average junior (i.e., a trainee) 
at psychiatric staff conferences were directed at himself, as compared to less than 8% 
for the average senior member of staff. Well aware of their insufficient competence,
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such neophytes wish to make others well aware of their awareness, in preparation for 
countless unintentional errors. They wish to excuse themselves by declaring “I am not 
(yet) a doctor/driver/adult/etc...”. Humour and laughter are basic technique used in 
such exhibitions of 'role^distance'. In an essay on this topic (1961), Goffman shrewdly 
noted that (in 1950’s America) "tasks that might be embraced by a housewife or maid 
may be tackled by the man of the house with carefully expressed clumsiness and with 
self-mockery" (p. 99). He also described in some detail the behaviour of a group o f 
teenage girls on a horseback riding trip (p. 98-99):
One girl, having been allotted the tallest horse, made a mock scene of 
declining to get on because o f the height, demanding to be allowed to go 
home. When she did get on, she called her horse ’Daddy-O’, diverting her 
conversation from her friends to her horse. During the ride, one girl pretended 
to post while the horse walked, partly in mockery of a person not in their party 
who was posting. Another girl leaned over the neck of her horse and shouted 
racing cries, again while the horse was locked in a walking file of other horses. 
She also slipped her right foot out of the stirrup and brought it over the saddle, 
making a joke of her affectation of riding sidesaddle and expressing that both 
positions were much alike to her —both equally unfamiliar and uncongenial; at 
the same time she tested the limits of the wrangler’s permissiveness. Passing 
under low branches, the girls made a point of making a point of this by pulling 
off branches, waving them like flags, then feeding them to their horses. 
Evidences of the excretory capacities of the steeds were greeted with 
merriment and loud respect.
Such behaviour effectively protects the actors involved from discredit as role-holders, 
to which they might well be subject by taking up the relevant activity in a serious 
manner. Effectively, they are saying, W e are not making any of the self-claims 
associated with this role’, and thus, in Goffman’s words, "We are not to be judged by 
this incompetence" (1961:99). 96
96 Sec also Goffman 1981: 307; and Smith 1996: 286.
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4.3.2. Protection from Intentional Self-Discredit
Self-directed laughter or humor can also be used when an actor is about to 
knowingly engage in behavioural anomalies which could discredit him, or during the 
course of such behaviour. In the following conversation (Coser, 1960: 89), the role 
demand of a psychiatrist to accurately report patient facts pressures him to transgress 
conflicting role requirements concerning acceptable terminology. The exchange takes 
place when, during a hospital staff meeting, a visiting psychiatrist reports on a patient 
before other members of staff.
Visiting psychiatrist: She called her house-mother names, like
"bitch," and so on.
Senior staff member [smiling]: Other names, like "other side of tracks"?
Visiting psychiatrist [smiling]: No, worse than that. [Senior staff member
smiles encouragingly] W ell, to tell you exactly, 
she called her a God-damned fucking bitch. [The 
two men laugh very hard, and are joined by more 
subdued laughter from the audience.]
This exchange is particularly interesting in that the visiting psychiatrist at first 
sheepishly avoids transgressing propriety, as if fearing that a full report would tarnish 
his and his interlocutor's dignity. The ironic question and 'encouraging' smile of his 
superior in rank, however, reassures the psychiatrist that the foreseen violation will be 
interpreted in a playful key. When the series of expletives is finally delivered, it is the 
two speakers who laugh hardest, in order to effect the ritual shedding of the selves 
spoilt by the offending words. The laughter of the audience, by comparison, is 
‘subdued.*
This and similar incidents suggest that as long as an audience can be counted 
on to accept a self-claim of non-association with discredit, every manner of 
transgression may be attempted under the cover of humour and laughter97. Indeed,
57 As has already been argued (this chapter, 4.1.4, above), though such a transgression may afford a 
momentary individual pleasure or release from tension, social norms themselves are unharmed, indeed 
strengthened, by such ‘play* transgressions, which as 'laughable* are marked as 'improper.*
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many authors have commented on the license' which humour offers to breach taboo 
topics and cany out norm violations. For Sigmund Freud (1905), it was this license 
which allowed the individual to release suppressed desires, especially of a sexual or 
aggressive nature, through wit. The profanities of carnival, marked out by a widely- 
accepted 'play-frame' applying once every year, playful insults, 'silly' or 'childish' 
behaviour, teasing, and mock violence between trusted friends; the bizarre antics and 
appearance of specialized figures such as clowns and comics; and joking on themes 
such as sexual perversion, death, and other normally unacceptable subjects of polite 
conversation -a ll  o f these constitute examples of norm-violations excused by their 
definition as 'non-serious.' v
This defensive quality o f humour is commonly used by individuals to attenuate 
the illocutionary force of linguistic acts (Mizzau, 1984: 82-84). Often, a person is or 
feels constrained to deliver communications which could be perceived as improper or 
demeaning: e.g., making an insult, applying a sanction, giving an order, or uttering a 
ritualistic formula ("thank you," "I love you") to a person known on friendly or 
intimate terms. A joking, ironic, or 'mock' rendering o f such an expression, however, 
while achieving the task intended, announces to the audience that 'this is not really 
me':
Through humor, men can sometimes communicate what would be difficult to 
say in any other way.
(Miller, 1967:271)
For teasers, as for people raising awkward topics and those in pursuit of 
intimacy, the humorous mode can provide a protective shield against some of 
the dangers lurking in the realm of serious discourse.
(Mulkay, 1988:91)
Persons in positions of authority may adopt such tactics to avoid aggravating their 
subordinates and obtain their willing cooperation while meting out orders and 
criticism. Surgeons during an operation, for example, have been observed to engage in 
frequent expressions of role-distance of this type (Goffman, 1961: 106-117).
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Relatedly, ironic renderings can also serve to disguise or ambiguate true 
intentions or attitudes (Mizzau, 1984: 83; 92-94), which in contexts of interactional 
risk can be greatly advantageous:
Joking provides a useful channel fo r covert communication on taboo topics....
For the very reason that humor officially does not ’count/ persons are induced
to risk messages that might be unacceptable if stated seriously.
(Emerson, 1969:269)
A classic case is the ’flirting' behaviour o f individuals romantically attracted to each 
other. Before any direct and unambiguous declaration of interest is made, an exchange 
of ironically exaggerated signs may take place and become habitualized: mock kisses, 
passionate declarations of love, suggestive nicknames, and endless sexual innuendo9*. 
The deniability of serious intent protects each partner from a hasty commitment or 
from discredit should the others’ intentions prove different. Nevertheless, the situation 
prevents both from attaining full certainty regarding the 'real situation.' They assert 
"this ridiculous 'me' who professes such an intense attraction is not my real self." 
What they do not reveal, however, is who the real self actually is. Of course, at any 
stage, one partner may challenge the other as to the 'serious import' of the humour — 
Emerson (1969) has studied how such transitions are negotiated. Otherwise, to the 
frustration of one or both partners, such behaviour may be prolonged for very long 
periods.
One good reason for masking true meaning is to protect the self when 
criticizing others, an aggressive act which may bring on unwanted hostilities. Teasing, 
wind-ups, satire, caricature, and parody are some forms o f humour which attempt to 
discredit some target in a 'nonserious' way. This nonseriousness depends on the 
exaggerated or transformed nature of the unmasking or criticism, which in fact 
constitutes a secondary humorous element, a  double-meaning 'trick.' Such genres are 
inherently ambiguous: they retell the discredit of some self-claim (Senator X is 
stupid/comipt/big-nosed) and yet accepting the criticism literally is funny in itself. 
Indeed, the latter constitutes an important part of the humour. This secondary element 
tells the audience 1 do not really think Senator X is as stupid/corrupt/big-nosed as I
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am playfully claiming, and anyone who would think so would be ridiculous himself/ 
This ambiguity protects the humourist from responsibility for the criticism, as the 
crucial link between joke and reality can always be denied. Emerson (1969) recounts 
how 1960’s folk singer Joan Baez threatened to sue cartoonist AJ Capp if he continued 
his "Joanie Phoanie" comic strip character, which she believed was a caricature of 
herself. Capp's reply was in fact to deny that Joanie Phonie, "a campus idol who sings 
protest songs for $10,000 a concert” was related to Baez: "I see no resemblance to 
Joan Baez whatsoever, but if Miss Baez wants to try to prove it, let her” (p. 274-75).
I- 98
98 Walle (1976) is a brilliant case study of the use of sexual humour in this 'exploratory' fashion.
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4.3.3. Protection From Discrediting Attacks
Laughter and/or humour can also be used by an actor to deflect an interactional 
move (i.e., a 'challenge' —See this chapter, 4.1.1) aimed at discrediting him. 
Conversation analysts have provided examples of humour use which is successful in 
transforming 'laughter at’ a person (who has committed some gaffe or is accused of 
some fault) to 'laughter with' him (daym an, 1992: 31-32; Glenn, 1995: 51-55; Smith 
1996:283-289).
Greg Smith (1996) has studied radio broadcast 'wind-ups,* involving the 
nonserious discredit o f some target by a radio discjockey, for the entertainment of the 
listening audience. The DJ phones up the victim, who is lured into involvement within 
a false and increasingly absurd frame. During the joke, it is the audience (and 
presumably the DJ), who experience amusement at the target o f humour for accepting 
the incredible claims of the joker, for overreacting emotionally, for allowing his 
dignity to be trampled on by the DJ’s offensive words, for resorting to offense and 
expletive himself, among other possibilities. When the deception is discovered by the 
victim, however, his most common response is also laughter (p. 281,285):
[from Extract 1]
SP: Anyway they’ve written to me and this isn’t really
((pause)) Ian Cooper from the travel shop, this is Steve 
Penk from [Key one-oh-three]
JC: [Oh::hhha ] hahahahahahaha you're joking,
you are joking...
[from Extract 3]
SP: This is Steve Penk from Key one-oh-three Ronnie.
RB: Hey! Herpurgh! Heeheehee (...)
W ith these laughter displays” , joke victims instantly become part of the joke 
audience, on one hand accepting the behaviour has been improper, but on the other 
demonstrating their distance from the part o f themselves which has appeared in such a 
bad light: “Who RB laughs at is his former self; what he laughs at is his now revealed
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foolishness in allowing that self to be sustained; but in so laughing he shows himself 
to be no fool” (ibid.: 286).
Nonserious discredits, such as friendly practical jokes, by definition allow the 
target of amusement the option o f shedding a self which has been abused by evidently 
unfair procedures. In the following example, on the other hand, defensive humour is 
employed by an individual challenged and discredited in a somewhat more serious 
manner, albeit over a minor self-claim of linguistic knowledge..
(OTCLA30. Phone)
Stanley: But deeming that a young lady's on the phone wu'we
In this passage, Stanley's independent self-claim to know the meaning of the word 
'deeming* (made by his use of it in talk) is discredited and subsequently laughed at by 
the other participants. By joining in the disparagement, however, Stanley transforms 
himself "from an accidental producer of a teaseable error into an intentional producer 
of comic accounts and narration,...recovering] artfully...and bring[ing] those laughing 
back into alignment with him" (ibid: 52-53). In other words, he takes a step back from 
the pretentious self who had used 'deeming' in talk, and thus demonstrates his 'real*
99 Smith also includes the successful use of humour by a victim, mid-joke, to demonstrate she has 
’caught on’ to the nonseriousness of proceedings <pp. 283-284).
woh' discuss nune u'thet
Jeffrey:
Stanley:
Deeming. Now wha'does deeming me[an ma::n).
[eh Deeming I
don't [know ma:n is jus'as jus ]uh c.-atchy wo:rd ma:n.
Jeffrey:
Rhonda:
Stanley:
Rhonda:
Jeffrey:
Stanley: [My English teachuh be exin 
my ass on that. Ev'iy time.=
=Who [deeming?
[hih-huh hu AH! huh-hah!] 
hih [heh.
[It don't fit shk. 
ihh [huh huh h:::]h
[Wu'I tell you what ma][::::n.
Rhonda:
Stanley: [ Deemin'.
(0.2)
Ooph! It don't fit.
(0-7)
[Off with it.
[(t'sh) mh! hmhuhhmhuh. (Glenn, 1995:51-53)
Stanley:
Stanley:
Jeffrey:
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self to be the down-to-earth Stanley of old, who is able to join in the mockery of such 
pretense. He thus attempts to protect himself from any real embarrassment.
Moves to discredit an individual, however, can be substantially more serious 
and consequential than practical jokes, challenges over word knowledge, and similarly 
trivial attacks. In fiercely competitive fields —political elections, employment and the 
corporate 'ladder', religious hierarchies, economic markets, artistic and academic 
circles- players may suffer important setbacks or even expulsion over damaging 
allegations. Perret's (1989) manual of humour use in business recommends joking as a 
defense measure against discredit attempts by adversaries. He cites the practice of 
septuagenarian Ronald Reagan during the 1984 presidential campaign, who was 
attacked by critics as 'too old' for office (p. 31 -32):
"He did age jokes on himself as often as he could. When his opponents tried to 
bring up the issue, it was dead —deflated. Reagan had done it -himself....
Some people reminded Reagan that if he were reelected, he would be 76 years 
old when he left office. Reagan replied, "Well, Andrew Jackson left the White 
House at the age of 75 and he was still quite vigorous. I know because he told 
me."
Whatever other evidence voters may have had for assessing Reagan's capabilities, 
such self-ridicule evoked the sparkle and wit of a 'young Ron' within the exterior 
'ancient Ron’ being mocked.
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4.3.4. Consequences o f Excessive Defensiveness
. .  . r*:
It is worth considering the long-term cumulative effects of humour and/or 
laughter displays directed at a distanced self. Occasional claims of identity distance 
from a discredited claimant apparently associated with the self may be deemed 
credible. However, abuse of this technique is likely to nurture distrust or disrespect in 
others. Social actors are required to make claims about themselves and attach to at 
least some actions by which the claims may be measured. Otherwise, they face grim 
interactional consequences. A person who continually adopts ironic overtones, winks, 
grimaces, and exaggerations, which distance him from practically every word and 
deed, will be seen as evasive and unreachable. His behaviour forces observers to guess 
his true intentions by a process of elimination which often yields confusion or 
contradiction. These others may simply become frustrated by the protective barriers, 
or even come to loathe the perpetual ironist's contemptuous and indiscriminate 
dismissiveness. Mizzau (1984) cites a literary characterization of such an individual:
As he spoke I noticed, what had often struck me before in his conversations 
with my grandmother’s sisters, that whenever he spoke of serious matters, 
whenever he used an expression which seemed to imply a definite opinion 
upon some important subject, he would take care to isolate, to sterilize it by 
using a special intonation, mechanical and ironic, as though he had put the 
phrase or word between inverted commas, and was anxious to disclaim any 
personal responsibility for it; as who should say ‘the “hierarchy”, don’t you 
know, as silly people call it.* But then, if it was so absurd, why did he say the 
‘hierarchy*? A moment later he went on: ‘Her acting will give you as noble an 
inspiration as any masterpiece of art in the world, as -o h , I don’t know—* and 
he began to laugh, ‘shall we say the Queens of Chartres?* (....) For what other 
kind of existence did he reserve the duties of saying in all seriousness what he 
thought about things, of formulating judgements which he would not put 
between inverted commas; and when would he cease to give himself up to 
occupations o f which at the same time he made out that they were absurd?
(Proust, 1922:115-116)
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Similar is the behaviour of individuals who mock themselves at every opportunity 
with self-disparaging humour, or exhibit an almost continuous stream of self-directed 
'nervous laughter' which annuls the serious intent of every other expression uttered. By 
refusing to claim any competence, responsibility, or worth at all, these individuals are 
perceived as insecure and cowardly, or else suspected of 'false modesty.'
The 'identity' connotation of humour and laughter may protect a displaying 
individual from the true discredit of his self-presentation —assuming a display is 
accepted as honest. This effect is relevant to cases of unintentional discredit, cases 
where the displaying individual has knowingly caused the discrediting events, and 
also those where an outside agent has engaged in a discrediting attack on the 
individual.
Though self-directed laughter and humour is commonly put to such uses, 
affording participants behavioural flexibility and some measure of interactional self- 
defense, excessive reliance on this manoeuvre can lead to the giving off of negative 
impressions.
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4.4. EffectsAJses Derived From the 'Involvement’ Connotation
Laughter and humour communicate to others that the displaying individual can 
become sufficiently involved in the funny stimuli pointed at to experience amusement 
In most cases, such a meaning is unremarkable. When perceived obstacles to such 
involvement exist, however, the display in question may reflect on the individual’s 
character or provide noteworthy information about his current mental activity.
When relevant competitors to attention include tragedy or misfortune, the 
displaying individual will give off an impression of ‘callousness’ or ‘toughness,* 
depending on the value attached to such empathie distance. The presence of events 
demanding a reaction of moral disapproval or outrage will result in the displayer 
appearing im m oral o r amoral. When the object of amusement referred to by the 
display is itself an emotional reaction perceived as improper, the effect will be to 
deny the reality o r  relevance of the underlying interpretation. Finally, in the case 
o f laughter only, the display will (supposedly) reveal the current focus of attention 
o f the displaying individual.
4.4.1. Revealing Inhumanity/Callousness/Toughness'
In Chapter Six, 3.2.2, it was suggested that self-claim discredit events often 
involve claimants (or other individuals) who suffer or may suffer tragic or painful 
consequences, such events often eliciting anxiety, sadness, or empathie pity rather 
than amusement. It may now be added that observing laughter or humour directed at 
such questionably funny events may lead observers to form a particular type of 
impression about the displaying individual: that he is a person who has the ability or 
disposition to distance himself emotionally from events 'normally* elicitory of such 
emotions as pity, grief, sadness, fear, and anxiety, either directed towards his own 
plight or those of others (through 'empathy').
Depending on the attitudes of the observer and the context of the situation, this 
impression will be coloured by varying shades of value. The distance may be 
perceived as morally questionable or even evil, describable with such terms as 
’inhumanity,’ 'callousness,' or 'coldness.' On the other hand, it may be seen as a
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positive characteristic: 'toughness,' ’hardness,' 'cool detachment,' or courageous 
'coping/
Black and 'sick' jokes, as well as violent and cruel practical jokes, seem to be 
more common in environments where physical violence and/or its threat are ordinary 
facts of everyday life. In our own society, good examples include the worlds of 
organized crime, law-enforcement, and war. A royal marine officer, for instance, is 
quoted by Mayo (1993: 43) as saying that “the humour of the [Armed] Forces in 
general can be rather cruel and harsh sometimes.” A relatively developed emotional 
distance from pain, injury, mutilation, and death in such contexts becomes a useful 
psychological tool for coping with tragic events when they occur to the self or others 
(Obrdlik, 1942) —and thus often also a  valued characteristic and role self-claim. 
Humour and laughter at events associated with cruelty and misfortune becomes one 
way of expressing and developing this valued distance. Being hard as nails' is 
considered a good thing, and the appreciation of heavy-handed humour can be taken 
as evidence of this quality.
Outside of such circles, however, distance from suffering may be perceived 
otherwise. Though generally concealed from outsiders, the attitude is subject to moral 
disapprobation, outrage, or scandal when observed. The following genre of news story 
(the article is taken from El Mundo 9/7/1997: 26, my translation) seeks to elicit this 
type of response:
German military leaders laughed at the video of the executions
BONN -  A soldier has accused his superiors of having seen but not 
denounced the video which has created scandal in Germany, in which military 
personnel simulate the executions and crucifixions of Bosnians. The soldier 
claimed that they even found it "very funny. 7AFP
News stories of 'horrifying' pranks played on natives of warring countries, prisoners of 
war, and even on soldiers of the same side occasionally emerge. The reports of 
'laughter' at such torture inspire moral revulsion in readers —it is for this reason they 
count as newsworthy enough to merit a headline. Relatedly, the Hollywood 'bad guy’ 
often achieves his badness' for audiences by virtue of some similar, though fictional, 
scene.
Emotional distance regarding misfortune relating to the self, on the other hand, 
is more generally perceived in a positive light, as evidence of'courage* and 'resilience.'
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If a person can laugh at his own problems and looming dangers, it would seem that he 
is 'coping' well with them: his mind is calm enough to enjoy amusement despite 
adverse circumstances. Thus, while laughing at the misfortune of others is frowned 
upon, laughing at one's own is encouraged. Gail Jefferson, through a close study of 
conversations in which people talk about their troubles, has provided evidence for this 
asymmetric pattern: “In the course of [this study], a recurrent phenomenon was found: 
a troubles-teller produces an utterance and then laughs, and the troubles-recipient does 
not laugh, but produces a recognizably serious response** (Jefferson, 1984: 346). The 
explanation arrived at for this pattern fits both Jefferson's data and our intuitions about 
laughter and humour displays (ibid.: 351): r
He is exhibiting that, although there is trouble, it is not getting the better of 
him; he is managing, he is in good spirits and in a position to take the trouble 
lightly. He is exhibiting what we might call 'troubles-resistance.' But this does 
not mean that... a recipient is invited to join in the merriment, to also find the 
thing laughable... it appears to be a recipient's job  to be taking the trouble 
seriously; to exhibit what might be called 'troubles-receptiveness.*
The extent to which we attend and react to our own and others* troubles is everywhere 
considered an important variable of personality. Laughter and humour displays 
constitute one important set of behaviours used by observers to form impressions 
regarding this variable in others, by actors to regulate others* impressions of 
themselves.
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4.4.2. Revealing Moral Character/Causing Moral Offense
Laughter or joking at objects considered sacred, as well as jokes which include 
scatological, sexual, aggressive or other elements considered offensive by an 
audience, lead observers to view the displaying individual as morally lax, if not 
depraved100. Unless accompanied by an explicit disclaimer, these displays commit the 
individual to the line that the offensive elements in question give him few if any moral 
qualms, as he is able to enjoy the amusing elements despite (if not because of) them. 
The display itself may be judged a moral offense, and may be subject to the same 
social and legal penalties.
Monty Python's 1979 parody of the Christian Gospels, Life o f Brian, caused a 
moral uproar in both Christian and Jewish communities. Though successful in terms 
of both box office and critical reviews, Brian was picketed by protesters, removed 
from several cinemas, and rated as "condemned" on a scale of 'moral acceptability' by 
the film and broadcasting office of the United Catholic Conference101, The contrast in 
moral sensibilities and subsequent audience reactions is evident from the following 
comment by New York Times film critic Vincent Canby (NYT 17/8/79:15).
Some people who wander into this film will stalk out in as high a dudgeon as 
is possible in the dread darkness of a  movie theatre - a s  did one fellow sitting 
behind me at a sneak preview. Others will want to see it a second time to catch 
the dialogue overwhelmed by laughter during the first viewing.
Numerous statements of moral indignation were voiced in the press by representatives 
o f political parties and religious organizations102:
100 In the previous section, I have already dealt with moral outrage at signs o f amusement towards 
aggression and misfortune. Therefore, I will limit my examples here to other areas o f morality.
101 See New York Tunes, 1979 -2 8 /8 :8 ; 30/8:13; 4 /9 :7 ; 4/10:30; 31/10:18.
102 Rabbi Abraham B Hecht, speaking on behalf o f  three Jewish organizations (New York Times, 
28/8/79: 8); Msgr. Eugene V. Clark, spokesperson for the Catholic Archdiocese of New York (New 
Y ork Times, 30/8/79: 13); Rev. Kenneth Jadoff, spokesperson for the Catholic Archdiocese o f New 
Y ork (ibid.).
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a crime against reIigion...This film is so grievously insulting that we are 
genuinely concerned that its continued showing could result in serious 
violence
The picture holds the person of Christ up to comic ridicule and is, for 
Christians, an act of blasphemy.
This is the most blasphemous film I have ever seen and it pretends to be 
nothing else....We are just drawing the attention of our people to the fact that it 
is their responsibility to avoid seeing immoral entertainment.
Such reactions reveal, among other things, that in some social environments it is 
considered a moral obligation to respect and leave unquestioned certain self-claims 
made by revered deities, holy men, and religious leaders and church members.
Punitive sanctions for 'immoral entertainment' can be even more extreme. 
Lenny Bruce, a daring comic transgressor of social taboos in 1960’s America was 
thrice arrested for obscenity in the US and in 1963 was refused entrance to Britain by 
the Home Secretary on similar grounds (Staveacre, 1987; 174; see also Van de 
Gejuchte, 1996).
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4.4.3. Denying a Particular Interpretation
When humour or laughter is directed at a specific and emotionally-arousing 
interpretation of reality (i.e., at a frame management error), the display signals a 
rejection of this interpretation. By communicating “I am (can be) involved in the 
funny elements of the situation,” it points out the existence o f these elements, and 
moreover their attendable quality, despite the competing interpretation which one or 
more participants engage or could engage in.
The further consequences o f this frame denial vary according to the specific 
character of the interpretation and its context One everyday example is the sudden 
and startling meeting of two acquaintances at a dimly lit street comer or doorway. 
Initial reactions of fear may quickly be reacted to by amusement and laughter at the 
improper fright By labelling the fear as improper, each o f the two participants 
reassures the other that no harm was meant and accepts the other's reassurance. This 
kind of humorous assurance can be more calculated in the mouth of the familiar 
Hollywood spy or snoop caught with his hands in the politician's desk drawer.
Ambiguous situations of varied types may serve as the setting for this effect of 
display. Emerson (1975: 338-339) has noted its frequent use during the course of 
gynecological examinations, a situation liable to much officially misplaced anxiety 
and arousal:
For example, in one encounter a patient vehemently protests, "Oh, Dr. 
Raleigh, what are you doing?” Dr. Raleigh, exaggerating his southern accent, 
answers, "Nothin'." (...)
In another incident Doctor Ryan is attempting to remove some gauze which 
has been placed in the vagina to stop the bleeding. He flippantly announces 
that the remaining piece of gauze has disappeared inside the patient. After a 
thorough search Doctor Ryan holds up a piece of gauze on the instrument 
triumphantly: "Well, here it is. Do you want to take it home and put it in your 
scrapbook?"
(p. 339)
Such displays deny the relevance o f manifest or potential patient interpretations 
portraying the doctor’s activities as threatening, invasive, or meaningful in any way
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outside of the strictly medical definition. In each of these incidents, the gynecologist 
acknowledges the existence of ambiguity by alluding to the improper interpretations. 
In the first, he takes up the role of a seducer claiming innocence; in the second, he 
jokingly describes the experience as so momentous and trying as to merit its 
remembrance by memento-keeping. These interpretations are mentioned, however, 
only as targets for ridicule.
Where conflicting definitions of events exist, humour and laughter displays 
may also communicate participant positions relative to debate. Illustrations of such 
definitional struggles have already been provided in this chapter (4.1.4) —skepticism 
of a speaker's portrayal of himself (Dan Quayle) as an environmentalist, o f a malady 
as serious, of a male love-interest as trustworthy, of police work stories as exciting, 
and of pseudoscientific theories as plausible. In the previous context I was concerned 
with the possible social control effects of display moves. Preliminary to any social 
pressure to modify interpretations, however, is the simple denial by the displaying 
individual of the relevant interpretation, and the resulting situation of definitional 
conflict.
Laughter and humour displays may, on the other hand, threaten the stability of 
what has been established as an official framework of interpretation. A board meeting, 
a lecture, a face-to-face reprimand, a sports match, a religious celebration —each of 
these activities achieves its sense of reality by the cooperative efforts of participants to 
treat events as officially defined. Goffman’s account of the fragility of serious 
enterprise in his essay "Fun in Games" incidentally considers the relevant destructive 
repercussions of laughter and humour displays in detail (1961: 17-81). A subsection of 
participants who refuses or loses the capacity to treat events seriously may well 
succeed in temporarily halting or entirely spoiling the proceedings. Denials of reality 
may also be communicated across secret channels, or after the termination of the 
encounter, between the participants who share or may be counted on to share a similar 
interpretation of events (ibid: 61-62).
In some situations, the official situation has been intentionally constructed in 
bad faith, with some participants being misled as to the real state of affairs. When 
such deceptions are engineered as jokes (i.e., in wind-ups or practical jokes), laughter 
and/or humour displays may cause the implosion o f the fabricated frame to all 
participants. Greg Smith has analysed this meaning of display and its consequences
465
Chapter Eight: Effects o f Amusement. Laughter and Humour Section AA
with reference to broadcast radio wind-ups (1996; see this chapter, 4.3.3, above). 
When the ‘wound-up’ victim discovers the falsehood of the frame he had been engaged 
in, whether disclosed by the DJ-prankster or 'seen through' by the victim himself, the 
most common reaction is laughter. Moreover, in the latter case, a suspicious victim 
may also engage in humour displays by which he claims "participation status as a 
gamester" (p. 284). According to Smith, laughter "signals a shift in alignment" from 
the specific identity maintained throughout the deception episode (wronged customer, 
etc.) to that of a fooled wind-up victim: "As soon as the mark laughs, the frame is in 
question" (ibid.). In other words, laughter here (and in other cases humour -a lso  
treated by Smith, p. 283-84) denies the previous reality, and signals the transition to a 
new interpretation o f events.
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4.4.4* Revealing the Focus of Attention (Laughter only)
Laughter displays offer clues as to where a person’s attention is directed. 
Laughter which arrives 'on cue' at a punchline announces not only that the audience 
finds the joke funny, has what it takes to 'get' it, etc., but also that they were actually 
paying attention. An unexpected and incomprehensible bout of hilarity, on the other 
hand, suggests to observers that a co-participant is attending to something which 
escapes them »perhaps leading to a reinterpretation of events or words, a survey of the 
surrounding scene, or a worried self-examination. This effect of communicating the 
focus of attention is habitually used in the course of ordinary talk.
During conversation, speakers are in continuous need of hack-channel cues' 
(Goffman, 1981: 12), signs from listeners that what is being communicated has been 
understood. Head nods, smiles, and sounds such as "yeah," "uh-huh," "ok," and 
"mmm," may accomplish this task for neutral topics, while other signals (frowns, 
upraised eyebrows, "tsk," "oh no," ''no way"...) provide commentary to more specific 
themes. Laughter displays can reassure a speaker that a listener is paying attention to 
relevant details of his speech when he is engaged in a display of humour. This back- 
channel effect becomes especially relevant in cases when the humorous intent of a 
phrase is ambiguous, as is often the case with irony:
Al: [You stolen // a car (1 bet)
Roger: [Daddy doesn't wantchu to have one.
((silence, 1 second))
Jim: No he wants me to have one, my oT lady doesn't, hh
Roger: Oh! Main conflict with mother.
(...)
Roger: Bring your mother in we’ll work on her hehh
Al: [hehh//hehh
Jim: [Okay, hh (Schenkein, 1972: 376)
In this excerpt from a group conversation, Roger tags a small laugh at the end of a 
statement ("Bring your mother in well work on her hehh") in order to distance himself 
from its literal sense (See this chapter, 4.3.2, above), which implies an invasive and 
possibly aggressive act The similarly reduced laughter displays which Al 
("hehh//hehh'') and Jim ("hh") offer in response provide reassurance that the statement 
was (1) received by hearers and (2) understood as offered -i.e ., ironically. As
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Schenkein notes, "a second-speaker’s heheh may accomplish, among other things, 
demonstration of hearership” (p. 366).
Another possibility, of course, is for such a laughter display to reveal that a 
listener has misunderstood the sense of a phrase. The speaker then has the choice of 
correcting the error, ignoring it, or adapting to the listener's interpretation.
The ‘involvement* connotation o f laughter and humour is associated with at 
least four separate effects. Three of them relate specifically to situations where 
competing foci of attention exist which according to observers could (or should) 
prevent full involvement in amusement. Elements of misfortune or tragedy which the 
display appears to ignore may cause the displaying individual to appear ‘callous* if 
theyapply to others, ‘tough* or ‘courageous* if they apply to himself. Similarly, 
ignored blasphemy or depravity may cause him to appear immoral or amoral. 
Individuals who wish to give off such impressions may use laughter and/or humour 
displays strategically to obtain these consequences. A different possibility concerns 
cases where competing emotional reactions are the very targets of amusement referred 
to by the display. Here the effect is to deny the definition of reality entertained 
(potentially or actually) by the audience of laughter and/or humour. This effect may be 
sought intentionally in particularly ambiguous situations, or in situations where there 
is the suspicion or certainty that the displaying individual has been contained by a 
deceptive fabrication.
A final and very general interactional consequence, relevant only to laughter 
displays, is the mere provision of information about the laughing individual’s current 
focus of attention. Laughter is commonly used during conversation to let the speaker 
know his humour display is being appreciated as offered.
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4.5. Effects Derived From the Entertainment’ Connotation
As seen in Chapter Seven (3.3), a humour display gives off a meaning not 
connoted by a laughter display: "I am delivering a communication which can produce 
amusement at cause Y in my target sharing audience, not including myself." This 
claim about events is simultaneously a self-claim about the humourist's own skill and 
judgement, which is subject to confirmation or discredit Such claim-making, with its 
subsequent interactional risks and outcomes, represents an additional effect 
attributable to laughter displays.
L.
4.5.1. Self-claim of Ability To Amuse
With a humour display, a comedian claims to know his audience well, and also 
claims a certain amount of communicational dexterity of varying type, according to 
the genre of humour. Skills might include story-telling, bodily and facial mimicry or 
mime, graphic design, attention-directing abilities, vocal control, a talent for 
deception, creative frame-mixing, etc.
Successful humour is not only enjoyed and appreciated by audiences, but 
builds up the humourist's reputation as a clever and confident social participant and 
communicator. Unsuccessful humour, commonly described in the grimmest of terms 
(a joke 'falling flat' or *bombing' leading to the comedian 'dying' on stage), leads to 
discredit and embarrassment. The British actress Emma Thomson has confessed from 
experience that few things can be more embarrassing than "not being laughed at when 
you're attempting to be funny...in front o f 60.000 CND supporters at Trafalgar Square" 
(Complete, 1989: 73). Comedian Michael Kilgarriff (1973) has also commented on 
the perils of stage humour: "there is always a strong whiff of embarrassment in all 
patter acts, but it is just this element of danger which makes the solo turn so exciting" 
(p. 15).
Success in the production and performance of humour also elicits the same 
admiration (and envy) associated with the fulfillment and surpassing of any self-claim 
made previously, daym an (1992) has noted that in political debates, audience 
laughter which follows a humorous statement "is often followed by applause" (p. 45), 
and from my own informal observations of live comedy performances, I would
L
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suggest this pattern is common in other types of humour display before large 
audiences. Exceptionally strong laughter reactions tend to be accompanied by 
clapping responses. During everyday encounters, co-participants may also verbally 
exhibit appreciation of the skills involved in humorous production -"very  clever," 
"nice timing," which are delivered separately or in conjunction with laughter itself.
Obviously, the self-claims of humorous skill made by a self-proclaimed 
'comedian' are stronger than those implied in a  single witty remark during 
conversation. Nevertheless, fellow co-participants often feel strong pressures to 
support each others' little humorous quips and innuendoes in order to protect each 
others' social standing. Persistent failures in this regard may have substantial negative 
effects on a person's social worth and self confidence.
It should be noted that this claim-making effect does not apply to all cases of 
humour, but only to those where the target sharing audience extends beyond the 
humourist himself. Though this is commonly the case, it is not always so. I have 
already suggested one example in this chapter (4.4.1), those conversations where one 
speaker tells another about current or recent 'troubles.' Here, humorous remarks by the 
former are not intended to be appreciated by the latter, and are generally followed by a 
recognizably serious response (Jefferson, 1984:346).
[Frankel:TC:l:4:SO]
G: You don't want to go through all the ha:ssle?
S: hhhh I don't know Geri,
<■)
S: I’ve I've stopped crying uhheh-heh-heh-heh-heh.
G: Wuh were you cry::ing?
[NB:n*.4:3:SO]
E: It's bleeding just a tiny tiny bit hastuh be 
dreissed, bu[t uh
N: ”
E: fGo:d jt was he:ll. uh hahh!
hhhfhhh
N: fWhat a shar.me.
Normally, however, humour displays are intended for one or more additional members 
o f the audience, and thus the claim-making effect applies.
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5. 'Functions’ of Amusement, Laughter, and Humour
The literature concerning effects and uses of amusement, laughter, and humour 
has often approached these topics in a functionalist language. It has been said, for 
instance, that a joking relationship has a cohesive function,’ that self-mockery has a 
defensive 'function,' or simply that amusement as a whole has a therapeutic 'function.' 
Very often, such terminology has been applied in a careless and unreflective manner, 
obscuring complex and fundamental questions of both biological and social causality 
and diluting the potential benefits of a more honest functionalism in a jumble of 
imprecision. £
5.1. Functions in Sociology
Functionalist analysis, a once-dominant paradigm in sociology, seeks to 
explain phenomena by their functional consequences. The 'function' construct is a 
mechanical metaphor, implying that the functional phenomenon provides a beneficial 
service to the system of which it is a part, and indeed exists for this very reason (i.e., 
like a single cog or wheel in a clock’s machinery). The metaphor is well suited to 
biological science: an organism of a certain species represents a well-defined 'whole' 
or system; individual organs, reflexes, and instincts represent well-defined 'parts'; and 
natural selection provides a mechanism by which the positive consequences of a 
mutation in an organism may determine its continuation and dissemination throughout 
a species: if it betters the individual's chances of living and reproducing itself, the 
genes in question will be more likely to survive.
In the social sciences, the metaphor is less clearly applicable. The 'organism* 
has sometimes been taken to be represented by 'society' itself, mainly by 
anthropologists (i.e., Radcliffe-Brown, 1935). The small island communities on which 
these ideas were based, however, displayed a degree of cultural and structural 
integration and boundedness that is relatively rare for human populations and certainly 
foreign to the amorphous chaos of so-called Western society,' where boundaries tend 
to shift and cross-cut each other, and where conflict and difference are widespread. 
Other sociologists have distinguished between functions applying to society as a 
whole and those relating to various subgroups or even to categories of individuals
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(Merton, 1968: 106). Though this is a step forward, the parallels with biological 
species (let alone constructed machines) remain rather strained. For example, 
individual societies, groups, and categories are in a process of continual flux and 
transformation, unlike the members o f a single species (at the level of their 
transmittable DNA). Functionalists have tended to portray their 'systems,' 
unrealistically, as moving from one static state of equilibrium to the next.
A second major problem is the lack of a clear mechanism by which the 
functional consequences of a social pattern or institution may lead to its establishment 
and/or continuation (Bister, 1983). Societies and subgroups are not members of a large 
'species' with greater chances of survival in the case of better adaptation to the 
environment. It is not clear in what sense they have 'needs' which require fulfillment. 
They are not bom and do not die, but merely split from, develop, and merge with each 
other. In functional analysis, the relationship from effects to causes is often merely 
assumed.
The only general and obvious links between a consequence of a social 
phenomenon and its cause are human consciousness, cognition, and will. The 
members (or some members) of a society may recognize the benefits of a certain 
social form and acquiesce with, copy, develop, promote, and/or build on it. This is 
what Robert Merton called 'manifest functions' (1968), in contrast to ’latent functions' 
—the unintended and unrecognized effects of a phenomenon. Manifest functions, of 
course, are not as theoretically interesting or novel as latent functions, since they do 
not identify the unconscious evolution of a 'part' o f a system, but rather the 
consequence of intentional collective action. The distinction between these two 
concepts is not as simple as may appear, however. Elster (1990) has identified some of 
the difficulties (131 -32):
The classification of consequences in intended versus unintended and 
recognized versus unrecognized suggests four categories rather than two. Also, 
we have to ask, as Merton rarely does: intended by whom? recognized by 
whom? These questions, in turn are related to another: functional for whom?
In any given item of functional analysis, there are two groups of 
individuals involved; those who engage in practices we want to explain and 
those who benefit from these practices, i.e., those for whom they are in some
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sense functional. The question o f intention arises only for the first group, the 
question o f recognition may arise for both. The two groups may coincide, 
overlap, or be totally disjoint. In the last case, the possibility arises that the 
effects are unintended by those who produce them but recognized by those 
who benefit from them. If, moreover, the latter have the power to sustain the 
activities from which they benefit, we have the ingredients of a filter 
explanation.
Even greater complexity is added if the meanings of the convenient terms 'intention' 
and 'recognition' are probed. Do intentions, for instance, need be conscious or explicit 
intentions? Do persons who buy designer clothes admit to others or even to 
themselves their intention to demonstrate their superior status? Perhaps so, perhaps 
not, perhaps vaguely, perhaps clearly, perhaps sometimes, perhaps for some persons. 
Again, do they, and in what senses might they recognize that status is demonstrated in 
this way? And how might they experience this as beneficial?
Functionalists have asserted that the task of sociology is to reveal the latent 
functions of phenomena, in order to provide a real or ‘deep* explanation o f their 
character and existence which goes beyond the actual intentions of actors (Merton, 
1968). The abovementioned difficulties in extricating intentions from the causal chain 
pose the question o f how to identify latent functions and whether and which latent 
functions will mm out to have explanatory power. This is an empirical question to be 
settled for specific cases, rather than a presupposition to be applied indiscriminately to 
all social phenomena, or any which appear to have beneficial consequences.
In practice, many sociologists have continued to use functional concepts and 
terminology in a loose metaphorical manner. The manifest/latent distinction has not 
been often followed (even by Merton in his own article; see Elster, 1990: 132), with 
the word 'function* being used merely as a convenient cover-all label for beneficial 
consequences to which is attributed some unspecified kind of explanatory 
significance, or merely for consequences as a whole. Sociological humour research 
represents a typical case.
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5.2, Functions in Humour Research
In sociological humour research, as elsewhere, imprecise and unsupported 
claims for functional significance have been common. Some authors seem to have 
assumed that all consequences of laughter and/or humour have functional 
significance:
Although dozens, if not hundreds, of specific functions of humor might be 
proposed, three seem of particular and general significance: humor promotes 
group cohesion, it provokes intergroup (or intragroup) conflict; and it provides 
social control. One might note that provoking conflict is contrary to traditional 
functional theory, but more recent analyses (Coser, 1956) have indicated that 
conflict can have functional consequences for a social system, and so we shall 
include it here.
(Fine, 1983: 173)
Does Fine distinguish at all between consequences in general and the ’hundreds* of 
functional consequences he hints at? Between beneficial and harmful consequences? 
Between manifest and latent functions? Between phenomena explained by functions 
and those merely ’functional' in a vague, metaphorical sense? No such distinctions are 
made, nor is his a unique case.
In these studies, though the explanatory value o f functional consequences is 
ever the justification and backdrop for analysis —suggesting that it is latent functions 
that are being proposed—, there is often plenty of implicit recognition that functions 
might actually be manifest:
In a spirit of harmony, the group realizes that the fact that they are able to 
laugh at each other’s foibles indicates that they have a  trusting, communal 
relationship.
(Fine, 1983: 173; my italics)
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Humor is intended to initiate social interaction and to keep the machinery of 
interaction operating freely and smoothly. Indeed, sometimes it may not be 
sufficient. But perhaps most often this is its intention and objective function.
(Maitineau, 1972:103; my italics)
Sometimes a joke is used to point out the shortcomings of members in the 
council
. (Miller, 1967:266; my italics)
v
I would suggest that the general categories of functions’ proposed by these 
authors are better described as categories of 'effects' or 'consequences' (as I have done 
throughout this chapter). In specific cases, effects which are desirable or useful in 
some context for some person or group may be strategically sought; undesirable ones 
may be avoided. It may be observed that certain humorous or laughter institutions 
emerge in particular situations. Most of these are easily accountable as recognized and 
relatively intentional 'uses' (the term I have prefened), however habitualized. 
Admittedly, in these cases, the use of the word 'function' can indeed 'function' as a 
useful "shorthand notation" (Boudon, 1990: 136). Nevertheless, if not explicitly 
defined, avoided, or limited to occasional informal use, this word should -a t the very 
least- not be employed as the main term referring to 'consequences' or even 'beneficial 
consequences', as many authors have done.
Some phenomena may perhaps be candidates for true functional analysis. 
These, however, will need to be well defined, as will the larger unit for which they are 
functional. The absence of intentionality and recognition on the part of actors should 
be demonstrated. And a clear mechanism explaining the link between beneficial 
effects and arising o f the phenomenon should be at least suggested, if not documented.
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5.3. Biological Functions
The function metaphor, as I have mentioned, is well suited to evolutionary 
explanations of biologically inherited traits. Amusement, as a psycho-physiological 
mechanism, is therefore subject to functional analysis of the evolutionary sort. 
Nevertheless, I will argue that such explanations are too speculative to merit serious 
effort or attention.
It is certainly possible and even likely that some effect of amusement 
improved the survival or reproductive potential of an individual organism, allowing 
laughing hominids to pass on their genes to future generations with more frequency 
than non-laughing hominids. If it is accepted that amusement is a universal inherited 
emotional trait, the consequence follows. The accounts of evolutionary laughter and 
humour theorists, however, have failed to concoct any single plausible 'story' 
explaining how a particular effect could have been adaptive to a single individual. In 
practice, unfortunately, all such accounts lack credibility due to the incompleteness of 
our knowledge regarding crucial variables:
1. The stage in the brain's evolution at which amusement.
2. The ecological and social conditions of our pre-human ancestors at this 
point.
3. The precise biological nature and functioning of amusement and its relation 
to laughter (The topic of Part Two of this thesis).
4. The various psycho-physiological, communicative and social effects that 
joking, amusement, and laughter produce under various conditions (The topic 
of the present chapter).
5. The interaction between emergent social organization on the one hand and 
structures and evolutionary change in early hominids on the other.
While each of these informational voids in itself makes nonsense of evolutionary 
reconstructions, many of them threaten to remain permanently opaque. The discovery 
of 'missing link' skulls, for instance, will never clarify the mystery of the human 
brain's gradual growth in size and complexity.
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An attempt to order the following partial list of contributions to the ‘debate’ 
according to probability of truth should convince the reader of its futility:
Laughter was originally a vocal signal to other members of the group that they 
might relax with safety.
(Hayworth, 1928: 384)
Humor evolved to induce the subject to seek out informative social stimulation 
and to reward others for providing such stimulation.
< (Weisfeld, 1993: 162)
Laughter probably evolved by ritualization of a redirected threatening 
movement.
(Lorenz, 1967:253)
The rehearsal of alternate categories and classifications of the world in which 
we find ourselves...may have survival value.
(Miller, 1988:11)
What is the survival value of the involuntary, simultaneous contraction of 
fifteen facial muscles associated with certain noises which are often 
irrepressible?...The sole function of this luxury reflex seems to be the disposal 
of excitations which have become redundant, which cannot be consummated 
in any purposeful manner.
(Koestler, 1964:31)
All things that were good, that made for pleasurable feelings were greeted with 
the full-throated, deep-chested laughter that springs forth naturally. [These 
outbursts were] invitations to others to share the delightful mood, [and anyone 
who didn't was] a pariah [and was] exterminated.
(McComas, 1923: 55)
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Laughter has a curious ambiguity, combining elements of affection and 
conciliation with elements of rejection and aggression. Perhaps all these 
ancestral means of social communication became fused to compose a single, 
absolutely irresistible way to make another person cease an activity regarded as 
objectionable or ridiculous.
(Minsky, 1985: 280)
Evolutionary theories are uncertain enough in cases o f gross bodily parts and 
physical mechanisms of small, relatively uncomplicated organisms. When considering 
laughter, all hope can safely be given up. The considerable speculation that exists on 
the subject, usually presented as probable fact, displays a heterogeneity proper to our 
profound ignorance regarding the fundamental variables.
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6. Conclusions
An overview of the various effects (and related phenomena) associated with 
amusement, laughter, and humour has been presented, with reference to the large 
humour research literature concerned with effects, uses, institutions, and ‘functions* 
of the three components of the laughter triad.
An instance of amusement may produce in its subject a number of 
‘mechanical* effects:
1. The sounds and movements of'laughter1
2. The pleasurable subjective sensation of funniness.
3. Numerous less observable bodily manifestations of amusement.
4. A subsequent state of physical and psychological relaxation.
5. In the long term, improved health.
6. The facilitation of further amusement.
An interpreted humour piece may produce amusement in its audience. As the 
effects of amusement cannot be stimulated directly, humour provides a method for 
obtaining any of the six effects of amusement listed above.
Laughter and humour displays produce their effects through the 
communication of meanings, including the five connotations of display set out in 
Chapter Seven (2.4, 3.3). Effects, classified according to the signifïcation(s) from 
which they derive, include:
(Derived from the 'discredit' connotation)
1. The immediate broadcasting of the fact that a claimant has been discredited 
to any observers, provoking or increasing discredit if  the claimant be present, 
and possibly eliciting facework on his part.
2. The subsequent provocation of amusement and/or laughter in observers 
whose attention is guided towards the funny events.
3. In the long term, and with reference to new members of a group, the 
transmission and reproduction of social norms alluded to by the display.
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4. Also in the long term, the maintenance and reinforcement of these sam e 
social norms within full members.
(Derived from the ’knowledge', 'identity', and 'involvement' connotations)
1. In objective terms, the placement of the displaying individual within a 
scheme or schemes of social classification, as betrayed by his mental contents, 
identities, and attitudes.
2. With reference to an observer who shares some/all of these mental contents, 
identities, and attitudes, an increased closeness or affiliation.
3. With reference to an observer who fails to share some/all of these mental 
contents, identities, and attitudes, an increased distance or disaffiliation.
(Derived from the 'identity' connotation)
1. Protection from discredit for a displayer unintentionally associated with a 
discrediting event.
2. Protection from discredit for a displayer who has intentionally produced a 
discrediting event.
3. Protection from discredit for a displayer who suffers a discrediting attack by 
another individual.
4. With reference to a  person who depends 'too often' on protective displays, 
the giving off of an impression of evasiveness or excessive defensiveness.
(Derived from the 'involvement' connotation)
1. When discrediting events are associated with tragedy or misfortune, the 
giving off of an impression of 'callousness* or ’toughness' (judged favourably 
or unfavourably depending on the observer's attitude towards empathy)
2. When discrediting events are associated with any fact which 'should' elicit 
an emotional reaction o f moral condemnation, the giving off of an impression 
o f moral looseness or depravity.
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3. When the source of amusement referred to by the display is an erroneous 
focus of involvement itself, the denial of this supposed misinterpretation.
4. In the case of laughter displays only, the revelation of the displayed focus 
of attention.
(Derived from the 'entertainment' connotation)
1. In the case of humour displays before an audience, the making of the self­
claim that the displayer is able to provoke the amusement of other members of 
the target sharing audience, t-
The relevance of an effect depends on the relevance and specific content of its parent 
meaning in context. Effects derived from the displaying individual's assertion of 
'involvement in the amusing elements' of a scene, for instance, do not apply in the 
absence of apparent obstacles to involvement. Several, o f course, may apply at once.
Throughout the discussion, I have also included references to many common 
strategic uses of laughter and humour by actors to achieve specific effects. The fact 
that humour pieces result in amusement, for instance, allow actors to obtain desirable 
effects of hilarity such as pleasure, relaxation, or improved health. Laughter/humour- 
induced conformity to social norms of demeanour, derived from the ‘discredit' 
connotation o f these displays, can be used by actors to control the behaviour of others 
through gossip, ridicule, and mockery. Such uses, moreover, may become 
institutionalized, as in the once-common practice of the ‘dunce* cap at schools, which 
exploited the conformity effect of ridicule to correct children's behaviour and study 
habits.
I have, however, avoided reference to the ‘functions' of amusement, laughter, 
and humour, which I have argued should be posited only with reference to specific 
empirical phenomena, and with more theoretical and methodological care than has 
often been applied by authors within the functionalist tradition.
The effects of amusement, laughter, and humour which have been presented in 
this chapter, and the related strategic uses and social institutions, have been the topic 
of a considerable amount of the work undertaken in the field of humour research. 
Indeed, the discussion has made continual reference to such studies, and has drawn
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from many for its empirical illustrations. The treatment offered in this chapter, 
however, has gone further than most mere summaries of effects or ‘functions’ by 
integrating them within a systematic ordering derived from a solid theoretical base. I 
have been careful in distinguishing effects relating to each of the three components o f 
the laughter triad, and between those of humour pieces and of humour displays. 
Moreover, the effects of laughter and humour displays have been traced to the various 
meanings which these displays imply by virtue of their reference to amusement. The 
intuitive knowledge which all human actors possess of this emotional experience, and 
which I have attempted to make explicit in Part Two of the thesis, can account for the 
presence of-carnivals, salesmen’s joshing, village idiots, and joking relationships in 
far-flung comers of the globe. Each of the various connotations of laughter and 
humour displays, it has been argued, naturally leads to a  set of interactional and/or 
social consequences which attain relevance within specific contexts, many of which 
can further be exploited by actors intentionally. This chapter can thus be considered a 
further test of the ‘claim-discredit’ hypothesis of amusement. The amenability of 
many and diverse research findings to the theoretical structure proposed represents 
additional support for its validity.
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1. Introduction
Throughout the past eight chapters, I have drawn up a suggested chart of the 
area bounding the three basic phenomena pursued from the start: amusement, 
laughter, and humour. Distinctions have been drawn, concepts delimited and defined, 
factors of variability identified, similarities noted, and, whenever possible or useful, 
empirical illustrations and links to relevant theory and research provided. It will be the 
charge of all those interested in these subjects to assess the accuracy of this 
preliminary guide, and perhaps to develop and improve upon its rough outlines.
In these final pages, I will provide a brief summary of the proposals, and some 
reflections on their cross-cultural validity. Within the context o f the current debate on 
the relative influence of nature and culture on emotional phenomena, I will argue that 
amusement can be considered one of the basic' universal emotions common to all 
human beings. I will also suggest how and on what bases the manifestations of 
amusement, laughter, and humour may vary cross-culturally.
Finally, the 'situation* of the laughter triad, in the three senses mentioned at the 
start of the thesis, will be addressed. I will draw attention to the continuous focus on 
‘the everyday situation,’ on which analysis has been firmly grounded. I will emphasize 
once again the essential links between the fundamental features of situated interaction 
and the workings of amusement. And, to conclude, I will draw up the outline of a 
suggested structure for the field of humour research, integrating the main theories of 
amusement as well as the full and varied body of interdisciplinary research.
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2. Summary of Proposals
Three concepts have been the focus of this dissertation: amusement (a 
universal emotion responsive to 'funny* objects), laughter (the observable and more- 
or-less faithful signs of amusement), and humour (the attempt to stimulate 
amusement).
No general theory of amusement (and by extension, of laughter and humour) 
has yet been widely accepted, though such a theory would be of immense benefit to 
the field of humour research. The four types of theory most commonly discussed — 
superiority, incongruity, tension-release, and play- are widely regarded as partial and 
unsatisfying, even by many of their proponents. These approaches have been rejected 
on the basis of their failure to explain all cases (or even a well-defined subsection) of 
amusing stimuli, or to account for the wide range of effects, uses, and additional 
features of the phenomena.
A successful theory could be identified on the same grounds, by its usefulness 
in drawing together and classifying the widest range of relevant data. Only individual 
judgments of validity are relevant to the assessment of such a theory, however, due to 
the relative difficulties posed by objective observation of basic phenomena. Some 
evidence for its general validity could be garnered from the balance of aggregate 
individual assessments, taking special notice of the variety of interests and 
backgrounds of validators, and each assessor's specific knowledge of the field.
A 'claim-discredit' amusement theory, closely akin to earlier views by 
Aristotle, Plato, E.F. Canitt, J.B. Baillie, Henri Bergson, and others, has been 
proposed. According to this proposal, amusement reacts to the observation, by a 
perceiver, that a self-claim attaching to some claimant has been discredited. It further 
requires the perceiver's identity distance from the claimant —otherwise resulting in his 
embarrassment- and his sufficient attention to the discrediting events —as opposed to 
other cognitive or emotionally-engaging percepts. The actual characteristics of a self­
claim's discredit, and the subjective quality of its perception, may vary widely due to 
differences in the self-claim's origin and content, the identity of the claimant 
discredited, the cause of discredit, the location of the discredit event within the 
structure of interpreted reality, and also the synchronicity of the perception and its 
result with other amusement reactions and/or other cognitive and emotional processes.
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This variety can account for the full range of amusing stimuli: unintentional gaffes, 
unorthodox ideas, practical jokes, political cartoons, slapstick movies, bouts of 
tickling, ironic quips, parodie imitations, comedic one-liners, blunt obscenity, and so 
on.
The proposal has been integrated within (and strongly influenced by) the larger 
structure of Erving Goffman’s study o f situated interaction, which portrayed 
individuals in public as fragile performers of the selves they craft for specific 
audiences. His analysis of the embarrassment which results in a subject when his self- 
claims are discredited in public has been extended by the parallel notion that 
amusement follows the same types of events (whether or not a present or real 
embarrassable person exists) in identity-distant and appropriately engrossed observers.
Flustering and apologetic displays, the expressions of embarrassment, are 
similarly complemented by laughter and humour displays, two nearly synonymous 
communicative signs. Through their common reference to amusement, laughter and 
humour displays imply a series of universal meanings derivable from the preceding 
analysis of the basal emotion, a set of connotations which in turn may provoke 
specific effects depending on context. Many of these effects, and the uses of laughter 
and humour which they inspire, have been widely observed and analyzed in the 
humour research field, including the broadcasting of discredit, the transmission and 
maintenance of social norms, interpersonal affiliation and disaffiliation, and protection 
from discredit. The definition of the social situation, modulated by the aims and 
relative power of an actor, will influence the display he desires to express. His 
achievement o f this display, moreover, will depend on his skills, and in the case of 
laughter, on the complicating influence o f the psycho-physiological process of 
amusement.
These proposals have been offered as tentative suggestions to be tested and 
improved upon by humour researchers, both professional and lay.
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3. Cross-Cultural Validity 
i 3.1. The Emotion Debate
The theory presented describes amusement as a discrete pan-human emotion. 
This claim requires some further elaboration and support, as the distinctiveness and 
universality of emotions has been strongly contested in some camps. The study of the 
emotions crosses a badly defined and much fought-over border between psychology 
and more sociological disciplines, where nature and culture interact closely. In this 
section, I will make clear and defend my own version of boundaries. Before the 
question of universality is addressed, however, it will first be necessary to defend the 
very existence of emotions as discrete and independent bodily processes, a proposition 
which has not always been taken for granted even within psychology.
An emotion is defined as a bodily mechanism which produces a specific, brief, 
immediate, and automatic psycho-physiological reaction in response to the outcome of 
a cognitive judgement of a specific type. A manifestation of emotion is perceivable by 
its subject as an 'emotional experience' and by an observer (when observable) as an 
'emotional display'. I assume that there is a set of such emotions (specific cognitive 
judgments corresponding to specific bodily reactions) which are distinct from each 
other and universal throughout our species. Evidence for such a set is overwhelming. 
The most compelling derives from our own subjective experiences of emotion, and 
from the fact that similar emotional events appear to be present in all other human 
beings with which we interact. Despite the immense variability in language and 
culture across the range of known societies, travellers and ethnographers have found 
(at least some) emotional displays recognizable and similar to their own in all known 
societies. People everywhere display what looks like our 'anger,' 'sadness,' or 
'happiness' for the same types of reasons. Indeed, these similarities provide a good part 
of the basis for communication between members of linguistically and culturally 
distant societies.
Nevertheless, these intuitive understandings of emotion have been unpopular 
within the social sciences. Cognitive psychology has questioned the distinctiveness of 
what are commonly regarded as separate emotions, while anthropology has questioned 
the cross-cultural validity of our emotional understandings. Each of these related
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issues will be addressed in turn, with reference to the recent shift in attitudes towards 
these aspects of emotion within the social sciences.
3.1.1. The Question o f Distinctiveness
In psychology, many have argued that the apparent distinctiveness of 
independent emotions is an illusion of subjectivity. Until recently, psychologists have 
granted little if any motivational importance to affects, conceiving them primarily as 
the result of cognitive processing (Tomkins, 1981):
IF ’
Contemporary psychology regards feelings as last. Affect is postcognitive. It is 
elicited only after considerable processing of information has been 
accomplished. An affective reaction, such as liking, disliking, preference, 
evaluation, or the experience of pleasure or displeasure, is based on a prior 
cognitive process in which a variety o f content discriminations are made and 
features are identified, examined for their value, and weighted for their 
contributions. Once this analytic task has been completed, a computation of 
the components can generate an overall affective judgement.
(Zajonc, 1980: 151)
In contrast to Charles Darwin's (1902) and William James' (1884) view that 
specific eliciting circumstances correspond to specific emotional responses, 
psychology has favoured the version of W.B. Cannon (1927). Cannon argued that 
varied eliciting circumstances are associated with an identical set of physiological 
responses, subsequently interpreted by the subject as one or other emotion. According 
to this view, though fear and anger both provoke the activation of the sympathetic 
nervous system through the release of the adrenalin hormone, it is the actor's appraisal 
o f circumstances which allows him to decide which emotion he is experiencing.
Schachter and Singer (1962) conducted an experiment which was widely held 
to support Cannon's claims, becoming an immediate classic in the discipline and a 
justification for psychology's disinterest with emotions as motivating forces. The 
experimenters injected subjects with adrenaline and placed them in situations elicitory 
o f either happiness or anger. According to predictions, subjects acted and felt happy in
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the former context, angry in the latter (and happier/angrier than control subjects). The 
fact that different emotions may share some physiological similarities does not, 
however, demonstrate that no extracognitive differences exist between them. 
Schachter and Singer's subjects may have truly experienced separable manifestations 
of happiness and anger, each group simply misattributing the general adrenaline- 
stimulated arousal as part of either one, or having either of the emotions amplified by 
the arousal. In the absence of external arousal, less intense versions of either emotion 
could have been experienced. Moreover, the results o f the experiment were weak and 
in some cases actually contradicted the main hypothesis; its methods have been 
strongly criticized; and attempts at replication have generally failed (Scherer, 1996: 
294). Nevertheless, the conclusions of Schachter and Singer were hardly questioned 
for a full two decades by the practitioners of a psychological science dominated by the 
cognitive paradigm (Tomkins, 1981:310-312).
More recently, considerable evidence for the physiological separability of 
emotions has accumulated. At least some physiological measures have been shown to 
discriminate between some emotions. Ekman, Levenson, and Friesen (1983; 1990) 
found that when posing emotional expressions, subjects’ heart rates were higher for 
sadness, anger, and fear than for happiness, disgust, and surprise; skin temperature 
higher for anger than for fear and sadness. A study seeking to produce real emotions 
of happiness, anger, and fear in subjects (Stemmier, 1989) found these reactions could 
be discriminated on the basis of skin conductance and head temperature.
Paul Ekman and others have provided evidence that many observable 
expressions of emotion are at least partly inherited and thus recognizable universally. 
Ekman and Friesen (1971) conducted a study which documented the ability of 
members of the South Fore, an isolated New Guinean society, and American college 
students to mutually comprehend each others' emotional facial displays. A group of 
Fore subjects accurately selected from six photographs of faces the one which best fit 
each 'emotion story' retold by the experimenters. Other Fore were photographed 
posing faces in reaction to these same 'emotion stories', and these photos accurately 
recognized by Western subjects. Six 'basic* facial emotional expressions were 
identified: happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, and disgust. Very similar results 
were obtained by an initially skeptical Karl and Eleanor Heider (1970; in Ekman, 
1980), when they replicated the experiment with the Grand Valley Dan, a much more
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isolated New Guinean culture. Additional evidence has been obtained by observing 
children bom deaf and blind, who are unable to leam emotional expression from 
others, and yet exhibit easily recognizable emotional behaviour (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 
1973).
More subtle correlations have been measured in the brain. Numerous tests 
have determined that 'positive' emotions -those leading to approach or positive action 
such as happiness and anger- are associated with greater activity in the left cerebral 
hemisphere, while 'negative' emotions -characterized by withdrawal: fear, disgust, 
sadness- are associated with right-brain processing (Oatley and Jenkins, 1996: 147- 
150). Electrical stimulation to specific regions of the brain is known to produce 
specific emotional feelings (Heath, 1954; Duchowny, 1983). It has also been found 
that the action of particular neurochemicals is related to particular emotions. The 
peptide cholecystokinin (CCK) can apparently induce panic attacks in the absence o f 
any recognizable cause (Oatley and Jenkins, 1993:154).
Subjective experience should not be discounted as evidence for emotional 
diversity. Though the way in which such experience is codified, interpreted, 
remembered, and communicated varies from person to person and from culture to 
culture, leading to insurmountable difficulties in the sharing of observations, certain 
fundamental features of subjective emotional life can be established through the 
sharing of introspective insights. Wundt (1874) suggested three basic dimensions of 
feeling along which emotions could be distinguished: pleasantness/unpleasantness, 
excitation/depression, and tension/relaxation. The first two of these have been 
strongly supported by empirical research (Scherer, 1996:306-07).
The unique flavour and distinctiveness of at least some emotions cannot be 
denied by any human being. Whatever the physiological similarities found between 
intense joy and intense fear, it seems nonsensical to theorize that purely cognitive 
interpretation distinguishes one from the other (Tomkins, 1981:311):
It is as reasonable a possibility as a theory of pain and pleasure which argued 
that the difference between the pain of a toothache and the pleasure of an 
orgasm is not in the stimulation of different sensory receptors, but in the fact 
that since one experience occurs in a bedroom, the other in a dentist's office, 
one interprets the undifferentiated arousal state differently.
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The conscious mind is a far more precise measuring tool for the distinctiveness of 
emotions than crude thermometers and EEG machines.
In recent years, the motivational role of emotions, and with it the 
distinctiveness of different affects, has increasingly come to be recognized. Current 
views propose that the different outcomes of certain cognitive 'appraisals' or 
evaluations directly produce specific types of emotion (Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 1993). 
Research in the field of emotions has experienced a dramatic upsurge (Oatley and 
Jenkins, xxiii; 26-31), and a revised edition of a social psychology text includes a new 
chapter on emotions (Hewstone, Stroebe, and Stephenson, 1996). This thesis can be 
positioned partly within this new movement
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3.1.2. The Question of Universality
Many social scientists have questioned the universality of emotions. Klineberg 
(193S) noted that in many societies, expressions are used in ways that to us seem 
bizarre. He cited the Melanesian Orokawa's use of fierce expressions to greet guests at 
a feast, or the joy  displayed by Samurai women upon hearing of the death of their 
husbands or sons in battle. Weston La Bane (1947) offered laughter itself as an 
example of cultural diversity:
Smiling, indeed, 1 have found may almost be mapped after the fashion of any 
other culture trait; and laughter is in some senses a geographic variable. On a 
map of the Southwest Pacific one could perhaps even draw lines between areas 
of ’Papuan hilarity' and others where a Cobuan, Melanesian doumess reigned. 
In Africa, Gorer noted that laughter is used by the negro to express surprise, 
wonder, embarrassment, and even discomfiture; it is not necessarily, or even 
often a sign of amusement; the significance given to ’black laughter* is due to a 
mistake of supposing that similar symbols have identical meanings. Thus it is 
that even if the physiological behaviour be present, its cultural and emotional 
functions may differ. Indeed, even within the same culture, the laughter o f 
adolescent girls and the laughter of corporation presidents can be functionally 
different things.
More recently, a number of anthropologists have argued that even apparently similar 
emotions actually differ significantly from one society to the next, in their causes, 
boundaries, and even their subjective quality, that "the passions are as cultural as the 
devices" (Geertz, 1980: 124; see also Rosaldo, 1984; and Solomon, 1984). Lutz 
(1988) and other ethnographers have conducted studies of the emotional lives of 
particular peoples which differ significantly from our own.
Some replies to these arguments have been already implied in the body of this 
thesis, with regard to the emotion of amusement. A distinction between the psycho- 
physiological response itself and its observable display must first be drawn. There are 
then three ways in which culture may influence an emotion and/or its expression.
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Firstly, though the type of cognitive judgement which triggers an emotion is 
claimed to be universal, the specific information used in assessments varies from 
moment to moment and from person to person, let alone from culture to culture (See 
Chapters Four and Six). The same mask which inspires terror in a young child may be 
found mildly amusing by an adult. The discovery of an unusual tumorous growth on a 
bodily organ could elicit fear in the patient, grief in his family, and scientific interest 
in the surgeon. An outside temperature that would make an Eskimo smile would make 
a Berber frown (and vice-versa). Public torture and beheadings that made medieval 
crowds cheer would inspire revulsion, grief, and moral outrage in modem Westerners. 
These different reactions reflect divergent attitudes, beliefs, and interpretations, rather 
than divergent emotional mechanisms. A particular group may also develop a general 
'threshold' of a particular emotion which is higher or lower than those of others, by 
learning certain recurrent patterns of interpretation in relevant circumstances. Where 
individuals leam their exclusive entitlement to large sets of rights and property, anger 
(due to inevitable violations) is likely to be common. Larger patterns of emotional 
difference may reflect relevant culturally variable features of personality such as the 
extent to which the individuality and independence of the single social actor is 
emphasized and valued (Oatley and Jenkins, 1996: 42-43). Sociologists and 
anthropologists may well draw out the connections between the sources of natives' 
emotional reactions and the outlines of their culture and social structure.
A second factor regards cultural rules and individual aims affecting the 
expression of emotion. Emotional display is partly subject to pressure from the 
relevant official definition of the situation (is the display acceptable/required here and 
now?) and also to the goals of the actor in question (is it in my interests to display here 
and now?). In a celebrated experimental study (Ekman, 1972; Friesen, 1972) it was 
found that while both Japanese and American college students displayed expressions 
of disgust in reaction to unpleasant filmed images, the former showed fewer such 
expressions when aware that they were being observed. The general level o f 
acceptable display of a single emotion or a group of emotions may also vary from one 
society to the next. As Douglas (1971) has noted, "the thresholds of tolerance o f 
bodily relaxation and control...are set socially," and these will affect the level and type 
of emotional display appropriate both generally and in specific contexts.
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Certain uses of emotional displays and of the stimuli that produce the emotion 
may also become institutionalized or more common in a single society, group, or 
environment either by mere historical accident or to achieve particularly desirable 
effects. In an imperialistic, military society, institutions of socialization and control 
may be directed towards reducing fear while encouraging and channeling anger (See 
David, 1988). On the other hand, in societies where the violent and unsociable 
consequences of anger could threaten survival or basic values, this emotion may be 
socialized to virtual nonexistence (Briggs, 1970; Levy 1973; Marshall).
Finally, there is the question of cultural interpretations o f emotion. Like any 
other feature of the environment, emotional reactions are the subject of varied 
classifications by different societies. In the same way that Eskimos are known to 
distinguish between countless varieties of snow, Tahitians reportedly have forty-seven 
terms referring to anger (Levy, 1984). Moreover, the content and boundaries 
separating emotional concepts may vary widely. The Ifaluk people's emotion 'metagu' 
integrates our ideas of 'fear,' 'anxiety,' and 'embarrassment,'(Lutz, 1982) whereas our 
'fear' includes what to Tahitians is an important and separable emotion of the 
'uncanny', involving perceptions of certain incongruous events which cause the flesh 
to crawl and the hair stand on end (Levy, 1984). Nevertheless, it can be argued that 
these diverse theories of emotions or 'emotionologies' (Steams and Steams, 1988) 
apply to some foundational reality of emotional predispositions common to all 
humans, on which specific concepts are based:
whatever the cultural peculiarities in the relations and associated meanings of 
Tahitian emotional terms, I had little trouble in recognizing, say, ri'ari'a as 
"fear," riri as "anger,'' hina'aro as "desire," 'oa’oa as "happiness," ha'ama as 
"shame." That is, if an emotion was recognized and named at all, its "central 
tendency" seemed to be universally human.
(Levy, 1984)
It seems probable that at least a number of separable 'basic emotions' exist, with 
universally definable causes and physiological/expressive features. Indeed, it can be 
observed that even ethnographers who attempt to demonstrate the uniqueness of other- 
cultural emotions fall back on intuitive understandings of such universal in their
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work. Oatley and Jenkins (1996: 49) make this point with reference to some of Lutz's
anecdotes among the Ifaluk:
One night she was frightened by a man entering the doorless, individual hut 
that she had negotiated for herself. Her scream awakened her adopted family 
who came to see what was wrong.... The man had fled, and the family laughed 
hilariously when they heard Lutz had been alarmed by such an event. She said 
that she had been on the island long enough to know that men sometimes 
called on women at night for a  sexual rendezvous. But she had imported the 
American idea that an uninvited visit from a man inevitably meant harm. On 
Ifaluk, Lutz says, although men may very occasionally seem frightening in 
public if drunk, so that others may fear that a disagreement might break out 
between them, interpersonal violence is virtually nonexistent, and rape 
unknown. Hence a night visitor means the very antithesis o f fear.
(Oatley and Jenkins, 1996:48)
In this story, as in many others related by Lutz, both native understandings of the 
ethnographer's emotional expressions (i.e., fear) and the latter's comprehension of the 
former’s displays (i.e., laughter) are easily achieved despite the considerable 
dissimilarities between the emotional lives of Ifaluks and Westerners which Lutz 
describes in her book Unnatural Emotions. A few lines also suffice to allow Western 
readers to understand why a particular emotion is felt by the Ifaluk.
It has also been found that descriptions of subjective emotional experience are 
also often cross-culturally very similar. For example, the hydraulic metaphor,' which 
portrays an emotion as an interior force which grows until it boils or spills over has 
been widely recorded in societies of very different temperaments, including of course 
our own (Levy, 1984). Russell’s (1991) comparison of numerous emotionologies from 
the most diverse cultures has also revealed certain basic common features.
Any psychological theory of emotions, however pretendedly ’scientific,’ 
constitutes an 'emotionology' in competition with others. Our own English folk terms - 
-anger, fear— may well turn out to be inadequate, and it is likely that attention to the 
distinctions made in other human cultures will continue to provide us with revelatory 
insights. It is uncertain how close to the foundational reality of human emotions such
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a theory will be able to arrive. Nevertheless, I assume that some emotionologies will 
be more accurate than others.
!
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3.2. Amusement as a Basic Emotion
Is amusement a basic emotion? It is curious that while a positive answer to this 
question is common both within the humour field (Morreall, 1983: 297) and in earlier 
theoretical accounts of emotion (Hobbes, 1640; 1651; James, 1890; Darwin, 1902), 
contemporary emotion theorists and researchers rarely address amusement. Neither 
Tomkins (1981), Izard (1977), Plutchik (1980), nor Ekman (1980) have included 
amusement within their lists of fundamental emotions. A recent textbook on the 
emotions (Oatley and Jenkins, 1996) fails to list either amusement or laughter in its 
wide-ranging index.
The historical difficulties in reaching (or even approaching) consensus 
regarding a single cause of amusement probably accounts in great part for this neglect. 
Ekman's (1992) list of seven criteria for identifying a ’basic’ emotion 
unproblematically fits with the features of amusement in all but this respect. In 
accordance with Ekman’s defining criteria, a manifestation of amusement occurs 
quickly and spontaneously; lasts a brief period of time; follows a relatively automatic 
and unconscious appraisal; and is associated with distinctive physiological responses 
as well as universal bodily signals (i.e., laughter). What has been unclear is whether 
amusement is also associated with ’universal antecedent events', a single and coherent 
range of stimuli observable cross-culturally.
In this thesis, I have argued for the existence of such a set of universal 
antecedent events for amusement. Specifically, I have suggested that amusement 
follows the judgement that another’s self-claim has been discredited, provided the 
subject attends to the discrediting event and does not feel identified as the discredited 
claimant. Whether this definition will be found accurate in relation to even Western 
society remains to be seen. For the purposes of discussion, I will for now take its local 
validity for granted and address the question of cross-cultural validity.
Travelers, missionaries, and ethnographers who have interacted with the 
widest range of human societies seem to have recognized laughter as laughter (i.e., as 
a sign of recognizable amusement), wherever they have gone. Reports of laughter and 
its sources are scattered sparsely throughout the ethnographic literature, and tend to 
confirm the universality of amusement causes. Marshall's reports of the IKung 
Bushmen, a nomadic hunter-gatherer society as removed from our own society as can
499
Chapter Nine: Situating the Laughter Triad JSediPCLa
be imagined, sound familiar in relation to humour behaviour and amusement 
reactions. She describes talking as a continuous activity between groups of !Kung, 
"the most loquacious people I know,” and remarks that it is frequently punctuated by 
"shrieks of laughter" (p. 232):
They laugh at mishaps that happen to other people, like the lions eating up 
someone else's meat, and shriek over particularly telling and insulting sexual 
sallies in the joking relationship... Men and women who have the joking 
relationship insult each other in a facetious way and also point out actual faults 
or remark on actual episodes which embarrass a person. Everyone joins in 
uproarious, derisive laughter.
(233-35)
Marshall's examples here include the simple identification and retelling of self-claim 
discredits ("[they] point out actual faults or remark on actual episodes which 
embarrass a person”), the accident-caused occurrence of events which discredit a 
person’s universal territorial self-claims (”mishaps...the lions eating up someone else’s 
meat”), and also agent-caused discredits ("telling and insulting sexual 
sallies...insult[s]”). The interpersonal nature of amusement is also evident from this 
passage, as in the emphasis on the 'other* or ’someone else' as the source of 
amusement.
Even when dealing with some of the most isolated peoples, and in the absence 
of a common language, ethnographers can immediately share laughter with 
individuals of radically different cultural backgrounds:
On one occasion, I trekked up into the mountains to the outermost confines of 
Dowayoland. Many of the children had never seen a white man before and 
began to scream with terror until comforted by their elders who explained that 
this was the white chief from Kongle. We all laughed good-naturedly at their 
fright and smoked together.
(Barley, 1983:54)
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Ethnographic studies of humour reveaJ self-claim discredit as the basis of 
humour pieces. Pierre Clastres (1974) analyzed two myths of the Chulupi Indians of 
the Paraguayan Chaco which provoke loud laughter during the retelling. Each of these 
involved important cultural figures —the shaman and the jaguar— failing to fulfill their 
most basic role self-claims. In one myth, a shaman is called upon to cure a girl of a 
fever, and his every action is a display of incompetence: he calls upon the help of 
other shamans (a measure reserved for desperate cases, here applied to a trifling 
malady); he dances with women (when he should dance alone); he tries to seduce 
women (revealing his lack of concentration, essential to the spiritual work); he 
discovers to have forgotten his tobacco (the most essential item of the shaman, the 
cure-all substance); his spirit assistant is a she-ass (considered a ridiculous, stupid, and 
stubborn animal) rather than the usual bird or serpent; he falls into a thorn bush.
A wide range of humour genres has been found to be widespread throughout 
humankind, including sexual and scatological taboo-breaking, verbal and physical 
abuse, teasing, gossip, clowning, and satirical mimic (Apte, 1983). The content of the 
joking' in joking relationships, varieties of which have been reported from every 
comer of the globe, have been described as
teasing, sexual innuendoes, mock insults, obscene remarks concerning an 
individual’s sexual organs and prowess, playfulness, banter and so forth.... 
Cultural notions of incongruent, outrageous, or deviant manifestations of 
personalities, behaviour, and so forth, are also important.
(ibid: 186)
Barley's account of ritual clowns among the Cameroonian Dowayo suggests again that 
differences in 'sense of humour* are a matter of taste, fashion, and emphasis rather than 
of substance:
The clowns were extravagant, their faces painted half white, half black. They 
wore rubbish or old rags and spoke in a high-pitched scream partly in Fulani, 
partly in Dowayo, shouting out obscenities and nonsense. The cunt of the 
beer!' they screamed. The crowd roared with pleasure. They exposed 
themselves, produced ear-shattering farts by what mechanism I know not.
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They attempted to copulate with each other. They were delighted with me. 
They 'took photographs' through a broken bowl, 'wrote notes' on banana 
leaves. I managed to give as good as I got; when they asked for money, I 
solemnly handed them a bottletop.
(p. 83-84)
Mark Twain's Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court was struck by the 
lack of novelty in modem humour as compared with the gags of a medieval court 
jester;
I think I never heard so many old played-out jokes strung together in my life.... 
It seemed peculiarly sad to sit there, 1300 years before I was bom and listen 
again to poor, flat, worm-eaten jokes that had given me the dry gripes when I 
was a boy 1300 years afterwards. It about convinced me that there isn't any 
such thing as a new joke possible.
(cited in Mintz, 1983: 133)
To support this literary observation, often reflected also in folk ideas of jokes being 
'old as the hills,' Larry Mintz has identified the links between such distant comedians 
as the Marx Brothers and the troupes of the 16th century Commedia del Arte, or 
between the frame-confusing wordplay found in both Greek comedy and Abbott and 
Costello's most famous routine:
[from Cyclops, Euripides, 400 BC]
CYCLOPS: I was battered by Nobody.
CHORUS: Then nobody touched you.
CYCLOPS: Nobody blinded me.
CHORUS: Then you can see....What? Blinded by nobody?
CYCLOPS: Where's Nobody?
CHORUS: Nowhere, of course.
[from Abbott and Costello's absurd dialogue about the players -first, second, 
and third basem en- of Abott's new baseball team]
ABBOTT: I say Who's on first, What’s on second, I Don’t
Know's on third...
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COSTELLO:
ABBOTT:
COSTELLO:
ABBOTT:
COSTELLO:
ABBOTT:
COSTELLO:
ABBOTT:
COSTELLO:
ABBOTT:
COSTELLO:
ABBOTT:
COSTELLO:
Yeah, do you know the fellow's name?
Yes.
Well, who's on first?
Yes.
I mean the guy playing first 
Who.
The fellow playing first 
Who.
The first baseman.
Who! :
The guy playing first 
Who is on first!
Well, what are you asking me for?
(inMintz, 1983:133)
More spontaneous, everyday examples of amusement from around the world 
reinforce this impression of universality. Many relevant examples gathered by 
Western visitors to distant lands have been unintentionally provoked by these visitors 
themselves, who inevitably were seen to lack the native version of human 
'fundamentals':
The Sumatrans, writes one authority, have very slow dances which are thought 
to be ludicrous by Europeans. Yet, funnily enough, they think our customary 
dances "to the full as ludicrous."
[In Borneo,] the girls, a visitor reports, made Europeans repeat sentences of 
their language after them, and burst out into loud laughter "either at our 
pronunciation or at the comical things they had made us utter."
The Fuegians, though living much in the water, have no idea of washing 
themselves; accordingly, "when Europeans fust came among them, the sight of 
a man washing his face seemed to them so irresistibly ludicrous that they burst 
into shrieks of laughter."
A teacher o f the native Australians had once tried to explain to [an aborigine] 
the doctrine of the immateriality and immortality of the soul. He afterwards 
learned that his pupil had gone away from the lesson to have a hearty fit of
___
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laughter at the absurdity of the idea “of a man living and going about without 
arms, legs, or mouth to eat."
(Sully, 1902: 240; 238; 243)
These examples suggest that the antecedent events identified for amusement in this 
thesis, to the extent that they are found accurate for our own society, are also likely to 
be universal. Such a conclusion would strengthen the case for classifying amusement 
as an emotion.
To the criteria for recognizing an emotion enumerated by Ekman, a  final one 
can be added. As mentioned above, emotions are currently distinguished from other 
feelings -pain , hunger— by their being reactions to a cognitive appraisal or judgement, 
and classified according to the particular type of elicitory evaluation associated with 
each/A s Frijda has stated, "appraisal is the central issue in emotion theory" (1993: 
225). Morreall (1983) has challenged the view that amusement is an emotion precisely 
on the basis that it does not follow an appraisal in the same sense that other emotions 
do (p.298):
Fear, anger, and other emotions involve different evaluations of their various 
objects, but a positive or a negative attitude of some kind is always taken up 
toward the object of the emotion.... But objects of amusement are different. If I 
am amused by something I need not have a positive or a negative attitude 
toward that thing. Suppose, for instance, that while driving through a tract of 
pastel, lookalike houses I suddenly come upon a gaily painted house with 
windows in the shapes of zoo animals. I may be amused by the house without 
thereby either liking or disliking the house itself. (...)
Not only need I not have a positive or negative attitude toward an 
object of amusement, moreover, but I need not have beliefs about what 
properties it actually has.... As has often been pointed out, an emotion like love 
or fear for some object X  involves beliefs about X. To be afraid of some dog, 
for example, is in part to believe that the dog is likely to hurt you. Now 
amusement, as we'll see in a moment, is based on incongruity, but we need not 
believe that the object amusing is in fact incongruous —it is enough to simply 
look at the object as incongruous.
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Morreall's analysis, as evident from this excerpt, features 'incongruity' as the identified 
cause of amusement. Incongruities, Morreall argues, are not objects to which we take 
up a positive or negative attitude, nor objects about which we need believe anything.
However, the causal theory presented in the current thesis oversteps this 
objection. According to the claim-discredit view, a manifestation of amusement does 
require a preceding cognitive evaluation of an object, indeed one of the objects most 
crucial to the individual human being: the interactional other. Evaluated against his 
projected self, the other may appear as fulfilling or as failing to fulfill his presented 
self-claims. This can be regarded a negative valuation of an aesthetic variety, so 
negative in fact that people fear and/or may be offended by it, and which, as has been 
seen in Chapter Eight (4.1.4), may lead in the long run to the exclusion of an 
individual from the main of social life.
Morreall claims not to take a positive or negative view towards a hypothetical 
multicoloured house with animal-shaped windows. His amusement, however, judges 
the style as inappropriate for a house, and negatively evaluates anyone who would 
regard it as normal. Of course, the house may have been built just so precisely as an 
object of merriment (i.e., as a preschool or by an eccentric and playful owner), in 
which case those responsible themselves display their laughter at (and disapproval 
with) its design as a normal house. An architect, at least in most environments, would 
have difficulties in promoting his career with such unorthodox ideas.
A case can thus be made for treating amusement as a basic human emotion. It 
conforms to Ekman’s seven criteria, including - i f  the theory set forth in chapters Four 
to Six is accepted— that of a universal antecedent cause. The evidence from reports o f 
travellers, ethnographers, and historians appears to confirm the similarity of 
amusement elicitors in remote and dissimilar cultures. The contents of humour pieces 
in such foreign environments, though they may not inspire our own amusement, also 
follow recognizable and familiar patterns. Laughter can be shared by individuals even 
across the widest o f linguistic and cultural divides. Finally, in addition to Ekman*s 
criteria, the additional requirement that emotions should follow a process of cognitive 
appraisal is fulfilled by the claim-discredit theory presented.
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3.3. Cross-Cultural Variation
While suspicion of essential cross-cultural differences regarding amusement 
seem unwarranted, it is evident that the specific character of amusing stimuli varies as 
radically as culture itself, and indeed closely in parallel. The causes of amusement are 
directly related to the self-claims associated with specific roles and to ideas of simple 
'normality' (i.e., to culturally specific norms of demeanour - s e e  Chapter Four, 2.4). 
Washing the face, to hygiene-minded Westerners is an obvious daily ritual, to 
Fuegians a pointless absurdity. In ancient Sparta, a military society where self-claims 
of great courage and fearlessness formed the central core of 'maleness' as a role, "the 
most prominent category of buffoons...consisted of the 'tremblers’ (trescmtes)”:
Cowardice in battle was punished at Sparta by a series of legal penalties... In 
addition to the legal sanctions, the punishment of the 'tremblers' entailed 
certain opprobrious norms, the virtual effect of which was to transform the 
victims into miserable clowns: 'any passer-by may strike them if he wishes. 
Moreover, they are supposed to go about in a dirty and abject state, wearing 
cloaks with coloured patches, half o f their beard shaven and half left to grow*
(David, 1988:14)
Culturally defined sensitivities to different types of misfortune or obscenity (see 
Chapter Six, 3.2) may also lead to divergent emotional reactions. Marshall reports of 
the !Kung that "they laugh when the lame man, Kham, falls down and do not help him 
up" (p. 231). This reaction seems foreign —'callous' and 'cruel'— to Westerners, who 
nevertheless laugh at the fictional pratfalls of slapstick comedy. It must be understood 
in the context of a nomadic band society, where independent mobility and action are 
basic prerequisites for survival. In this barren desert landscape, excessive 'sympathy* 
with lameness or other handicaps would probably endanger the survival of the 
collectivity.
Particular genres of humour and rules about its display can also be culturally 
specific, though variability, again, is limited by the common intention to provoke a 
universal emotional reaction. The carnivals and buffoons of the middle ages can be 
analyzed in conjunction with the social structure and culture of feudal Europe, as can
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the televised sitcoms and postmodern comedy performances of today with reference to 
the wider features of our own society. The development of artistic forms and 
communications media also influences the range of humorous display. The 
development of the press, radio, and television have transformed the substance and 
widened the scope of comedy in the past two centuries. The history and ethnography 
of literature and the performance arts embraces also the full catalogue of known 
humorous genres. An extreme and surprising example of how far variability can go is 
again taken from the lives of the !Kung Bushmen:
They do not invent stories. They said they had no interest in hearing things that
are not true and wonder why anybody has.
(Marshall: 233)
The possible humorous repertory in a society wholly devoid of explicitly fictional 
retellings seems to us astoundingly restricted. Nevertheless, as documented previously 
(3.2), the objects of the humour and laughter which the IKung do display are not 
unlike categories of our own amusing stimuli.
As with any emotion, laughter is regulated by culturally specific rules 
regarding appropriate expression, and affected by the motives of actors in relation to 
cultural meanings and values. In 1902, Sully had already identified the mismatch 
between display and genuine emotion as a possible obstacle to the cross-cultural study 
of amusement. He cited the account of an African missionary who reported that while 
natives may often express seriousness in the face of a European's awkward mistakes 
or accidents, they will often "amuse themselves at his expense after he is gone, and, 
indeed, while he is present, if they know that he cannot understand their speech” (p. 
221). More recently, Chapman (1983) has observed similar concealment relating to 
laughter in the experimental lab. The general style and level of acceptable laughter 
may also vary from one society to the next:
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We know that some tribes are said to be dour and unlaughing. Others laugh 
easily. Pygmies lie on the ground and kick their legs in the air, panting and 
shaking in paroxysms of laughter
(Douglas, 1971: 387)
Certain uses o f humour and/or laughter may also become institutionalized or 
more common in a single society, group, o r environment either by mere historical 
accident or to achieve particularly desirable effects. In small-scale nomadic 
communities, for instance, where cooperation of every member may be crucial to 
common survival, the use of humour and laughter to resolve disputes is widespread 
(Roberts, 1979: 88). In other societies where conflict is not as threatening, the 
affiliative potential of humour may remain less exploited. In the same way that 
present-day laughter therapists teach their patients to develop their 'senses of humour', 
a culture recognizing the health benefits o f amusement could similarly promote its 
development within members.
Regarding cultural interpretations o f amusement and its relation to other 
aspects of emotion and behaviour, I am aware of few specific studies -D avid 's (1988) 
study of laughter in ancient Sparta is one example. Undoubtedly however, 
classifications and descriptions of the causes, features, physiology, and effects of 
amusement vary greatly from one society to another103. The great variety of theories 
that have accumulated over the history of humour research itself provide a sampling of 
possibilities. Focusing merely on the place o f amusement among other emotions, we 
find that it has been presented as akin to delight or pleasure (Sully, 1902, McComas, 
1923; Morreall, 1982), to displeasure (McDougall, 1903), to (pleasurable or playful) 
pain (Plato, 1961; Eastman, 1921), to "strong feeling of almost any kind" (Spencer, 
1860), and to aggression (Feinberg, 1978). Koestler (1964) identifies it as one element 
of a trio completed by scientific discovery and aesthetic pleasure, Baillie (1921) and
m  As I have argued in Chapter Seven, 2.3, however, interpretations of laughter are limited by the 
universal features of amusement In David's (1988) study, for instance, it is seen how the ‘corrective* 
and ‘punitive* effects of laughter and humour were emphasized in ancient Sparta. Such effects have 
been treated in Chapter Eight, 4.1.3 - 4.1.4, as resulting from the 'discredit* connotation of laughter 
displays. It is not to be supposed, moreover, that other meanings and effects of laughter were not 
recognized by Spartans.
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Hobbes (1651) as complementary to weeping, and Bergler (1956) as opposed to fear 
"of one’s own internal masochism."
The present theory of amusement is also part of a particular ’emotionology.’ It 
opposes amusement to embarrassment on the basis of their common sensitivity to the 
vicissitudes of the social selves people present to each other in everyday situations. Its 
basic outline coincides with ideas proposed by other 'claim-theorists’ identified in 
Chapter Three and many of its individual distinctions can be mapped on to elements 
of numerous other theories (see Section 4.3. below). Most probably, many of the 
concepts will also be found to relate to ideas on amusement held by specific cultures 
and individuals. Though inevitably partial and ultimately inaccurate, it is hoped that 
the present account will be found recognizably closer to the shape of this elusive 
emotion than at least its better-known competitors.
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4. Situating the Laughter Triad
The aim of this thesis has been to 'situate' the laughter triad, in three senses:
1. To observe and describe the triad in the 'social situation,’ the specific 
interactional context where its members most commonly or exclusively 
manifest themselves.
2. To identify the roots of amusement in fundamental features of situated 
interaction —selves and their constitutive self-claims.
3. To map out the confines and relative positions of the three basic concepts 
and associated phenomena, in all their empirical variety, bounding the field of 
humour research and locating it within the varied set o f disciplines which have 
shared an interest in the field.
In this section I will provide a final summary of results by addressing each of these 
three objectives in turn.
4.1. The Return to Situation
Throughout the thesis, I have presented the laughter triad as it naturally 
manifests itself in the context of eveiyday social situations. This return to the 
situation, in all its complexity, contrasts with the inevitable artificiality of laboratory 
experiments and decontextualized analyses of commercial humour.
My own everyday experiences have served as the foundational source of data 
for analysis, even if such examples have not often been included explicitly in the text. 
These personal events —often recalled by reference to abstract concepts or empirical 
facts under consideration- provided my primary guidance in delineating boundaries, 
widening the scope of inquiry, and selecting examples for illustration. The aim of 
these illustrations, in turn, has been to stir up the memory of such experiences in 
readers, as part of an attempt to solicit recognition that would bolster the theory's 
validity (see Chapter Two, 3.2 - 3.5).
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This attention to everyday events permitted a broad approach to the subject 
unbiased by an exclusive or excessive reliance on easily available written sources of 
humour. Considerable effort, in fact, was made to obtain textual materials themselves 
descriptive of everyday events, including first-hand accounts o f experienced reality. I 
have also drawn heavily from previous naturalistic studies relevant to the subject, 
including anthropological and sociological fieldwork, studies involving the use of 
personal laughter 'diaries,' and analyses o f conversation. In comparison with 
traditional humour theory, the conceptual structure is clothed in a considerably richer 
texture of empirical detail, which covers the full range of causes, types, effects and 
uses of the main phenomena. This structure, in turn, has been located within the larger 
framework of Goffman's theory of the interaction order, itself developed from a close 
(and by all accounts acute) observation of everyday events.
The situated aspects of amusement, humour, and laughter have been 
emphasized at every step, including such features as the number and identity of 
participants present, the shared definition of events, and the distribution of power. 
Special attention has been paid to the single perspective of each individual participant 
—the perceiver of amusement, the audience of the laughing individual or humourist, 
the discredited individual-, and thereby to the importance of features such as 
attention, culturally acquired frames of interpretation, meanings, levels of interpreted 
reality, identity, and inter-personal relations. Laughter and humour have been 
portrayed as communicative signs, meaningful elements interpretable by other 
copresent participants, and in fact commonly deployed and/or modified with an 
audience in mind. The immediate effects upon the current situation which these 
displays may provoke have also been detailed, together with many related strategic 
uses to which they may be put.
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4.2. Amusement and Situated Interaction
Social situations are defined by the co-presence of a set of participants. This 
co-presence transforms individual behaviours into dramatic presentations where 
selves are constructed out of single self-claims and maintained by fulfillment and 
cooperative safeguarding of these claims. Amusement (and by extension laughter and 
humour) have been understood, in these pages, as rooted in and complementary to 
such fundamental features of the social situation.
Both embarrassment and amusement emerge from the proposed analysis as 
psychological mechanisms attuned to social features o f the most primitive type: self­
claims and their fulfillment or discredit Analyses of the interaction order, of 
embarrassment, o f rules of demeanour, of the nature of insanity and social strangeness 
—whether by academic Goffmans or by more literary Pirandellos, cannot help but to 
deal, more or less explicitly, with the emotion of amusement. The psychological link 
is one Goffman always cautiously refrained from making, but which others have done 
for him:
Goffman frequently stakes a claim for the very general nature of the practices 
he analyses. If such should indeed be the case, it would definitely tend to 
suggest that generic mechanisms of a psychological sort are at work.
(Giddens, 1988:275)
The psychological study of embarrassment has been strongly influenced if not 
dominated by the view proposed by Goffman in "Embarrassment and Social 
Organization" (1967). A recent book on the subject attributes to Goffman both of the 
main theoretical contenders purporting to describe the causes of this emotion (Miller, 
1996:121). I have argued that amusement can be understood in a similar perspective.
It is tempting to speculate on whether such psychological mechanisms might 
have evolved in humans precisely to maintain their social situations, and thus the 
wider social world, ordered and safe for interaction with other members of our 
unpredictable, uninstinctive species. Considering the dangers of such evolutionary 
analysis (See Chapter Eight, IV) and the speculative nature of the present thesis in its 
entirety, however, I will go no further than admit the temptation.
f
i!
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What I do suggest is that (1) a worthy contender to a causal theory of 
amusement -present already in the work of Plato and Aristotle— can be derived quite 
naturally from Goffman’s hugely influential description of situated interaction; (2) 
grounding the concept of amusement in the defining features of situated interaction 
can serve to clarify and integrate large bodies of data from all areas of humour 
research. The apparent belongingness o f this emotion to Goffman's realm of the 
interaction order is noted, and this note submitted for appraisal.
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4.3. The Field and Its Placement
An attempt has been made to unify and organize the scattered ideas and data of 
a growing interdisciplinary field of ‘humour research*. Many of these have been 
successfully integrated into the theoretical structure developed: the incongruity 
accounts of verbal humour, the interpersonal dimension emphasized by superiority 
theorists, the humour cues of play theorists, and the anxiety-reduction and 'tendentious 
elements' of tension-release theorists; the control, conflict, and cohesion effects and 
uses of humour and laughter; the role of humour and laughter in early learning during 
childhood; the protective use of irony and similar displays; the conversational uses of 
laughter and humour; social influence on amusement and laughter displays; the moral 
and self-presentation consequences of laughter and humour.
The first step has been the establishment of a single, coherent way of 
describing amusement itself, as a reaction to the perception of a self-claim’s discredit 
in appropriate circumstances. This approach can be located within the bounds of 
social psychology, specifically on the more psychological side of Erving Goffman's 
more sociological social psychology. Of the three central topics along this boundary -  
amusement, embarrassment, and the cognitive interpretation o f and involvement in 
social reality-- only the latter two were directly treated by Goffman himself104. From a 
more general perspective, the account fits within the psychological study of universal 
human emotions.
In comparison to the unitary analysis proposed, the traditional causal theories 
of amusement appear not ‘wrong’ but partial, focusing on limited sets of amusing 
stimuli and shedding light on restricted areas of research. Aggression and superiority 
theorists concentrate on the discredit o f individuals other than the perceiver himself, 
giving particular weight to territorial aggressions; incongruity theorists on agent- 
caused frame mismanagement errors of the self; tension-release theorists on frame 
management errors of the self as well as certain provoked territorial invasions; play 
theorists on varieties of intentional humour. How does the substance and findings of 
each of these theories relate to the proposals of the current thesis?
Amusement does not result from a feeling of superiority but it does involve an 
interpersonal assessment: a judgement that another person has failed to maintain some
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presented self-claim. 'Feeling superior’, whatever this may mean in a precise cognitive 
and emotional sense, is certainly not the cause of hilarity. It may, however, be the 
result of an independent subsequent assessment relevant to certain cases of 
amusement. An opera singer’s missed note could be the cause for amusement of both 
another opera singer and a non-singer. Only the former would have cause for feeling 
’superior’ however. The interpersonal dimension of amusement, identified by 
superiority theorists, requires attention to basic features of the relationship between 
observer and object —such as the extent to which the former identifies as the latter, or 
the amount of sympathy the former may be willing to extend to the latter's plight. This 
interpersonal dimension, in turn, is related to the influence of ’affective disposition’ on 
amusement, as measured by numerous psychologists of the ’superiority’ school; and 
also to many of the social effects and uses often associated with laughter and humour, 
including affiliation, disaffiliation, and self-defense.
Amusement, as incongruity theorists propose, may indeed be triggered off by 
the mental conjunction of the opposing scripts or frames thrown together by a joke (or 
rather, by awareness of the inappropriateness o f this conjunction). Detailed analyses of 
joke-work techniques have undoubtedly provided important contributions to the field, 
and these tie into issues of affiliation and disaffiliation effects based on shared 
knowledge pools. However, it is not only one’s own mental errors, stimulated by 
linguistic tricks, which we find funny. The accidental frame mismanagements of 
others (from temporary erroneous misinterpretations to the ’wild’ beliefs of 
pseudoscientists and ’cranks’) can also inspire hilarity. Furthermore, appropriate frame 
management is only a single, if central, case of a wider range of competencies and 
characteristics which all individuals must claim for themselves to be considered full 
members of any human society. Only when the nonfulfilment of these ’universal self- 
claims’ is added to that of more specific ’role’ and ’independent’ self-claims can the full 
range of amusing stimuli be accounted for.
Amusement does not result from a release of tension, but it may be coincident 
with a release of tension in specific cases. If new information or a new perspective on 
the current situation causes an individual to view his behaviour and interpretation of 
events as mistaken, amusement at his improper stress, worry, anger, sadness, sexual 104
104 In "Embarrassment and Social Organization" (1967) and Frame Analysis (1974).
516
Chapter Nine: Situating the Laughter Triad ■Section 4
arousal, interest, actions, words, etc, may be elicited. Whether and to what extent any 
'tension' (whatever this may be taken to mean) which is reduced as a result of this new 
awareness results from the awareness itself or from the amusement and laughter that 
follows it could be debated. In either case, this set of amusing stimuli represents a 
subtype of a much wider range —similar to that of incongruity theories. It is the set 
with reference to which individuals may intentionally use humour as a 'coping' device, 
to decrease unwanted and unnecessary negative feelings (i.e., o f fear, depression, etc.). 
A further relationship between amusement and tension-release regards 'tendentious' 
humour -i.e ., sexual, aggressive, scatological, or otherwise taboo-breaking. In 
appropriate contexts, social norms may be transgressed under the cover or excuse of 
non-seriousness. It is the fact of transgression itself (rather than the 'released tension') 
which is funny, and its explicit labelling as funny (i.e., 'a transgression I would not 
really commit') which provides the necessary license1“ . But the performance of an 
illicit act may provide additional pleasure to the actor if such behaviour has been 
psychologically repressed, which could be subjectively experienced as a 'release.'
The application of a playful frame — a transformation explicitly labelled as 
improper- may 'cause' amusement (by first provoking an anticipated frame 
mismanagement), but it does not account for all cases. Serious and untransformed 
events -unintentional improprieties or self-presentation failures— may also lead to 
amusement. Play theory has, nevertheless, contributed interesting reflections on the 
'humour cues' which humourists use to warn audiences of their intention to amuse, 
guide their interpretation, reassure them that any improprieties are not meant seriously 
and that no accusation of impropriety partaken in will follow, grant them permission 
to laugh, and ensure that the humourists' self-claims of taste and skill are fulfilled. 
Through the fruitful concept of 'unseriousness,' it also relates closely to the defensive 
effects and uses o f humour and laughter. Moreover, it highlights the fact that much 
intentional humour, in addition to other amusing elements, includes a frame- 
mismanagement 'trick' designed to fool the audience, which in relevant cases protects 
the humourist from charges of impropriety of one type or another.
The establishment of a unitary conception of amusement, integrating elements 
of these four traditional theories (and similar to a lesser-known ‘claim-discredit*
m  The irony that Freudian humour as license' ideas most closely relate to social control effects of 
laughter and humour has already been noted in Chapter Eight (4.1.4,4.3.2).
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school), has permitted the development of an account of the effects and uses of the 
laughter triad integrating and classifying research from varied comers of the field. 
Some of these apply exclusively to the emotion of amusement itself: clinical studies of 
its stress-relief and 'health’ aspects, practical theories of 'method acting' and comedy 
'timing' and technique, or research on certain educational, economic, and advertising 
uses of humour. One category has been classified as concerned mainly with humour 
pieces, the content of humour displays. This area, primarily represented by aesthetic 
and media-related disciplines such as literary criticism or film studies, also includes 
historical and anthropological approaches to culture as well as studies of personality 
and psychopathology, ideology, and attitudes (including gender beliefs).
The most sizeable and complex set o f studies, however, relates to the effects 
and uses of laughter and humour displays on the immediate situation and beyond, and 
is thus to be located more squarely within the fields of face-to-face strategic 
interaction, communication studies, and conversation analysis, with their links to 
wider sociological concerns. This large and varied body of research has been 
organized on the basis of the common reference to amusement implied in either 
display. Each of the five major connotations of the displays is associated with a group 
o f effects and uses, many of which have been the object o f study by investigators in 
the field of humour.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize some suggestions regarding the relationship 
between different topics in the field of humour research. Amusement serves as a 
central hub connecting the three main divisions of the laughter triad: the emotion 
itself, the productions intended to elicit its manifestation, and the display of 
communicative signs referring to i t  Each o f these has been subdivided according to 
rough disciplinary boundaries and again according to specific topics. In the case of 
laughter and humour displays, table 2 provides a detailed breakdown of relevant areas 
of study according to the derived connotations of amusement which displays may 
imply.
Needless to say, this classification of research is a rough and incomplete guide. 
Nevertheless, it represents a possible starting point for orientation within an 
increasingly large and complex field lacking much internal organization or coherence. 
In a  sense, it can also be considered a concluding statement of the proposals advanced 
throughout the thesis.
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Tabic 1: Classification of some areas of humour research.
Psychology
neurobiological structures and cognitive processes 
involved; influence of attitudes, identities, and 
personality; effects on body, mood, cognitive 
processing; relationship to other basic emotions
Amusement Medicine effects on stress and health
(the emotion Sociology/ cultural codes informing the assessment process
itself) Anthropology/ leading to manifestation; influence of social
History pressure on appraisal; cultural interpretations of
the emotion within schemes of knowledge
A Evolutionary the evolution of the emotion
M . Science
U Aesthetic and humorous technique and skill; genres and their
S Humour Literary criticism development; topics of humour
E Pieces Linguistics techniques and structure of verbal humour
M (productions Sociology/ cultural beliefs, values, interests, and ideas (i.e.,
E designed to Anthropology/ gender or ethnic biases) as reflected in humour
N provoke History
T amusement) Personality and individual beliefs, values, interests, and ideas, as
Psycho- reflected in humour
pathology
Sociology/ effects and uses of laughter and humour displays
Laughter and Anthropology/
Humour History/ (See table 2)
Displays Communication
(signs Sciences
referring to Sociology/ cultural interpretations of laughter and humour
amusement) Anthropology/ displays, their effects, and their uses
History
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Table 2. Classification of humour research relating to effects and uses of 
laughter/humour.
Connotation Effects/Uses Topics o f study
Discredit
Broadcasting
discredit
Situated interaction
Provocation of 
amusement/laughter
Social facilitation; humour cues and 
techniques; 'invitations’ to laugh
Transmission of 
social norms
Developmental studies; education
Maintenance of 
social norms
Social control, deviance, and power, 
mental health; defining reality; gossip, 
teasing, mockery, and 'informal sanctions'
Knowledge, 
Identity, and 
Involvement
Social classification Social classification
Affiliation and 
Disaffiliation
'cohesion/consensus* and 'conflict'; group 
formation and identity; ethnic humour; 
advertising, sales, public speaking, and 
conflict mediation; the negotiation of 
intimacy; joking relationships
Identity
Protection from 
unintentional self­
discredit
Self-deprecation, role-distance, 
embarrassment management
Protection from 
intentional self­
discredit
Irony and ambiguity; tendentious humour 
and licensed improprieties (i.e., carnivals); 
critical or aggressive humour
Protection from 
discrediting attacks
Face-work
Consequences of 
excessive 
defensiveness
Personality studies
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Table 2. (Continued)
Connotation Effects/Uses Topics of study
Involvement
Revealing
callousness/
toughness
Morality; 'coping' behaviour
Revealing moral 
character
Morality
Denying a particular 
interpretation
Symbolic interaction; face-to-face 
conversation
Revealing the focus 
of attention
Face-to-face conversation
Entertainment Claim of ability to 
amuse
Situated interaction; comedy performance
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, 5. Conclusions
In this final chapter, I have provided a summary of the basic proposals: the 
need for an adequate causal theory of amusement, the inadequacy of existing theories, 
and how such a theory might be developed and validated; the possibility of accounting 
for amusement with reference to the perception of self-claim discredits; the wide 
range of amusing stimuli amenable to such an explanation; the historical precedent for 
such a view and its links to Goffman's work on the interaction order; the link between 
amusement and laughter/humour displays; the ordered classification of effects and 
uses of amusement, laughter, and humour,
I have addressed the issue of the potential cross-cultural validity of the central 
amusement theory. Though the distinctiveness and universality of emotions have been 
questioned both in psychology and in the sociological sciences, a case can be made for 
both. Evidence for the discreteness of emotions derives from numerous physiological 
and neurobiological studies, research on cross-cultural facial expression, and 
subjective experience —as well as the weakness of contrary argument and empirical 
support. In recent times, psychologists have increasingly begun to recognize the 
discreteness of separate emotions and their autonomy as motivational forces.
Anthropology has revealed the varied character of emotional life when viewed |
ij
from a global perspective. Nevertheless, the existence of basic universal emotions has 
not been disproves On the contrary, ethnographers themselves continue to rely on j
emotional expressions for their most basic observations and interactions with natives. I
The influence of culture on emotion is undoubtedly manifold and varied: on the
i
frames of interpretation informing the elicitory evaluations, on the rules for fc
appropriate emotional display, on the specific channelled uses of particular emotions, 
and on the interpretation of emotional life itself. As observation of emotional 
expressions and ideas can only access phenomena combining natural and cultural 
elements, only together will the psychological and sociological disciplines obtain a !
clearer view of cross-cultural emotion. j
The case has been made for amusement as a basic human emotion. Though, j
laughter and humour have been observed in all societies, hilarity has not often been j
classified as one o f the universal emotions. Its long-standing deficiency in this regard 
has been its lack of a clear set o f universal antecedent events. This thesis has provided
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a possible definition of such a set, which appears to be valid even for the societies 
most distant from our own. Styles and content of humour, the intentional attempts to 
provoke amusement, also seem remarkably similar cross-culturally. Variations 
concern, in the case of amusement stimuli, culturally-specific ideas of normality for 
individuals and role-holders, as well as sensitivity to other potentially conflicting 
emotions; in the case of humour pieces, genres of art and performance; in the case of 
laughter and humour displays, norms of expression both specific to these displays and 
to emotion in general, as well as cultural values and consequent needs affecting the 
uses to which displays may be oriented; in the case of cultural interpretations of 
amusement, any of the features of humour theory as observable in the varied 
interpretations of Western humour theorists and in ethnographic accounts.
Bringing the thesis to a close, I have addressed its principal aim as described in 
Chapter One: the situation of the laughter triad. I have drawn attention to the 
continuous emphasis, throughout these pages, on the interactional situation where 
amusement, laughter, and humour most often manifest themselves and achieve their 
full relevance. Only such a wide-ranging and empirically grounded analysis, it has 
been claimed, can be successful in delivering a comprehensive account of the triad. I 
have once again argued for an essential relationship between the basal emotion of 
amusement and the fundamental features of situated interaction. Finally, on the basis 
of this conception, I have provided a rough guide to the field of humour theory and 
research, tracing out connections and distinctions between its numerous and scattered 
areas to compose a well-ordered if tentative classification.
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